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DATE  SLIP 

i*  iihetorie ..:         .-.,. 

By  D.  J.  Hill,  A.M.,  President  Lewisburg  University,  author 
of  the  Science  of  Rhetoric.  Beginning  with  the  selection  of  a 
theme,  this  book  conducts  the  learner  through  every  process 
of  composition,  including  the  accumulation  of  material,  its 
arrangement,  the  choice  of  words,  the  construction  of  sentences, 
the  variation  of  expression,  the  use  of  figures,  the  formation  of 
paragraphs,  the  preparation  of  manuscript,  and  the  criticism  of 
the  completed  com|X)sition. 

Hill's  Science  of  Rhetoric 

An  introduction  to  the  Laws  of  Effective  Discourse.  By 
D.  J.  Hill.  A.M.,  President  of  the  University  at  Lcwisburg. 
12mo,  300  i)ages. 

This  is  a  thoroughly  scientific  work  on  Rhetoric  for  advanced 
classes. 

Intellectual  P]iiloso2)hy  (Elements  of).    426  pages 

By  Francis  VVayland,  late  President  of  Brown  Univer- 
sity. 

The  Elements  of  Moral  Science 

By  Francis  Watland,  D.D.,  President  of  Brown  Univer- 
sity, and  Professor  of  ^^^^ra^  Philosophy.  Fiftieth  thousand. 
12mo,  cloth. 

Eletnents  of  l*olitic      Economy 

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Recast  by  Aaron  L.  Chapin,  D.  D.,  President  of  Beloit 
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1  No  text-book  on  the  subject  has  gained  such  general  accept- 

I  ance,  and  been  so  extensively  and  continuously  used,  as  Dr. 
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the  class-room,  as  suggested  by  an  experience  of  many  years. 
His  aim  has  been  to  give  in  full  and  proportioned,  yet  clear 
and  compact  statement,  the  elements  of  this  important  branch 

i        of  science,  in  their  latest  aspects  and  applications. 


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;j  A-mli<, 


THE 


ELEMENTS 


or 


MORAL    SCIENCE. 


BY 

FRANCIS   WAYLAND,  D.D.,  LL.D., 

LAT£  ritJESIDENT  OF   BROWN   UNIVERSITY,  AND  PROFESSOR  OF  MORAL 
PHlIiOSOPHV. 

V^ITHDRAWN  FROM 
•       UNIVERSITY  OF  REDIANDS  LIBRARY 


NEW  YORK: 
SHELDON     AND    COMPANY, 

8  Murray  Street. 

jyNiC]912 


r  / 


Dr,  Francis  Wayland's  Valuable  Series. 


MORAIi   SCIEWCE. 

One  vol.,  12ino $1  T5 

A1>ridged;  on.e  -vol.,  ISmo.       .        «        «  70 


POI^ITICAIi    ECOIVOMT. 


One  vol.,  ISmo.    .        .        . 
Aliridged,  one  vol.,  18ino. 


1  T5 
TO 


nVTEIiLECTITALi  PHIX^OSOPHY. 

One  vol.,  ISmo 1  T.^ 


Cj^jA  dl  (A^v-^  /]  fei^.^  j^^ 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  tlio  year  1365,  by 

FRANCIS  WAYLAND, 

Id  th©  District  Clerk's  Office  of  tbo  District  Court  of  llhjdc  Island, 


PREFACE. 


In  presenting  to  the'public  a  new  treatise  upon  Moral  Sciencb, 
ii  may  not  be  improper  to  state  the  circumstances  which  led  to  the 
undertaking,  and  the  design  which  it  is  intended  to  accomplish. . 

When  it  became  my  duty  to  instruct  in  Moral  Philosophy  in 
Brown  University,  the  text-book  in  use  was  the  work  of  Dr  Paley. 
Frona  many  of  his  principles  I  found  myself  compelled  to  dissent, 
and  at  first  I  contented  myself  with  stating  to  my  classes  my  objec- 
tions to  the  author,  and  offering  my  views,  in  the  form  of  familiar 
conversations,  upon  several  of  the  topics  which  he  discusses.  These 
views,  for  my  own  convenience,  I  soon  committed  to  paper,  and 
delivered  in  the  form  of  lectures.  In  a  few  years  these  lectures  had 
become  so  far  extended  that,  to  my  surprise,  they  contained  by 
themselves  the  elements  of  a  different  system  from  that  of  the  text- 
book which  I  was  teaching.  To  avoid  the  inconvenience  of  teaching 
two  different  systems,  I  undertook  to  reduce  them  to  order,  and  to 
make  such  additions  as  would  render  the  work  in  some  measure 
complete  within  itself.  I  thus  relinquished  the  work  of  Dr.  Paley, 
and  for  some  time  have  been  in  the  habit  of  instructing  solely  by 
lecture.  The  success  of  the  attempt  exceeded  my  expectations,  and 
encouraged  me  to  hope  that  the  publication  of  what  I  had  delivered 
to  my  classes  might  in  some  small  degree  facilitate  the  study  of  moraJ 


rV  PREFACE. 

From  these  circumstances  the  work  has  derived  its  character 
Being  designed  for  the  purposes  of  instruction,  its  aim  is  to  be  sbf 
pie,  clear,  and  purely  didactic.  I  have  rarely  gone  into  extended 
discussion,  but  have  contented  myself  with  the  attempt  to  state  the 
moral  law,  and  the  reason  of  it,  in  as  few  and  as  comprehensive  terms 
as  possible.  The  illustration  of  the  principles,  and  the  application 
of  them  to  cases  in  ordinary  life,  I  have  generally  left  to  the 
instructor,  or  to  the  student  himself.  Hence,  also,  I  have  omitted 
everything  which  relates  to  the  history  of  opinions,  and  have  made 
but  little  allusion  even  to  the  opinions  themselves  of  those  from 
whom  I  dissent.  To  have  acted  otherwise  would  have  extended 
the  undertaking  greatly  beyond  the  limits  which  I  had  assigned  to 
myself;  and  it  seemed  to  me  not  to  belong  to  the  design  which  I  had 
in  view.  A  work  which  should  attempt  to  exhibit  what  was  true 
appeared  to  me  more  desirable  than  one  which  should,  point  out 
what  was  exploded,  discuss  what  was  doubtful,  or  disprove  what  was 
false. 

In  the  course  of  the  work  I  have  quoted  but  few  authorities,  as  in 
preparing  it  I  have  referred  to  but  few  books.  I  make  this  remark 
in  no  manner  for  the  sake  of  laying  claim  to  originality,  but  to  avoid 
die  imputation  of  using  the  labors  of  others  without  acknowledgment. 
When  I  commenced  the  undertaking  I  attempted  to  read  exten- 
sively, but  soon  found  it  so  difficult  to  arrive  at  any  definite  results 
in  this  manner  that  the  necessities  of  my  situation  obliged  me  to  rely 
upon  my  own  reflection.  That  I  have  thus  come  to  the  same  conclu- 
sions with  many  others,  I  should  be  unwilling  to  doubt.  When  this 
coincidence  of  opinion  has  come  to  my  knowledge,  I  have  mentioned 
it.    When  it  is  not  mentioned,  it  is  because  I  have  not  known  it. 

The  author  to  whom  I  am  under  the  greatest  obligations  is  Bishop 
Butler.  The  chapter  on  Conscience  is,  as  I  suppose,  but  little  more 
than  a  development  of  his  ideas  on  the  same  subject     How  mucb 


PREFACE.  V 

more  I  owe  to  this  incomparable  writer  I  know  not.  As  it  was  the 
study  of  his  sermons  on  human  nature  that  first  turned  my  attention 
to  this  subject,  there  are  doubtless  many  trains  of  thought  which  I 
have  derived  from  him,  but  which  I  have  not  been  able  to  trace  to 
their  source,  as  they  have  long  since  become  incorporated  with  my 
own  reflections.  The  article  on  the  Sabbath,  as  is  stated  in  the 
text,  is  derived  chiefly  from  the  tract  of  ^Ir.  J.  J.  Gurney  on  the 
same  subject  Entertaining  those  views  of  the  Sacred  Scriptures 
which  I  have  expressed  in  the  work  itself,  it  is  scarcely  necessary  to 
add  here  that  I  consider  them  the  great  source  of  moral  truth,  and 
that  a  system  of  ethics  will  be  true  just  in  proportion  as  it  develops 
their  meaning.  To  do  this  has  been  my  object ;  and  to  have,  in  ever 
80  humble  a  manner,  accomplished  it,  I  shall  consider  as  the  greatest 
possible  success. 

It  is  not  without  much  diffidence  that  I  have  ventured  to  lay  be- 
fore the  public  a  work  on  this  important  subject.  That  something 
of  this  sort  was  needed  has  long  been  universally  confessed.  My 
professional  duty  led  me  to  undertake  it ;  and  I  trust  that  the  hope 
of  usefulness  has  induced  me  to  prepare  it  for  publication.  If  I 
have  not  been  so  happy  as  to  elucidate  truth,  I  have  endeavored  to 
express  myself  in  such  a  manner  that  the  reader  shall  have  as  little 
trouble  as  possible  in  detecting  my  errors.  And  if  it  shall  be  found 
that  I  have  thrown  any  light  whatever  upon  the  science  of  human 
duty,  I  shall  have  unspeakable  cause  for  gratitude  to  that  Spirit 
whose  inspiration  alone  teacheth  man  understanding.  And  my 
cause  for  gratitude  will  scarcely  be  less  should  my  failure  incite  some 
one,  better  able  than  myself  to  do  justice  to  the  subject,  to  a  more 
successful  undertaking. 

Bbown  Univebsitt,  Apbil,  18%. 


PREFACE 


TO     THE     SECOND     EDITION. 


A  SECOND  edition  of  the  Elements  of  Moral  Science  having  been 
demanded,  within  a  much  shorter  period  than  was  anticipated,  I 
have  given  to  the  revisal  of  it  all  the  attention  which  my  avocations 
have  pennitted. 

The  first  edition,  owing  to  circumstances  which  could  not  be  fore- 
seen, was,  unfortunately,  in  several  places  inaccurate  in  typograph- 
ical execution.  I  have  endeavored,  I  hope  with  better  succtss,  to 
render  the  present  edition  in  this  respect  less  liable  to  censure.  In 
a  few  cases  single  words  and  modes  of  expression  have  also  been 
changed.  I  have,  however,  confined  myself  to  verbal  corrections, 
and  have  in  no  case  that  I  remember  intentionally  altered  the  sense. 

Having  understood  that  the  work  has  been  introduced  as  a  text- 
book into  some  of  our  highest  seminaries  of  education,  I  hope  that  1 
may  be  forgiven  if  I  suggest  a  few  hints  as  to  the  manner  in  which 
I  suppose  it  may  be  most  successfully  used  for  this  purpose. 

1.  In  the  recitation-room,  let  neither  instructor  nor  pupil  evei 
make  use  of  the  book. 

2.  Let  the  portion  prt'^iously  assigned  for  the  exercise  be  so  maf 


PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION.  VU 

^red  bv  the  pupil,  both  in  plan  and  illustration,  that  he  will  be  able 
♦o  recite  it  in  order,  and  explain  the  connection  of  the  different 
parts  with  each  other,  without  the  necessity  of  assistance  from  his 
instructor.  To  give  the  language  of  the  author  is  not,  of  course, 
desirable.  It  is  sufficient  if  the  idea  be  given.  The  questions  of 
the  instructor  should  have  respect  to  principles  that  may  be  deduced 
from  the  text,  practical  application  of  the  doctrines,  objections  which 
may  be  raised,  ete. 

3.  Let  the  lesson  which  was  recited  on  one  day  be  invariably 
reviewed  on  the  day  succeeding. 

4.  As  soon  as  any  considerable  progress  has  been  made  in  the 
work,  let  a  review  from  the  beginning  be  conunenced.  This  should 
comprehend,  for  one  exercise,  as  much  as  had  been  previously 
recited  in  two  or  three  days ;  and  should  be  confined  to  a  brief 
analysis  of  the  argument,  with  a  mere  mention  of  the  illustrations. 

6.  As  soon  as  the  whole  portion  thus  far  recited  has  been  re- 
viewed, let  a  new  review  be  commenced  and  continued  in  the  same 
manner,  and  thus  on  successively  until  the  work  is  completed.  By 
pursuing  this  method,  a  class  will,  at  any  period  of  the  course  of 
itudy,  be  enabled,  with  the  slightest  effort,  to  recall  whatever  they 
have  acquired,  and  when  the  work  is  completed  they  will  be  able 
to  pursue  the  whole  thread  of  the  argument  from  the  beginning  to 
the  end,  and  thus  to  retain  a  knowledge,  not  only  of  the  individual 
principles,  but  also  of  their  relations  to  each  other. 

But  the  advantage  of  this  mode  of  study  is  not  confined  to  that 
of  a  more  perfect  knowledge  of  this  or  of  any  other  book.  By  pre- 
•euting  the  whole  field  of  thought  at  one  view  before  the  mind,  it 


Vm  PREFACE  TO  THE  SECOND  EDITION. 

will  cultivate  the  power  of  pursuing  an  extended  range  of  argument  *, 
of  examining  and  deciding  upon  a  connected  chain  ot  reasoning ;  and 
will,  in  no  small  degree,  accustom  the.  student  to  carry  foi'ward  in 
Ills  own  mind  a  train  of  original  investigation. 

I  have  been  emboldened  to  make  these  suggestions,  not  in  the 
least  because  I  suppose  the  present  work  worthy  of  any  peculiar 
attention  from  an  instructor,  but  simply  because,  having  been  long 
in  the  habit  of  pursuing  this  method,  and  having  witnessed  its  results 
in  my  own  classes,  I  have  thought  it  my  duty  to  suggest  it  to  those 
who  are  engaged  in  the  same  profession  with  myself.  Other  in- 
structors may  have  succeeded  better  with  other  methods ;  I  have 
succeeded  best  with  this. 

At  the  suggestion  of  some  of  his  friends,  the  author  has  it  in  co&« 
templation  to  prepare  a  small  abridgment  of  the  present  work,  is 
duodecimo,  for  the  use  of  schools  and  academies.  It  will  be  pul^ 
Eshed  as  soon  as  his  engagements  will  permit. 

Bbowv  UnnYERSITT.  Sevtbubsb.  1£8S. 


PREFACE 

TO     THE     REVISED     EDITION 


In  using  the  following  volume  as  a  text-book  for 
many  years,  I  have  derived  great  benefit  from  the  free 
discussions  of  the  lecture-room.  Some  of  the  princi- 
ples I  thought  needed  modification,  and  others  might 
bo  presented  in  a  form  more  easy  to  be  understood. 
As  soon,  therefore,  as  I  was  released  from  the  actual 
duties  of  instruction,  I  commenced  the  work  of  re- 
vision of  what  I  had  so  long  taught.  My  progress  was 
arrested  by  an  attack  of  illness,  and  for  two  or  three 
years  I  was  obliged  to  lay  it  entirely  aside.  With 
returning  health  I  resumed  my  labors,  and  I  lay  the 
result  before  the  public.  A  large  portion  of  the  work 
is  unchanged.     Some  chapters  have  been  modified, 


X  PREFACE  TO  THE  REVISED  EDIIION. 

and  a  few  wholly  rewritten.    I  hope  that  by  this  labor 
the  book  is  made  better. 

Grateful  for  the  kind  reception  whu^i  has  been  given 
to  the  original  work,  specially  by  tke  instructors  of 
youth,  and  hoping  that  these  my  later  labors  may  aid 
them  yet  more  in  the  important  work  of  the  teaching 
of  morals,  it  is  cheerfully  offered  for  their  approvaL 

FBOTiOBnoB,  AUOV0T  80,  1866 


CONTENTS 

PLAN    OF    THE    WORK 


THEORKTIOAL    ETHICS. 

cif  apte:k  I. 

OF  ti:e  origin  of  our  notion  of  the  moral  quality  "*" 

OF  actions 25 

8ECTI0NL 

Of  Moral  Law .,29 

Of  law  in  general •       .       ,      25 

Of  moral  law 26 

Moral  law  unchangeable •       •  .27 

SECTION  n. 

What  is  a  Mobal  Action? .28 

Of  action 28 

Of  moral  action 31 

SECTION  III. 

\S  WHAT  PART  OP  AN    ACTION    BESIDES    ITS    MORAL  QUALITT?       32 

When  is  the  intention  wrong? 33 

SECTION  IV. 

WnBNOB  DO  WE  DERIVE  OUR  NOTION  OP  THE  MOBAL  ChABAO- 

TER  OP  Actions?  ........«•     36 

Oar  notions  original  or  derived 36 

Moral  idoas  origmal    .•••.•••••90 


in  CONTENTS. 

.  VAOh 

Not  derived  from  judgment,  or  the  idea  of  the  greatest  amount  of 

happiness 3f 

An  answer  to  the  question  suggested  ..•••••     3^ 


CHAPTER  11. 

CONSCIENCE,  OR  THE  MORAL  SENSE 45 

SECTION  I. 

Is  THERE  A  Conscience? .45 

Question  considered 45 

Objections  answered •       ...  46 

SECTION  U. 

The  States  op  Mind  which  arise  immediately  fbom  the 

Ideas  of  Right  and  Wrong 50 

1.  The  feeling  of  obligation iSi 

2.  An  impulse  to  do  or  not  to  do 50 

3.  Obedience  to  conscience,  or  the  contrary,  followed  by  eithev- 

pleasure  or  pain 5i 

4.  Followed  by  expectation •       .  ul 

5.  This  expectation  definite 53 

6.  It  is  unchangeable ,53 

7.  It  is  more  thari  certain 52 

8.  We  are  pleased  to  observd  this  connection    .....  53 
^^  9.  Boldness  of  innocence  and  timidity  of  guilt .       •       •       •       •  54 

SECTION  III. 

The  Authority  op  Conscience SI 

Its  superior  authority  shown  from  our  conception  of  this  faculty  .  57 

From  a  comparison  between  man  and  brutes 59 

Its  superiority  necessary  in  order  to  accomplish  the  objects  for 

which  we  were  created .  61 

SECTION  IV. 

The  Cultivation  op  Conscience  ..•..,.  69 

As  a  disci-irainating  power •       .       .  ?• 

As  an  impulsive  power .73 

As  a  source  of  pleasure  or  pain  ..••••••74 

SECTION  V, 

Rules  for  Moral  Conduct r       •       •  "^ 

Before  resolving  upon  an  action  ..••»•••  7? 

After  an  action  has  been  performed          >.••.•  8( 


CONTENTS.  Xin 


CHAPTER  III. 

rAoj 
TRk  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE       ......  84 


SECTION  I. 

Of  Yirtub  in  general 84 

SECTION  n. 

Of  Virtue  in  Imperfect  Beings ,  87 

Of  the  obligations  of  such  beings ,       .  91 

Man's  relation  to  moral  law       ...••••*  92 

The  moral  relations  of  habit •       ...  95 


CHAPTER  IV. 

OF  HUMAN  HAPPINESS 99 

Happiness  the  gratification  of  desire         ..••..  100 

But  that  gratification  must  be  within  limits 101 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF  SELF-LOVE 104 

Nature  of  self-love 104 

Rank  of  self-love 101 


CHAPTER  VI. 

(NPERFECTION  OF  CONSCIENCE;  NEED  OF  SOME  OTHER 

MORAL  LIGHT HI 

Imperfection  of  conscience ,       .       .  Ill 

Necessity  of  additional  light      .       .       ; 114 

Whafc  light  mi(];ht  be  expected 115 


CHAPTER  VII. 

k  -  NATURAL  RELIGION .       .       .    IH 

3 


XrV  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  L 

rAOB 

Of  the  Manner  in  which  we  may  leabn  our  Duty  ieom 

THE  Light  of  Nature .       .118 

From  general  consequenced .        •  118 

Objection  considered •       •       •       .  122 

SECTION  IL 

How  FAR  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE  LlOHT  OF  NATURE  123 

Knowledge  acquired  in  this  manner 123 

Motives  which  it  presents     ...              •       •       •       •       •  125 

SECTION  III. 

Defects  of  Natural  Religion  as  a  Moral  Guidb       •       •  126 

From  facts •       •       .  126 

The  cause  of  these  defects 120 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

THE    RELATION    BETWEEN    NATURAL  AND    REVEALED 

RELIGION 132 

What  expectations  are  to  be  entertained 132 

How  these  expectations  are  realized  by  the  Scriptures     ...  133 


CHAPTER  IX 

THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES 137 

SECTION  L 

A.  View  of  the  Holy  Scriptures        • 137 

The  Old  Testament 138 

The  New  Testament •       •       •       •       .  140 

SECTION  U. 

Of  the  Manner  in  which  we  may  learn  cub  Dutt  from 

THE  Scriptures 141 

What  is  excluded        . 142 

What  is  included 144 

Our  means  of  moral  instruction 145 


CONTENTS.  XT 


§00k  ^a0nlr. 

PRACTICAL.      F,  THICS. 

PART  I. 
LOVE  TO  GOD,  OR   PIETY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

TAOm 

GENERAL  OBLIGATION  OF  SUPREME  LOVE  TO  GOD  .        .    151 

Tlie  relaUon  existing  between  God  and  his  creatures  .  .  .  151 
Rights  and  obligations  arising  from  this  relation  .  •  .  .153 
These  suited  to  our  nature 16^ 

CHAPTER  n. 
THE  CUL3 IVATION  OF  A  DEVOTIONAL  SPIRIT      ...    163 


CHAPTER  m. 

OF  PRAVER 170 

The  nature  of  prayer  ....•••••.  170 

The  duty  of  prayer 172 

The  utility  of  prayer 175 


CHAPTER  IV. 

1IE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH 179 

Of  the  original  institution  of  the  Sabbath ISO 

Of  the  Mosaic  Sabbath 182 

Of  the  Christian  Sabbath 184 

Of  the  manner  in  which  the  day  is  tc  be  obserred  .       •       .       .187 

The  duty  of  the  civil  magistrate ,       .  189 


XT*  CONTENTS. 

PART   II 
DUTIES    TO    MAN. 

RECIPROCITY  AND   BENEVOLENCE. 

DIVISION  I. 

EECIPKOCITY. 

VAaa 
THE     DUTY     OF     RECIPROCITY— GENERAL     PRI5CIPLES 
ILLUSTRATED,    AND   THE    DUTIES    OF    RECIP,10CITY 

CLASSIFIED 191 

Nature  of  human  equality 191 

Teaching  of  the  Scriptures 196 

The  law  applies  to  communities         .......  198 

.   Classificatiou  of  the  duties  of  reciprocity  ..••..  199 

CLASS  I. 

DUTIES  TO  MEN  AS  MEN. 
JUSTICE  AND  VERACITY. 

JUSTICE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

PERSONAL  LIBERTY 90U 


SECTION  I, 

Nature  op  Personal  Libebtt       ••••••,    202 

Physical  liberty •       •       •       •       .    203 

Intellectual  liberty       ..•.•••,,,    204 

Religious  liberty  •       •       •       • ,       ,    206 

iCxccptions ••..207 


CONTENTS.  XVli 

SECTION  II. 

TAOB 

Of  the  Violation  op  Personal  Liberty  by  the  Individual  208 

Domestic  slavery,  its  nature  and  effects 208 

Without  support  from  natural  law 211 

Vitliout  support  from  the  Scriptures 217 

Noah's  curse 217 

The  law  of  Moses 219 

Teachings  of  Christ  and  the  apostles 221 

Duties  of  masters 225 

Duties  of  slaves 227 

SECTION  in. 

rHE  Violation  op  Personal  Liberty  by  Society  .       •       .228 

Violation  of  physical  liberty 229 

Violation  oi  intellectual  liberty  ...•••«.    230 

SECTION  IV. 
The  Violation  op  Religious  Liberty  by  Society        .       .    235 


CHAPTER  11. 

JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  PROPERTY 239 

SECTION  I. 

The  Right  op  Property 239 

Definition 239 

On  what  the  right  of  property  is  founded 239 

Modes  in  which  the  right  of  property  may  be  acquired  .       .       .  241 


SECTION  n. 

Modes  in  which  the  Rights  op  Property  may  be  Violat- 
ed BY  the  Individual 246 

Withoutconsent,  —  !.  Theft.    2.  Robbery 247 

By  consent  fradulently  obtained 248 

(a.)  Where  no  equivalent  is  offered 248 

(6.)  Where  the  equivalent  is  different  from  what  it  purports  to  be  248 

1.  Where  the  equivalent  is  material,  and  the  transfer  perpetual     .  248 
The  law  of  buyer  and  seller 248 

2.  Where  the  transfer  is  temporary 253 

Interest  or  loan  of  money 253 

Loan  of  other  property 257 

..asurance 258 

2* 


XVm  CONTENTS. 

tAam 

3.  Where  the  equivalent  Is  immaterial       •••••.  25£ 

Of  master  and  servant        ...•••••.  1^59 

Of  principal  and  agent 2C0 

Of  representatives •       .       •       .  2G3 

SECTION  III. 

ElGKI   OF  PeOPEETT  AS  VIOLATED  BY  SOCISTT    •         •         •         .  264 


CHAPTER  III. 

JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  CHARACTER 269 

Nature  of  the  obligation 269 

Violated  by  weakening  the  moral  restrains  of  men .       •       •       .  271 

Violated  by  exciting  their  evil  dispositions       •       •       •       •       •  272 


CHAPTER  IV. 

JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION 276 

Nature  of  the  obligation 276 

Giving  publicity  to  bad  actions 278 

Unjust  conclusions  respecting  character   ......  279 

Assigning  bad  motives  unnecessarily 280 

Ridicule  and  mimicry 281 

Our  duty  to  reveal  the  bad  actions  of  others 284 

Our  duty  to  promote  the  ends  of  public  justice        ....  284 

Oui  duty  to  protect  the  innocent,  and  for  the  good  of  the  offender  284 

Duty  of  historians 285 

Duty  of  the  public  press 28Q 


CLASS  I  (continued). 

DUTIES  TO  MEN  AS  MEN. 
VERACITY. 

CHAPTER  I. 

VERACITY  AS  IT  RESPECTS  THE  PAST  AND  PRESENT   .  289 

Law  of  veracity 289 

What  it  forbids 290 

Necessity  of  sach  a  law •       .293 


CONTENTS.  Xn 


CHAPTER  11. 

Fagb 

VERACITY  IN  RESPECT  TO  THE  FUTURE 295 

Of  promises 295 

Their  intention  and  obligation    ...,.,,,    295 

When  promises  are  not  binding •       .    296 

Of  contracts ••.29 


CHAPTER  in. 

OF  OATHS 301 

The  theory  of  oaths     .       .        • 301 

Lawfulness  of  oaths •       .       .       .  303 

Interpretation  of  oaths •       .  304 

Different  kinds  of  oaths      •••• 301 


CLASS  n. 

DUTIES  WHICH  ARISE  FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION  OF  THE 
SEXES. 

CHAPTER  I. 

THE  DUTY  OF  CHASTITY        ...•••••  307 

What  the  moral  law  forbirif        ..••••••  307 

What  it  commands,--exciusive  union 307 

union  for  life ,       .  308 

Precepts  of  religion  on  this  subject 310 


CHAPTER  n. 

THE  LAW  OF  MARRIAGE 312 

The  nature  of  the  contract  .        •       •       •       •       •       ••.       .312 

Duties  imposed  by  the  contract •    315 

Chastity ••  •    315 

Mutual  affection       ..•••••>  .315 

Mutual  assistance     ••••••••«•    ^^ 


XX  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  III. 

FA  OB 

THE  LAW  OF  PARENTS 318 

Relation  of  the  parties  to  each  other 318 

Duties  of  parents 320 

Support  or  maintenance  .        .       .       .       .       •       •       .        .  320 

Physical  education  ..........  32i 

Intellectual  education ,       .  321 

Moral  education 323 

Rights  of  parents 327 

Duration  of  these  rights 327 

Of  instnictors 328 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE  LAW  OF  CHILDREN .330 

Duties  of  children 330 

Obedience 330 

Reverence 332 

Filial  affection 332 

Necessary  maintenance ,       ,  333 

Rights  of  children 333 

Duration  of  these  rights  and  obligations  ......  333 

Duties  of  pupils  .••...•••••  335 


CLASS  III. 

DUTIES  TO  MAN  AS  A  MEMBER  OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

CHAPTER  L 
OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY *       .    338 

SECTION  I. 

Op  a  Simple  Society •       •       ,  338 

Nature  of  the  contract 338 

Manner  in  which  governed 340 

Limits  of  the  power  of  a  majority     .        •       .       .       ...       .  34tf 

Durability  of  corporations 342 


CONTENTS.  X^ 

SECTION  n. 

FAOl 

Of  Civil  Society 344 

Natural  rights  of  the  individual 344 

Inability  of  the  individual  to  maintain  them 345 

Society  the  natural  resource 345 

The  powers  of  society  limited 347 

Eights  of  the  individual  in  society •       .  348 

Civil  society  distinguished  from  voluntary  associations  •       •       .  349 

Society  may  err;  what  then? 350 

Blessings  of  civil  society 350 

Special  claims  of  society •       •       •  351 


CHAPTER  11. 

or  THE  MODE  IN  WHICH  THE  OBJECTS  OF  SOCIETY  ARE 

ACCOMPLISHED 352 

The  parts  of  a  government         ....••«.  353 

What  form  of  government  is  preferable 355 


CHAPTER  III. 

DUTIES  OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  A  G0VER21MENT    ...  358 

Of  legislative  officers 358 

Of  judicial  officers 300 

Of  executive  officers 361 


CHAPTER  IV. 

DUTIES  OF  CITIZENS 363 

As  individuals 363 

As  constituent  members  of  society    ....••.    364 
When  the  compact  is  violated .366 


DIVISION    II. 


BENEVOLENCE. 


CHAPTER  I. 


GENERAL  OBLIGATION,  AND  DIVISION  OF  THE  SUBJECT  ^69 
Nature  and  proof  of  the  obligation  from  our  constitutiau  .  .  369 
Fnoof  from  the  Holy  Scriptures t       •    3W 


YTTT 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  II. 
BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  UNHAPPY     . 


rial 

376 


SECTION  I. 

Unhappiness  from  Putsical  Condition 
Objects  of  charity 
Laws  affecting  the  recipient 
Laws  affecting  the  benefactor 
Poor-laws     .... 
Voluntary  associations 


376 
376 
377 
378 
379 
381 


SECTION  II. 
Ukhappiness  from  Intellectual  Condition 


383 


CIIAI*TEU  III. 

BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  WICKED 381 

CHAPTER  IV. 

BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  INJURIOUS 390 

Injury  committed  by  an  individual  against  an  individaal       .        .  390 

Injury  committed  by  an  individual  against  society  ....  391 

Injury  committed  by  a  society  against  a  society       .       •       .  392 

Of  war 394 

NOTE. 

Duties  to  Beutei 899 


BOOK    I. 

THEORETICAL   ETfllCS. 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

lt3U 
CHAPTER  I. 

CP  THE   ORiaiN    OF   OUR   NOTION   OF   THE   MORAL   QUALITY 
OF   ACTIONS. 

SECTION  I. 

OP  MORAL   LAW. 

Ethics,  or  Moral  Philosophy,  is  the  Science  of  Moral 
Law. 

The  first  question  which  presents  itself  is,  What  is 
moral  law?  Let  us,  then,  inquire  first,  what  is  law; 
and,  secondly,  what  is  moral  law. 

By  the  term  law  I  think  we  generally  mean  a  form 
of  expression  denoting  either  a  mode  of  existence  or 
an  order  of  sequence. 

Thus,  the  first  of  Sir  Isaac  Newton's  laws,  namely, 
that  every  body  will  continue  in  a  state  of  rest,  or  of 
uniform  motion  in  a  right  line,  unless  compelled  by 
some  force  to  change  its  state,  denotes  a  mode  of  ex- 
istence. 

The  third  law  of  motion,  that,  to  every  action  of  one 
body  upon  another,  there  is  an  equal  and  contrary  re- 
action, denotes  an  order  of  sequence  ;  that  is,  it  declares 
the  general  fact  that,  if  one  event  occur,  the  constitu- 
tion of  things  under  which  we  exist  is  such  that  an- 
other event  will  also  occur. 

* '  Tho-  axioms  in  Mathematics,  are  laws  of  the  same 
3 


^^'l~y:[  J  ^'  :    -miisORE'ricAL  ethics. 

kind.  Thus,  the  axiom,  "  If  equals  be  added  to  equals, 
the  wholes  will  be  equal,"  denotes  an  order  of  sequence 
in  respect  to  quantity. 

Of  the  same  nature  are  the  laws  of  Chemistry. 
Such,  for  instance,  is  the  law  that,  if  soda  be  saturated 
with  mui'iatic  acid,  the  result  will  be  common  salt. 

Tims,  also,  in  Intellectual  Philosophy.  If  a  picture 
of  a  visible  object  be  formed  upon  the  retina,  and  the 
impression  be  communicated,  by  the  nerves,  to  the 
brain,  the  result  will  be  an  act  of  perception. 

The  meaning  of  law,  when  referring  to  civil  society, 
is  substantially  the  same.  It  expresses  an  established 
order  of  sequence  between  a  specified  action  and  a 
particular  mode  of  reward  or  of  punishment.  Such, 
in  general,  is  the  meaning  of  law. 

Moral  Philosophy  takes  it  for  granted  that  there  is  in 
human  actions  a  moral  quality  ;  that  is,  that  a  human 
action  may  be  either  right  or  wrong.  Every  one  knows 
that  we  may  contemplate  the  same  action  as  wise  or 
unwise  ;  as  courteous  or  impolite  ;  as  graceful  or  awk- 
ward ;  and,  also,  as  right  or  wrong.  It  can  have  es- 
caped  the  observation  of  no  one  that  tliere  are  conse- 
quences distinct  from  each  other,  which  follow  an  action, 
and  which  are  connected,  respectively,  with  each  of  its 
attributes.  To  take,  for  instance,  a  moral  quality. 
Two  men  may  both  utter  what  is  false  ;  the  one  intend- 
ing to  speak  the  truth,  the  other  intending  to  deceive. 
Now,  some  of  the  consequences  of  this  act  are  common 
to  both  cases  ;  namely,  that  the  hearers  may  in  both 
cases  be  deceived.  But  it  is  equally  manifest  that 
there  are  also  consequences  peculiar  to  the  case  in 
\<hich  the  speaker  intended  to  deceive ;  as,  for  example, 
the  effects  upon  his  own  moral  character,  and  upon  the 
estimation  in  which  he  is  held  by  the  community. 
And  thus,  in  general.  Moral  Philosophy  proceeds  upon 
the  supposition  that  there  exists  in  the  actions  of  men 
a  moral  quality,  and  that  there  are  certain  sequences 
connected  by  our  Creator  with  the  exhibition  of  that 
quality. 

4  moral  law  is,  therefore,  a  form  of  expression  do* 


OF  MORAL  LAW.  27 

i^tin^  an  order  of  sequence  established  between  the 
moral  quality  of  actions  and  their  res^ilts. 

Moral  Pliilosophy,  or  Ethics,  is  the  science  which 
classifies  and  illustrates  moral  law. 

Here  it  may  be  worth  while  to  remark,  that  an  order 
of  sequence  established,  supposes  of  necessity  an  Estab- 
Hslier.  Hence  Moral  Philosophy,  as  well  as  every  other 
science,  proceeds  upon  the  supposition  of  the  existence 
of  a  universal  Cause,  the  Creator  of  all  things,  who  has 
made  everything  as  it  is,  and  who  has  subjected  all 
things  to  the  relations  which  they  sustain.  And  hence, 
as  all  relations,  whether  moral  or  physical,  are  the  re- 
sult of  his  enactment,  an  order  of  sequence  once  estab- 
lished in  morals,  is  just  as  invariable  as  an  order  of 
sequence  in  physics. 

Such  behig  the  fact,  it  is  evident  that  the  moral  laws 
of  God  can  never  be  varied  by  the  institutions  of  man, 
any  more  than  the  physical  laws.  The  results  which 
God  has  connected  with  actions  will  inevitably  occur, 
all  the  created  power  in  the  universe  to  the  contrary 
notwithstanding.  Nor  can  these  consequences  be  eluded 
or  averted,  any  more  than  the  sequences  which  follow 
by  the  laws  of  gravitation.  What  should  we  think 
of  a  man  who  expected  to  leap  from  a  precipice,  and  by 
some  act  of  sagacity  elude  the  effect  of  the  accelera- 
ting power  of  gravity  ?  or  of  another,  who,  by  the  exer- 
cise of  his  own  will,  determined  to  render  himself 
imponderable?  Every  one  who  believes  God  to  have 
established  an  order  of  sequences  in  morals,  must  see 
that  it  is  equally  absurd  to  expect  to  violate  with  impu- 
nity any  moral  law  of  the  Creator. 

Yet  men  have  always  flattered  themselves  with  the 
hope  that  they  could  violate  moral  law  and  escape  the 
consequences  which  God  has  established.  The  reason 
is  obvious.  In  physics^  the  consequent  follows  the  ante- 
cedent, often  immediately,  and  most  commonly  after  a 
stated  and  well-known  interval.  In  mo/als,  the  result 
is  frequently  long  delayed  ;  and  the  time  of  its  occur- 
rence is  always  uncertain.  Hence,  "  because  sentence 
agaiost  an  evU  work  is  not  executed  speedily,  therefore 


28  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

the  hearts  of  the  sons  of  men  are  fully  set  in  them  to 
do  evil/'  But  time,  whether  long  or  short,  has  neither 
power  nor  tendency  to  change  the  order  of  an  estab- 
lished sequence.  The  time  required  for  vegetation  in 
diiTerent  orders  of  plants  may  vary ;  but  yet  wheat 
will  always  produce  wiieat,  and  an  acorn  will  always 
produce  an  oak.  That  such  is  the  case  in  morals,  a 
heathen  poet  has  taught  us :  — 

Raro,  antccedentem  scelestum 
Deseruit,  pede  po&na  claudo. 

HoBACE,  Lib.  3.  Car.  2. 

A  higher  authority  has  admonished  us,  "  Be  not  de- 
ceived ;  God  is  not  mocked  ;  whatsoever  a  man  soweih, 
that  shall  he  also  reap"  It  is  also  to  be  remembered 
that  in  morals  as  well  as  in  physics  the  harvest  is  always 
more  abundant  than  the  seed  from  which  it  sprmgs. 


SECTION  II. 

WHAT  IS  A  MORAL  ACTION  t 

Action,  from  actum.,  the  supine  of  the  Latin  verb  ago^ 
I  do,  signifies  something  done ;  the  putting  forth  of 
some  power. 

But  under  what  circumstances  must  power  be  put 
forth  in  order  to  render  it  a  moral  action  ? 

1.  A  machine  is,  in  common  conversation,  said  to  be 
powerful.  A  vegetable  is  said  io  put  forth  its  leaves,  a 
tree  to  bend  its  branches,  or  a  vine  to  run  towards  a 
prop  ;  but  we  never  speak  of  these  instances  of  power 
as  actions. 

2.  Action  is  never  affirmed  but  of  beings  possessed 
of  a  will;  that  is,  of  those  in  whom  the  putting  forth 
uf  power  is  immediately  consequent  upon  their  deter- 


OF  MORAL  ACTION.  29 

iniiiation  to  put  it  forth.  Could  we  conceive  of  ani- 
mate beings  whose  exertions  had  no  connection  with 
their  will,  we  should  not  speak  of  such  exertions  as 
actions. 

8.  Action,  so  far  as  we  know,  is  affirmed  only  of 
beings  possessed  of  intelligence  ;  that  is,  who  are  capa- 
ble of  comprehending  a  particular  end,  and  of  adopting 
tlie  means  necessary  to  accomplish  it.  An  action  is 
something  done  ;  that  is,  some  change  effected.  But 
man  effects  change  only  by  means  of  stated  antecedents. 
An  action,  therefore,  in  such  a  being,  supposes  somo 
change  to  be  effected,  and  some  means  employed  for  the 
purpose  of  effecting  it. 

4.  All  this  exists  in  man.  He  is  voluntary  and  intel- 
ligent, capable  of  foreseeing  the  result  of  an  exertion 
of  power,  and  that  exertion  of  power  is  subject  to  his 
will.  This  is  sufficient  to  render  man  the  subject  of 
government.  He  can  foresee  the  results  of  a  particular 
action,  and  can  will,  or  will  not,  to  accomplish  it.  And 
other  results  can  be  connected  with  the  action  of  such 
a  nature  as  to  influence  his  will  in  one  direction  or  in 
another.  Thus  a  man  may  know  that  stabbing  another 
will  produce  death.  He  has  it  in  his  power  to  will  or 
not  to  will  it.  But  such  other  consequences  may  be 
connected  by  society  with  the  act,  that  though  on  many 
accounts  he  would  desire  to  do  it,  yet  on  other  and 
graver  accounts  he  would  prefer  not  to  do  it.  This  is 
sufficient  to  render  man  a  subject  of  government.  But 
is  this  all  that  is  necessary  to  constitute  man  a  moral 
agent ;  that  is,  to  render  him  a  subject  of  moral  govern- 
ment? 

May  not  all  this  be  affirmed  of  brutes  ?  Are  they  not 
voluntary,  and  even  to  some  extent  intelligent  agents? 
Do  they  not,  frequently  at  least,  comprehend  the  rela- 
tion of  means  to  an  end,  and  voluntarily  put  forth  the 
power  necessary  for  the  accomplishment  of  that  end  ? 
Do  they  not  manifestly  design  to  injure  us,  and  alsu 
select  the  most  appropriate  means  for  effecting  their 
purpose  ?  And  can  we  not  connect  such  results  with 
their  actions  as  shall  influence  their  will  and  prevent  oi 


fO  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

e;:cite  the  exercise  of  their  power  ?  We  do  this  whon- 
e\  9r  we  eitlicr  caress  or  intimidate  them,  in  order  to  pre- 
Vi)  it  them  from  injuring  us,  or  to  excite  them  to  labor. 
Th  y  are,  then,  subjects  of  government  as  truly  as  man. 

Is  there,  then,  no  difference  between  the  inteUigent 
and  voluntary  action  of  a  brute,  and  the  moral  action, 
of  a  man  ?  Suppose  a  brute  and  a  man  both  to  perform 
the  same  action  ;  as,  for  instance,  suppose  the  brute  to 
kill  its  offspring,  and  the  man  to  murder  his  child.  Are 
these  actions  of  the  same  character  ?  Do  we  entertain 
the  same  feelings  towards  the  authors  of  them  ?  Do 
wo  treat  the  authors  in  the  same  manner,  and  with  the 
design  of  producing  in  them  the  same  result  ? 

1  think  no  one  can  answer  these  questions  in  the 
afnrmative.  We/)%  the  brute,  but  we  are  filled  with 
indig-nation  against  the  man.  In  the  one  case,  we  say 
there  has  b^en  harm  done,  in  the  other,  injury  com- 
mitted. We  feel  that  the  man  deserves  punishment: 
we  have  no  such  feelings  towards  the  brute.  We  say 
that  the  man  has  done  wrong  ;  but  we  never  affirm  this 
of  the  brute.  We  may  attempt  to  produce  in  the  brute 
such  a  recollection  of  the  offence  as  may  deter  him 
from  the  act  in  future  ;  but  we  can  do  no  more.  We 
attempt  in  the  other  case  to  make  the  man  sensible  of 
the  act  as  wrong,  and  to  produce  in  him  a  radical 
change  of  character ;  so  that  he  not  only  would  not 
commit  the  crime  again,  but  would  be  inherently  averse 
to  the  commission  of  it. 

These  considerations  are,  I  think,  sufficient  to  rend'T 
it  evident  that  we  perceive  an  element  in  the  actions 
of  men  which  does  not  exist  in*  the  actions  of  brutes. 
What  is  this  element  ? 

If  we  should  ask  a  child,  he  would  tell  us  tliat  th<5 
man  knows  better.  This  would  be  his  mode  of  explain 
Lig  it. 

But  what  is  meant  by  knowing  better  ?  Did  not  thy 
brute  and  the  man  both  know  that  the  result  of  thcii 
action  would  be  harm?  Did  not  both  intend  that  \i 
should  be  harm  ?  In  what  respect,  then,  did  the  one 
k<iow  better  than  the  other  V 


OF  MORAL  ACTION.  31 

I  tlihik  that  a  plain  man  or  a  child  would  answer, 
the  man  knew  that  he  ought  not  to  do  it,  and  the  brute 
did  not  know  that  he  ovght  not  to  do  it ;  or  he  might 
Bay,  the  man  knew,  and  the  brute  did  not  know,  that  it 
was  wiong  ;  but  whatever  terms  he  might  employ,  tliey 
would  involve  the  same  idea.  I  do  not  know  tliat  a 
philosopher  could  give  a  more  satisfactory  answer. 

If  tlie  question,  then,  be  asked,  AVliat  is  a  moral  ac- 
tion ?  we  may  answer,  it  is  the  voluntary  action  of  an 
intelligent  agent,  wlio  is  capable  of  distinguishing  be- 
tween right  and  wrong,  or  of  distinguishing  what  he 
ought,  from  what  he  ought  not,  to  do. 

It  is,  however,  to  be  remarked,  that,  although  action 
is  delined  to  be  the  puy^ing  forth  of  power,  it  is  not 
intendad  to  be  asserted  that  the  moral  quality  exists 
only  where  'power  is  actually  exerted.  It  is  manifest 
that  our  thoughts  and  resolutions  may  be  deserving 
either  of  praise  or  of  blame  ;  that  is,  may  be  either 
right  or  wrong,  where  they  do  not  appear  in  action. 
When  the  will  decides  upon  the  performance  of  an 
action,  though  the  act  cannot  be  done,  the  omniscient 
Deity  justly  considers  us  as  either  virtuous  or  vicious. 

From  what  has  been  said,  it  may  be  seen  that  there 
exists  in  the  actions  of  men  an  element  which  does 
not  exist  in  the  actions  o^  brutes.  Hence,  though  both 
are  sul)J3cts  of  govcrnruont,  the  government  of  the  one 
should  l)e  constructed  upon  principles  diiferent  frona 
those  of  the  other.  Wo  can  operate  upon  brutes  only 
by  fear  of  punishment  and  hope  of  reward.  We  can, 
operate  upon  man  not  only  in  this  manner,  but  also 
by  an  appeal  to  his  consciousness  of  right  and  wrong, 
and  by  the  use  of  such  means  as  iaz.f  ^'mpiovo  hif 
moral  nature.  Hence,  all  modes  of  punish riicnt  which 
treat  men  as  we  treat  brutes,  are  as  unphilosophical  as 
they  are  thoughtless,  cruel,  and  vindictive.  Such  are 
those  systems  of  criminal  jiirispradonce  which  have 
ill  view  nothing  more  than  the  infliction  of  pain  upon 
the  oifendor.  The  leading  object  of  all  such  systems 
sliould  be  to  reclaim  the  vicious.  Such  was  the  result 
t<>  which  all  the  investigations  of  Howard  led- 


32  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

And  it  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  the  Christian  pre- 
cept respecting  the  treatment  of  injuries  proceeds 
precisely  upon  this  principle.  The  New  Testament 
teaches  us  to  love  our  enemies,  to  do  good  to  those  that 
hate  us,  to  overcome  evil  with  good;  that  is,  to  set 
before  a  man  who  does  wrong  the  strongest  possiljle 
exemplification  of  the  opposite  moral  quality  —  right. 
Now  it  is  manifest  that  nothing  would  be  so  likely  to 
show  to  an  injurious  person  the  turpitude  of  his  own 
conduct,  and  to  produce  in  him  self-reproach  and  re- 
pentance, as  precisely  this  sort  of  moral  exhibition. 
Revenge  and  retaliation  might,  or  might  not,  prevent  a 
repetition  of  the  injury  to  a  particular  individual.  Tho 
requiting  of  evil  with  good,  in  addition  to  this  effect, 
has  an  inherent  tendency  to  produce  sorrow  for  the  act, 
and  dislike  to  its  moral  quality  ;  and  thus,  by  produc- 
ing a  change  of  character,  to  prevent  the  repetition  of 
the  offence  under  all  circumstances  hereafter. 


SECTION  III, 

IN  WHAT  PAET  OF  AN  ACTION  DO  WE  DISCOVEE  ITS  MOBAL 
QUALITY  f 

In  a  deliberate  action,  four  distinct  elements  may  be 
commonly  observed.     These  are  — 

1.  The  outward  act ;  as  when  I  put  money  into  the 
hands  of  another. 

2.  The  conception  of  this  act,  of  which  tho  external 
performance  is  the  mere  bodying  forth. 

3.  The  resolution  to  carry  that  conception  into  effect. 

4.  The  intention,  or  design,  with  which  all  this  is 
done. 

Now,  the  moral  quality  does  not  belong  to  the  exter- 
nal act ;  lor  the  same  external  act  may  be  performed 
by  two  men,  while  its  moral  character  is  in  the  two 
cases  entirely  dissimilar. 


OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY   OF  AN  ACTION.  33 

Nor  does  it  belong  to  the  conception  of  the  external 
act,  nor  to  the  resolution  to  carry  that  conception  into 
effect ;  for  the  resolution  to  perform  an  action  can  liavo 
no  other  character  than  that  of  the  action  itself.  It 
must,  then,  reside  in  the  intention. 

That  such  is  the  fact,  may  be  illustrated  by  an  ex- 
ample. A  and  B  both  give  to  C  a  piece  of  money. 
Tl.cy  botli  conceived  of  this  action  before  they  performed 
it.  They  both  resolved  to  do  precisely  what  they  did. 
In  all  this  both  actions  coincide.  A,  however,  gave 
it  to  C,  with  the  intention  of  procuring  the  murder  of 
a  friend  ;  B,  with  the  intention  of  relieving  a  family  in 
distress.  It  is  evident  that,  in  this  case,  the  intention 
gives  to  tlie  action  its  character  as  right  or  wrong. 

That  the  moral  quality  of  the  action  resides  in  the 
intention,  may  be  evident  from  various  other  considera- 
tions. 

1.  By  reference  to  the  intention,  we  inculpate  or  ex- 
culpate otliers,  or  ourselves,  without  any  respect  to  the 
happiness  or  misery  actually  produced.  Let  the  result 
of  an  action  be  what  it  may,  we  hold  a  man  guilty 
simply  on  the  ground  of  intention,  or  on  the  same 
ground  we  hold  him  innocent.  Thus  also  of  ourselves 
We  are  conscious  of  guilt  or  of  innocence,  not  from  the 
result  of  an  action,  but  from  the  intention  by  ^hich  we 
were  actuated. 

2.  We  always  distinguish  between  being  the  instru- 
ment of  good,  and  intending  it.  We  are  grateful  to 
one  who  is  the  cause  of  good,  not  in  proportion  to  the 
amount  effected,  but  the  amount  intended. 

Intention  may  be  wrong  in  various  ways. 

1.  As,  for  instance,  where  we  intend  to  injure  another ; 
as  in  cruelty,  malice,  revenge,  deliberate  slander. 

Hero,  however,  it  may  bo  remarked,  that  we  may 
intend  to  inflict  pain,  without  intending  wrong:  for 
we  may  be  guilty  of  the  violation  of  no  rignt.  Such 
is  the  case  when  pain  is  inflicted  by  a  civil  officer  for 
the  purposes  of  justice ;  for  it  is  manifest  that  if  the  man 
deserve  pain,  it  is  no  violation  of  right  for  him  to  iii- 
flict  it.     Hence  we  see  the  difference  between  harm» 


84  THEORETICAL  ETIHCS. 

injury y  and  punishment,  TVo  harm  anotliftr  when  we 
actually  inflict  pain  ;  we  injure  him  when  we  inflict 
pain  in  violation  of  his  rights  ;  -^q  punish  him  when  we 
inflict  pain  which  he  deserves,  and  to  which  he  has 
been  properly  adjudged  ;  and  in  so  douig  there  is, 
therefore,  no  violation  of  right. 

2.  Intention  is  wrong,  where  we  act  for  the  gi-aiiii- 
cation  of  our  own  passion;^,  without  any  respect  to  ihe 
happiness  of  others.  Such  is  the  case  of  seduction, 
ambition,  and  in  nations,  commonly,  of  war.  Every 
man  is  bound  to  restrain  tlie  indulgence  of  his  passions 
within  such  limits  that  they  will  work  no  ill  to  his 
neighbor.  If  they  actually  inflict  injury,  it  is  no  ex- 
cuse to  say  that  he  had  no  ill-will  to  the  individual 
injured.  The  Creator  never  conferred  on  him  the  right 
to  destroy  another's  happiness  for  his  own  gratification. 

3.  As  the  right  and  wrong  of  an  action  reside  in  tho 
intention,  it  is  evident  that,  where  an  action  is  intended, 
though  it  be  not  actually  performed,  that  intention  is 
worthy  of  praise  or  blame,  as  truly  as  the  action  itself, 
provided  the  action  itself  be  wholly  out  of  our  power. 
Thus  God  rewarded  David  for  intending  to  build  the 
temple,  though  he  did  not  permit  him  actually  to  build 
it.  So,  he  who  intends  to  murder  another,  though  ho 
may  fail  to  exec\ite  his  purpose,  is,  in  the  sight  of  God, 
a  murderer.  The  meditation  upon  wickedness  with 
pleasure  comes  under  tha  same  condemnation. 

4.  As  the  right  or  wrong  exists  in  the  intention, 
wherever  a  particular  intention  is  essential  to  virtuous 
action,  the  performance  of  the  external  act,  without 
that  intention,  is  destitute  of  the  element  of  virtue. 
Thus,  a  child  is  bound  to  obey  his  parents,  with  the 
intention  of  thus  manifesting  his  love  and  gratitude. 
If  he  do  it  from  fear,  or  from  hope  of  gain,  the  act  is 
destitute  of  tho  virtue  of  filial  obedience,  and  becomes 
merely  the  result  of  passion  or  self-interest.  And  thus 
our  Saviour  charges  upon  the  Jews  the  want  of  the 
proj)er  intention  in  all  their  dealings  with  God.  "  I 
know  you,"  said  he,  "  that  yo  have  not  tho  love  oj  God 
xu  you  " 


OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY  OF  ACTIONS.       85 

^nd,  again,  it  is  makifcst  that  our  moral  feelings, 
iilco  our  taste,  may  be  excited  by  the  conceptions  of 
our  own  imagination,  scarcely  less  than  by  the  reality. 
These,  therefore,  may  develop  moral  character.  He 
who  meditates  with  pleasure  upon  fictions  of  pollution 
and  crime,  whether  originating  with  himself  or  with 
others,  renders  it  evident  that  nothing  but  opposing 
circumstances  prevents  him  from  being  himself  an  ac- 
tor in  the  crime  which  he  loves.  And  still  more,  as  tho 
moral  character  of  an  action  resides  in  the  intention, 
and  as  whatever  tends  to  corrupt  the  intention  must  be 
wrong,  the  meditating  with  pleasure  upon  vice,  which 
has  manifestly  this  tendency,  must  be  wrong  also. 

And  here  let  me  add,  that  the  imagination  of  man  is 
the  fruitful  parent  both  of  virtue  and  vice.  Thus  saith 
the  wise  man,  '•  Keep  thy  lieart  with  all  diligence,  for 
out  of  it  are  the  issues  of  life."  No  man  becomes 
openly  a  villain  until  his  imagination  has  become  fa- 
miliar with  conceptions  of  villany.  The  crimes  which 
astonish  us  by  their  atrocity  were  first  arranged  and 
acted  and  reacted  in  the  recesses  of  the  criminal's  own 
mind.  Lot  the  imagination,  then,  be  most  carefully 
guarded,  if  we  wish  to  escape  from  temptation,  and 
make  progress  in  virtr^.  Let  no  one  flatter  himself 
that  he  is  innocent,  if  ,.3  love  to  meditate  upon  any- 
thing which  he  would  blush  to  avow  before  men,  or  fear 
to  unveil  before  God. 


SECTION  IV. 

WHENCE  DO  WE  DERIVE  OUR  NOTION  OF  THE  MORAL  QUALin 
OF  ACTIONS  f 

I^efore  we  attempt  to  answer  this  question,  let  ns 
first  inquire  whether  our  notion  of  the  moral  quality  of 
actions  be  original  or  derived. 

By  an  original  idea,  I  mean  an  idea  which  arises 


86  THEOKETICAL  ETHICS. 

Spontaneously  in  the  hnman  mind,  by  virtue  of  the 
constitution  with  which  we  were  created,  as  soon  as  its 
appropriate  object  is  presented.  Thus,  the  idea  of 
color  arises  in  us  spontaneously  as  soon  as  a  colored 
object  is  presented  to  our  vision.  No  one  can  convey  the 
idea  of  color  to  a  blind  man.  Let  him,  however,  be 
endowed  with  sight,  and  as  soon  as  a  colored  object  is 
presented  to  him,  the  notion  of  color  immediately 
arises.  A  derived  idea,  on  the  contrary,  is  the  result 
of  some  preceding  intellectual  exercise.  Thus,  the 
idea  that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  are  equal  to 
two  right  angles,  is  a  derived  idea.  Before  I  knew  sucl 
to  be  the  fact,  I  had  seen  a  hundred  triangles,  but  this 
idea  never  arose  in  my  mind.  Afterwards,  wlien  1  had 
studied  Euclid's  Elements,  I  passed  through  several 
mental  acts  which,  together,  resulted  in  the  conviction 
that  such  a  relation  exists. 

Now,  as  all  our  ideas  must  be  either  original  or  de- 
rived, the  question  arises,  To  which  of  tlicse  classes 
does  the  moral  idea  —  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong  — 
belong  ? 

In  attempting  to  answer  this  question,  let  us  ap- 
peal, in  the  first  place,  to  our  own  consciousness.  "We 
are  all  familiar  with  tlie  ideas  which  we  denominate 
right  and  wrong.  In  the  first  place,  I  think  that  these 
ideas  are  generically  distinct  from  any  others  which  we 
can  contemplate.  Compare  tliem  with  the  ideas  of 
beauty  and  deformity,  of  utility  and  inutility,  of  joy 
and  grief,  of  wisdom  and  folly,  and  the  dissimilarity 
to  which  we  refer  must  be  at  once  obvious.  The  moral 
idea  forms  a  class  by  itself  entirely  distinct  from  every 
other. 

Secondhj.  The  idea  of  right  and  wrong  arises  sponta- 
ncous:ly  whenever  tlie  appropriate  objects  are  presented 
to  us.  Such  objects  are  the  actions  of  intelligent  be- 
ings. A  judge  sentences  to  death  a  man  whom  he 
knows  to  bo  innocent ;  and  as  !-.oon  as  we  learn  tlie  facts, 
the  idea  of  wrong  arises  unbidden  within  us.  Another 
man  employs  his  time  and  income  in  ministering  to 
the  perishing,  whether  bis  friends  or  enemies.     As  we 


OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY  OF  ACTIONS.  37 

(sontemplate  such  a  life,  there  arises  witliin  us  the  no 
tion  of  virtue,  right,  moral  goodness.  These  ideas  are 
not  derived  from  reasoning.  They  are  the  necessary 
result  of  no  previous  mental  state.  There  is  nothing 
that  intervenes  between  the  cognition  of  the  act  ancl 
the  spontaneous  existence  of  the  moral  idea.  Tlie  will 
cannot  create  it,  nor  can  tlie  will  prevent  its  ex'stence. 
If  we  are  asked  what  is  the  cause  of  the  rise  of  this 
idea  under  these  circumstances,  we  can  only  answer  we 
do  not  know  ;  but  such  is  the  constitution  by  w^ich  wo 
were  endowed  by  our  Creator. 

We  may  also  remark,  in  passing,  that  this  /  ]<ja  arises 
only  from  the  contemplation  of  the  action')  o!  ml'lli- 
gent  beings.  We  never  discover  right  or  -w.ong,  vii-tue 
or  vice,  in  the  actions  of  brutes.  Nor  is  this  id(  a  oc- 
casioned by  all  tlie  actions  of  men.  F/i*  iuhlauce,  a 
man  in  a  shower  shelters  himself  from  y  ini  by  opening 
his  umbrella.  lie  uses  the  proper  rafans  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  an  end,  and  we  say  iio  acts  wisely. 
We  discover  neltlier  right  nor  wror  y  \\\  ibe  action. 
But  if  we  see  him  steal  an  umbrella,  ii^fie  arises  at 
once  a  different  idea,  the  idea  of  wrong.  Or,  again, 
let  him  give  up  his  umbrella  to  shelter  a  sick  stranger 
from  exposure,  the  idea  of  virtue,  of  right,  arises  at 
once  —  the  opposite  of  that  to  which  we  last  alluded. 

Again.  If  it  be  said  that  the  moral  idea  is  derived, 
that  is,  that,  like  the  mathematical  idea  to  which  we 
iiave  already  referred,  it  is  a  necessary  result  from  pre- 
vious states  of  mind,  the  previous  states  of  mind  must 
oe  designated  from  which  it  emanates.  I  do  not  be- 
lieve that  this  can  be  done.  Indeed,  if  a  man  could  not 
discover  the  quality  of  right  and  wrong  in  the  actions 
*^S  men,  he  could  no  more  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  it 
by  previous  acts  of  mind  than  a  blind  man  could  attain 
llie  cognition  of  color  by  argument  or  illustration. 

It  seems,  then,  apparent  that  the  idea  of  right  and 
wrong,  or  the  moral  idea,  arises  spontaneously  within 
us  in  virtue  of  the  constitution  with  which  we  were 
endowed  by  our  Creator,  whenever  its  appropriate 
objects  are  present  to  our.  contemplation. 
4 


38  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

If  this  bo  SO,  it  is  plain  that  the  moral  idea  is  not 
derived  from  an  exercise  of  the  judgment,  as  some 
persons  have  supposed.  Judgment  can  do  no  morr 
than  affirm  a  predicate  of  a  subject,  as  that  grass  if 
green,  or  that  an  assertion  is  true.  But  the  ideas  of 
the  predicate  and  subject  must  already  have  existed  in 
the  mind  before  a  judgment  could  have  been  pro- 
nounced Judgment  could  not  account  for  the  exist , 
dice  of  an  idea  which  must  have  been  present  to  the 
mind  before  any  act  of  judgment  was  possible.  Nor, 
from  a  similar  reason,  can  the  idaa  of  right  and  wrong 
be  derived  from  association.  Association  can  do  no 
more  than  cause  a  desire  or  emotion  or  conception  to 
be  awakened  by  one  object  in  preference  to  another. 
It  can  originate  nothing,  but  can  only  act  upon  the 
ideas  already  present  in  the  mind  ;  and  acts  in  different 
men  in  the  most  dissimilar  manner,  and  differently, 
even  in  the  same  man,  under  dissimilar  circumstances. 
There  is  nothing  analogous  to  this  in  the  rise  of  our 
ideas  of  right  and  wrong. 

It  has  been  said  that  an  idea  of  right  and  wrong  is 
derived  from  the  idaa  of  the  greatest  amount  of  happi- 
ness.    Lot  us  briefly  consider  this  view  of  the  subject. 

First.  When  we  appeal  to  our  own  consciousiiess,  I 
think  we  must  decide  that  the  idaas  are  wholly  dissimi- 
lar. They  seem  to  mo  as  different  from  each  other  as 
the  ideas  of  form  and  color,  of  beauty  and  utility,  or 
any  other  dissimilar  ideas. 

Secondly.  If  it  bo  true  that  one  gives  origin  to  tho 
other,  then  the  idea  of  right  and  wrong  can  never  ex- 
ist unless  it  be  preceded  by  the  idea  of  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness.  I  appeal  to  the  human  conscious- 
ness, and  ask.  Is  this  the  fact  ?  When  the  idea  of  wrong 
is  called  into  existence  by  the  commission  of  crime,  or 
the  returning  evil  for  good,  do  we  find  that  w^e  previ- 
ously  determine  that  such  an  act  would  not  be  produc- 
tive of  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness  ?  For  myself, 
I  must  confess  I  can  discover  no  such  connections. 

Thirdly.  How  can  any  finite  being  ever  decide  that  any 
ft-jtion  will  or  will  not  produces  the  greatest  amount  of 


OF  TIIE  MOUAL  QUALITY  OF  ACTIONS.  39 

happiness  ?  Of  tlie  future  we  are  manifestly  ignorant. 
Unless  we  know  tlio  consequences  which  would  flow 
from  two  actions  respectively  throughout  eternity,  wo 
could  never  determine  which  of  the  two  would  produce 
the  greatest  amount  of  happiness ;  that  is,  which  was 
right  and  which  was  wrong. 

Fourthly,  Were  we  to  determine  the  moral  character 
of  an  action  by  the  amount  of  happiness  which  it  would 
produce,  it  would,  I  fear,  tend  to  destroy  all  moral  dis- 
tinctions ;  for  sometimes  atrocious  crimes  have,  in  the 
long  run,  been  the  occasion  of  the  happiest  results.  If 
an  action  is  right  because  it  produces  the  greatest 
ftmount  of  happiness,  we  must  award  to  the  treachery 
of  Judas  the  praise  of  the  greatest  virtue. 

The  question  then  returns,  Whence  do  we  derive  our 
idea  of  right  and  wrong,  or  our  notion  of  the  moral 
quality  of  actions  ?  The  view  which  we  take  of  this 
subject  is  briefly  as  follows  : 

The  moral  idea,  being  original  and  simple,  is  incapa- 
ble of  definition.  Like  any  other  original  idea,  it  arises 
by  virtue  of  the  constitution  bestowed  upon  us  ])y  the 
Creator,  wlicrever  its  appropriate  objects  are  presented 
to  our  contemplation.  The  question,  then,  to  be  an- 
swered is.  What  are  the  appropriate  objects,  on  the 
contemplation  of  which  the  moral  idea  arises  ? 

The  answer  whicli  we  venture  to  propose  to  this 
question  is  the  foUowhig: 

1.  It  is  manifest  to  every  one  that  we  all  stand  in 
various  and  dissimilar  relations  to  all  the  sentient  be- 
ings, created  and  uncreated,  with  which  we  are  ac- 
quainted. Among  our  relations  to  created  beings  are 
those  of  man  to  man,  or  that  of  substantial  equality,  of 
parent  and  child,  of  benefactor  and  recipient,  of  hus- 
banrl  and  wife,  of  brother  and  brother,  citizen  and 
citizen,  citizen  and  magistrate,  and  a  thousand  others. 

2.  Now,  it  seems  to  me  that,  as  soon  as  a  human 
being  comprehends  the  relation  in  which  two  human 
beings  stand  to  each  other,  there  arises  in  his  mind  a 
consciousness  of  moral  obligation,  connected,  by  our 
Ci-eatoi*,  with  the  very  conception  of  this  relation.     And 


40  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

the  fact  is  tlie  same,  whether  he  be  one  of  the  parlies 
or  not.  The  nature  of  this  feeling  is,  that  the  one 
ought  to  exercise  certain  dispositions  towards  the  others 
to  whom  he  is  thus  related,  and  to  act  towards  tliem  in 
a  manner  corresponding  with  those  dispositions. 

3.  The  nature  of  these  dispositions  varies,  of  course, 
with  the  relations.  Thus,  those  of  a  parent  to  a  cliild 
are  different  from  those  of  a  child  to  a  parent  ;  those 
of  a  benefactor  to  a  recipient,  from  those  of  a  recipient 
to  a  benefactor  :  and  both  of  them  differ  from  that  of  a 
brother  to  a  brother,  or  of  a  master  to  a  servant.  But, 
different  as  these  may  be  from  each  other,  they  are  ali 
pervaded  by  the  same  generic  feeling,  that  of  moral  ob- 
ligation ;  that  is,  we  feel  that  we  ovght  to  be  thus  or 
thus  disposed,  and  to  act  in  this  or  that  manner. 

4.  This  I  suppose  to  be  our  constitution,  in  regard  to 
created  beings ;  and  such  do  I  suppose  would  be  oui 
feelings,  irrespectively  of  any  notion  of  the  Deity.  That 
is,  upon  the  conception  of  these  and  such  like  relations, 
there  would  immediately  arise  this  feeling  of  moral  ob- 
ligation, to  act  towards  those  sustaining  those  relations 
in  a  particular  manner. 

5.  But  there  is  an  Uncreated  Being,  to  whom  wo 
stand  in  relations  infinitely  more  intimate  and  incon- 
ceivably more  solemn,  than  any  of  those  of  which  we 
have  spoken.  It  is  that  Infinite  Being  who  stands  to 
us  in  the  relation  of  Creator,  Preserver,  Benefactor, 
Lawgiver,  and  Jidge  ;  and  to  whom  we  stand  in  the 
relation  of  dependent,  helpless,  ignorant,  and  sinful 
creatures.  Hoiv  much  this  relation  involves,  we  cannot 
possibly  know  ;  but  so  much  as  this  we  know,  that  it 
involves  obligations  greater  than  our  intellect  can  esti- 
mate. We  cannot  contemplate  it  without  feeling  that 
from  the  very  fact  of  its  existence  we  are  under  ol»liga- 
tions  to  entertain  the  disposition  of  filial  love  and  obe- 
dience towards  God,  and  to  act  precisely  as  he  shall 
condescend  to  direct.  And  this  obligation  arises  sim- 
ply from  the  fact  of  the  relation  existing  between  the 
parties,  and  irrespectively  of  any  other  consideration ; 
and  if  it  be  not  felt,  when  the  relations  are  perceived,  it 


OF  THE  MORAL  QUALITY  OF  ACTIONS.       '         41 

can  never  be  produced  by  any  view  of  the  consequences 
wliich  would  arise  to  the  universe  from  exercising  it 

6.  This  relation,  and  its  consequent  obligation,  in- 
volve, comprehend,  and  transcend  every  other.  Hence 
it  places  obligation  to  man  upon  a  new  foundation. 
For  if  we  be  ourselves  thus  under  illimitable  obligations 
to  God,  and  if,  by  virtue  of  the  relation  which  he  sus- 
tains to  the  creation,  he  is  the  Protector,  Ruler,  and 
Proprietor  of  all,  we  are  under  obligations  to  obey 
liim  ill  cvorythhig.  And  as  every  other  being  is  also 
his  creature,  we  are  bound  to  treat  that  creature  as  he 
its  Proprietor  shall  direct.  Ilence  we  are  bound  to 
perform  the  obligation  under  which  we  stand  to  his 
creatures,  not  merely  on  account  of  our  relations  to 
tliem,  but  also  on  account  of  the  relations  in  which  we 
and  they  stand  to  God, 

And  hence,  in  general,  our  feeling  of  moral  obliga- 
tion is  a  peculiar  and  instinctive  impulse,  arising  at 
once  by  the  principles  of  our  constitution,  as  soon  as 
the  relations  are  perceived  in  which  we  stand  to  tlio 
beings,  created  and  uncreated,  with  whom  we  are  con- 
nected. 

The  proof  of  this  must  rest,  as  I  am  aware,  with  every 
man's  consciousness.  A  few  illustrative  remarks  may, 
however,  not  be  altogether  useless. 

I  think,  if  we  reflect  upon  the  subject,  that  the  man- 
ner in  which  we  attempt  to  awaken  moral  feelings  con- 
firms the  view  which  I  have  taken.  In  such  a  case, 
if  I  mistake  not,  ive  always  place  before  the  mind  the 
relation  in  ivhich  the  parties  stand  to  each  other, 

1.  If  we  wish  to  awaken  in  ourselves  gratitude  to 
another,  we  do  not  reflect  that  this  affection  will  i)ro- 
duce  i\iG  greatest  g'ood  ;  but  we  remember  the  individ- 
ual in  the  relation  of  benefactor ;  and  we  place  thip 
relation  in  the  strongest  possible  light.  If  this  will  not 
produce  gratitude,  our  effort,  of  necessity,  fails. 

2.  If  we  desire  to  inflame  moral  indignation  against 
crime,  we  show  the  relations  in  which  the  parties  stand 
to  each  other,  and  expect  hence  to  produce  a  con  vie 

4* 


42  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

tion  of  the  greatness  of  the  obligation  which  such  tur- 
pitude violates. 

3.  So,  if  we  wish  to  overcome  evil  with  good,  we 
place  ourselves  in  tlie  relation  of  benefactor  to  the  inju- 
rious person  ;  and,  in  spite  of  liimself,  he  is  frequently 
compelled  to  yield  to  the  law  of  his  nature  ;  and  grati- 
tude for  favors,  and  sorrow  for  injury,  spontaneously 
arise  hi  his  bosom. 

4.  And  in  the  plan  of  man's  redemption  it  seems  to 
me  that  the  Deity  has  acted  on  this  principle.  Irre- 
s])ectivcly  of  a  remedial  dispensation,  he  is  known  to  us 
only  as  a  Creator,  all-wise  and  all-powerful,  perfect  in 
holiness,  justice, and  truth.  To  oiu'  fallen  nature  these 
attributes  could  minister  nothhig  but  terror.  lie,  there- 
fore, has  revealed  himself  to  us  in  the  relation  of  a  Sa- 
viour and  Redeemer,  a  God  forgivhig  transgression  and 
iniquity ;  and  thus,  by  all  the  power  of  this  neio  relor 
tion,  he  imposes  upon  us  new  obligations  to  gratitude, 
repentance,  and  love. 

5.  And  hence  it  is  that  God  always  asserts,  that  as, 
from  the  fact  of  this  new  relation,  our  obligations  to 
him  are  increased  ;  so  he  who  rejects  the  gospel  is,  in 
a  special  manner,  a  sinner,  and  is  exposed  to  a  m.ore 
terrible  condemnation.  The  climax  of  all  that  is  awful 
in  the  doom  of  the  unbelieving  is  expressed  by  the 
terms,  "  the  wrath  of  the  Lamb." 

Again.  I  am  not  much  accustomed  to  such  refined 
speculations  ;  but  I  think  that  obedience  or  love  to 
God,  from  any  more  ultimate  motive  than  that  this 
affection  is  due  to  him  because  he  is  God,  and  our  God, 
is  not  piety.  Thus,  if  a  child  say,  I  will  obey  my  fa- 
ther, because  it  is  for  the  happiness  of  the  family  ;  what 
the  character  of  this  action  would  be  I  am  not  prepared 
to  say  ;  but  I  think  the  action  would  not  ha  filial  obedi- 
ence. Filial  obedience  is  the  obeying  of  another  bo- 
cause  he  is  my  father ;  and  it  is  filial  obedience  only 
in  so  far  as  it  proceeds  from  this  motive.  This  will  bo 
evident  if  we  substitute  for  the  love  of  the  happiness 
of  the  family,  the  love  of  money,  or  some  othei  such 
motive.     Every  one  sees  that  it  would  not  hafiliiJ  ob^ 


OJ?    rfiE  MORAL  QUALITY  OF  ACTIONS.  43 

die  nee  for  a  child  to  obey  his  parent  because  he  would 
be  well  paid  for  it. 

Now,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  same  principle  applies 
m  the  other  case.  To  feel  under  obligation  to  lovo 
God  because  this  affection  would  be  productive  of  the 
greatest  good,  and  not  on  account  of  what  he  is,  and  of 
the  relations  in  which  he  stands  to  us,  seems  to  me  not 
to  hQ piety  ;  that  is,  not  to  be  the  feeling  which  a  creature 
is  bound  to  exercise  towards  his  Creator.  If  the  obliga- 
tion to  the  love  of  God  can  really  arise  from  anything 
more  ultimate  than  the  essential  relation  which  he  sus- 
tains to  us,  why  may  not  this  more  ultimate  motive  be 
something  else  as  well  as  the  love  of  the  greatest  good  ? 
I  do  not  say  that  anything  else  would  be  as  benevolent ; 
but  I  speak  metaphysically,  and  say,  that  if  real  piety 
or  love  to  God  may  truly  spring  from  any  tlung  more 
ultimate  than  God  himself,  1  do  not  see  why  it  may  not 
spring  from  one  thing  as  well  as  from  another;  and 
thus  true  piety  might  spring  from  various  and  dissimi- 
lar motives,  no  one  of  which  has  any  real  reference  to 
God  himself. 

My  view  of  this  subject,  in  few  words,  is  as  follows : 

1.  We  stand  in  relations  to  the  several  beings  with 
whom  we  are  connected,  such,  that  some  of  them,  as 
soon  as  they  are  conceived,  suggest  to  us  the  idea  of 
moral  obligation. 

2.  Our  relations  to  owr  felloiv-men  suggest  this  con- 
viction, in  a  limited  and  restricted  sense,  correspond- 
uig  to  the  idea  of  general  or  essential  equality. 

3.  The  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  the  Deity  sug- 
gests the  conviction  of  universal  and  unlimited  love  and 
obedience.  This  binds  us  to  proper  dispositions  to- 
wards Ilim,  and  also  to  such  dispositions  towards  his 
creatures  as  he  shall  appoint, 

4.  Hence,  our  duties  to  man  are  enforced  by  a  two- 
fold obligation  :  first,  because  of  our  relations  to  man  as 
man  ;  and  secondly,  because  of  our  relation  to  man  as 
being,  with  ourselves,  a  creature  of  God, 

5.  And  hence  an  act  which  is  performed  in  obedience 
to  our  obligations  to  man,  maybe  virtuous;  but  it  if 


44  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

not  pious  unless  it  also  be  performed  in  obedience  to 
our  obligations  to  God. 

6.  And  hence  we  see  that  two  things  are  necessary 
in  order  to  constitute  any  being  a  moral  agent.  Tlicy 
are,  first,  that  he  possess  an  intellectual  power,  by  which 
he  can  understand  the  relation  in  which  he  stands  to 
the  beings  by  whom  he  is  surrounded ;  secondly,  tliat 
he  possess  a  moral  power  by  which  the  feeling  of  obli- 
gation is  suggested  to  him,  as  soon  as  the  relation  in 
which  he  stands  is  understood.  This  is  sufficient  to 
render  him  a  moral  agent.  He  is  accountable  just  in 
proportion  to  the  opportunity  which  he  has  enjoyed  for 
acquiring  a  knowledge  of  the  relations  in  which  ha 
stands,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  his  obligations  are  to 
be  discharged. 


CHAPTER    II. 

CONSCIENCE,  OR  THE  MORAL  SENSE. 
SECTION  I. 

IS  THERE  A  CONSCIENCE  t 

By  Conscience,  ot  the  moral  sense,  is  meant  that 
faculty  by  which  we  discern  the  moral  quality  of  actions, 
and  bj  which  we  are  capable  of  certain  affections  in 
respect  to  this  quality. 

-  Bj  faculty  is  meant  any  particular  part  of  our  con- 
stitution by  which  we  become  affected  by  the  various 
qualities  and  relations  of  beings  around  us.  Thus,  by 
taste,  we  are  conscious  of  the  existence  of  beauty  and 
deformity ;  by  perception,  we  acquire  a  knowledge  of 
the  existence  and  qualities  of  the  material  world.  And, 
in  general,  if  we  discern  any  quality  in  the  universe,  or 
produce  or  suffer  any  change,  it  seems  almost  a  truism 
to  say  that  we  have  a  faculty,  or  power,  for  so  doing. 
A  man  who  sees,  must  have  eyes,  or  the  faculty  for  see- 
ing ;  and  if  he  have  not  eyes^  this  is  considered  a  suf- 
ficient reason  why  he  should  not  see.  And  thus  it  is 
universally  admitted  that  there  may  be  a  thousand 
qualities  in  nature  of  which  we  have  no  knowledge,  for 
the  simple  reason  that  we  have  not  been  created  with 
the  faculties  for  discerning  them.  There  is  a  world 
without  us  and  a  world  within  us,  which  exactly  cor- 
respond to  each  other.  Unless  both  exist,  we  can  never 
be  conscious  of  the  existence  of  either. 

Now,  that  we  do  actually  observe  a  moral  quality  in- 
the  actions  of  men,  must,. I, think,  be  admitted.    Every 


46  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

human  being  is  conscious  that,  from  cliildliood,  he  has 
observed  it.  We  do  not  say  that  all  men  discern  this 
quality  with  equal  accuracy,  any  more  than  that  they 
all  sre  with  equal  distinctuess  ;  but  we  say  that  all  men 
perceive  it  in  some  actions,  and  that  there  is  a  multi- 
tude of  cases  in  which  their  perceptions  of  it  will  be 
found  universally  to  agree.  And,  moreover,  this  qual- 
ity, and.  the  feeling  which  accompanies  the  perception 
of  it,  are  unlike  those  derived  from  every  other  faculty. 

The  question  would  then  seem  reduced  to  this :  Do 
we  perceive  this  quality  of  actions  by  a  single  faculty, 
or  by  a  combination  of  faculties  ?  I  think  it  must  be 
evident,  from  what  has  already  been  stated,  that  this 
notion  is,  in  its  nature,  simple  and  ultimate,  and  dis- 
liiictfrom  every  oilier  notion.  Now,  if  this  be  the  case, 
it  seems  self-evident  that  we  must  liave  a  distinct  and 
separate  faculty  to  make  us  acquainted  with  the  exist- 
ence of  this  distinct  and  separate  quality.  This  is  the 
case  in  respect  to  all  other  distinct  and  original  qualities: 
it  is,  surely,  reasonable  to  suppose  tliat  it  would  be  the 
case  with  this,  unless  some  reason  can  be  shown  to  the 
contrary. 

But,  after  all,  this  question  is,  to  the  moral  philoso- 
pher, of  but  comparatively  TUle  importance.     All  that 
is  necessary  to  his  investigations  is,  that  it  be  admitted 
that  there  is  such  a  quality,  and  that  men  are  so  con- 
sli'utod  as  to   perceive   it,  and   to  be  susceptible  ol 
certain  affections  in  consequence  of  that  perception 
Whether  these  facts  are  accounted  for  on  the  supposi 
tion  of  the  existejice  of  a  single  faculty,  or  a  combina- 
tion of  faculties,  will  not  alVect  the  question  of  moral 
obligation.     If  it  be  granted  that  we  do  actually  recog- 
nize moral  distinctions,  and  feel  the  pressure  of  moral 
obligation,  it  matters  little  whether  in  thus  acting  we 
make  use  of  one  power  of  tb?  mind  or  of  several. 

It  may,  however,  be  worth  while  to  consider  some  of 
the  objections  which  have  been  urged  against  the  sup- 
position of  the  existence  of  such  a  faculty. 

I.  It  has  been  said,  if  such  a  faculty  has  been  be- 
etowod,  it  must  have  been  bestowed  universally  i  but  it 


IS  TnERF  A  CONSCIENCE?  47 

is  not  bestowed  universally ;  for  what  some  nationp 
consider  right,  other  nations  consider  wrong ;  as  infanti- 
cide, parricide,  duelling,  etc. 

1.  To  this  it  miy  be  answered,  first,  the  ohjcction 
seems  to  admit  the  universality  of  the  existence  of  con- 
science, or  the  power  of  discerning  in  certain  actions  a 
moral  quality.  It  admits  that  everywhere  men  make 
this  distinction,  but  affirms  that  in  different  countries 
they  refer  the  quality  to  different  actions.  Now,  how 
this  dijfcrence  is  to  be  accounted  for  ^  may  be  a  question  ; 
but  the  fact  as  stated  in  the  objection  shows  the  uni- 
versality of  the  power  of  observing  such  a  quality  in 
actions. 

2.  But,  secondly,  we  have  said  that  we  discover  the 
moral  quality  of  actions  in  the  intention.  Now  it  is  not 
the  fact  that  this  difference  exists,  as  stated  in  the  ob- 
jection, if  the  intention  of  actions  be  considered.  Where 
was  it  not  considered  right  to  intend  the  happiness  of 
parents  ?  Vvhero  was  it  not  considered  wrong  to  intend 
their  misery  ?  Where  was  it  ever  considered  right  to 
intend  to  requite  khidness  by  injury  ?  and  where  was 
it  ever  considered  wrong  to  intend  to  requite  kindness 
with  still  greater  kindness  ?  In  regard  to  the  manner 
in  which  these  intentions  mayJbeJuJJiUed^  there  may  be 
a  difference  ;  but  as  to  the  liioral  quality  of  these  iaten' 
lions  themselves^  as  well  as  of  many  others,  there  is  a 
very  universal  agreement  among  men. 

3.  And  still  more,  it  will  be  seen,  on  examination, 
that  in  these  very  cases  i.i  wliicli  wrong  actions  are 
practised,  they  are  justified  on  thu  ground  of  a  good 
intention^  or  of  some  view  of  the  relations  l'».:ween  tlio 
parties^  which,  if  true,  would  render  there  innocent. 
Thus,  if  infanticide  be  justified,  it  is  on  the  ground 
that  this  world  is  a  place  of  misery,  and  that  the  infant 
is  better  off  not  to  encounter  its  troubles  ;  that  is,  that 
Uie  parent  wishes  or  intends  well  to  the  child  :  or 
else  it  is  defended  on  the  ground  that  the  relation  be- 
tween the  parent  and  child  is  aich  as  to  confer  on  tlie 
cue  the  right  of  life  and  death  over  the  other ;  and, 
therefore,  that  to  take  its  life  ij  as  umocent  as  the  slay- 


4b  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

ing  of  a  bruto  or  the  destruction  of  a  vegetable.  Thus 
also  arc  parricide,  and  revenge,  and  various  other 
wrong  actions  defended.  Where  can  the  race  of  men 
be  found,  bo  they  ever  so  savage,  who  need  to  be  told 
that  ingratitude  is  wrong,  that  parents  ought  to  love 
their  children,  or  tliat  men  ought  to  be  submissive  and 
obedient  to  the  Supreme  Divinity  ? 

4.  And  still  more,  I  think  one  of  the  strongest  exem- 
plifications of  the  universality  of  moral  distinctions  is 
found  in  the  character  of  many  of  the  ancient  heathen. 
4.Tliey  perceived  these  distinctions,  and  felt  and  obeyed 
the  impulses  of  conscience,  even  though  at  variance 
with  all  the  examples  of  the  deities  whom  they  wor- 
shipped. Thus,  says  Rousseau,  "  Cast  your  eyes  over 
all  the  nations  of  the  world,  and  all  the  histories  of 
nations.  Amid  so  many  inhuman  and  absurd  supersti- 
tions, amid  that  prodigious  diversity  of  manners  and 
characters,  you  will  fmd  everywhere  the  same  principles 
and  distinctions  of  moral  good  and  evil.  The  paganism 
jf  the  ancient  world  produced,  indeed,  abominable  gods, 
i7ho  on  earth  would  have  been  shunned  or  punished 
as  monsters  ;  and  who  offered,  as  a  picture  of  supreme 
happiness,  only  crimes  to  commit,  or  passions  to  satiate. 
But  Vice,  armed  with  this  sacred  authority,  descended 
in  vain  from  the  eternal  abode.  She  found  in  the  heart 
of  man  a  moral  instinct  to  repel  her.  The  continence 
of  Xenocrates  was  admired  by  those  who  celebrated  the 
dcbauclicries  of  Jupiter.  The  chaste  Lucrctia  adored  b 
the  unchaste  Venus.  The  most  intrepid  Roman  sacri-  " 
ficed  to  fear.  He  invoked  the  god  who  dethroned  his 
father,  and  died  without  a  murmur  by  the  hand  of  liis 
own.  The  most  contemptible  divinities  were  served  by 
the  greatest  men.  Tlio  holy  voice  of  nature,  stronger 
than  that  of  the  gods,  made  itself  heard,  and  respected, 
And  obeyed  on  the  earth,  and  seemed  to  banish  to  the 
confines  of  heaven  guilt  and  the  guilty.''  Quoted  by 
Di\  Drown,  Lecture  75. 

II.  Again,  tlie  objection  has  been  made  in  another 
form.     It  is  said  that  savages  violate,  without  remorse  \ 
or  compunction,  the  plainest  pruiciples  of  right.    Such/ 


IS  THERE  A  CONSCIENCE  ?  49 

is  the  case  when  they  are  guilty  of  revenge  and  liccn' 
liousncss. 

This  o!)jection  has  been  partly  considered  before.  It 
may,  liowevcr,  be  added, 

Flrsi.  No  men,  nor  any  class  of  men,  violate  every 
mr»ral  precept  without  compunction,  without  the  feeling 
of  guilt,  and  the  consciousness  of  desert  of  punishment. 

Secondly.  Uence  the  objection  will  rather  prove  the 
existence  of  a  defcctiue  or  imperfect  conscience,  than 
that  no  such  faculty  exists.  The  same  objection  would 
prove  us  destitute  of  taste  or  of  understanding  ;  because 
these  faculties  exist  only  in  an  imperfect  state  among 
savages  and  uncultivated  men. 

lii.  It  has  been  objected,  again,  that  if  we  suppose 
this  faculty  to  exist,  it  is,  after  all,  useless  ;  for  if  a  man 
please  to  violate  it,  and  to  suffer  the  pain,  then  this  is 
the  end  of  the  question,  and,  as  Dr.  Paley  says,  "  the 
moral  instinct  man  has  nothing  more  to  offer." 

To  this  it  may  be  answered : 

The  objection  proceeds  upon  a  mistake  respecting  the 
function  of  conscience.  Its  use  is  to  teach  us  to  dis- 
cern our  moral  obligations,  and  to  impel  us  towards 
the  corresponding  action.  It  is  not  pretended,  by  the 
believers  in  a  moral  sense,  that  man  may  not,  after  all, 
do  as  ho  chooses.  All  that  they  contend  for  is,  that  he 
is  constituted  with  such  a  faculty,  and  that  the  posses- 
sion of  it  is  necessary  to  his  moral  accountability.  It 
is  in  his  power  to  obey  it  or  to  disobey  it,  just  as  he 
pleases.  Tlie  fact  that  a  man  may  obey  or  disobey  con- 
science, no  more  proves  that  it  does  not  exist,  than  the 
fact  that  he  sometimes  does  and  sometimes  does  not 
obey  passion,  proves  that  he  is  destitute  of  passion 
6 


50  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


SECTION   II. 

OF  THE  STATES  OF  MIND  WHICH  IMMEDIATELY  EMAIfATS 
FKOM  THE  IDEA  OF  EIGHT  AJSD  WRONG. 

Wo  have  thus  far  considered  that  part  of  tlie  action 
of  conscience  which  discovers  to  us  the  quality  of  a 
human  action  as  either  right  or  wrong.  We  cannot, 
however,  have  failed  to  observe  tliat  as  soon  as  this  idea 
presents  itself,  other  ideas  accompany  or  follow  it,  witli- 
out  any  will  of  our  own,  but  purely  in  obedience  to  the 
laws  of  our  moral  constitution.   To  these  let  us  attend. 

1.  In  the  first  place,  as  soon  as  we  perceive  in  an 
action  a  moral  quality,  there  arises  withhi  us  the  feeling 
of  obligation.  If  it  be  right,  we  feel  an  obligation  to  do 
it ;  if  it  be  wrong,  an  obligation  to  refrain  from  doing  it. 
This  feeling  of  obligation  we  designate  by  the  terras 
onght  and  ovght  not.  We  always  consider  the  quality 
of  the  action  as  the  necessary  cause  of  the  obligation. 
Thus  we  say  it  is  wrong  to  lie,  therefore  I  ovght  not  to 
lie  ;  it  is  right  to  relieve  the  helpless,  therefore  I  ovght 
to  do  it.  We  see  that  right  or  wrong  are  qualities  of 
the  action;  ought  and  ought  not  designate  the  mental 
btate  of  the  moral  agent  who  takes  cognizance  of  these 
qualities. 

2.  Intimately  connected  with  this  feeling  of  ought 
and  ought  not  is  the  impulse  to  do  or  not  to  do  tho 
action  in  which  we  observe  the  moral  quality.  If  the 
action  is  right,  and  we  feel  that  we  ought  to  dc  it,  we 
are  sensible  of  an  impulse  to  do  it.  It  is  as  thcugh  a 
voice  within  us  was  advising  and  sometimes  even  urging 
us  to  act ;  as  if  it  said,  Do  it,  do  it :  and  if  the  action  is 
wrong,  and  we  feel  that  we  ought  not  to  do  it,  the  voice 
within  us  is,  Do  it  not,  do  it  not.  ,  The  action  of  con- 
science is  in  this  respect  analogous  to  that  of  passion. 
Thus,  when  by  a  particular  act  Ave  can  gratify  a  passioji, 
whether  the  act  be  right  or  wrong,  passion  urges  us  to 
do  it.    And  thus  it  comes  to  pass  that  passion  and  coi*- 


OF  THE  IDEA  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG.  01 

science   are   frequently  brought  into   direct  collision. 
Conscience  perceives  in  the  act  which  passion  urges  us  -? 
to  do   the  clement  of  wrong,  and  forbids   us,  saying,; 
Do  it  not.     The, human  being  is  thus  placed  between^ 
two  impulses,  free  to  determine  to  which  he  will  yield, 
and  it  is  upon  this  determination  that  his  moral  charac- 
ter depends. 

8.  This  determination  and  its  consequent  action  aro  ; 
attended  by  results  either  pleasant  or  painful.     If  wo  ^ 
have  successfully  resisted  the  impulse  of  passion,  and   | 
thus  escaped  temptation  by  obeying  the  impulse  of  con- 
science, this  of  itself  is  not  only  a  source  of  pleasure, 
but   pleasure   of  a   peculiar    kind.     It  is  not  like  the 
pleasure  derived  from  the  sight  of  a  beautiful  object,  or 
from  the  successful  pursuit  of  truth.    It  is  the  pleasure 
of  innocence,  of  the  consciousness  of  right,  of  victory 
over  our  inner  propensities,  and  of  just  approbation  and 
consciousness  of  good  desert.     If,  on  the  contrary,  wo 
have  obeyed  the  impulse  of  passion,  and  disobeyed  tho^ 
impulse  of  conscience,  the  pain  which  we  suffer  is  also^ 
disthict  and  peculiar.     It  is  the  pain  of  self-disapproba-  \ 
tion,  of  shame,  of  consciousness  of  guilt,  which  we  can- 
hot  wash  away ;  of  desert  of  punishment,  which,  much 
as  we  may  desire  it,  we  know  not  how  to  escape.     Cor-> 
respondent  feelings  are  awakened  by  an  act  cither  o^ 
right  or  wrong,  when  done  by  another.    If  he  have  done^ 
right,  we  feel  for  him  a  sentiment  of  respect  and  love, 
a  desire  to  do  him  good,  a  hope  and  feeling  that  he  will 
be  somehow  rewarded.      If  he   have    done   wrong   by 
obeying  his  passions  instead  of  his  conscience,  we  in- , 
stinctirely  perceive  that  he  has  sunk  by  one  step  nearer^ 
to  the  level  of  brutes.     AVe  shrhik  from  him  with  dis->' 
rej  pect ;  we  feel  that  he  has  deserved  punishment ;  tliat2 
he  muvt  yet  meet  it,  and  not  unfrequently  desire  to  ^ 
punish  him  ourselves,  s  And  more  than  this :   he  who 
lias  done  wrong  feels  tha^  he  deserves  all  this,  and  that 
if  all  the  facts  were  known,  all  men  would  feel  thus 
towards  him. 

4.  Another  state  of  mind  which  arises  from  the  con- 
templation of  the  moral  idea  is  expectation.   We  always 


b2  THEORETICAL  ETKICS. 

expect  some  consequence  to  follow  it.     In  this  resj^ect  1 
think  the  moral  idea  differs  from  any  other  of  which  >vh 
are  conscious.  ..No  other  idea  has  respect  to  the  future, 
or  gives  rise  to  any  other  distinct  from  itself.     Thus,  we 
look  upon  a  beautiful  object;  we  are  pleased :  we  after- 
wards, in  an  inferior  degree,  repeat  the  same  pleasure 
by  recollection.     But  here  it  ends.     We  look  upon  an 
ugly  object ;  it  displeases  us ;  and  the  feeling  of  dislike  ^ 
may,  as  in  the  other  case,  be  repeated  by  recollection :  / 
but  it  goes  no  farther.     Another  and  different  idea  i*^ 
not    necessarily   connected   by   our  constitution   with 
either.  / 

/     6.  This  expectation,  moreover,  is  of  a  definite  char-  v 
/  ncter,     I  say  definite ;  but  by  this  I  do  not  mean  that  J 
(  wo  expect  any  particular  event,  but  that  events  of  a 
j   definite  character  will  follow  the  doing  of  good,  and 
that  events  of  an  opposite  character  will  follow  the  do- 
ing of  evil.  '',  We  feel  that  such  consequences  are  indis-  ^ 
Bolubly  linked  to  moral  actions  by  a  power  which  we  can  ) 
neither  resist  nor  elude.  ^  We  may  strive  to  drown  the  \ 
memory  of  a  crime,  but  we  cannot  forget  it ;  and  when-j 
ever  it  arises  to  our  recollection,  it  is  ever  accompanied: 
by  the  conviction  that  justice  has  a  claim  upon  us,  which 
somehow  and  somewhere  must  be  satisfied. 

6.  This  connection  of  the  opposite  results  of  dissim- 
/  ilar  actions  is  unchangeable.     We  expect  happiness  as 
the  reward  of  virtue,  and  misery  as  the  wages  of  vice ; 
and  we  cannot  reverse  them.    /To  suppose  an  act  of 
disinterested  goodness  to  be  puifisliable,  and  an  act  of 
deliberate  wickedness  to  be  deserving  of  reward,  and 
that  this  connection  is  a  part  of  the  constitution  under 
which  we  are  created,  is  unthinkable.    A  moral  governs 
/  ment  established  on  such  principles  cannot  be  conceived.  ] 
S  On  the  contrary,  we  are  obliged  to  believe  that  happiness  \ 
kis  unalterably  connected  with  virtue,  and  misery  as   \ 
/unalterably  connected  with  vice.  ^ 

'  7.  I  say  we  expect  this  with  certainty;  but  this  is  not 
all.  When  I  place  water  in  the  temperature  of  zero,  1 
expect  with  certainty  that  it  will  freeze.  When  I  plant 
seed  in  tiio  eround,  I  expect  with  certainty  that,  undef 


s 


\ 


OF  THE  IDEA  OF  RIGHT  AND  WEONG.  63 

proper  conditions,  it  will  germinate.  But  in  morals  it 
is  not  merely  certainty  —  it  is  sometMng-  more.  We  feel 
not  only  that  the  appi-opriate  consequent  will,  but  that 
it  MUST  follow.  Abolish  this  idea  of  the  ncQessary  con- 
nection between  virtue  and  happiness,  and  wickedness 
and  punishment,  and  all  respect  for  the  government  of 
the  universe  would  be  prostrated. 

The  absolute  certainty  of  the  connection  between  virtue 
and  vice,  and  their  appropriate  consequences,  gives  rise 
io  one  of  the  finest  passages  in  the  English  language : 

Against  the  threats 
Of  malice,  or  of  sorcery,  or  the  power 
Which  em'tig  men  call  chance,  this  I  hold  firm: 
Virtue  may  be  assailed,  but  never  hurt; 
Surprised  by  unjust  torce,  but  not  enthralled; 
Yea,  even  that  which  mischief  meant  most  harm. 
Shall  in  the  happy  trial  prove  most  glory; 
But  evil  on  itself  shall  back  recoil. 
And  mix  no  more  with  goodness;  when,  at  last. 
Gathered  like  scum,  and  settled  to  itself, 
It  shall  be  in  eternal  ceaseless  change. 
Self-fed  and  self-consumed.    If  this  fail, 
The  p;llared  firmament  is  rottenness. 
And  earth's  base  built  on  stubble. 

Comus,  585-598. 

^  fi.  A.nd  it  is  worthy  of  remark,  that  we  derive  a  high 
id^y^cree  of  pleasure  from  the  contemplation  of  this  con- 
^nettion.  We  deliglit  to  see  disinterested  goodness 
rewarded,  innocence  protected,  and  wickedness  over 
taken  by  its  appropriate  punishment.  When  virtuous 
men,  u^der  an  arbitrary  government,  have  been  exposed 
to  the.  xitmost  peril,  for  no  other  cause  than  the  pure 
love  of  liberty  a'ld  law,  their  deliverance  is  an  occasion 
for  national  exultation.  A  case  of  this  kind  is  related 
by  Lord  Mucaulay,in  his  account  of  the  trial  of  the  nine 
Bishops,  in  the  time  of  James  II.  During  this  mem- 
orable trial,  the  interest  of  the  people  was  intense. 
When  the  jury  appeared  to  render  their  verdict,  the  peo- 
ple of  London  \-vere  in  breathless  suspense.  The  verdict, 
and  the  manner  of  its  reception,  are  thus  described  by 
the  author  in  one  of  his  most  brilliant  passages: 

I 


§4  THEOEETICAL  ETHICS 

"  Sir  Samuel  Astry  spoke :  '  Do  you  find  the  defend 
ants,  or  any  of  them,  guilty  of  the  misdemeanor  whereof 
they  are  impeached,  or  not  guilty  ? '  Sir  Roger  l^ajig- 
Icy  answered,  *  Not  guilty  ! '  As  the  words  passed  his 
lij)s,  Halifax  sprang  up  and  waved  his  hat.  At  that 
signal,  benches  and  galleries  raised  a  shout.  In  a 
moment,  ten  thousand  persons  who  crowded  the  great 
hall  replied  with  a  still  greater  shout,  which  made  tho 
old  oaken  roof  crack,  and  in  another  moment  the  innu- 
m(;rable  throng  without  set  up  a  third  huzza,  which  was 
heard  at  Temple  Bar.  The  boats  which  covered  tho 
Thames  gave  an  answering  cheer.  A  peal  of  gun- 
powder was  heard  on  the  water,  and  another  and  another, 
and  so  in  a  few  moments  the  glad  tidings  went  flying 
past  the  Savoy  and  the  Friars  to  London  Bridge  and  the 
forest  of  masts  below.  As  the  news  spread,  streets  and 
squares,  market-places  and  coffee-houses,  broke  forth 
into  acclamations.  Yet  were  the  acclamations  less 
strange  than  the  weeping ;  for  the  feelings  of  men  had 
been  wound  up  to  sucli  a  point,  that  at  length  the  stern 
English  nature,  so  little  used  to  outward  signs  of  emo- 
tion, gave  way,  and  thousands  sobbed  aloud  for  very 
joy." — History  of  England,  Vol.  II.,  Chap.  8. 

This  expectation  of  certain  results  which  must  inevi- 
tably follow  moral  action,  is  frequently  alluded  to  by  the 
poets. 

Thus  Shakspeare  puts  into  the  mouth  of  Macbeth, 
when  meditating  the  murder  of  Duncan,  tho  following 
words : 

But  in  these  cases, 
We  still  have  judgment  here ;  that  we  but  teach 
Bloody  instructions;  which,  bein<?  taught,  return 
To  plag:ue  the  inventor.    This  even-handed  justice 
Commends  the  ingredients  of  the  poisoned  chalice 
To  our  own  lips. 

Macbeth,  Act  i.,  Scene  7. 

9.  The  boldness  of  innocence  and  the  timidity  of  guilt 
may  both  be  traced  to  these  facts  in  our  moral  con- 
Btitution.    The  virtuous  man  is  conscious  of  deserving 


OF  THE  IDEA  OF  RIGHT  AND  WRONG.  55 

from  his  fellow-men  nothing  but  reward.     Whom,  then,    „"^^ 
slioul  J  ho  foar  ?     The  guilty  man  is  conscious  of  desert 
of  punishment,  and  is  aware  that  as  soon  a«  his  crime 
is  known  every  one  will  desire  to  punish  him,  and  he 
is  never  sure  but  that  every  one  knows  it.     Whom,  then, 
can  he  trust  ?^  And  still  more,  this  consciousness  of 
desert  of  puni^Himent  is  attended  by  a  feeling  of  self- 
disapprobation  and  remorse,  whicli  depresses  the  spirit, 
and  prostrates  the  courage  of  the  offender,  more  than  even  ) 
the  external  circumstances  by  which  he  is  surrounded. 
Thus,  says  Solomon,  4  The  wicked  flee  when  no  man  / 
pursueth,  but  the  righteous  is  bold  as  a  Hon."  ) 

Thrice  is  he  armed  who  hath  his  quarrel  jwsf; 
And  he  but  naked,  though  locked  up  in  steel. 
Whoso  conscience  with  injustice  is  corrupted. 

Uenry  VI.,  Part  2,  Act  iii.,  Scene  a. 

We  learn,  also,  from  the  nature  of  our  moral  consti- 
tution, the  reason  why  crime  is  with  so  great  certamty 
detected. 

A  man,  before  the  commission  of  a  crime,  can  foresee 
no  reason  wliy  he  may  not  commit  it  without  detection. 
He  can  perceive  no  reason  why  he  should  be  suspected, 
and  can  imagine  a  thousand  methods  by  which  suspi- 
cion, if  awakened,  may  be  allayed.     But  he  no  sooner 
becomes  guilty,  than  he  fmds  his  relations  to  his  fel- 
low-men entirely  reversed.     He  becomes  suspicious  of 
every  one,  and  sees  every  occurrence  through  a  false 
medium.     He  cannot  act  like  an  innocent  man.     He    / 
either  docs  too  much  or  too  little ;  and  this  difference  in  ( 
his  conduct  is  frequently  the  means  of  his  detection.    ^ 
When   to  this  effect  produced  upon  his  own  mind  is 
added  the  fact,  that  every  action  must,  by  the  condition 
of  our  being,  be  attended  by  antecedents  and  conse-      / 
qiicnts  wholly  beyond  our  control,  all  of  which  lead  direct- 
ly to  the  discovery  of  the  truth  ;  it  is  not  wonderful  that 
the  guilty  so  rarely  escape.     Hence  it  has  grown  into  a 
jiroverb,  "  Murder  will  out ; "  and  such  do  we  gene/«illy 
Qud  to  be  the  fact.       — 


56  THEORETICAL  ETHICa. 

Tliis  effect  of  guilt  upon  cliaracter  has  been  frequently 
remarked. 

Thus  Macbeth,  after  the  murder  of  Duncan : 

How  is  it  with  me  when  every  noise  appalls  me? 


"K 


Macbeth,  Act  ii..  Scene  3. 


■/ 


Guiltiness  will  speak,  though  tongues  were  out  of  use. 
Suspicion  always  haunts  the  guilty  mind; 
The  thief  doth  fear  each  bush  to  be  an  oliicer. 


The  same  fact  is  frequently  referred  to  in  the  sacred 
Scriptures.  The  wicked  is  snared  in  the  work  of  his 
own  hands. 

We  hardly  need  remark  that  this  expectation  of  con- 
sequences, necessarily  connected  witli  moral  action, 
points  us  directly  to  a  future  life,  and  a  day  of  certain 
retribution.  We  feel  that  goodness  wnst  be  rewarded 
and  wickedness  punislied,  and  that  this  retribution  is 
inevitable.  ^But  this  retribution  takes  place  but  imper- 
fectly in  the  present  world  ;  there  must,  therefore,  be 
another  state  of  being,  in  which  individuality  shall  be 
distinctly  preserved,  and  an  infallible  tribunal,  at  which 
every  action  shall  receive  its  due  demerit  at  the  hands 
of  an  omniscient  and  all-holy  Judge.  ^Thus  saith  tlie 
Scripture :  "  For  we  must  all  appear  before  the  judg- 
ment-seat of  Christ,  that  every  one  may  receive  the 
things  done  in  his  body  according  to  that  he  hath  done, 
whetiier  it  be  good  or  bad  "  (2  Cor.  v.  10). 

I  close  this  section  with  the  remarks  of  Mr.  Webster 
in  a  trial  for  murder,  as  they  powerfully  enforce  the  view 
which  we  have  taken  on  this  subject. 

"  There  is  no  evil  fhat  we  cannot  either  face  or  fly 
from  but  the  consciousness  of  duty  disregarded.  A 
sense  of  duty  pursues  us  ever.  It  is  omnipresent,  like 
the  Deity.  If  we  take  to  ourselves  the  wings  of  the 
morning,  and  dwell  in  the  uttermost  parts  of  the  sea^ 
duty  performed  or  duty  violated  is  still  with  us  for  our 
happiness  or  our  misery.  If  we  say  the  darkness  shall 
cover  us,  in  the  darkness  as  in  the  light  our  obligations 


THE  AUTHOKITY  OF   CONSCIENCE.  57 

arc  still  with  us.  We  cannot  escape  their  power,  nor 
fly  from  their  presence.  They  are  with  us  in  this  life, 
and  they  will  he  with  us  at  its  close  ;  and  in  that  scene 
of  inconceivable  solemnity,  which  lies  yet  further  on- 
ward, we  shall  still  find  ourselves  surrounded  by  tho 
consciousness  of  duty,  to  pain  us  whenever  it  has  been 
violated,  and  to  console  us  so  far  as  God  may  have 
given  us  grace  to  perform  it."  ^ 


SECTION   III. 

,      THE  AUTHOniTY  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

We  have  thus  far  endeavored  to  show  that  there  is 
in  man  a  faculty  denominated  Conscience  ;  and  that  it 
is  not  merely  a  discriminating,  but  also  an  impuh:ive 
faculty.  The  next  question  to  be  considered  is,  What  is 
the  authority  of  this  impulse  ? 

The  object  of  the  present  section  is  to  show  that  thia 
is  the  most  authoritative  impulse  of  which  we  find  cmi- 
selves  susceptible. 

The  supremacy  of  conscience  may  be  illustrated  in 
various  ways. 

I.  It  is  involved  in  the  very  conception  which  men 
form  of  this  faculty. 

The  various  impulses  of  which  we  find  ourselves  sus- 
ceptible, can  diifer  only  in  two  respects,  that  of  strength 
and  that  of  authority. 

When  we  believe  them  to  differ  in  nothing  hwi  strength, 
we  feel  ourselves  perfectly  at  liberty  to  obey  the  strong- 
est. Thus,  if  different  kinds  of  food  be  set  before  us,  all 
equally  healthful,  we  feel  entirely  at  liberty  to  partake 
of  that  which  we  prefer  ;  that  is,  of  that  to  which  we  aro 
most  strongly  impelled.  If  a  man  is  to  decide  between 
making  a  journey  by  land,  or  by  water,  he  considers  it 

1  Works. Vol.  vi.,  p.  105.   Boston:  Little  &  Brown,  J867. 


58  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

a  FufTicicnt  motive  for  clioico,  that  the  one  mode  of  trav- 
elling is  more  pleasant  to  him  than  the  other.  But  wlieu 
our  impulses  differ  in  authority ^\fQ  feci  obliged  to  neglect 
the  dilibrence  in  strength  of  impulse,  and  to  obey  that, 
be  it  ever  so  weak,  which  is  of  the  higher  authority. 
Thus,  suppose  our  desire  for  any  particular  kind  of  food 
to  be  ever  so  strong,  and  we  know  that  it  would  injure 
our  health,  self-love  would  admonish  us  to  leave  it 
alone.  Now,  self-love  being  a  more  authoritative  im- 
pulse than  passion,  we  feel  an  obligation  to  obey  it,  be 
its  admonition  ever  so  weak,  and  the  impulse  of  appetite 
ever  so  vehement.  If  we  yield  to  the  impulse  of  appe- 
tite, be  it  ever  so  strong,  in  opposition  to  that  of  self- 
love,  be  it  ever  so  weak,  we  feel  a  consciousness  of  self 
degradation,  and  of  acting  unworthily  of  our  nature ; 
and  if  we  see  another  person  acting  in  this  manner,  we 
cannot  avoid  feeling  towards  him  a  sentiment  of  con- 
tempt. "  'Tis  not  in  folly  not  to  scorn  a  fool."  And, 
in  general,  whenever  we  act  in  obedience  to  a  lower, 
and  in  opposition  to  a  higher  sentiment,  we  feel  tnis  1 
consciousness  of  degradation,  which  we  do  not  feel  wheii 
the  impulses  differ  only  in  degree.  And,  conversely, 
whenever  we  feel  this  consciousness  of  degradation  for 
acting  in  obedience  to  one  instead  of  to  another,  we 
may  know  that  we  have  violated  that  which  is  of  the 
higher  authority. 

If,  now,  we  reflect  upon  our  feelings  consequent  upon 
any  moral  action,  I  think  we  shall  find  that  we  always 
are  conscious  of  a  sentiment  of  self-degradation  when- 
ever we  disobey  the  monition  of  conscience,  be  that  mo- 
nition ever  so  vjeak^  to  gratify  the  impulse  of  appetite, 
or  passion,  or  self-love,  be  that  impulse  ever  so  strong. 
Do  we  consider  it  any  palliation  of  the  guilt  of  murder, 
for  the  criminal  to  declare  that  his  vhidictive  feelings 
hnpelled  him  much  more  strongly  than  his  conscience? 
whereas,  if  w^c  perceived  in  these  impulses  no  other 
difference  than  that  of  strength,  we  should  consider  this 
not  merely  an  excuse,  but  a  justifidation.  And  that  / 
the  impulse  of  conscience  is  of  the  highest  authority  is  ^^ 
evident  frojn  the  fact  that  we  cannot  conceive  of  aiij 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  CONSCIENCE.  59 

ciroiiinFtaiices  in  wliicli  we  should  not  feel  guilty  and 
degraded  from  acting  in  obedience  to  any  impulse  what- 
ever in  opposition  to  it.  And  thus,  we  cannot  conceive 
of  any  more  exalted  cliaracter  than  that  of  him  wlio,  on 
all  occasions,  yields  himself  up  implicitly  to  the  im- 
pulses of  conscience,  all  things  else  to  the  contrary  not 
withstanding.  1  think  no  higher  evidence  can  he  pro- 
duced to  show  that  we  do  really  regard  the  impuh.e  of 
conscience  as  of  higher  authority  than  any  other  of 
which  we  are  conscious. 

II.  The  same  truth  may,  I  think,  be  rendered  evident 
by  observing  the  feelings  wliich  arise  within  us  when 
we  comj)are  the  actions  of  men  with  those  of  beings  of 
an  inferior  order. 

Sui)pose  a  brute  to  act  from  appetite,  and  injure  itself 
by  gluttony ;  or  from  paseion,  and  injure  another  brute 
from  anger :  we  feel  nothing  like  moral  disapprobation. 
We  pity  it,  and  strive  to  put  it  out  of  its  power  to  act 
thus  in  future.  AVe  never  feel  that  a  brute  is  disgraced 
or  degraded  by  such  an  action.  But  suppose  a  man  to 
act  thus,  and  we  cannot  avoid  a  feeling  of  disapproba- 
tion and  of  disgust ;  a  conviction  that  the  man  has  done 
violence  to  his  nature.  Thus,  to  call  a  man  a  brute,  a 
sensualist,  a  glutton,  is  to  speak  to  him  in  the  most  in- 
sulting manner:  it  is  to  say,  in  the  strongest  terms,  that 
he  has  acted  unworthily  of  himself,  and  of  the  nature 
with  which  his  Creator  has  endowed  him. 

Again.  Let  a  brute  act  from  deliberate  selfishness  ; 
that  is,  with  deliberate  caution  seek  its  own  happiness 
upon  the  whole,  unmindful  of  the  impulsions  of  present 
appetite,  but  yet  wholly  regardless  of  the  happhiess  of 
any  other  of  its  species.  In  no  case  do  we  feel  disgust 
at  such  a  course  of  action  ;  and  in  many  cases,  we,  on 
the  contrary,  rather  regard  it  with  favor.  We  thus 
speal"  of  the  cunning  of  animals  in  taking  their  prey,  in 
escaping  danger,  and  in  securing  for  themselves  all  the 
amount  of  gratification    that  may  be   in  their  power. 

We  are.  sensible,  in  these  cases,  that  the  animal  has 
acted  fiom  the  highest  impulses  of  which  the  Creator 
has  made  it  susceptible.     But  let  a  man  act  thus.     Let 


60  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

him,  carerul  merely  of  his  own  happiness  upon  the 
w^hole,  be  careful  for  notliing  else,  and  be  perfectly  wil- 
liii<^  to  sacriiice  the  happiness  of  others,  to  any  amount 
whatsoever,  to  promote  his  own,  to  the  least  amount 
soever.  Such  has  been,  frequently,  the  character  of 
Bcasuai  and  unfeeling  tyrants.  AVe  arc  conscious,  in 
such  a  case,  of  a  sentiment  of  disgust  and  deep  disap- 
probation. We  feel  that  the  man  has  not  acted  in 
o])edience  to  the  highest  impulses  of  which  he  was  sus- 
ceptible ;  and  poets  and  satirists  and  historians  unite 
in  holding  him  up  to  the  world  as  an  object  of  universal 
detestation  and  abhorrence. 

Again.  Let  another  man,  disregarding  the  impulses 
of  passion  and  appetite  and  self-love,  act,  under  all 
circumstances,  in  obedience  to  the  monitions  of  con- 
science, unmoved  and  unallured  by  j/leasure,  and  un- 
awed  by  power ;  and  we  instinctively  feel  that  he  has 
fittained  to  the  highest  eminence  to  which  our  nature 
can  aspire;  and  that  he  has  acted  from  the  highest 
impulse  of  whicii  his  nature  is  susceptible  We  are  con- 
scious of  a  conviction  of  his  superiority,  ^  *ch  nothing 
can  outweigh  ;  of  a  feeling  of  veneration,  allied  to  the 
reverence  which  is  due  to  the  Supreme  Being.  And 
with  this  homage  to  virtue  all  history  is  filled.  The 
judge  may  condemn  the  innocent,  but  posterity  will 
condemn  the  judge.  The  tyrant  may  murder  the  mar- 
tyr, but  after-ages  will  venerate  the  martyr,  and  exe- 
crate the  tyrant.  And  if  we  will  look  over  the  names 
of  those  on  whom  all  past  time  has  united  in  conferring 
the  tribute  of  praise-worthiness,  v/e  shall  find  them  to 
be  the  names  of  those  who,  although  they  might  differ 
in  other  respects,  yet  were  similar  in  this,  that  they 
ghonc  resplendent  in  the  lustre  of  unsullied  virtue. 

Now,  as  our  Creator  has  constituted  us  sucli  as  wo 
are,  and  as  by  our  very  constitution  we  do  thus  con- 
sider conscience  to  be  the  most  authoritative  impulse 
of  our  nature,  it  must  be  the  most  authoritative,  unless 
we  believe  that  he  has  deceived  us,  or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  that  he  has  so  formed  us  as  to  give  credit 
til  a  lie. 


THE  AUTHOPwIXr  OF  CONSCIENCE.  61 

Til.  The  supremacy  of  conscience  may  be  also  illus- 
trntcd  by  showing  the  necessity  of  tliis  supremacy  to 
tlio  accomplishmont  of  the  objjcts  for  which  man  was 
created. 

Wiieii  wo  consider  any  work  of  art,  as  a  system  com- 
posed of  parts,  and  arranged  for  the  accomplishment  of 
a  given  ohjoct,  tiiere  are  three  several  views  which  wq 
may  have  of  it,  and  all  of  them  necessary  to  a  ccmiplete 
and  perfect  knowledge  of  the  thing. 

1.  We  must  have  a  knowdedge  of  the  several  parts 
of  which  it  is  composed.  Thus,  he  who  would  under- 
stand a  watch,  must  know  the  various  wheels  and 
springs  which  enter  into  the  formation  of  the  instru- 
ment. But  this  alone,  as,  for  instance,  if  they  were 
spread  separately  before  him  upon  a  table,  would  give 
him  a  very  imperfect  conception  of  a  watch. 

2.  He  must,  therefore,  understand  how  these  parts 
are  put  together.  Tliis  will  greatly  increase  his  knowl 
edge ;  hut  ii  will  still  be  imperfect,  for  he  may  yet  be 
ignorant  of  the  relations  which  the  parts  sustain  to  each 
other.  A  man  miglit  look  at  a  steam  boat  until  he 
was  familiarly  acq^uaiiited  with  its  whole  machinery,  and 
yet  not  know  whether  the  paddles  were  designed  to 
move  the  piston-rod,  or  the  piston-rod  to  move  the 
paddles. 

3.  It  is  necessary,  therefore,  that  he  should  have  a 
conception  of  the  relation  which  the  several  parts  sus- 
tain to  each  other ;  that  is,  of  the  effect  which  every 
part  was  designed  to  produce  upon  every  other  part. 
Wiien  he  has  arrived  at  this  idea,  and  has  combined  it 
with  the  oth3r  ideas  just  m3ncion3d,  then,  and  not 
till  then,  is  his  knowledge  of  the  instrumant  compbte. 

It 's  manifest  that  this  last  notion  —  tliat  of  thj  rela 
tions  which  the  parts  sustain  to  each  other — is  fre- 
quently of  more  importance  than  cither  of  the  otliers. 
lie  who  has  a  conception  of  the  cause  of  motion  iii  a 
oteam-engiue,  and  of  the  manner  in  which  tlie  ends  are 
accom[)lished,  has  a  more  valuable  notion  of  the  instru- 
ment than  he  who  has  ever  so  accurate  a  knowledge  of 
the  several  parts,  without  a  conception  of  the  relation 
ft 


62  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

Thus,  in  the  history  of  astronomy  we  learn  that  the 
existence  of  the  several  parts  of  the  solar  system  was 
known  for  ages,  without  being  productive  of  any  valu- 
able result.  Tiio  progress  of  astronomy  is  to  be  dated 
from  the  moment  when  the  relation  which  the  several 
parts  hold  to  each  other  was  discovered  by  Copernicus. 

Suppose,  now,  we  desire  to  ascertain  what  is  the 
relation  which  the  several  parts  of  any  system  are  de- 
signed, by  its  author,  to  sustain  to  each  other.  1  know 
of  no  other  way  than  to  hnd  out  that  series  of  relations 
in  obedience  to  which  the  system  will  accomplish  the 
object  for  which  it  was  constructed.  Thus,  if  we  desire 
to  ascertain  the  relation  which  the  parts  of  a  watch  are 
designed  to  sustain  to  each  other,  we  inquire  what  is 
that  series  of  relations  in  obedience  to  which  it  will 
accomplish  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  constructed ; 
that  is,  to  keep  time.  For  instance,  we  should  conduct 
the  inquiry  by  trying  each  several  part,  and  ascertain- 
ing by  experiment  wliether,  on  the  supposition  that  it 
was  the  cause  of  motion,  the  result,  namely,  the  keeping 
of  time,  could  be  effected.  After  we  had  tried  them 
all,  and  had  found  that  under  no  other  relation  of  the 
parts  to  each  other  than  that  which  assumes  the  main- 
spring to  be  the  source  of  motion,  and  the  balance- 
wheel  to  be  the  regulator  of  the  motion,  tlie  result 
could  be  produced ;  we  should  conclude  with  certainty 
that  this  was  the  relation  of  the  parts  to  each  other, 
intended  to  be  established  by  the  maker  of  the  watch. 

And,  again,  if  an  instrument  were  desi^gned  for  sev- 
eral purposes,  and  if  it  was  found  that  not  only  a  single 
purpose  could  not  be  accomplished,  but  that  no  one  of 
them  could  be  accomplished  under  any  other  system  of 
relations  than  that  which  had  been  at  first  discovered, 
we  should  arrive  at  the  highest  proof  of  which  the  case 
was  susceptible,  that  such  was  the  relation  intended  to 
be  established  between  the  parts  by  the  inventor  of  the 
machine. 

Now,  man  is  a  system  composed  of  parts  iu  the  man- 
ner above  stated.  He  has  various  powers,  and  facul- 
ties, and  impulses;  and  he  is  manifestly  designed  to 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  CONSCIENCE.  63 

produce  some  result.  As  to  the  ultimate  dcjtign  for 
which  man  was  created,  there  may  be  a  difference  of 
opinion.  In  one  view,  however,  1  presume  there  will 
be  no  difference.  It  will  be  allowed  by  all  that  he  was 
designed  for  the  production  of  his  own  liappiness.  Look 
at  his  senses,  his  intellect,  his  affections,  and  at  the 
external  objects  with  which  these  are  brought  into  re- 
lation ;  and  at  the  effects  of  the  legitimate  action  of 
these  powers  upon  their  appropriate  objects  ;  and  no 
one  can  for  a  moment  doubt  that  this  was  one  object 
for  which  man  was  created.  Thus  it  is  as  clear  tliat 
the  eye  was  intended  to  be  a  source  of  pleasure  as  that 
it  was  intended  to  be  the  instrument  of  vision.  It  is 
as  clear  that  the  car  was  intended  to  be  a  source  of 
pleasure  as  to  be  the  organ  of  hearing.  And  thus  of 
the  other  faculties. 

But  when  we  consider  man  as  an  instrument  for  the 
production  of  hapi)iness,  it  is  manifest  that  we  must 
take  into  the  account,  man  as  a  society  as  well  as  man 
as  an  individual.  The  Urger  part  of  the  hap})iness  of 
the  individual  depends  upon  society ;  so  that  whatever 
would  destroy  the  happiness  of  man  as  a  society,  would 
destroy  the  happiness  of  man  as  an  individual.  And 
such  is  the  constitution  under  which  we  are  placed,  that 
no  benc.it  or  injury  caii  be,  in  its  nature,  individual. 
"WHioevor  truly  promotes  his  own  happiness,  promotes 
the  ha})])iness  of  society ;  and  whoever  promotes  the 
happiness  of  society,  promotes  his  own  happiness.  In 
this  view  of  the  subject,  it  will  then  be  proper  to  con- 
sider man  as  a  society,  as  an  instrument  for  producing 
the  happiness  of  man  as  a  society,  as  well  as  man  as 
an  individual,  as  an  instrument  for  producing  the  hap- 
piness of  man  as  an  individual. 

Let  us  now  consider  man  as  an  instrument  for  tho 
production  of  human  happiness,  in  the  sense  here  ex- 
plained. 

If  we  examine  the  impulsive  and  restraining  faculties 
of  man,  we  shall  find  that  they  may  generally  be  can- 
prehended  under  three  classes : 

1.  Passion  or  appetite.    The  object  of  this  class  of 


61  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

our  faculties  is  to  impel  us  towards  certain  acts  which 
produce  immediate  pleasure.  Thus,  the  appetite  for 
f  jod  impels  us  to  seek  gratiacatiou  by  eating.  The  love 
of  power  impels  us  to  seek  tlie  gratiiicatiou  resulthig 
,  from  superiority ;  and  so  of  all  the  rest. 

If  we  consider  the  nature  of  these  faculties,  we  shall 
find  that  they  impel  us  to  immediate  gratification,  witli- 
out  any  respect  to  the  consequences,  either  to  ourselves 
or  to  others ;  and  that  they  know  of  no  limit  to  indul- 
gence, until,  by  their  own  action,  they  paralyze  the 
power  of  enjoyment.  Thus,  the  love  of  food  would 
impel  us  to  eat,  until  eating  ceased  to  be  a  source  of 
pleasure.  And  where,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  no 
such  limit  exists,  our  passions  are  insatiable.  Such  is 
the  case  with  the  love  of  wealth,  and  the  love  of  power. 
In  these  instances,  there  being  in  the  constitution  of 
man  no  limit  to  tlie  power  of  gratification,  the  appetite 
grows  by  what  it  feeds  on. 

2.  Interest  or  self-love.  This  faculty  impels  us  to 
seek  our  own  happiness,  considered  in  reference  either 
to  a  longer  or  shorter  period,  but  always  to  one  beyond 
the  present  moment.  Thus,  if  appetite  impelled  me  to 
eat,  self-love  would  prompt  me  to  eat  such  food,  and  in 
such  quantity,  as  would  produce  for  me  the  greatest 
amount  of  happiness  upon  the  whole.  If  passion 
prompted  me  to  revenge,  self-love  would  prompt  me  to 
seek  revenge  in  such  a  manner  as  would  not  involve 
me  in  greater  distress  than  that  which  I  now  suffer ;  or 
to  control  the  passion  entirely,  unless  I  could  so  gratify 
it  as  to  promote  my  own  happiness  for  the  future,  as 
well  as  for  the  present.  In  all  cases,  however,  the 
promptings  of  self-love  have  respect  solely  to  the  pro- 
duction of  our  own  happiness  ;  they  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  happiness  of  any  other  being. 

3.  Conscience.  The  office  of  conscience,  considered 
in  relation  to  these  other  impulsive  faculties,  is,  to  re- 
strain our  appetites  within  such  limits  that  the  gratifi- 
cation of  tlierti  will  injure  neither  ourselves  nor  others ; 
and  so  to  govern  our  self-love,  that  we  shall  act,  not 
solely  in  obedience  to  the  Law  of  our  own  happiness, 
but  in  obedience  to  that  law  wliich  restricts  the  pursuit 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  CONSCIENCE.  65 

of  happiness  witliin  such  limits  as  shall  not  interfere 
with  the  happuicss  of  others.  It  is  not  hero  asserted 
tliat  conscieuce  always  admonishes  us  to  this  ctlect,  or 
tliat  when  it  admonislies  us  it  is  always  successful.  We 
may,  if  i\'e  please,  disobey  its  monitions ;  or,  from  rea 
sons  hereafter  to  bo  mentioned,  its  monitions  may  has'O 
ceased.  What  \7e  would  speak  of  here  is  the  tendency 
anu  object  of  this  faculty,  and  the  resvdt  to  which,  if 
it  were  perfectly  obeyed,  it  would  manifestly  lead.  And 
that  such  is  its  tendency,  I  think  that  no  one,  who  re- 
flects upon  the  operations  of  his  owd  mind,  can  for  a 
moment  doubt. 

Suppose,  now,  man  to  be  a  system  for  the  promotion 
of  happhiess,  individual  and  social,  and  these  various 
impelling  powers  to  be  parts  of  it.  These  powers  being 
frequently,  in  their  nature,  contradictory,  —  that  is,  be- 
ing such  that  one  frequently  impels  to  and  another 
repels /y'owi  the  same  action,  —  the  question  is,  In  what 
relation  of  these  powers  to  each  other  can  the  happiness 
of  man  be  most  successfully  promoted  ? 

1.  It  cannot  be  asserted  that  when  these  impulsions 
are  at  variance  it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  to  which 
of  them  we  yield  ;  that  is,  that  a  man  is  just  as  happy, 
and  renders  society  just  as  happy,  by  obeying  the  one 
as  the  other.  For,  as  men  always  obey  either  the  one  or  the 
other,  this  would  be  to  assert  that  all  men  are  equally 
happy,  and  that  every  man  promoted  his  own  happiness 
just  as  much  by  one  course  of  conduct  as  by  another  ; 
than  which  nothing  can  he  more  directly  at  variance 
with  the  whole  experience  of  all  men  in  all  ages.  It 
would  be  to  assert  that  the  glutton  who  is  racked  with 
pain  is  as  happy  as  the  temperate  and  healthy  man  ; 
and  that  Kero  and  Caligula  were  as  great  benefactors 
to  maidiind  as  Howard  or  AVilborforce. 

2.  If,  then,  it  be  not  indifferent  to  our  happhicfs  to 
which  of  them  we  yield  the  supremacy,  tlie  qucstioii 
returns,  Under  Avhat  relation  of  each  to  the  other  can 
the  happiness  of  man  bo  most  successfully  promoted  ? 

>     1.  Can  the  happiness  of  man  bo  promoted  l>y  subject- 
Zing  his  other  impulses  to  his  appetites  and  passions  t 


b6  TnEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

By  referring  to  the  nature  of  appetite  and  passion,  as 
previously  explained,  it  will  be  seen  that  the  result  to 
the  individual  of  such  a  course  would  ho  sickness  and 
death.  It  would  be  a  life  of  unrestrained  gratilicatiou 
of  every  desire,  until  the  [)Owcr  of  enjoyment  was  ex- 
hausted, without  the  least  regard  to  the  future  ;  and 
of  refusal  to  endure  any  present  pahi,  no  matter  how 
great  might  be  the  subsequent  advantage.  E'^cry  one 
must  see  that,  under  the  present  constitution,  such  a 
course  of  life  must  produce  nothing  but  individual  mis- 
cry. 

The  result  upon  society  would  be  its  utter  destruc- 
tion. It  would  render  every  man  a  ferocious  beast, 
bent  upon  nothing  bui  present  gratification,  utterly 
reckless  of  the  consequences  which  gratification  pro- 
duced upon  himself,  cither  directly  or  through  the 
instriuuentality  of  others,  and  reckless  of  the  havoc 
which  he  made  of  the  happiness  of  his  neighbor.  Now, 
it  is  manifest  that  tlie  result  of  subjecting  man  to  such 
a  principle  would  be  not  only  the  destruction  of  socie- 
ty, but  also,  in  a  few  years,  the  entire  destruction  of 
the  human  race. 

2.  Can  the  liappiness  of  man  be  best  promoted  by 
subjecting  all  his  impulses  to  self-love  ? 

It  may  be  observed  that  our  knowledge  of  the  future, 
and  of  the  results  of  the  things  around  us,  is  mani- 
festly insufficient  to  secure  our  own  happiness,  even 
by  tlie  most  sagacious  self-love.  When  we  give  up 
the  present  pleasure,  or  suffer  the  present  pain,  we 
murt,  from  necessity^  be  wholly  ignorant  whether  we 
Bhall  ever  reap  the  advantage  we  anticipate.  The 
system,  of  which  every  individual  forms  a  part,  was  not 
constructed  to  secure  the  happiness  of  any  single  indi- 
vidual ;  and  he  who  devises  his  plans  with  sob  refer- 
once  to  himself,  must  find  them  continually  tliwarted 
by  tliat  Omnipotent  and  Invidlsle  Agency  v.iiich  is 
overruling  all  things  upon  principles  directly  at  vari- 
ance with  those  which  he  has  adopted.  Inasmuch, 
then,  as  we  can  never  certainly  secure  to  ourselves  those 
results  which  self-love  anticipates,  it  seems  necessary 


THE  AUTHORITY  OF  CONSCIEKCE.  67 

that,  ill  order  to  derive  from  our  actions  the  happiness 
which  thoy  are  capable  of  producing,  they  involve  in 
themselves  some  clement,  irrespective  of  future  result, 
which  shall  give  us  pleasure,  let  the  result  be  what  it 
may. 

The  imperfection  of  self-love  as  a  director  of  conduct 
is  nobly  set  forth  in  Cardinal  Woolsey's  advice  to  Croitt* 
well : 

Mark  but  my  fall,  and  that  which  ruined  me. 
Cromwell,  1  cliar<je  thee  flin;?  away  ambition; 
Love  thyself  last.    Cherish  the  hearts  that  hate  thee. 

Be  just,  and  fear  not; 
Let  all  the  ends  thou  aim'st  at  be  thy  country's, 
Thy  God's,  and  truth's;  then,  if  thou  fall'st,  O  Cromwelll 
Thou  fall'st  a  blessed  martyr. 

Henry  VIIL,  Act.  iii.,  Scene  2. 

May  he  do  just Icef 
For  truth's  sake,  and  his  conscience ;  that  his  bones. 
When  he  has  run  his  course,  and  sleeps  in  blessings, 
May  have  a  tomb  of  orphans'  tears  wept  on  them." 

Jbid. 

For  care  and  trouble  set  j'^our  thought, 

Ev'n  when  3'our  end's  attained; 
And  all  j'our  plans  may  come  to  naught, 

When  every  nerve  is  strained. 

Burns  —  Epistle  to  a  Young  Friend, 

But,  mousie  1  thou  art  not  alone 

In  pi'o\'m<i foresight  may  be  vain: 
The  best  laid  schemes  of  nv'ie  and  men 

Gang  oft  agley. 
And  leave  us  nauc/ht  but  r/rief  and  pain 
For  promised  joy. 

Burns  —  On  turning  up  a  Mouse's  Nest. 

Besides,  a  man  acting  from  uncontrolled  self-lov* 
knows  of  no  other  object  than  his  own  happiness.  lU 
would  sacrifice  the  happiness  of  others  to  any  amount, 
how  great  soever,  to  secure  his  own,  in  any  amount, 
how  &:mall  soever.  Now,  suppose  every  individual  to 
act  in  obedience  to  this  principle  ;  it  must  produce  uni- 
versal war,  and  terminate  in  the  subjection  of  all  to  the 
dominiou  of  the  strongest,  and  in  sacrificing  the  happi- 


C8  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

ness  of  all  to  that  of  one ;  that  is,  producing  the  least 
amount  of  happiness  of  which  the  system  is  siisccptibie. 
And  still  more,  since  men  who  liave  acted  upon  this  princi- 
ple have  boon  proverbially  unhappy,  the  result  of  such  a 
course  of  conduct  is  to  render  ourselves  miserable  by  tlio 
misery  of  everij  one  else  ;  that  is,  its  tendency  is  to  the 
entire  destruction  of  happiness.  It  is  manifest,  tlien, 
that  the  highest  happiness  of  man  cannot  be  promoted 
by  subjecting  all  his  impulses  to  the  government  of  self- 
love. 

Lastly.  Suppose,  now,  all  the  impulses  of  man  to  be 
subjected  to  conscience. 

The  tendency  of  this  impulse,  so  far  as  this  subject  is 
concerned,  is,  to  restrain  the  appetites  and  passions  of 
man  within  those  limits  that  shall  conduce  to  his  hap- 
piness on  the  whole,  and  so  to  control  the  impulse  of 
self-love,  that  the  individual,  in  the  pursuit  of  his  own 
happiness,  shall  never  interfere  with  tlie  rightful  hap- 
piness of  his  neighbor.  Each  one,  under  sucli  a  system, 
and  governed  by  such  an  impulse,  would  enjoy  all  the 
happiness  which  he  could  create  by  the  use  of  the  pow- 
ers wliich  God  had  given  him.  AH  men  doing  thus, 
the  whole  would  enjoy  all  the  liappiness  of  whicli  their 
constitution  was  susceptible.  The  happiness  of  man  as 
an  individual,  and  as  a  society,  would  thus  be,  in  the 
best  conceivable  manner,  provided  for.  And  thus, 
under  the  relation  which  we  have  suggested,  —  that  is, 
conscience  being  supreme,  and  governing  both  self-love 
and  passion  ;  and  self-love,  where  no  higher  principle 
intervened,  governhig  passion,  —  man  individual  and 
man  universal,  considered  as  an  instrument  for  the 
production  of  happiness,  would  best  accomplish  the 
purpose  for  whicli  he  was  created.  This,  then,  is  the. 
:elation  between  his  powers,  which  was  designed  to  be 
sstablisbed  by  his  Creator. 

It  can  in  tlie  eame  manner  be  shown,  that  if  man, 
individual  and  universal,  be  considered  as  an  instru- 
ment for  the  production  of  power ^  this  end  of  his  crea- 
tion Can  be  accomplished  most  successfully  by  obedience 
to  tlie  relation  here  suggested  ;  that  is,  on  the  principle 


THE  CULTIVATIOX  OF  CONSCIENCE.  69 

thai  tlie  authority  of  conscience  is  supreme."*  This  is 
conclusively  shown  in  Butlers  Analo;:^!/^  Part  I.  Chap- 
ter 3.  And  thus,  let  anij  reasonable  end  he  sujigested 
ibr  which  it  may  he  su])poscd  tliat  man  has  been  crea- 
ted, and  it  will  be  found  that  this  end  can  be  best  at- 
tained by  the  subjection  of  every  other  impulse  to  that 
of  conscience  ;  nay,  that  it  can  be  attained  in  no  other 
way.  And  hence  the  argument  seems  conclusive,  that 
this  is  the  relation  intended  by  his  Creator  to  be  estab- 
lished between  his  faculties. 

If  the  preceding  views  be  correct,  it  will  follow : 

1.  If  God  has  given  man  an  impulse  for  virtue,  it  is 
/as  true  that  he  has  designed  him  for  virtue  as  for  any- 
thing else  ;  as,  for  instance,  for  seeing  or  for  hearing. 

2.  If  this  impulse  be  the  most  authoritative  in  his 
nature,  it  is  equally  manifest  that  man  is  made  for  vir- 
tue more  than  for  anything  else. 

3.  And  hence  he  who  is  vicious  not  only  acts  con- 
trary to  his  nature^  but  contrary  to  the  highest  impvlse 
of  his  nature  ;  that  is,  he  acts  as  mucli  in  opposition  to 
his  nature  as  it  is  possible  for  us  to  conceive. 


SECTION  IV. 


THE  CULTIVATION  OF  CONSCIENCE. 

Conscience  follows  the  general  law  by  which  the  im- 
provement of  all  our  other  faculties  is  regulated.  It  is 
strengthened  by  use;  it  is  impaired  by  disuse. 

Here  it  is  necessary  to  remark,  that,  by  use,  we  mean 
the  use  of  the  faculty  itself,  and  not  of  some  other  faculty, 

1  Vis  consili  expers,  mole  ruit  sua. 
Vim  temperatam,  di  quoque  provehunt 
In  majus;  Idem  odere  vires 
tksiue  Defofi  anitno  roovente^. 

UoB^CE.  LA.  8.  Qur  4 


70  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

This  is  so  plain  a  case,  that  it  seems  wonderful  tiiat  there 
should  have  been  any  mistake  concerning  it.  Every 
one  knows  that  the  arms  are  not  strengthened  by  using 
the  legs,  nor  the  eyes  by  ushig  the  cars,  nor  the  taste 
by  usiijg  the  understanding.  So  the  conscience  can  be 
strengthened,  not  by  using  the  memory,  or  the  taste,  or 
the  understanding ;  but  by  using  the  conscience,  and 
by  using  it  precisely  according  to  the  laws,  and  under 
the  conditions  designed  by  our  Creator.  The  conscience 
is  not  improved  by  the  reading  of  moral  essays,  nor  by 
committing  to  memory  moral  precepts,  nor  by  imagin- 
ing moral  vicissitudes  ;  but  by  hearkening  to  its  moni- 
tions, and  obeying  its  impulses. 

If  wo  reflect  upon  the  nature  of  the  monition  of  con- 
science, we  shall  find  that  its  office  is  of  a  threefold 
character. 

1.  It  enables  us  to  discover  the  moral  quality  of 
actions. 

2.  It  impels  us  to  do  right,  and  to  avoid  doing  wrong. 

3.  It  is  a  source  of  pleasure  when  we  have  done  riglit, 
and  of  pain  when  we  iiave  done  wrong. 

Let  us  ilhistrate  the  manner  in  which  it  may  be  im- 
proved and  injured  in  each  of  these  respects. 

I.  Of  the  improvement  of  the  discriminating  power 
of  conscience. 

1.  The  discriminating  power  of  conscience  is  improved 
by  reflecting  vpon  the  moral  character  of  our  actions, 
botli  before  and  after  we  have  performed  them.  If,  be- 
fore we  resolve  upon  a  course  of  conduct,  or  before  we 
suiror  ourselves  to  be  committed  to  it,  we  dehberately 
ask.  Is  this  ri^j^ht?  am  1  now  actuated  by  appetite,  by 
self-iove,  or  by  conscience  ?  we  shall  seldom  mistake 
the  path  of  duty.  After  an  action  has  been  performed, 
if  we  deliberately  and  impassionatcly  examine  it,  we 
may  without  difficulty  determine  whether  it  was  right 
or  wrong.  Now,  with  every  such  effort  as  this,  the  dis- 
criminating ])ower  of  conscience  is  strengthened.  We 
discyn  moral  dilferences  more  distinctly  ;  and  we  dis- 
tinguish between  actions  that  before  seemed  blended 
and  similar. 


L 


THE  CULTIVATION  OF  CONSCIENCE.  71 

2.  The  d  iscriminating  power  of  conscience  is  improved 
hj  meditating  upon  characters  of  preeminent  excellence, 
and  specially  upon  the  character  of  God  our  Creatoi*, 
and  Christ  our  Redeemer,  the  Fountain  of  all  moral 
excellence.  As  we  cultivate  taste,  or  our  susceptibility  to 
beauty,  by  meditating  upon  the  most  finished  specimens 
of  art  or  the  most  lovely  scenery  in  nature,  so  con- 
science, or  our  moral  susceptibility,  is  improved  by  mcd- 
itathig  upon  anything  eminent  for  moral  goodness.  It 
is  hence  that  example  produces  so  powerful  a  moial 
elTect ;  and  hence  that  one  single  act  of  heroic  virtue, 
as  that  of  Howard,  or  of  illustrious  self-denial,  gives  a 
new  impulse  to  the  moral  character  of  an  age.  Men 
cannot  reflect  upon  such  actions  without  the  production 
of  a  change  in  their  moral  susceptibility.  Hence  the 
effect  of  the  Scripture  representations  of  the  cliaracter 
of  God,  and  of  the  moral  glory  of  the  heavenly  state. 
The  Apostle  Paul  refers  to  this  principle  when  he  says, 
"  We  all,  with  open  face,  beholding  as  in  a  glass  the 
glory  of  tlie  Lord,  are  changed  into  the  same  image,  from 
glory  to  glory,  even  as  by  the  Spirit  of  the  Lord." 

On  the  contrary,  the  discriminating  power  of  con 
science  may  be  injured, 

1.  By  neglecting  to  reflect  upon  the  moral  character 
of  our  actions,  both  before  and  after  we  have  jjerformed 
them.  As  taste  is  rendered  obtuse  by  neglect,  so  that 
we  fail  to  distinguish  between  elegance  and  vulgarity, 
and  between  beauty  and  deformity ;  so,  if  we  yield  to 
the  impulses  of  passion,  and  turn  a  deaf  car  to  tho 
monitions  of  conscience,  the  dividing-line  between  right 
and  wrong  seems  gradually  to  become  obliterated.  We 
pass  from  the  confines  of  the  one  into  those  of  the  other 
with  less  and  less  sensation,  and  at  last  neglect  tho  dis- 
tinction altogether. 

Horace  remarks  this  fact : 

Fas  atqne  ncfas,  exigno  fine,  libidinnin 
Disceniunt  avidi. 

This  is  one  of  the  most  common  causes  of  the  grieT« 
ous  moral  imperfection  which  wo  everywhere  boliold. 


72  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

Men  act  without  moral  reflection.  Tlicy  will  ask,  re 
epoctiiig  ail  action,  every  question  before  that  mosi 
hnportant  one,  Is  it  riglit  ?  and  in  the  great  mnjorit}  . 
of  cases  act  without  putting  to  themselves  this  questioL 
at  all.  "•  The  ox  knoweth  his  owner,  and  the  ass  hit 
master's  crib  ;  but  Israel  doth  not  know,  my  people  at 
not  considcry  If  any  man  doubt  whetlier  this  be  true^ 
let  him  ask  liimself,  flow  large  is  tlie  portion  of  the  ac 
tions  which  I  i)erforni  upon  which  I  deliberately  decide 
wliether  they  be  right  or  Avrong  ?  And  on  how  large  s 
portion  of  my  actions  do  1  form  such  a  decision,  afte? 
they  have  been  performed  ?  For  the  want  of  this  re 
flection,  the  most  pernicious  habits  arc  daily  formed  or 
strengthened ;  and  when  to  the  power  of  habit  is  addeo 
the  seductive  influence  of  passion,  it  is  not  wonderful 
that  tlic  virtue  of  man  should  be  the  victim. 

2.  The  discriminating  power  of  conscience  is  impaired 
by  frequent  meditation  upon  vicious  character  and  ac 
tion.  By  frequently  contemplating  vice,  our  passions 
become  excited,  and  our  moral  disgust  diminishes. 

Thus,  also,  by  becoming  familiar  with  wicked  men, 
we  learn  to  associate  whatever  they  may  possess  of  intel 
Icctual  or  social  interest  with  their  moral  character ; 
and  hence  our  abhorrence  of  vice  is  lessened.  Thus, 
men  who  are  accustomed  to  view  habitually  any  vicious 
custom,  cease  to  have  their  moral  feelings  excited  hy 
beholding  it.  All  this  is  manifest  from  the  facts  made 
known  in  the  progress  of  every  moral  reformation.  0! 
Bo  delicate  a  texture  has  God  made  our  moral  nature, 
and  so  easily  is  it  either  improved  or  impaired.  Pope 
says,  truly : 

Vice  is  a  monster  of  so  frightful  mien. 
As,  to  be  dreaded,  needs  b  it  to  be  seen : 
But  seen  too  oft,  familiar  with  her  face, 
We  first  endure,  then  pity,  then  embrace. 

It  is  almost  unnecessary  to  remark  that  this  fact  will 
enable  us  to  estimate  the  value  of  much  of  our  reading, 
and  of  much  of  our  society.  Whatever  fills  the  me niory 
with  scenes  of  vice,  or  stimulates  the  imagination  to 


THE  CULTIVATION  OF  COXSCIEXCE.  73 

conceptions  of  impurity,  vulgarity,  profanity,  or  thought- 
lessness, must,  by  the  whole  of  this  effect,  render  us 
vicious.  /As  a  man  of  literary  sensibility  will  avoid  a 
badly-written  book,  for  fear  of  injuring  his  taste,  by  how 
much  more  should  we  dread  communion  with  any- 
thing wrong,  lest  it  should  contaminate  our  imagination, 
and  thus  injure  our  moral  sense ! 

II.  The  impulsive  power  of  conscience  is  improved  by 
^ase,  and  weakened  by  disuse. 

To  illustrate  this  law,  we  need  only  refer  to  the  ele> 
ments  of  man's  active  nature.  We  are  endowed  with 
appetites,  passions,  and  self-love,  in  all  their  various 
forms ;  and  any  one  of  them,  or  all  of  them,  may  at 
times  be  found  impelling  us  towards  actions  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  impulsion  of  conscience  ;  and,  of  course,  one 
or  the  other  impulse  must  be  resisted.  Now,  as  the  law 
of  our  faculties  is  universal,  that  they  are  strengthened 
by  use  and  weakened  by  disuse,  it  is  manifest  that, 
when  we  obey  the  impulse  of  conscience,  and  resist  the 
impulse  of  passion,  the  power  of  conscience  is  strength- 
ened ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  when  we  obey  the  impulse 
of  passion,  and  resist  that  of  conscience,  the  power  of 
passion  is  strengthened.  And,  yet  more,  as  cither  of 
these  is  strengtliened,  its  antagonist  impulse  is  weak- 
ened. Thus,  every  time  a  man  does  right,  he  gains  a 
victory  over  his  lower  propensities,  acquires  self-control, 
and  becomes  more  emphatically  a  freeman.  Every  time 
a  man  does  wrong,  that  is,  yields  to  his  lower  propen- 
sities, he  loses  self-control,  he  gives  to  his  passions  power 
over  him,  he  weakens  the  practical  supremacy  of  con- 
science, and  becomes  more  perfectly  a  slave.  The  de- 
sign of  the  Christian  religion  in  this  respect  is  to  bring 
us  under  the  dominion  of  conscience,  enlightened  by 
revelation,  and  to  deliver  us  from  the  slavery  of  evil 
propensity.  Thus,  our  Lord  declares,  "  If  the  Son  shall 
make  you  free,  ye  shall  be  free  indeed."  And,  on  the 
contrary,  "  Whosoever  committeth  sin,  is  the  servant 
[the  slave]  of  sin." 

Again.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  that  there  exists  a 
reciprocal  eonueotiou  bctweoii  the  use  of  the  di* 
7 


74  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

criminating  and  of  the  impulsive  power  of  conscience. 
The  more  a  man  reflects  upon  moral  distinctions,  the 
greater  will  be  the  practical  hifluence  which  he  will 
find  them  to  exert  over  him.  And  it  is  still  more 
decidedly  true,  that  the  more  implicitly  we  obey  the  im- 
pulsions of  conscience,  the  more  acute  will  be  its  power 
of  discrimination,  and  the  more  prompt  and  definite  its 
decisions.  This  connection  between  theoretical  knowl- 
edge and  practical  application  is  frequently  illustrated 
in  the  other  faculties.  He  who  delineates  objects  of 
lo^  eliness,  finds  the  discriminating  power  of  taste  to  im- 
prove. And  thus  also  this  effect,  in  morals,  is  frequently 
alluded  to  in  the  Scriptures. 

Our  Saviour  declares,  "  If  any  man  will  do  ais  will, 
he  shall  know  of  the  doctrine." 

Thus,  also,  "  Unto  him  that  hath  shall  be  gi/«in,  and 
he  shall  have  abundance  ;  but  from  him  that  irnth  not 
[that  is,  does  not  improve  what  he  has] ,  shall  o*^  taken 
away  even  that  which  he  hath." 

Thus,  also,  the  Apostle  Paul  :  "  I  beseech  yoi?  there- 
fore, brethren,  by  the  mercies  of  God,  that  ye  pi-esent 
your  bodies  a  living  sacrifice,  holy  and  acceptable  unto 
God,  which  is  your  rational  service  ;  and  be  ye  not  con- 
formed to  this  world,  but  be  ye  transformed  unto  the 
renewing  of  your  mind,  that  [^so  that,  to  the  end  thct^ 
ye  may  know  what  is  that  good,  and  acceptable,  and 
perfect  will  of  the  Lord." 

HI.  The  sensibility  of  conscience  as  a  source  of  pleaS' 
ure  or  ofpairiy  is  strengthened  by  use,  and  weakened  by 
disuse. 

The  more  frequently  a  man  does  right,  the  stronger 
is  his  impulse  to  do  right,  and  the  greater  is  the  pleas- 
ure that  results  from  the  doing  of  it.  A  liberal  man 
derives  a  pleasure  from  the  practice  of  charity,  of  which 
the  covetous  man  can  form  no  conception.  A  bene- 
ficent man  is  made  happy  by  acts  of  self-denial  and 
philanthropy,  while  a  selfish  man  performs  an  act  of 
goodness  by  painful  and  strenuous  efibrt,  and  merely  to 
escape  the  reproaches  of  conscience.  By  the  habitual 
••^fti-ciso  of  tho  Ixmevolent  aJOfections,  a  man   becomes 


THE  CULTIVATION  OF  CONSCIENCE.  75 

more  and  more  capacious  of  virtue,  capable  of  higher 
and  more  disinterested  and  more  self-denying  acts  of 
mercy, until  he  becomes  an  enthusiast  in  goodness,  lovhig 
to  do  good  better  tlian  anything  else.  And,  in  the  same 
manner,  the  more  our  affections  to  God  are  exercised, 
the  more  constant  and  profound  is  the  happiness  which 
they  create,  and  the  more  absolutely  is  eveiy  other  wish 
absorbed  by  the  single  desire  to  do  the  will  of  God.  Il- 
lustrations of  tliese  remarks  may  be  found  in  the  lives 
of  the  Apostle  Paul,  John  Howard,  and  other  philan- 
thropists. Thus,  it  is  said  of  our  Saviour,  "-  He  went 
about  doing  good."  And  he  says  of  himself,  "  Mf/  meat 
is  to  do  the  luill  of  Him  that  sent  me,  and  to  finish  his 
work." 

And  it  deserves  to  be  remarked,  that,  in  our  present 
dtate,  opportunities  for  moral  improvement  and  moral 
pleasure  are  incessantly  occurring.  Under  the  present 
conditions  of  our  being,  there  are  cvery\Yhere,  and  at 
all  times,  sick  to  be  relieved,  mourners  to  be  comforted, 
ignorant  to  be  taught,  vicious  to  be  reclaimed,  and  men 
by  nature  enemies  to  God  to  be  won  back  to  reconcili- 
ation to  Iiim.  The  season  for  moral  labor  depends  not, 
like  that  for  physical  labor,  upon  vicissitudes  beyond 
our  control :  it  depends  solely  upon  our  own  will.  This 
I  suppose  to  be  the  general  principle  involved  in  our 
Saviour's  remark  to  his  apostles  :  ''  Say  ye  not.  There 
are  four  months^  and  then  cometh  the  harvest  ?  Lift  up 
your  eyes,  and  look  upon  the  fields,  for  they  are  while 
alrtady  to  the  harvest^  That  is,  the  fields  are  always 
waitiijg  for  the  laborer  in  the  moral  harvest. 

And,  on  the  contrary,  the  man  who  habitually  vio- 
lates his  conscience,  not  only  is  more  feebly  impelled 
K)  do  riglit,  but  he  becomes  less  sensible  to  the  pain  of 
ioing  wrong.  A  child  feels  poignant  remorse  after  the 
drst  act  of  pilfering.  Let  the  habit  of  dishonesty  be 
formed,  and  he  will  become  so  hackneyed  in  sin,  tliat 
lie  will  perpetrate  robbery  with  no  other  feeling  tlian  the 
mere  fear  of  detection.  The  first  oath  almost  palsies 
tlie  tongue  of  the  stripling.  It  requires  but  a  few 
moiilh.«,  however,  to  transform  him  into  the  bold  aji4 


/ 


76  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

thoughtless  blaspliemcr.  The  mTirdcror,  after  the  death 
of  his  first  victim,  is  agitated  with  all  the  horrors  of 
guilt.  He  may,  however,  pursue  his  trade  of  blood 
until  he  have  no  more  feeling  for  man  than  the  butcher 
for  the  animal  which  he  slaughters.  Burk,  who  was  in 
tlie  habit  of  murdering  men  for  the  purpose  of  selling 
their  bodies  to  the  surgeons  for  dissection,  confessed 
this  of  himself.  Nor  is  this  true  of  individuals  alone. 
Whole  communities  may  become  so  accustomed  to 
deeds  of  violence,  as  not  merely  to  lose  all  the  milder 
sympathies  of  their  nature,  but  also  to  take  pleasure  in 
exhibitions  of  the  most  revolting  ferocity.  Sucli  was 
tlie  case  in  Rome  at  the  period  of  the  gladiatorial  con- 
tests ;  and  such  was  the  fact  in  Paris  at  the  time  of  the 
French  Revolution. 

This  also  serves  to  illuctrate  a  frequently  repeated 
aphorism,  Qucm  Deus  vult  perdere,prius  dementat.  As 
a  man  becomes  more  wicked,  he  becomes  bolder  in 
crime.  Unchecked  by  conscience,  he  ventures  upon 
more  and  more  atrocious  villany,  and  he  does  it  with 
less  and  less  precaution.  As  in  the  earliest  stages  of 
guilt  he  is  betrayed  by  timidity,  in  the  latter  stages  of 
it  he  is  exposed  by  recklessness.  lie  is  thus  discov- 
ered by  the  very  effect  which  his  conduct  is  produc- 
ing upon  his  own  mind.  Thus  oppressors  and  despots 
seem  to  rush  upon  their  own  rmn,  as  though  bereft  of 
reason.  Such  limits  has  our  Creator,  by  the  conditions 
of  our  being,  set  to  the  range  of  human  atrocity. 

Thus  we  see  that  by  every  step  in  our  progress  in 
virtue,  the  succeeding  step  becomes  less  difficult.  In 
proportion  as  we  deny  our  passions,  they  become  less 
imperative.  The  oftener  we  conquer  tliem,  the  less  is 
the  moral  effort  necessary  to  secure  the  victory,  and  the 
less  frequently  and  the  less  powerfully  do  they  assail 
us.  By  every  act  of  successful  resistance,  we  diminish 
the  tremendous  power  of  habit  over  us,  and  thus  be- 
come more  perfectly  under  the  government  of  our  own 
will.  Thus,  with  eveiy  act  of  obedience  to  conscience, 
our  character  is  fixed  upon  a  more  immovable  foundar 
fciou. 


TIIE  CULTIVATION  OF  CONSCIENCE.  77 

And,  on  the  contrary,  by  every  act  of  vicious  indul- 
gence, we  give  our  passions  more  uncontrolled  power 
over  us,  and  diminish  the  power  of  reason  and  of  con- 
science. Tlius,  by  every  act  of  sin,  we  not  only  incur 
new  guilt,  but  we  strengthen  the  bias  towards  sin  during' 
the  whole  of  our  subsequent  being.  Hence  every  vicious 
act  renders  our  return  to  virtue  more  difficult  and 
more  hopeless.  The  tendency  of  such  a  course  is  to 
give  to  habit  the  power  which  ought  to  be  exerted  by 
our  will.  And  hence  it  is  not  improbable  that  the  con 
ditions  of  our  being  may  be  such  as  to  allow  of  our 
arriving  at  such  a  state,  that  reformation  may  be  actu- 
ally impossible.  That  the  holy  Scriptures  allude  to 
such  a  condition  during  the  present  life,  is  evident. 
Such,  also,  is  probably  the  necessary  condition  of  the 
wicked  in  another  world. 

In  stating  the  cliange  thus  produced  upon  our  moral  ,r 
nature,  it  deserves  to  be  remarked,  that  this  loss  of  sen-  -^ 
sibility  is  probably  only  temporary.  There  is  reason  to 
believe  that  no  impressions  made  upon  the  human  soul 
during  its  present  probationary  state  are  ever  perma- 
nently erased. . .  Causes  operating  merely  upon  man's 
pliysical  nature  frequently  revive  whole  trains  of 
thought,  and  even  the  knowledge  of  languages  which 
had  been  totally  forgotten  during  the  greater  portion 
of  a  long  life.  This  seems  to  show  that  the  liability  to 
lose  impressions  once  made  upon  us  depends  upon  some 
condition  arising  from  our  material  nature  only,  and 
that  this  liability  will  cease  as  soon  as  our  present  mode 
of  existence  terminates.  ,  That  is  to  say,  if  the  power 
of  retaining  knowledge  is  always  the  same,  but  if  our 
consciousness  of  knowledge  is  veiled  by  our  material 
organs,  when  these  have  been  laid  aside,  our  entire  con- 
sciousness will  return.  Now,  indications  of  the  same 
nature  are  to  be  found  in  abundance  with  respect  to 
conscience.  Wicked  men,  after  having  spent  a  life  in 
prosperous  guilt,  and  without  being  in  trouble  like  other 
men,  are  frequently,  witliout  any  assignable  cause,  tor-  j 
nientcd  with  all  the  agonies  of  remorse  ;  so  that  the  / 
mere  consciousness  of  guilt  lias  become  absolutely  in- 


78  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

tolerable,  and  tlicy  have  perished  by  derangement  or  by 
Biiicido.  The  liorrors  of  a  licentious  sinner's  death-bed 
present  a  striking  illustration  of  the  same  solemn  fact. 
A  scene  of  this  sort  has  been  no  loss  vividly  than  accu- 
rately described  by  Dr.  Young,  in  the  death  of  Alta- 
mont.  All  these  things  should  be  marked  by  us  as 
solemn  warnings.  They  show  us  of  what  the  constitu 
tion  under  which  we  exist  is  capable  ;  and  it  is  in  forms 
like  these  that  the  "  coming  events"  of  eternity  "  cast 
tlicir  shadows  before.'* 

Tn  such  indexes, 

There  is  seen 
The  baby  figures  of  the  giant  mass 
Of  things  to  come  at  large. 

Shakspeasb. 


SECTION    V, 

BULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT,  DERIVED  FROM  THE  PRECEDING 
REMARKS. 

Several  plain  rules  of  conduct  are  suggested  by  the 
above  remarks,  which  may  more  properly  be  introduced 
here  than  in  any  other  place. 

I.  Before  you  resolve  upon  an  action,  or  a  course  of 
action, 

1.  Cultivate  the  habit  of  deciding  upon  its  moral 
character.  Let  the  first  question  always  be,  Is  this 
action  right  ?  For  this  purpose  God  gave  you  this  fiic- 
ulty.  If  you  do  not  use  it,  you  are  false  to  yourself 
and  inexcusable  before  God.  *  We  despise  a  man  who 
never  uses  his  reason,  and  scorn  him  as  a  fool.  Is  ho 
not  iniic'i  more  to  be  despised  who  neglects  to  use  a  fao- 
ully  of  so  much  higher  authority  than  reason  ?  :^And 
let  the  question, )ls  this  right?  be  as^ked /r^/,  before 
imagination  has  set  before  us  the  seductions  of  pleasure, 
or  any  step  has  been  taken  which  should  pledge  out 


Kl^CES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT.  79 

consistency  of  rAiaractar.   ,  If  we  ask  this  question  firsts 
it  can  generally  ))3  decided  with  case.    If  we  wait  until 
the  mind  is  agitited  and  harassed  by  contending  emo- 
tions, it  will  not  be  easy  to  decide  correctly. 
/•     2.  Remember  that  your  conscience  has  become  im- 
l  perfect   from  your   frequent  abuse   of  it.     Hence,  in 
Lmany  cases,  its  discrimination  will  be  indistinct.     In- 
stead of  decidu^g'^  it  will  frequently  only  doubt.     That 
doubt  should  be,  generally,  as  imperative  as  a  decision. 
)   When  you,  therefore,  doubt  respecting  the  virtue  of  an 
S   action,  do  not  perform  it  unless  you  as  much   doubt 
I   whether  you  are  at  liberty  to  refrain  from  it.     Thus 
saj's   President  Edwards,  in   one   of  his   resolutions: 
"Resolved,  nevci  to  do  anything  of  which  I  so  much 
question  the  lawfulness,  as  that  I  intend  at  the  same 
time  to  conside:*  nnd  examine  afterwards  whether  it  be 
lawful  or  not ;  except  I  as  much  question  the  lawfulness 
of  the  omission." 
/      3.  Cultivate  oi  all  occasions,  in  private  or  in  public, 
)  in  small  or  greal,  in  action  or  in  thought,  the  habit  of 
)   obeying  the  monitions  of  conscience  ;  all  other  things  to 
v_  the  contrary  not  ivitnstanding. 

Itf.  si  gh test  touches,  instant  pause; 

Debar  a' side  pretences; 
Anri  rcjolutcly  licep  its  laws, 

Uncaring  consequences. 

BUBNS. 

The*  supremacy  of  conscience  imposes  upon  you  the 
obligation  to  act  tluis.  You  cannot  remember,  in  the 
course  of  your  whole  life,  an  instance  in  which  you 
regret  having  obeyjd  it ;  and  you  cannot  remember  a 
'  single  instance  in  vrhich  you  do  not  regret  having  diso- 
beyed it.i  There  can  nothing  happen  to  you  so  bad  as 
to  have  done  wrorg :  there  can  nothing  be  gained  so 
valuable  as  to  ha/o  done  right,  f  And  remember  that  it 
is  only  by  cultivaUng  the  practical  supremacy  of  con- 
science over  cvjry  other  impulse  that  you  can  attain  to 
that  bold,  simplo,  manly,  elevated  character  which  is 
essential  to  true  g  /.'atness. 


THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 


This  has  been  frequently  taught  us,  even  by  the  hea- 
then poets : 

Virtus,  repulsae  nescia  sordidaB, 
Intaminatis  fulgct  honoribus : 
Nee  sumit  aut  ponit  secures 
Arbitrio  popularis  aurae : 

Virtus,  recludens  immeritis  raorl 
Coelum,  negata  tentat  iter  via; 
CcEtusque  vulgares  et  udam 
Spemit  humum  fugiente  penna. 

Horace,  Lib.  3,  Car.  2. 

A  greater  than  a  heathen  has  said,  "  If  thine  eye  bo 
single,  thy  whole  body  shall  be  full  of  light ;  "  and  has 
enforced  the  precept  by  the  momentous  question.  What 
shall  it  profit  a  man,  though  he  should  gain  the  whole 
world  and  lose  his  own  soul  ?  or  what  shall  a  man  give 
in  exchange  for  his  soul  ?  " 

II.  After  an  action  has  been  performed, 
1.  Cultivate  the  habit  of  reflecting  upon  your  actions, 
and  upon  the  intention  with  which  they  have  been  per- 
formed, and  of  thus  deciding  upon  their  moral  charac- 
ter. This  is  called  self-examination.  It  is  one  of  the 
most  important  duties  in  the  life  of  a  moral,  and  spe- 
cially of  a  probationary  being. 

'Tis  greatly  wise  to  talk  with  our  past  hours, 
And  ask  them  what  report  they  bore  to  heaven, 
And  how  they  might  have  borne  more  welcome  news. 

a.  Perform  this  duty  deliberately.  It  is  not  the  busi- 
ness of  hurry  or  of  negligence.  Devote  time  exclusively 
to  it.  Go  alone.  Retire  within  yourself,  and  weigh 
your  actions  coolly  and  carefully,  forgetting  all  other 
things  in  the  conviction  that  you  are  a  moral  and  an 
accountable  being. 

h.  Do  it  impartially.  Remember  that  you  are  liable 
to  be  misled  by  the  seductions  of  passion  and  the 
allurements  of  self-interest.  Put  yourself  in  the  place 
of  those  around  you,  and  put  others  in  your  own  place, 
and  remark  how  you  would  then  consider  your  actions. 


RULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT.  81 

Pay  great  attention  to  the  opinions  of  your  enemies : 
there  is  generally  foundation,  or  at  least  the  appearance 
of  it,  in  what  they  say  of  you.  But,  above  all,  take  the 
true  and  perfect  standard  of  moral  character  exhibited 
in  the  precepts  of  the  gospel,  and  exemplifieJ  in  the 
life  of  Jesus  Christ ;  and  thus  examine  your  conduct 
by  the  light  that  emanates  from  the  holiness  of  heaven. 
2.  Suppose  you  have  examined  yourself,  aixd  arrived 
at  a  decision  respecting  the  moral  characler  of  your 
actions. 

1.  If  you  are  conscious  of  having  done  right,  be 
thankful  to  that  God  who  has  mercifully  enabled  you  to 
do  so.  Observe  the  peace  and  serenity  which  fills  your 
bosom,  and  remark  how  greatly  it  overbalances  the  self- 
denials  which  it  has  cost.  Be  humbly  thankful  that  you 
have  made  some  progress  in  virtue. 

2.  If  your  actions  have  been  of  a  mixed  character,—^; 
that  is,  if  they  have  proceeded  from  motives  partly  good  \ 
and  partly  bad,  —  labor  to  obtain  a  clear  view  of  each,; 
and  of  the  circumstances  which  led  you  to  confound' 
them.     Avoid  tlie  sources  of  this  confusion  ;  and  when 
you  perform  thes  same  actions  again,  be   specially  on 
your  guard  against  the  influence  of  any  motive  of  which 
you  now  disapprove. 

3.  If  conscience  convicts  you  of  having  acted  wrongly, 

1.  Iveflect  upon  the  wrong;  survey  the  obligations 
which  you  have  violated,  until  you  are  sensible  of  your 
guilt. 

2.  Be  willing  to  suffer  the  pains  of  conscience.  Tliey 
are  the  rebukes  of  a  friend,  and  are  designed  to  v/itli- 
hold  you  from  the  commission  of  wrong  in  future. 
Neither  turn  a  neglectful  ear  to  its  monitions,  nor 
drown  its  voice  amid  the  bustle  of  business  or  the 
gayety  of  pleasure. 

3.  Do  not  let  the  subject  pass  away  from  your  thoughts 
until  you  have  come  to  a  settled  resolution  —  a  resolu- 
tion founded  on  moral  disapprobation  of  the  action  — 
never  to  do  so  any  more. 

4.  If  restitution  be  in  your  power,  make  it  without 
hesitation,  and  do  it  immediately.     The  least  that  a 


82  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

man  ought  tj  be  satisfied  witli,  who  has  done  wrong,  is 
to  repair  tlie  wrong  as  soon  as  it  is  possible. 

5.  As  every  act  of  wrong  is  a  sin  against  God,  seek 
in  humble  penitence  his  pardon  through  the  merits  and 
intercession  of  his  Son,  Jesus  Christ. 

G.  Remark  the  actions,  or  the  courses  of  thinking, 
which  were  the  occasions  of  leading  you  to  do  wrong. 
Be  specially  careful  to  avoid  them  in  future.  To  tliis 
efifect  says  President  Edwards :  '*•  Resolved,  that  when  I 
do  any  conspicuously  evil  action,  to  trace  it  back  till  I 
come  to  the  original  cause ;  and  then  both  carefully 
endeavor  lo  do  so  no  more,  and  to  fight  and  pray  with 
all  my  might  against  the  original  of  it." 

7.  Do  all  this  in  humble  dependence  upon  that  mer- 
ciful and  everywhere  present  Being  who  is  always  ready 
to  grant  us  all  the  assistance  necessary  to  keep  his  com- 
mandments, and  who  will  never  leave  us  nor  forsake 
us,  if  we  put  our  trust  in  him. 

It  seems,  then,  from  what  has  been  remarked,  that 
we  are  all  endowed  with  conscience,  or  a  faculty  for 
discerning  a  moral  quality  in  human  actions,  impelling 
us  towards  right,  and  dissuading  us  from  wrong  ;  and 
that  the  dictates  of  this  faculty  are  felt  and  known  to  be 
of  supreme  authority. 

The  possession  of  this  faculty  renders  us  accounta- 
ble creatures.  Without  it  we  should  not  be  specially  dis- 
tinguished from  the  brutes.  With  it,  we  are  brought 
into  moral  relations  with  God,  and  all  the  moral  intel- 
ligences in  the  universe. 

It  is  an  ever-present  faculty.  It  always  admonishes 
ns,  if  we  will  listen  to  its  voice,  and  it  frequently  does 
60  even  when  we  wish  to  silence  its  warnings.  Ilence 
we  may  always  know  our  duty,  if  we  will  but  inquire 
for  it.  AV^o  can,  therefore,  never  have  any  excuse  for 
doing  wrong,  since  no  man  need  do  wrong  unless  he 
chooses  ;  and  no  man  will  do  it  ignorantly,  unless  from 
criminal  neglect  of  the  faculty  which  God  has  given 
1dm. 

How  solemn  is  the  thought  that  we  are  endowed 
with  such  a  faculty,  and  that  we  can  never  be  disunited 


RULES  FOR  MORAL  CONDUCT.  83 

from  it !  It  goes  with  us  through  all  the  scenes  of  life, 
ill  company  and  alone,  admonishing,  warning,  reproving, 
and  recording ;  and,  as  a  source  of  happiness  or  of 
misery,  it  must  abide  with  us  forever.  Well  doth  it 
become  man,  then,  to  reverence  himself. 

And  thus  we  see  that  from  his  moral  constitution, 
/   were  there  no  other  means  of  knowledge  of  duty,  man 
^  is  an  accountable  creature.     Man  is  under  obligation  to 
1  obey  the  will  of  God,  in  ivhat  manner  soever  ngnified. 
\  That  it  is  signified  in  this  manner,  I  think  there  cannot 
/  be  a  question  ;  and  for  this  knowledge  he  is  justly  held 
/    responsible.     Thus  the  Apostle  Paul  declares,  that "  the 
I     Gentiles,  who  have  not  the  law,  are  a  law  unto  them- 
]    selves,  which  show  the  work  of  the  law  turillen  on  their     j 
I    hearts^  their  consciences  being  continually  excusing  or    / 
/    accusing  one  another."     IJow  much  greater  must  be    \ 
(     the  responsibility  of  those  to  whom  God  has  given  th©    / 
)    additioual  light  of  natural  and  revealed  religion  I 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE  NATURE  OF  VIRTUE. 

SECTION  I. 

OF  VIETUE  IN  GENERAL. 

It  has  been  already  remarked,  that  we  find  ourselves 
BO  constituted  as  to  stand  in  various  relations  to  all  tho 
beings  around  us,  especially  to  our  fellow-men  and  to 
God.  There  may  be,  and  there  probably  are,  other 
beings  to  whom,  by  our  creation,  we  are  related ;  but  we 
as  yet  have  no  information  on  the  subject ;  and  we  must 
wait  until  we  enter  upon  another  state, before  the  fact 
and  the  manner  of  the  fact  be  revealed. 

In  consequence  of  these  relations,  and  either  by  the 
appointment  of  God,  or  from  the  necessity  of  the  case, 
—  if,  indeed,  these  terms  mean  anything  different  from 
each  other,  —  there  arise  moral  obligations  to  exercise 
certain  affections  towards  other  beings,  and  to  act 
towards  them  in  a  manner  corresponding  to  those  afleo- 
tions.  -  Thus,  we  are  taught  in  the  Scriptures  that  tho 
relation  in  which  we  stand  to  Deity  involves  the  obli- 
gation to  universal  and  unlimited  obedience  and  love, 
and  that  the  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  each  other 
/  involves  the  obligation  to  love,  limited  and  restricted, 
/  and,  of  course,  to  a  mode  of  conduct  in  all  respects 
'  correspondent  to  these  affections. 

An  action  is  rig-Iit  when  it  corresponds  to  these  obli- 
gations, or,  which  is  the  same  thing,  is  the  carrying  into 
V  effect  of  these  affections.     It  is  wron^  when  it  is  in 


OF  VIRTUE  IN  GENEJJAL.  85 

violation  of  these  obligations,  or  is  the  carrying  into 
effect  any  other  affections. 

By  means  of  our  intellect  we  become  aware  of  the 
relations  in  which  we  stand  to  the  beings  with  whom  we 
are  connected.     Thus,  by  the  exertion  of  our  intellect- 

/  ual  faculties  we  become  acquainted  witli  the  existence 
and  attributes  of  God,  his  power,  his  wisdom,  his  good- 
ness ;  and  it  is  by  these  same  faculties  that  we  under- 
stand and  verify  those  declarations  of  the  Scriptures 
which  give  us  additional  knowledge  of  his  attributes, 
and  by  which  we  arrive  at  a  knowledge  of  the  condi- 
tions of  our  being  as  creatures,  and  also  of  the  various 
relations  in  which  we  stand  to  each  other. 

Conscience,  as  has  been  remarked,  is  that  faculty  by 
which  we  become  conscious  of  the  obligations  arising 

j  from  these  relations  ;  by  which  we  perceive  the  quality 
of  right  in  those  actions  which  correspond  to  these  obli- 
gations, and  of  wrong  in  those  actions  which  violate 
them,  and  by  which  we  are  impelled  towards  the  one 
and  repelled  from  the  other.,  It  is  manifestly  the  design 
of  this  faculty  to  suggest  to  us  this  feeling  of  obli- 
gation as  soon  as  the  relations  on  which  it  is  founded 

I  are  understood  ;   and  thus  to  excite  in  us  the  corre- 

■  spending  affections. 

f      Now,  in  a  perfectly  constituted  moral  and  intellect 

*7  Tial  being,  it  is  evident  that  there  would  be  a  perfect 
(adjustment  between  these  external  qualities  and  the 
internal  faculties.  K  perfect  eye  is  an  eye  that,  under 
the  proper  conditions,  would  discern  every  variety  and 
shade  of  color  in  every  object  which  it  was  adapted  to 
perceive.  The  same  remark  would  apply  to  our  hear- 
ing, or  to  any  other  sense.  So,  a  perfectly  constituted 
intellect  would,  under  the  proper  conditions,  discern  the 
relations  in  which  the  being  stood  to  other  beings  ;  and 
a  perfectly  constUnted  conscience  would  at  the  same 
time  become  conscious  of  all  the  obligations  which 
arose  from  such  relations,  and  would  impel  us  to  the 
corresponding  courses  of  conduct.  That  is,  there  would 
exist  a  perfect  adaptation  between  the  external  quali- 
ties which  were  addressed  to  these  faculties,  and  tlie 


66  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

faculties    themselves,  to   wliich   these    qualities   vi^itf^ 
addressed. 
^^     Hence,  iu   a  being  thus  perfectly  constituted,  it  is 
^manifest  that  virtue,  the  doia;^  of  rig-lU, or  obedience  to 
conscience,  would  mean  tlie  same  thhig. 
s  ,       When,  however,  we  speak  of  the  })ericction  of  a  mora) 
^/organization,  we  speak  of  the  perfectness  of  adjustment 
^  between  the  faculty  of  conscience  and  the  relations  and 
obligations  under  which  the  particular  being  is  created. 
Hence  this  very  perfection  admits  of  various  gradations 
and  modifications.     For  example : 

1.  The  relations  of  the  same  being  change,  during 
the   progress   of  its   existence,  from  infancy,  throiigli 

}  childliood  and  manhood,  until  old  age.     Tiiis  change 
]  of  relations  involves  a  change  of  obhgations ;  and  tlio 
j  perfection  of  its  moral  organization  would  consist  in 
c    the  perfect  adjustment  of  its  moral  faculty  to  its  moral 
1    relations,  throughout  the  whole  course  of  its  history. 
Now,  tlie  tendency  of  this  change  is,  manifestly,  from 
less  to  greater ;  tiiat  is,  from  less  imperative  to  more 
imperative,  and  f 'om  less  numerous  to  more  numerous 
obligations.  ,'That  is,  the  tendency  of  the  present  sys- 
tem is  to  render  beings  more  and  more  capacious  of 
virtue  and  of  vice,  as  far  as  we  are  permitted  to  have 
any  knowledge  of  them. 

2.  As  it  is  manifestly  impossible  for  us  to  conceive 
ii-  «!iiher  how  numerous  or  how  important  may  be  our 
/    I'elations  to  other  creatures  in  another  state,  or  how 

Ajiuch  more  intimate  may  be  the  relations  in  which  we 
shall  stand  to  our  Creator  ;  and  as  there  can  be  no 
limit  conceived  to  our  power  of  comprehending  these 
relations,  nor  to  our  power  of  becoming  conscious  of 
tlie  obligations  which  they  involve  ;  so  it  is  manifest 
that  no  limit  can  be  conceived  to  the  progress  of  man's 
capacity  for  virtue.  It  evidently  contains  within  itself 
elements  adapted  to  infinite  improvement,  in  any  state^ 
in  which  we  may  exist. 

3.  And  the  same  may  be  said  of  vice.     As  our  obliga^ 
tions  must,  from  what  we  already  know,  continue  to 

.  increase,  and  our  power  for  recognizing  them  must  also 


OF  VIRTUE  IN  DIPERFECT  BEIXGS.  87 

continue  to  increase,  if  we  perpetually  violate  them  we  be- 
come more  and  more  capable  of  wrong  ;  and  thus,  aL  o, 
become  more  and  more  intensely  vicious.  And  tlnis  l!ie 
very  elements  of  a  moral  constitution  seem  to  invulvo 
tlie  necessity  of  illimitable  progress,  either  hi  virtue  or 
m  vice,  so  long  as  we  exist. 

4.  And  as,  on  the  one  hand,  we  can  have  no  conccj)- 
(ion  of  the  amount  of  attainment,  both  in  virtue  and 
vice,  of  which  man  is  capable,  so,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
can  have  no  conception  of  the  delicacy  of  that  moraJ 
tinge  by  which  his  character  is  first  designated.  Wo 
detect  moral  cliaracter  at  a  very  early  age  ;  but  this  by 
no  means  proves  that  it  did  not  exist  long-  before  we 
detected  it.  llence,  as  it  may  thus  have  existed  before 
we  were  able  to  detect  it,  it  is  manifest  that  we  have  no 
elements  by  wliicli  to  determine  the  time  of  its  com- 
mencement. That  is  to  say,  in  general,  we  are  capable 
of  observing  moral  qualities  within  certain  limits,  as 
from  childhood  to  old  age  ;  but  this  is  no  manner  of 
indication  tliat  these  qualities  may  not  exist  in  the 
being,  both  before  and  afterwards,  in  degrees  greatly 
below  and  vastly  above  anythhig  which  we  are  capable 
Df  observino:. 


SECTION   II. 

OF  VIRTUE  IN  IMPERFECT  BEINGS. 

Part  I.  Let  us  now  consider  this  subject  in  relation 
to  a  being  whose  moral  constitution  has  become  dis- 
ordered. 

Now,  this  disorder  might  be  of  two  kinds  : 
1.  Lie  might  not  perceive  all  the  relations  in  which 
he  stood,  and  which  give  rise  to  moral  obligations,  and, 
of  course,  would  be  unconscious  of  the  corrcspoiidhiij 
obligations. 


88  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

2.  He  might  perceive  the  relation,  but  his  conscienco 
might  be  so  disordered  as  not  to  feel  the  obligation 
which  corresponded  to  it. 

What  shall  we  say  concerning  the  actions  of  such  a 
being  ? 

1.  Tlie  relations  under  which  he  is  constituted  are 
the  same,  and  the  obligations  arising  out  of  these  rela 
tions  are  the  same,  as  though  his  moral  constitution 
had  not  become  disordered. 

2.  His  actions  would  all  be  comprehended  under  two 
classes : 

1.  Those  which  came,  if  I  may  so  express  it,  within 
the  limit  of  his  conscience  ;  that  is,  tliose  in  which  liis 
conscience  did  correctly  intimate  to  him  his  obligation  ; 
and, 

2.  Those  in  which  it  did  not  so  intimate  it. 

Now,  of  the  first  class  of  actions,  it  is  manifest  that, 
where  conscience  did  correctly  intimate  to  him  his  obli- 
gations, the  doing  of  right  and  obedience  to  conscience 
would,  as  in  the  last  section,  be  equivalent  terms. 

But  what  shall  we  say  of  those  without  this  limit ; 
that  is,  of  those  which  he,  from  the  conditions  of  his 
being,  is  under  obligation  to  perform  ;  but  of  wliich, 
from  the  derangement  of  his  moral  nature,  he  does  not 
perceive  the  obligation  ? 

1.  Suppose  iiim  to  perform  these  very  actions,  there 
could  be  in  them  no  virtue  ;  for,  the  man  perceiving  in 
them  no  moral  quality,  and  having  towards  them  no 
moral  impulsion,  moral  obligation  could  be  no  motive 
for  performing  tliem.  He  might  act  from  passion,  or 
from  self-love  ;  but,  under  sucli  circumstances,  as  there 
is  no  moral  motive,  there  could  be  no  praiseworthiness. 
Thus,  for  a  judge  to  do  justice  to  a  poor  widow,  is  man- 
ifestly right ;  but  a  man  may  do  this  without  any  moral 
desert ;  for,  hear  what  the  unjust  judge  saith  :  "  Though 
I  fear  not  God^  nor  regard  man,  yet,  because  this  widow 
trovbleth  me,  I  will  avenge  her,  lest  by  her  continual 
coming  she  weary  me.'' 

It  doe?  not,  however,  follow  that  the  performing  of 
an  action  iu  this  manner  is  innocent.     The  relation  in 


OF  VIRTUE  IX  IMPERFECT  BEINGS.  69 

which  aboiiiff  stands  to  other  beings  involves  tho  obliga- 
tion to  certain  feelings,  as  well  as  the  acts  correspond- 
ent to  those  feelings.  If  the  act  bo  performed,  and  tho 
feeling  bo  wanting,  the  obligation  is  not  fnlhlled,  and 
the  man  may  be  guilty.  How  far  he  is  guilty  will  be 
seen  below. 

2.  But,  secondly,  suppose  him  not  to  perform  thoso 
actions  which  are,  as  we  have  said,  without  the  limit  of 
his  conscience.  In  how  far  is  the  omission  of  these  ac- 
tions, or  the  doing  of  the  contrary,  innocent  ?  That  is 
to  say,  is  the  impulse  of  conscience  in  a  morally  imper- 
fect being  the  limit  of  moral  obligation  ? 

This  will,  I  suppose,  depend  upon  the  following 
considerations  : 

1.  His  knowledge  of  the  relations  in  which  ho  stands. 
If  he  know  not  the  relations  in  which  he  stands  to 

others,  and  have  not  the  means  of  knowing  thein,  he  is 
guiltless.  If  he  know  them,  or  have  the  means  of  know- 
ing them,  and  have  not  improved  these  means,  he  is 
guilty.  This  is,  I  think,  the  principle  asserted  by  the 
Apostle  Paul  in  his  Epistle  to  the  Romans.  He  asserts 
that  the  lieathen  are  guilty  in  sinning  against  God,  be- 
cause his  attributes  may  he  known  by  the  light  of  nature^ 
He  also  asserts  tliat  there  will  be  a  difference  between 
the  condemnation  of  the  Jews  and  that  of  the  heathen, 
on  the  ground  that  the  Jews  were  informed  of  many 
points  of  moral  obligation,  whicli  the  heathen  could  not 
have  ascertained  without  a  revelation  :  "  Those  that  sin 
without  law  shall  perish  without  law ;  and  those  that 
have  sinned  in  the  law  shall  be  judged  by  the  law." 

2.  His  guilt  will  depend,  secondly,  on  the  cause  of 
this  imperfection  of  his  conscience. 

Were  this  imperfection  of  conscience  not  the  result 
of  his  OTSTi  act  he  would  be  guiltless.  But,  in  just  so 
far  as  it  is  the  result  of  his  own  conduct,  he  is  responsi- 
ble. And,  inasmuch  as  imperfection  of  conscience,  or 
diminution  of  moral  capacity,  can  result  from  nothing 
but  voluntary  transgression,  I  suppose  that  he  must  bo 
answerable  for  the  whole  amount  of  that  imperfection. 
We  have  already  seen  that  conscience  may  be  improved 
8* 


»0  TIIEOllETICAL  ETHICS. 

by  nso  and  injured  by  disuse,  or  by  abuse.  Now,  as  a 
man  is  entitled  to  all  the  benefits  which  accrue  Irom  the 
laithiul  improvement  of  his  conscience,  so  he  is  rcq)on- 
siblij  ibr  all  tlic  injury  that  results  from  the  abuse  of  it. 
That  this  is  the  fact,  is,  I  think,  evident  from  obvious 
consiidcralions: 

1.  It  is  well  known  that  the  repetition  of  wickedness 
produces  great  stupidity  of  conscience,  or,  as  it  is  fre- 
quently termed,  hardness  of  heart.  Lut  no  one  ever 
considers  this  stupidity  as  in  any  manner  an  excuse. 
It  is,  on  the  contrary,  always  held  to  be  an  aggravation 
of  crime.  Thus,  wo  term  a  man,  who  has  become  so 
accustomed  to  crime  that  he  will  commit  murder  with- 
out feeling  and  without  regret,  a  remorseless  murderer, 
a  colJrblooded  assassin  ;  and  every  one  knows  that  by 
these  epithets  we  mean  to  designate  a  special  and  addi- 
tional clement  of  guiltiness.  This  1  take  to  be  the 
universal  sentiment  of  man. 

2.  The  assertion  of  the  contrary  would  lead  to  results 
manifestly  erroneous. 

Snppose  two  men  of  precisely  the  same  moral  at- 
tainments, to-day,  to  commence  at  the  same  time  two 
courses  of  conduct  diametrically  opposed  to  each  other. 
The  first,  by  the  scrupulous  doing  of  right,  cultivates 
to  the  utmost  his  moral  nature,  and  increases  with 
every  day  his  capacities  for  virtue.  The  sphere  of  his 
benevolent  affections  enlarges,  and  the  activity  of  his 
moral  feelings  becomes  more  and  more  intense,  until 
he  is  fdled  with  the  most  ardent  denre  to  promote  the 
welfare  of  every  fellow-creature,  and  to  do  the  will  of 
God  with  his  whole  heart.  The  other,  by  a  continued 
course  of  crime,  gradually  destroys  the  susceptibility  of 
his  conscience,  and  lessens  his  capacity  for  virtue,  until 
his  soul  is  filljd  with  hatred  to  Cod,  and  no  other  feel- 
ing nf  ()!)ligatio:i  remains, except  that  of  fidelity  to  liii 
coj):irtners  in  guilt. 

Now,  at  the  expiration  of  this  period,  if  both  of  these 
men  should  act  according  to  what  each  felt  to  be  the 
dictate  of  conscience,  they  woidd  act  very  dilTerently. 
But  if  a  man  can  bo  under  obligation  to  do,  and  to 


or  VIRTUE  IN  niPEEFECT  BEINGS.        91 

Icavc3  undone,  nothing  but  what  his  conscience  at  a 
particular  moment  indicates,  I  do  not  see  but  t!iat  these 
men  would  be,  in  the  actions  of  that  moment,  equally 
innocent.  Tlio  only  diricrence  between  them,  so  lar  as 
the  actions  of  a  particular  moment  were  concerned, 
would  bo  t!ic  difrerencc  between  a  virtuous  man  and  a 
virtuous  child. 

From  these  facts  we  are  easily  led  to  the  distinction 
between  ri^ht  and  wron^,  and  innocence  and  guilt. 
R{^ht  and  wrong'  depend  upon  the  relations  under 
which  beings  are  created ;  and  hence  the  obligations 
resulting  from  these  relations  are,  in  their  nature,  fixed 
and  unchangeable.  Guill  and  innocence  depend  upon 
the  knowledge  of  these  relations,  and  of  the  )bligations 
arising  from  them.  As  these  are  manifestly  susceptible 
of  variation,  while  right  and  wrong  are  invariable,  the 
two  notions  may  manifestly  not  always  correspond  to 
each  other. 

Thus,  for  example,  an  action  may  be  wrong ;  but  if 
the  actor  have  no  means  of  knowing  it  to  be  wrong,  he 
is  held  morally  guiltless  in  the  doing  of  it.  Or,  agaiiij 
a  man  may  have  a  consciousness  of  obligation,  and  a 
sincere  desire  to  act  in  conformity  to  it,  and  may,  from 
ignorance  of  the  way  in  which  that  obligation  is  to  be 
discharged,  perform  an  act  in  its  nature  vrrong ;  yet,  if 
he  have  acted  according  to  the  best  of  his  possible 
knoivlcdg'e,  he  may  not  only  be  hold  guiltless,  but  even 
virtuous.  And,  on  the  contrary,  if  a  man  do  what  is 
actually  right,  but  without  a  desire  to  fulnl  the  obligar 
tion  of  which  he  is  conscious,  he  is  held  to  be  guilty; 
for  he  has  not  manifested  a  desire  to  act  in  obedience 
to  the  obligations  under  which  he  knew  himself  to  be 
created.  Illustrations  of  these  remarks  may  be  easily 
drawn  from  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life,  or  from  the 
Scriptures. 

And  hence  we  also  arrive  at  another  principle,  of 
importance  in  our  moral  judgments  ;  namely,  that  our 
own  consciousness  of  innocence,  or  our  not  being  con- 
scious of  guilt,  is  by  no  means  a  sufncient  proof  of  our 
innocence.    A  man  may  never  have  reflected  on  *ho 


92  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

relations  in  which  he  stands  to  other  men,  or  to  God ; 
and  hence  may  be  conscious  of  no  feehng  of  obhgation 
toward  either,  in  any  or  in  particular  respects.  This 
may  be  the  fact ;  but  his  innocence  would  not  be  estab- 
lished unless  he  can  also  show  that  he  has  faithfully 
and  impartially  used  all  the  powers  which  God  has 
giv^en  him  to  obtain  a  knowledge  of  these  relations. 
Or,  again,  he  may  understand  the  relation,  and  have 
no  corresponding  sensibility.  This  may  be  the  fact ; 
but  his  innocence  would  not  be  established  unless  htJ 
can  also  show  that  he  has  always  faithfully  and  honestly 
obeyed  his  conscience,  so  that  his  moral  insensibility  is 
in  no  manner  attributable  to  his  own  acts.  Until  these 
things  can  bo  shown,  the  want  of  consciousness  of  guilt 
will  be  no  proof  of  innocence.  To  this  principle,  if  I 
mistake  not,  the  Apostle  Paul  alludes,  in  1  Cor.  iv.  3, 
4 :  "  But  with  me  it  is  a  very  small  thing  to  be  judged 
of  you,  or  of  man's  judgment ;  yea,  I  judge  not  my 
own  self,  for  I  know  nothing  of  my  own  self  [or,  rather, 
I  am  conscious  of  nothing  wrong  in  myself;  that  is,  of 
no  imfaithfulness  in  oflQco]  ;  yet  ani  I  not  hereby  justi- 
fied: but  hej;hat  judgeth  me  is  the  Lord."  And  thus 
a  man  may  do  great  wrong,  and  be  deeply  guilty  in 
respect  to  a  whole  class  of  obligations,  without  being  in 
any  painful  degree  sensible  of  it.  Such  I  think  to  bo 
the  moral  state  in  which  men  in  general  are  in  respect 
to  their  obligations  to  God.  Thus  saith  our  Saviour  to 
the  Jews :  "  I  know  you,  that  ye  have  not  the  love  of 
God  in  you;'''*  while  they  were  supposing  themselves 
to  be  the  special  favorites  of  Heaven. 

Paut  II.  From  these  remarks  we  may  also  learn  the 
relation  in  which  being-s,  created  as  we  are,  stand  to 
moral  law. 

Man  is  created  with  moral  and  intellectual  powers, 
capable  of  progressive  improvement.  Ilence,  if  he  use 
liis  faculties  as  he  ought,  he  will  progressively  improv^e  ; 
that  is,  become  more  and  more  capable  of  virtue.  He 
is  assured  of  enjoying  all  the  benelits  which  can  result 
from  such  improvement.     If  he  use  these  faculties  as 


.      OF  VIRTUE  IH  Dn»ERFECT  BEINGS.  93 

ho  ought  not,  and  becoms  less  and  less  capalolo  of  virtiio. 
he  is  hence  held  responsible  for  all  the  consequences  of 
his  misimproYcment. 

Now,  as  this  misimprovement  is  his  own  act,  for  which 
he  is  responsible,  it  manifestly  does  not  affect  the  rela- 
tions under  which  he  is  created,  nor  the  obligations 
resulting  from  these  relations  ;  that  is,  he  stands  in 
respect  to  the  moral  requirements  under  which  he  is 
created,  precisely  in  the  same  condition  as  if  he  had 
always  used  his  moral  powers  correctly.  That  is  to  say, 
under  the  present  moral  constitution,  every  man  is 
justly  held  responsible,  at  every  period  of  his  existence, 
for  that  degree  of  virtue  of  which  he  would  have  been 
capable  had  he  from  tlie  first  moment  of  his  existence 
improved  his  moral  nature  in  every  respect  just  as  he 
ought  to  have  done.  In  other  words,  suppose  some 
human  being  to  have  always  lived  thus,  (Jesus  Christ, 
for  instance),  every  man,  supposing  him  to  have  the 
same  means  of  knowing  his  duty,  would  at  every  suc- 
cessive period  of  his  existence  be  held  responsible  for 
the  same  degree  of  virtue  as  such  a  perfect  being  at- 
tained to  at  tiie  corresponding  periods  of  his  existence. 
Such  I  think  evidently  to  be  tiie  nature  of  the  obligation 
which  must  rest  upon  such  beings  throughout  the 
whole  extent  of  their  duration. 

In  order  to  meet  this  increasing  responsibility  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  fulfil  the  requirements  of  moral  law,  a 
being  under  such  a  constitution  must  at  every  moment 
of  his  existence  possess  a  moral  faculty,  which,  by  per- 
fect previous  cultivation,  is  adapted  to  the  responsibili- 
ties of  that  particular  moment.  But  suppose  tliis  not 
to  have  been  the  case,  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  his 
moral  faculty,  by  once  doing  wrong,  has  become  im- 
paired, so  that  it  either  does  not  admonish  him  correctly 
of  his  obligations,  or  that  he  has  become  indisposed 
to  obey  its  monitions.  Tliis  failure  must  at  the  next 
moment  terminate  in  action  more  at  variance  with  reo- 
titude  than  before.  The  adjustment  between  conscience 
and  the  passions  must  become  deranged  :  and  thus 
the  tendency,  at  every  suceossivo  moment,  must  bo  to 


94  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

involve  liim  in  deeper  and  deeper  guilt.  And  unless 
50in3  other  moral  ibrco  bo  exerted  in  the  case,  such 
inuj^^t  be  the  tendency  forever. 

And  suppose  some  such  force  to  be  exerted,  and  at 
any  period  of  his  existence  the  being  begin  to  obey 
his  coiisciei  ^e  in  every  one  of  its  present  monitions.  It 
is  manifest  that  he  would  now  need  some  otlier  and 
more  perfect  guide,  in  order  to  inform  him  perfectly  of 
his  obligations,  and  of  the  mode  in  which  tliey  were  to 
bo  fulalled.  And  suf»posing  this  to  be  done:  as  he  is 
at  this  moment  responsible  for  such  a  capacity  for  vir- 
tue as  would  have  been  attained  by  a  previoustij  perfect 
rectitude^  and  as  his  capacity  is  inferior  to  this,  and  as 
no  reason  can  be  suggested  why  his  progress  in  virtue 
should,  under  tlie:*o  circumstances,  be  more  rapid  than 
tliat  of  a  perfect  being,  but  the  contrary  ;  it  is  manifest 
that  he  must  ever  fall  short  of  what  is  justly  required 
of  liim  ;  nay,  that  he  must  be  continually  fallhig  further 
and  further  behind  it. 

And  hence  the  present  constitution  tends  to  show  us 
the  remediless  nature  of  moral  evil  under  the  govern- 
ment of  God,  unlci^s  some  other  principle  than  that  of 
law  be  admitted  into  the  case.  These  conditions  of 
being  having  been  violated,  unless  man  be  placed 
inder  some  other  conditions^  natural  religion  would 
lead  us  to  believe  that  he  must  sulfer  the  penalty, 
whatever  it  be,  of  wrong.  Penitence  could  in  no  man- 
ner alter  his  situation  ;  for  it  is  merely  a  temper  justly 
demanded  in  consequence  of  his  sin.  But  tliis  could 
not  replace  him  in  his  original  relation  to  the  law  which 
had  bcejx  violated.  Such  seem  to  be  the  teachings  of 
the  holy  Scrij>tures  ;  and  they  seem  to  me  to  declare, 
moreover,  that  this  change  in  the  conditions  of  our 
being  has  been  accomplished  by  the  mediation  of  a.  Re- 
deemer, by  which  change  of  conditions  we  may,  through 
the  oi)ediencc  of  another,  be  justified  (that  is,  treated 
is  though  just),  altliougli  wo  are  by  confession  guilty. 

And  hence,  although  it  were  sliown  that  a  man  was 
It  any  particular  period  of  his  being  incapable  of  that 
degree  of  virtue  which   the  law  of  God  required,  it 


OF    TinTUE  IN  DIPERFECT  BEINGS.  95 

Fould  neither  follow  that  he  was  not  under  obligation  to 
exercise  it,  nor  that  he  was  not  rcsponeiblo  for  the  whole 
amount  of  that  exercise  of  it ;  since,  if  he  liave  dwarfed 
his  own  powers,  he  is  losponsible  for  tlie  result.  And, 
conversely,  if  God  require  this  whole  amount  of  virtue, 
it  will  not  })rove  that  man  is  now  capable  of  exercising 
it;  but  only  that  he  is  cither  thus  capable,  or  that  ho 
would  have  been  so  if  ho  had  used  correctly  the  powera 
which  God  gave  him. 

Part  III.  A  few  suggestions  respecting  tlio  moral 
relations  of  habit  will  close  this  discussion. 

Some  of  the  most  important  facts  respecting  habit 
are  the  following : 

It  is  found  to  be  the  fact  that  the  repetition  of  any 
physical  act  at  stated  periods,  and  especially  after  brief 
intervals,  renders  the  performance  of  the  act  easier ;  it 
is  accomplished  in  less  time,  with  less  elTort,  with  less 
expense  of  nervous  power,  and  of  mental  energy.  This  is 
exemplified  every  day  in  the  acquisition  of  the  mechan- 
ical arts,  and  in  learning  the  rudiments  of  music.  And 
whoever  will  remark,  may  easily  be  convinced  that  a 
great  part  of  our  education,  physical  and  intellectual, 
in  so  far  as  it  is  valuable,  consists  in  the  formation  of 
habits. 

The  same  remarks  apply,  to  a  very  considerable  ex 
tent,  to  moral  habits. 

The  repetition  of  a  virtuous  act  produces  a  tendency 
to  continued  repetition ;  the  force  of  opposing  motives 
is  lessened  ;  the  power  of  the  will  over  passion  is  moro 
decided  ;  and  the  act  is  accomplished  with  less  moral 
effort.  Perhaps  we  should  express  the  fact  truly  by 
saying  that  by  the  repetition  of  virtuous  arts  noral 
power  is  gained,  while  for  the  performance  of  the  same 
acts  less  moral  power  is  required. 

On  the  contrary,  by  the  repetition  of  vicious  aots,  a 
tendency  is  created  towards  such  rejietition  ;  the  power 
of  the  passions  is  increased  ;  the  power  of  opposing 
I'orccs  is  diminished,  and  the  resistance  to  passion 
reqiiiros  a  greater  moral  effort ;  or,  as  in  the  contrary 


9G  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

of  the  preceding  case,  a  greater  moral  effort  is  required 
to  resist  our  passions,  while  the  moral  power  to  resist 
them  is  diminished. 

Now,  the  obvious  nature  of  such  a  tendency  is  to 
arrive  at'  a  fixed  and  unalterable  moral  state.  Be  the 
fact  accounted  for  as  it  may  I  think  that  habit  has 
Buch  an  effect  upon  the  will,  as  to  establish  a  tendency 
towards  the  impossibility  to  resist  it.  Thus  the  practice 
of  virtue  seems  to  tend  towards  rendering  a  man  inca- 
pable of  vice,  and  the  practice  of  vice  towards  rendering 
a  man  incapable  of  virtue.  It  is  common  to  speak  of 
a  man  as  incapable  of  meanness  ;  and  I  think  we  see 
men  as  often,  in  the  same  sense,  incapable  of  virtue. 
And  if  I  mistake  not,  we  always  speak  of  the  one  inca- 
pacity as  an  object  of  praise,  and  of  the  other  as  an 
object  of  blame. 

If  we  inquire  what  are  the  moral  effects  of  such  a 
condition  of  our  being,  I  think  we  shall  find  them  to  be 
as  follows : 

1.  Habit  cannot  alter  the  nature  of  an  action,  as 
riglit  or  wrong.  It  can  alter  neither  our  relations  to 
our  fellow-creatures  nor  to  God,  nor  the  obligations 
consequent  upon  those  relations.  Hence  tlic  character 
of  the  action  must  remain  unaffected. 

2.  Nor  can  it  alter  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  actor. 
As  he  who  acts  virtuously  is  entitled  to  the  benefit  of 
virtuous  action,  among  which  tlie  tendency  to  virtuous 
action  is  included,  so  he  who  acts  viciously  is  responsible 
for  all  the  consequences  of  vicious  action,  the  corre- 
spondent tendency  to  vicious  action  also  included.  The 
conditions  being  equal,  and  he  being  left  to  his  own  free 
choice,  the  consequences  of  cither  course  rest  justly 
upon  himself. 

Tlie  final  causes  of  such  a  constitution  are  also 
apparent. 

1.  It  is  manifestly  and  precisely  adapted  to  our  pres- 
ent state,  when  considered  as  probationary,  and  capable 
of  moral  changes,  and  terminating  in  one  where  moral 
change  is  impossible.  The  constitution  under  wliich 
we  are  placed  presents  us  wiih  the  apparent  paradox 


OF  VIRTUE  IK   IMPERFECT  BEINGS.  97 

of  a  state  of  incessant  moral  change,  in  wliicli  e?ery 
individual  change  has  a  tendency  to  produce  a  state  that 
is  unchangeable. 

2.  The  fact  of  such  a  constitution  is  manifestly  in- 
tended to  present  the  strongest  possible  incentives  to 
virtue,  and  monitions  against  vice.  It  teaches  us  that 
consequences  are  attached  to  every  act  of  both,  not  only 
present  but  future,  and,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  intermin- 
able. As  every  one  can  easily  estimate  the  pleasures 
of  vice  and  the  pains  of  virtue,  both  in  extent  and  du- 
ration ;  but  as  no  one,  taking  into  consideration  the 
results  of  the  tendency  which  each  will  produce,  can 
estimate  the  interminable  consequences  which  must 
arise  from  either,  —  there  is,  therefore,  hence  derived 
the  strongest  possible  reason  why  we  should  always  do 
right  and  never  do  wrong. 

A  3.  And  again.  It  is  evident  that  our  capacity  for 
increase  in  virtue  depends  greatly  upon  the  present 
constitution  in  respect  to  habit.  I  have  remarked  that 
the  effect  of  the  repetition  of  virtuous  action  was  to 
give  us  greater  moral  power,  while  the  given  action 
itself  required  less  moral  effort.  There  hence  arises,  if 
I  may  so  say,  a  surplus  of  moral  power,  which  may  be 
applied  to  the  accomplishment  of  greater  moral  achieve- 
ments. 1  He  who  has  overcome  one  evil  temper  has 
acquired  moral  power  to  overcome  another,  and  that 
which  was  first  subdued  is  kept  in  subjection  witliout  a 
struggle.  ^He  who  has  formed  one  habit  of  virtue, 
practises  it  without  effort  as  a  matter  of  course,  or  of 
original  impulse  ;  and  the  power  thus  acquired  may  be 
applied  tp  the  attainment  of  other  and  more  difficult 
liabits,  and  the  accomplishment  of  higher  and  more 
arduous  moral  enterprises.  He  who  desires  to  see  the 
influence  of  habit  illustrated  with  great  beauty  and  ac- 
curacy, will  be  gratified  by  the  perusal  of  "  The  Hermit 
of  Teneriffe,"  one  of  the  most  delightful  allegories  to 
be  found  in  the  English  language.^ 

The  relation  between  the  moral  and  the  intellectual 


1  Johnson's  Works,  Vol.  xi.,  p.  833.    Murphy's  edition. 
d 


98  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

powers,  in  the  moral  conditions  of  our  being,  may  be 
thus  briefly  stated : 

1.  We  are  created  under  certain  relations  to  our  Cre- 
ator and  to  our  fellow-creatures. 

2.  We  are  created  under  certain  obligations  to  our 
Creator  and  our  fellow-creatures,  in  consequence  of 
tliese  relations,  —  obligations  to  exercise  certain  affec- 
tions, and  to  maintain  courses  of  action  correspondent 
to  those  affections. 

3.  By  means  of  our  intellectual  powers  we  perceive 
these  relations. 

4.  By  means  of  our  moral  powers  we  become  con- 
scious of  these  obligations. 

5.  The  consciousness  of  these  obligations  alone  would 
not  always  teach  us  how  they  were  to  be  discharged ; 
as,  for  example,  the  consciousness  of  our  obligations  to 
God  would  not  teach  us  how  God  should  be  worshipped, 
and  so  in  various  other  cases.  It  is  by  the  use  of  the 
powers  of  our  intellect  that  we  learn  how  these  moral 
affections  are  to  be  caried  into  action.  The  use  of  the 
intellect  is,  therefore,  twofold  :  first,  to  discover  to  us 
our  relations ;  secondly,  to  discover  m  what  manner 
our  obligations  are  to  be  discharged. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

HUMAN  HAPPINESS. 

We  have  already,  on  several  occasions,  alluded  to  the 
fact  that  God  has  created  every  thing  double  —  a  world 
w^ithout  us,  and  a  correspondent  world  within  us.  Ho 
has  made  light  without,  and  the  eye  within;  beauty 
«7ithout,  and  taste  within  ;  moral  qualities  in  actions, 
and  conscience  to  judge  of  them ;  and  so  of  every  other 
case.  By  means  of  this  correspondence,  our  communi- 
cation with  the  external  world  exists. 
These  internal  powers  are  called  into  exercise  by  the 

/presence  of  their  correspondent  external  objects.  Thus 
the  organ  of  vision  is  excited  by  the  presence  of  light, 
the  sense  of  smell  by  odors,  the  faculty  of  taste  by 
beauty  or  by  deformity,  and  so  of  the  rest. 

j     The  first  effect  of  this  exercise  of  these  faculties  is, 

S  that  we  are  conscious  of  the  existence  and  qualities  of 
eurrounding  objects.  ^Thus  by  sight  we  become  con- 
scious of  the  existence  and  colors  of  visible  objects  ;  by 
Clearing,  of  the  existence  and  sound  of  audible  objects,  etc. 
<    But  it  is  manifest  that  this  knowledge  of  the  exist- 

'  ence  and  qualities  of  external  objects  is  far  from  being 
all  the  intercourse  which  we  are  capable  of  holding  with 
them.  -^This  knowledge  of  their  existence  and  qualities 
IS  most  n-equently  attended  with  pleasure  or  pain,  desire 
or  aversion,  ^ometimes  the  mere  perception  itself  is 
immediately  pleasing ;  in  other  cases,  it  is  merely  the 
sign  of  some  other  quality  which  has  the  power  of 
pleasing  us.  In  the  first  case,  the  perception  produces 
gratification  ;  in  the  other,  it  awakens  desire. 

That*  is,  we  stand  in  such  relations  to  the  external 
world,  tliat  certaiu  objects,  besides  being  capable  of 


UNIVERSITY  OF  REDUNDS  LIBRARY 

100  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

being  perceived,  are  also  capable  of  giving  us  plea«tiie ; 
and  certain  other  objects,  besides  being  perceived,  are 
capable  of  giving  us  pain.  Or,  to  state  the  same  truth 
in  the  other  form,  we  are  so  made  as  to  be  capable  not 
only  of  perceiving,  but  also  of  being  pleased  with,  o^' 
pained  by,  the  various  objects  by  which  we  are  sur- 
rounded. 

This  general  power  of  being  pleased  or  pained,  may 
be,  and  I  think  frequently  is,  termed  sensitiveness. 

This  sensitiveness,  or  the  power  of  being  made  happy 
by  surrounding  objects,  is  intimately  connected  with  the 
exercise  of  our  various  faculties.  Thus  the  pleasure 
of  vision  cannot  be  enjoyed  in  any  other  manner  than 
by  the  exercise  of  the  faculty  of  sight.  The  pleasure 
of  knowledge  can  be  enjoyed  in  no  other  way  than  by 
the  exercise  of  the  intellectual  powers.  Tlie  pleasure 
of  beauty  can  be  enjoyed  in  no  other  manner  than  by 
the  exercise  of  the  faculty  of  taste,  and  of  the  othei 
subordinate  faculties  on  which  this  faculty  depends. 
And  thus,  in  general,  our  sensitiveness  derives  pleasure 
from  the  exercise  of  those  powers  which  are  made  neces- 
sary for  our  existence  and  well-being-  in  our  present 
state. 

Now,  I  think  that  we  can  have  no  other  idea  of  hap- 
piness than  the  exercise  of  this  sensitiveness  upon  lU 
corresponding  objects  and  qualities.  It  is  the  gratitiCtSr 
lion  of  desire,  the  enjoyment  of  what  we  love ;  o*-,  a^ 
Dr.  Johnson  remarks,  "  Ilappiness  consists  in  the  mal- 
tiplication  of  agreeable  consciousness." 

It  seems,  moreover,  evident  that  this  very  constitution 
is  to  us  an  indication  of  the  will  of  our  Creator  ;  thai 
is,  inasmuch  as  he  has  created  us  with  these  capacities 
for  happiness,  and  has  also  created  objects  around  us 
precisely  adapted  to  these  capacities,  he  meant  that  the 
one  should  be  exercised  upon  the  other ;  that  is,  that 
we  should  be  made  happy  in  this  manner. 

And  this  is  more  evident,  from  considering  that  this 
happiness  is  intimately  connected  witli  the  exercise  of 
those  faculties,  the  employment  of  which  is  necessary 
to  our  existence  and  our  well-being.     It  thus  becomes 


HUMAN  HAPPINESS.  >      ^101 

the  incitement  to  or  the  reward  of  certain  courses  of 
conduct,  which  it  is  necessary  to  our  own  welfare  or  to 
that  of  society  that  we  should  pursue. 

And  thus  we  arrive  at  the  general  principle,  that  our 
desire  for  a  particular  object,  and  the  existence  of  the 
object  adapted  to  this  desire,  is  in  itself  a  reason  why 
we  should  enjoy  that  object,  in  the  same  manner  as  our 
aversion  to  another  object  is  a  reason  why  we  should 
avoid  it.  There  may  sometimes  be,  it  is  true,  other 
reasons  to  the  contrary,  more  authoritative  than  that 
emanating  from  this  desire  or  aversion,  and  these  may 
and  ought  to  control  it ;  but  this  does  not  show  that 
this  desire  is  not  a  reason,  and  a  sufficient  one,  if  no 
better  reason  can  be  shown  to  the  contrary. 

But,  if  we  consider  the  subject  a  little  more  minutely, 
we  shall  find  that  the  simple  gratification  of  desire  in 
the  manner  above  stated  is  not  the  only  condition  on 
which  our  happiness  depends. 

We  find  by  experience  that  a  desire  or  appetite  may 
be  so  gratified  as  forever  afterwards  to  destroy  its  power 
of  producing  happiness.  Thus,  a  certain  kind  of  food 
is  pleasant  to  me  ;  this  is  a  reason  why  I  should  partake 
of  it.  But  I  may  eat  of  it  to  excess,  so  as  to  loathe  it 
forever  afterwards,  and  thus  annihilate  in  my  constitu- 
tion this  power  of  gratification.  >  Now,  the  same  reason- 
ing which  proves  that  God  intended  me  to  partake  of 
this  food,  namely,  because  it  will  promote  my  happiness, 
also  proves  that  he  did  not  intend  me  to  partake  of  it 
afte^r  this  manner;  for  by  so  doing  I  have  diminished 
by  this  whole  amount  my  capacity  for  happiness,  and 
thus  defeated,  in  so  far,  the  very  end  of  my  constitution. 
Or,  again,  though  I  may  not  destroy  my  desire  for  a 
particular  kind  of  food  by  a  particular  manner  of  grat- 
ification, yet  I  may  so  derange  my  constitution  that  the 
eating  of  it  shall  produce  pain  and  distress,  so  that  it 
ceases  to  be  to  me  a  source  of  happiness  upon  the  whole. 
In  this  case  I  equally  defeat  the  design  of  my  constitu- 
tion. The  result  equally  shows  that,  although  the  Cre- 
ator means  that  I  should  eat  it,  he  does  not  mean  that 
I  should  eat  it  beyond  a  certain  limit. 
9* 


£02'  fHEOTftetlCAL  ETHICS. 

Again,  every  man  is  created  with  various  and  dissim- 
ilar forms  of  desire,  correspondent  to  the  different  exter- 
nal objects  designed  to  promote  his  happiness.  Now,  it 
is  found  that  one  form  of  desire  may  be  gratified  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  destroy  the  power  of  receiving  happiness 
from  another ;  or,  on  the  contrary,  the  lirst  may  be  so 
gratified  as  to  leave  the  other  powers  of  receiving  hap- 
piness unimpaired. /'^^ince,  then,  it  is  granted  thct  these 
were  all  given  us  for  the  same  end,  namely,  to  promote 
our  happiness,  if  by  the  first  manner  of  gratification 
we  destroy  another  power  of  gratification,  while  by  the 
second  manner  of  gratification  we  leave  the  other  power 
of  gratification  uninjured,  it  is  evidently  the  design  of 
our  Creator  that  we  should  limit  ourselves  to  this  sec- 
ond mode  of  gratification. 

Tlius,  I  am  so  formed  that  food  is  pleasant  to  me. 
This,  even  if  there  were  no  necessity  for  eating,  is  a 
reason  why  I  should  eat  it.  But  I  am  also  formed  with 
a  desire  for  knowledge.  •  ^This  is  a  reason  why  I  should 
study  in  order  to  obtain  it.  That  is,  God  intended  me 
to  derive  happiness  from  both  of  these  sources  of  grati- 
fication. S  If,  tlien,  I  eat  in  such  a  manner  that  I  can- 
not study^  or  study  in  such  a  manner  that  I  cannot  eat, 
in  either  case  I  defeat  his  design  concerning  me,  by 
destroying  those  sources  of  happiness  with  which  he  has 
created  me.  The  same  principle  might  be  illustrated 
in  various  other  instances. 

Again,  we  find  that  the  indulgence  of  any  one  form 
of  gratification  in  such  manner  as  to  destroy  the  power 
of  another  form  of  gratification,  also  in  the  end  dimin- 
ishes and  frequently  destroys  the  power  of  deriving 
happiness  even  from  that  which  is  indulged.  Tims,  ho 
who  eats  so  as  to  injure  his  power  of  intellectual  grati 
fication,  injures  also  his  digestive  organs  and  produces 
disease,  so  that  his  pleasure  from  eating  is  diminished. 
Or,  he  who  studies  so  as  to  destroy  his  appetite,  in  the 
end  destroys  also  his  power  of  study.  This  is  another 
and  distinct  reason  to  show  that,  wliile  I  am  designed 
to  be  happy  by  the  gratification  of  my  desires,  I  am  also 
designed  to  be  happy  by  gratifying  them  within  a  limit 


HUMAN  HAPPINESS.  103 

f  The  limit  to  gratification  enters  into  my  constitution, 
\  as  a  being  designed  for  happiness,  just  as  much  as  tho 
(  power  of  gratification  itself. 

Q     And  again,  our  Creator  has  endowed  us  with  an  addi- 
^tional  and  superior  power,  by  which  we  can  contemplate 
/these  two  courses  of  conduct ;  by  which  we  can  approve 
I  of  the  one  and  disapprove  of  the  other,  and  by  which 
the  one  becomes  a  source  of  pleasure  and  the  other  a 
source  of  pain ;  both  being  separate  and  distinct  from 
the  sources  of  pain  and  pleasure  mentioned  above.   And, 
moreover,  he  has  so  constituted  us,  that  this  very  habit 
of  regulating   and  limiting  our   desires  is  absolutely 
essential  to  our  success  in  every  undertakhig.     Both  of 
these  are,  therefore,  additional  and  distinct  reasons  for 
believing  that  the  restriction  of  our  desires  within  cer- 
tain limits  is  made  by  our  Creator  as  clearly  necessary 
to  our  Happiness  as  the  indulgence  of  them, 
r         All  this  is  true,  if  we  consider  the  happiness  of  man 
7    merely  as  an  individual.  (  But  the  case  is  rendered  still 
stronger  if  we  look  upon  man  as  a  society.     It  is  mani- 
fest that  the  unwerml  gratification  of  any  single  appe- 
tite or  passion,  without  limit,  not  to  say  the  gratification 
of  all,  would  in  a  very  few  years  not  only  destroy  soci- 
ety, but  absolutely  put  an  end  to  the  whole  human  race. 
And  hence  we  see  that  the  limitation  of  our  desires  is 
not  only  necessary  to  our  happiness,  but  also  to  our 
existence. 

/     Hence,  while  it  is  the  truth  that  human  happiness 

)  consists  in  the  gratification  of  our  desires,  it  is  not  the 

I  whole  truth.     It  consists  in  the  gratification  of  our  de- 

7  iires  within  the  limits  assigned  to  them  by  our  Creator. 

\  And  tlie  happiness  of  that  man  will  be  the  most  perfect 

who  regulates  his  desires  most  perfectly  in  accordance 

with  the  laws  under  which  he  has  been  created.     And 

hence  the  greatest  happiness  of  which  man  is,  in  his 

present  state,  capable,  is  to  be  attained  by  conforming 

his  whole  conduct  to  the  laws  of  virtue,  that  is,  to  the 

m\\  of  God. 


CHAPTER  V. 

OF  SELF-LOVE. 

By  the  term  sensitiveness,  I  have  designated  the  ca- 
pacity of  our  nature  to  derive  happiness  from  the  various 
objects  and  qualities  of  the  world  around  us.  Though 
intimately  associated  with  those  powers  by  which  wo 
obtain  a  knowledge  of  external  objects,  it  differs  from 
them.  When  a  desire  for  gratification  is  excited  by  its 
appropriate  objects,  it  is  termed  appetite,  passion,  etc. 

As  our  means  of  gratification  are  various,  and  are  also 
attended  by  different  effects,  there  is  evidently  an  oppor- 
tunity for  a  choice  between  them.  By  declining  a  grat- 
ification at  present,  we  may  secure  one  of  greater  value 
at  some  future  time.  That  which  is  at  present  agree- 
able, may  be,  of  necessity,  followed  by  pain  ;  and  that 
which  is  at  present  painful,  may  be  rewarded  by  pleas- 
ure which  shall  far  overbalance  it. 

Now,  it  must  be  evident  to  every  one  who  will  reflect, 
that  my  happiness,  at  any  one  period  of  my  existence, 
is  just  as  valuable  as  my  happiness  at  the  present  period. 
No  one  can  conceive  of  any  reason  why  the  present  mo- 
ment should  take  the  precedence,  in  any  respect,  of  any 
other  moment  of  my  being.  Every  moment  of  my  past 
life  was  once  present,  and  seemed  of  special  value ;  but 
in  the  retrospect  all  seem,  so  far  as  the  happiness  of 
each  is  concerned,  of  equal  value.  Each  of  those  to 
come  may  in  its  turn  claim  some  preeminence ;  though 
now  we  plainly  discover  in  anticipation  that  no  one  is 
more  than  another  entitled  to  it.  Nay,  if  there  be  any 
difference,  it  is  manifestly  in  favor  of  the  most  distant 
future,  in  comparison  with  the  present.  The  longer  wo 
exist,  the  greater  is  our  capacity  for  viitue  and  happiness, 


OF  SELF-LOVE.  105 

and  the  wider  is  our  sphere  of  existence.  To  postpone 
the  present  for  the  future  seems,  therefore,  to  be  the 
dictate  of  wisdom,  if  we  calmly  consider  the  condition 
of  our  being.  "  Whatever,"  says  Dr.  Johnson,  "  with- 
draws US  from  the  power  of  our  senses  ;  whatever  makes 
the  past,  the  distant,  or  the  future  predominate  over 
the  present,  advances  us  in  the  dignity  of  thinking  be- 
ings." —  Tour  to  the  Hebrides^  lona. 

But  it  is  of  the  nature  of  passion  to  seize  upon  the 
present  gratification,  utterly  irrespective  of  consequen- 
ces, and  utterly  regardless  of  other  or  more  excellent 
gratifications  which  may  be  obtained  by  self-denial. 
He  whose  passions  are  inflamed,  looks  at  nothing  be- 
yond the  present  gratification.  Hence  he  is  liable  to 
seize  upon  a  present  enjoyment,  to  the  exclusion  of  a 
much  more  valuable  one  in  future,  and  even  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  entail  upon  himself  poignant  and  reme- 
diless misery.  And  hence,  in  order  to  be  enabled  to 
enjoy  all  the  happiness  of  which  his  present  state  is 
capable,  the  sensitive  part  of  man  needs  to  be  combined 
with  another,  which,  upon  a  comparison  of  the  present 
with  the  future,  shall  impel  him  towards  that  mode 
either  of  gratification  or  of  self-denial,  which  shall  most 
promote  his  happiness  upon  the  whole. 

Such  is  self-love.  We  give  this  name  to  that  part  of 
our  constitution  by  which  we  are  incited  to  do  or  to 
forbear,  to  gratify  or  to  deny  our  desires,  simply  on  the 
ground  of  obtaining  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness 
for  ourselves,  taking  into  view  a  limited  future,  or  else 
our  entire  future  existence.  When  we  act  from  simple 
respect  to  present  gratification,  we  act  from  passion. 
When  we  act  from  a  respect  to  our  whole  individual 
happiness,  without  regard  to  the  present,  only  as  it  is  a 
part  of  the  whole,  we  are  then  said  to  act  from  self-love. 

The  difference  between  these  two  modes  of  impulsion 
may  be  easily  illustrated. 

Suppose  a  man  destitute  of  self-love,  and  actuated 
only  by  passion.  He  would  seize  without  reflection, 
and  enjoy  without  limit,  every  object  of  gratification 
which  the  prgsent  moment  might  ofier,  without  regard 


106  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

to  its  value  in  comparison  with  others,  which  might  be 
secured  by  self-denial,  and  without  any  regard  to  the 
consequences  which  might  follow  present  pleasure^  be 
they  ever  so  disastrous. 

On  the  contrary,  we  may  imagine  a  being  destitute 
of  passions,  and  impelled  only  by  self-love ;  that  is,  by 
a  desire  for  his  own  happiness  on  the  whole.  In  this 
case,  so  far  as  I  see,  he  would  never  act  at  all.  Hav- 
ing no  desires  to  gratify,  there  could  be  no  gratification; 
and  hence  there  could  be  no  happiness.  Happiness  is 
the  result  of  the  exercise  of  our  sensitiveness  upon  its 
corresponding  objects.  But  we  have  no  sensitiveness 
which  corresponds  to  any  object  in  ourselves ;  nor  do 
ourselves  present  any  object  to  correspond  to  such  sen- 
sitiveness. Hence  the  condition  of  a  being  destitute  of 
passions,  and  actuated  only  by  self-love,  would  be  an 
indefinite  and  most  painful  longing  after  happiness, 
without  the  consciousness  of  any  relation  to  externa) 
objects  which  could  ^ci^tify  it.  Nor  is  this  an  entirely 
imaginary  condition.  In  cases  of  deep  melancholy,  and 
of  fixed  hypochondria,  tending  to  derangement,  I  think 
every  one  must  have  observed  in  others,  and  he  is 
happy  if  he  have  not  experienced  in  himself,  the  ten- 
dencies to  precisely  such  a  state.  The  very  power  of 
affection,  or  sensitiveness,  seems  paralyzed.  This  state 
of  mind  has,  I  think,  been  ascribed  to  Hamlet  by 
Shakspeare,  in  the  following  passage : 

"  I  have  of  late  (but  wherefore  I  know  not)  lost  all 
my  mirth,  foregone  all  custom  of  exercises ;  and,  in- 
deed, it  goes  so  heavily  with  my  dispositions,  that  this 
goodly  frame,  the  earth,  seems  to  me  a  sterile  promon- 
tory ;  this  most  excellent  canopy,  the  air  —  look  you  — 
tliis  brave  overhanging  firmament ;  this  majestical  roof, 
fretted  with  golden  fire ;  why,  it  appears  no  other  thing 
to  me  than  a  foul  and  pestilent  congregation  of  vapors. 
Man  delights  me  not,  nor  woman  neither,  though  by 
your  smiling  you  seem  to  say  so."  —  Haw  kt,  Act  ii., 
Scene  2. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  self-love  is  not  in  itself 
a  faculty,  or  part  of  our  constitution  in  itself  produc 


OF  SELF-LOVi;  107 

live  of  happiness,  but  rather  an  i*npulse  which,  out  of 
several  forms  of  gratification  which  may  be  presented, 
inclines  us  to  select  that  which  will  be  the  most  for  our 
happiness  considered  as  a  whole.  This  seems  the  more 
evident  from  the  obvious  fact  that  a  man,  actuated  by 
the  most  zealous  self-love,  derives  no  more  happiness 
from  a  given  gratification  than  any  other  man.  His 
pleasure  in  any  one  act  of  enjoyment  is  not  in  the  ratio 
of  his  self-love,  but  of  his  sensitiveness. 

From  these  remarks  we  can  easily  determine  the 
rank  to  which  self-love  is  entitled. 

1.  Its  rank  is  superior  to  that  of  passion.  As  our 
happiness,  as  a  whole,  is  of  more  consequence  than  the 
happiness  of  any  separate  moment,  so  the  faculty  which 
impels  us  towards  our  happiness  upon  the  whole  was 
manifestly  intended  to  control  that  which  impels  toward 
our  happiness  for  a  moment.  If  happiness  be  desirable, 
the  greatest  amount  of  it  is  most  desirable ;  and  as  we 
are  provided  with  a  constitution  by  which  we  are  fore- 
warned of  the  difierence,  and  impelled  to  a  correct 
choice,  it  is  the  design  of  our  Creator  that  we  should 
obey  it. 

2.  Its  rank  is  inferior  to  that  of  conscience.  We  are 
made  not  only  sensitive  beings,  that  is,  beings  capable 
of  happiness,  but  also  moral  beings,  that  is,  beings  ca- 
pable of  virtue.  The  latter  is  manifestly  the  most  im- 
portant object  of  our  being,  even  in  so  far  as  our  own 
happiness  is  concerned ;  for,  by  the  practice  of  virtue, 
without  respect  to  our  own  temporal  happiness,  we  se- 
cure our  moral  happiness,  the  most  valuable  of  any  of 
which,  even  at  the  present,  we  are  capable ;  while,  by 
acting  for  own  happiness,  when  these  seem  to  come 
into  competition,  we  lose  that  which  is  most  valuable, 
and  can  be  by  no  itieans  certain  of  obtaining  the  other. 
That  is  to  say,  when  our  own  happiness  and  our  duty 
seem  to  come  into  collision,  we  are  bound  to  discard 
the  consideration  of  our  own  happiness,  and  to  do  what 
W(3  believe  to  be  right. 

This  may  be  illustrated  by  an  example, 

Suppose  that  two  courses  of  action  are  presented  to 


108  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

our  choice.  The  one,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  will  pro- 
mote our  individual  happiness ;  the  other  will  fulfil  a 
moral  obligation.  Now,  in  this  case,  we  may  act  m 
either  of  these  ways : 

1.  We  may  seek  our  own  happhiess,  and  violate  our 
obligations.  In  this  case  we  certainly  lose  the  pleasure 
of  virtue,  and  suffer  the  pain  of  remorse,  while  we  must 
be  uncertain  whether  we  shall  obtam  the  object  of  our 
desires. 

2.  We  may  perform  the  act  which  conscience  indi- 
cates, but  from  our  self-love  as  a  motive:  Here  we 
shall  gain  whatever  reward,  by  the  constitution  under 
which  we  are  placed,  belongs  to  the  action;  but  we 
lose  the  pleasure  of  virtue. 

3.  We  may  perform  the  act  indicated  by  conscience, 
and  from  the  simple  impulse  of  duty.  In  this  case  we 
obtain  every  reward  which  could  he  obtained  in  the 
preceding  case,  and  in  addition  are  blessed  with  the 
approbation  of  conscience.  Thus,  suppose  I  deliberate 
whether  I  shall  spend  a  sum  of  money  in  self-gratifica- 
tion, or  else  in  an  act  of  benevolence,  which  is  plainly 
my  duty.  If  I  pursue  the  former  course,  it  is  very 
uncertain  whether  I  actually  secure  the  gratification 
which  I  seek,  while  I  lose  the  pleasure  of  rectitude,  and 
am  saddened  by  the  pains  of  remorse.  The  pleasure 
of  gratification  is  soon  over,  but  the  pain  of  guilt  is 
enduring.  Or,  again,  I  may  perform  the  act  of  benev- 
olence from  love  of  applause,  or  some  modification  of 
self-love.  I  here  obtain  with  more  certainty  the  repu- 
tation which  I  seek,  but  lose  the  reward  of  conscious 
virtue.  Or,  thirdly,  if  I  do  the  act  without  any  regard 
to  my  own  happiness,  and  simply  from  love  to  God  and 
man,  I  obtain  all  the  rewards  which  attach  to  the  ac- 
tion by  the  constitution  under  which  I  am  placed,  and 
also  enjoy  the  higher  rewards  of  conscious  rectitude. 

Tliis  subordination  of  motives  seems  clearly  to  be  re- 
ferred to  by  our  Saviour :  "  There  is  no  man  that  hath 
left  house,  or  brethrer. ,  or  sisters,  or  father,  or  mother, 
or  wife,  or  children,  or  lands,/or  vii/  sake  and  the  gos- 
peVsj  but  he  shall  receive  an  hundred-fold  now  in  this 


OF  SELF  LOVE.  109 

time,  and  in  the  world  to  come  life  everlasting."  That 
is  to  say,  a  man  does  not  obtain  the  reward  of  virtue, 
even  in  self-denial,  unless  he  disregard  the  consideration 
of  himself,  and  act  from  simple  love  to  God.  To  the 
same  purport  is  the  often-repeated  observation  of  our 
Saviour :  "  Whosoever  will  save  his  life  shall  lose  it ; 
and  whosoever  will  lose  his  life  for  my  sake  shall  find 
it."  There  are  many  passages  of  Scripture  which  seem 
to  assert  that  the  very  turning-point  of  moral  character, 
so  far  as  our  relations  to  God  are  concerned,  consists  in 
yielding  up  the  consideration  of  our  own  happiness  as 
a  controlling  motive,  and  subjecting  it  without  reserve 
to  the  higher  motive,  the  simple  will  of  God. 
If  these  remarks  be  true,  we  see, 

1.  That  when  conscience  speaks,  the  voice  of  self-love 
must  be  silent.  That  is  to  say,  we  have  no  right  to  seek 
our  own  happiness  in  any  manner  at  variance  with 
moral  obligation.  Nevertheless,  from  several  courses  of 
action,  either  of  which  is  innocent,  we  are  at  liberty  to 
choose  that  which  will  most  conduce  to  our  own  happi- 
ness. In  such  a  case,  the  consideration  of  our  happiness 
is  justly  ultimate. 

2.  The  preceding  chapter  has  shown  lis  that  man  was 
designed  to  be  made  happy  by  the  gratification  of  his 
desires.  The  present  chapter  teaches  us  that  when  the 
gratification  of  desire  is  at  variance  with  virtue,  a 
greater  happiness  is  to  be  obtained  by  self-denial.  Or, 
in  other  words,  our  greatest  happiness  is  to  be  obtained, 
not  by  the  various  modes  of  self-gratification,  but  by 
simply  seeking  the  good  of  others,  and  in  doing  the  will 
of  God  from  the  heart. 

3.  And  hence  we  may  arrive  at  the  general  principle, 
that  every  impulse  or  desire  is  supreme  within  its  own 
assigned  limits;  but  that,  when  a  lower  comes  into 
competition  with  a  higher  impulsion,  the  inferior  accom- 
plishes its  own  object  most  perfectly  by  being  wholly 
subject  to  the  superior.  Thus  desire,  or  the  love  of 
present  gratification,  may  within  its  own  limits  be  in- 
dulged. But  when  tliis  present  gratification  comes  into 
competition  with  self-love,  even    passion   accomDlishesi 

10 


llO  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

its  own  object  best ;  that  is,  a  man  actually  attains  ta 
more  enjoyment  by  submitting  present  desire  implicj  tly 
to  self-love.  And  so  self-love  is  ultimate  within  its 
proper  limits  ;  but  when  it  comes  into  competition  w  ith 
conscience,  it  actually  accomplishes  its  own  object  b^st 
by  being  entirely  subject  to  that  which  the  Creator  i  as 
constituted  its  superior. 

4.  The  difference  between  self-love  as  an  innocent^ 
part  of  our  constitution,  and  selfishness,  a  vicious  dis) po- 
sition, may  be  easily  seen.  Self-love  properly  direi^ts 
our  choice  of  objects  where  both  are  equally  innoceat. 
Selfishness  is  a  similar  disposition  to  promote  our  own 
happiness  upon  the  whole  :  but  it  disposes  us  to  seek  it 
in  objects  over  which  we  have  no  just  control ;  that  is, 
which  are  not  innocent,  and  which  we  could  not  enjoy 
without  violating  our  duties  either  to  God  or  to  oar 
neighbor. 


CHAPTER  VL 


IMPERFECTION  OF  CONSCIENCE ;  NECESSITY  OF  SOME 
ADDITIONAL  MORAL  LIGHT. 

[t  has  been  already  remarked  that  a  distinction  may 
be  very  clearly  observed  between  right  and  wrong,  and 
guilt  and  innocence.  J  Right  and  wrong  depend  upon 
th.3  relations  under  which  we  are  created,  and  the  obli- 
gations resulting  from  them,  and  are  in  their  nature 
immutable.  .Guilt  and  innocence  have  respect  to  the 
individual,  and  are  modified,  moreover,  by  tlie  amount 
of  his  knowledge  of  his  duty,  and  are  not  decided  solely 
by  the  fact  that  the  action  was  or  was  not  performed. 
/  It  is,  moreover,  to  be  observed  that  the  results  of  these 
fwo  attributes  of  action  may  be  seen  to  differ.  ->  Thus 
every  right  action  is  followed,  in  some  way,  by  pleasure 
or  benefit  to  the  individual  ;  and  every  wrong  one  by 
pain  or  discomfort,  irrespective  of  the  guilt  or  inno- 
cence of  the  author  of  the  act.  {Thus,  in  the  present 
constitution  of  things,  it  is  evident  that  a  nation  which 
had  no  knowledge  of  the  wickedness  of  murder,  re- 
venge, uncleanness,  or  theft,  would,  if  it  violated  the 
moral  law  in  these  respects,  suffer  the  consequences 
which  are  attached  to  these  actions  by  our  Creator. 
And,  on  the  contrary,  a  nation  which  practised  forgive- 
ness, mercy,  honesty,  and  purity,  without  knowing  them 
to  be  right,  would  enjoy  the  benefits  which  are  connected 
with  such  actions. 

Now,  whatever  be  the  object  of  this  constitution  by 
which  happiness  or  misery  is  consequent  upon  actions 
as  right  or  wrong,  whether  it  be  as  a  monition,  or  to 
hiform  us  of  the  will  of  God  concerning  us,  one  thing 
seems  evident,  —  it  is  not  wholly  to  punish  actions  as 


112  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

innocent  or  guilty :  for  the  happiness  or  misery  of  which 
,  we  speak  affects  men  simply  in  consequence  of  the  action, 
)  and  without  any  regard  to  the  innocence  or  guilt  of  the 
/   actor. 

/ .Let  us  now  add  another  element.  Suppose  a  man  to 
kiTOw  the  obligations  which  bind  him  to  his  Creator, 
and  also  what  is  his  Creator's  will  respecting  a  certain 
action,  and  that  he  then  deliberately  violates  this  obli- 
gation. -^  Every  man  feels  that  this  violation  of  obliga- 
tion deserves  punishment  on  its  own  account,  and  also 
punishment  in  proportion  to  the  greatness  of  the  obli- 
gation violated.  Hence  the  consequences  of  any  action 
are  to  be  considered  in  a  twofold  light :  first,  the  con- 
sequences depending  upon  the  present  constitution  of 
things  ;  and,  secondly,  those  which  follow  the  action  as 
innocent  or  guilty ;  that  is,  as  violatijig  or  not  violating 
our  obligations  to  our  Creator. 

These  two  things  are  plainly  to  be  considered  distinct 
from  each  other.  Of  the  one  we  can  form-  some  esti- 
mate ;  of  the  other,  none  whatever.  Thus,  whatever  be 
the  design  of  the  constitution,  by  which  pain  should  be 
consequent  upon  wrong  actions,  irrespective  of  guilt ; 
whether  it  be  to  admonish  us  of  dangers,  or  to  intimate 
to  us  the  will  of  our  Creator ;  we  can  have  some  con- 
ception how  great  it  would  probably  be.  But  if  we 
consider  the  action  as  guilty,  —  that  is,  as  violating  the 
known  will  of  our  Creator,  —  no  one  can  conceive  how 
great  the  punishment  of  such  an  act  ought  to  be,  for 
no  one  can  conceive  how  vast  is  the  obligation  which 
binds  a  creature  to  his  Creator ;  nor,  on  the  other  hand, 
can  any  one  conceive  how  vast  would  be  the  reward  if 
this  obligation  were  perfectly  fulhlled. 

As,  then,  every  moral  act  is  attended  with  pleasure  or 
pain,  and  as  every  one  also  exposes  us  to  the  punish- 
ments or  rewards  of  guilt  or  innocence,  both  of  which 
manifestly  transcend  our  power  of  conception ;  ^and  if 
such  be  our  constitution  that  every  moment  is  render- 
ing our  moral  condition  either  better  or  worse ;  specially 
if  this  world  be  a  state  of  probation,  tending  to  a  state 
wi\ero  change  is  impossible  ;^  it  is  manifestly  of  the 


niPERFECTION  OF  CONSCIENCE.  113 

greatest  possible  importance  that  we  should  both  know 
our  duty,  and  bo  furnished  with  all  suitable  impulsions 
to  perform  it.  The  constitution  under  which  man  is 
formed  in  this  respect  has  been  explained  at  the  closo 
of  the  chapter  on  virtue.  And  were  the  intellect  and 
conscience  of  man  to  be  in  a  perfect  state,  and  were  ho 
in  entire  harmony  with  the  universe  around  him,  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  his  happiness  in  the  present  stato 
would  be  perfectly  secured. 

It  would  not,  however,  be  certain  that,witli  intellectr 
ual  and  moral  powers  suited  to  his  station,  man  would 
be  in  no  need  of  further  commimication  from  his  Maker. 
Although  his  feeling  of  obligation,  and  his  desire  to  dis- 
charge it,  might  be  perfect,  yet  he  might  not  be  fully 
aware  of  the  manner  in  which  this  obligation  should 
be  discharged.  Thus,  though  our  first  parents  were 
endowed  with  a  perfect  moral  constitution,  yet  it  was 
necessary  that  God  should  make  to  them  a  special  rev- 
elation respecting  some  portion  of  his  will.  Such  might 
also  be  the  case  in  any  other  instance  of  a  perfect  moral 
constitution  in  a  being  of  limited  capacity. 

How  much  more  evidently  is  additional  light  neces- 
sary, when  it  is  remembered  that  the  moral  constitution 
of  man  seems  manifestly  to  be  imperfect!  This  may  be 
observed  in  several  respects : 

1.  There  are  many  obligations  under  which  man  is 
created,  both  to  his  fellow-creatures  and  to  God,  which 
liis  unassisted  conscience  does  not  discover.  Such  are 
the  obligations  to  universal  forgiveness,  to  repentance, 
and  many  others. 

2.  When  the  obligations  are  acknowledged,  man 
frequently  errs  in  respect  to  the  mode  in  which  they  aro 
to  be  .discharged.  Thus,  a  man  may  acknowledge  his 
obligations  te  God,  but  may  suppose  that  God  will  bo 
pleased  with  ,  human  sacrifice.  A  man  may  acknowl- 
edge his  obi  ration  to  love  his  children,  but  may  be- 
lieve that  this  obligation  may  best  be  discharged,  under 
certain  circumstances,  by  putting  them  to  death.  Now, 
it  is  manifest  that  in  botii  these  cases  a  man  must  suf 
fer  many  of  the  present  evils  resulting  Jrom  such   « 

10* 


114  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

course,  just  as  mucli  as  though  he  knowingly  violated 
these  obligations. 

3.  When  men  know  both  the  obligations  under  which 
they  are  created,  and  the  mode  in  which  they  are  to  ba 
discharged,  they  wilfully  disobey  the  monitions  of  con- 
science. We  act  according  to  the  impulsions  of  blind, 
headlong  passion,  regardless  of  our  own  best  good,  and 
of  the  welfare  of  others,  in  despite  of  what  we  know  to 
be  the  will  of  our  Maker.  It  is  a  melancholy  fact  that 
men  do  deliberately  violate  the  commands  of  God  for 
the  sake  of  the  most  transient  and  trifling  gratification. 
Hence  the  hackneyed  confession : 

Video,  proboque  meliora; 
Deteriora  sequor. 

And  hence  it  is  evident  that  not  only  are  men  expos- 
ing themselves  to  the  pains  attendant  upon  wrong 
actions  during  the  present  life,  but  they  are  also  exposing 
themselves  to  the  punishments,  how  great  and  awful 
soever  these  may  be,  which  are  incurred  by  violating 
our  obligations  to  our  Creator  and  our  Judge.  The  state 
of  human  nature  in  these  respects  I  suppose  to  be 
vividly  set  forth  by  St.  Paul  in  the  Epistle  to  the 
Romans,  ch.  vii.  v.  7-25. 

If  such  be  our  state,  it  is  manifest  that,  under  such  a 
moral  constitution  as  we  have  above  described,  our 
condition  must  be  sufficiently  hopeless.  Unless  some- 
thing be  done,  it  would  seem  that  we  must  all  fail  of  a 
large  portion  of  the  happiness  to  which  we  might  other- 
wise in  the  present  life  attain  ;  and,  still  more,  must  bo 
exposed  to  a  condemnation  greater  than  we  are  capable 
of  conceiving. 

Under  such  circumstances  it  surely  is  not  improba- 
ble that  a  benevolent  Deity  should  make  use  of  somo 
additional  means  to  inform  us  of  our  duty,  and  thus 
warn  us  of  the  evils  which  we  are  bringing  upon  our* 
selves.  Still  less  is  it  improbable  that  a  God  delight- 
ing in  right  should  take  some  means  to  deliver  us 
from  the  guilty  habits  whicli  we  have  formed,  and 
restore  us  to  that  love  and  practice  of  virtue  which  can 


IMPERFECnON  OF  CONSCIENCE.  115 

alone  render  us  pleasing  to  him.  That  God  was  under 
any  obligation  to  do  this,  is  not  asserted ;  but  that  a 
being  of  infinite  compassion  and  benevolence  should  do 
it,  though  not  under  any  obligation,  is  surely  not  im- 
probable. 

Should  a  revelation  be  made  to  remedy  the  defects 
of  man's  moral  state,  we  can  form  some  conceptions  of 
what  might  be  expected  in  order  to  accompliiih  such  a 
result. 

1.  Our  defective  knowledge  of  moral  obligation  might 
be  remedied  by  a  clear  view  of  the  attributes  of  God, 
and  of  the  various  relations  which  we  sustain  to  him. 

2.  Our  ignorance  of  the  mode  in  which  our  obliga- 
tions should  be  discharged,  might  be  dispelled,  either  by 
a  more  expanded  view  of  the  consequences  of  actions, 
or  by  direct  precept. 

3.  In  order  to  overcome  our  temper  of  disobedience, 
I  know  not  what  means  might  be  employed.  A  reason- 
able one  would  seem  to  be  a  manifestation  of  the  char- 
acter of  the  Deity  to  us  in  some  new  relation,  craating 
some  new  obligations,  and  thus  opening  a  new  source 
of  moral  motives  within  the  soul  of  man. 

The  first  and  second  of  these  objects  are  accomplished, 
as  I  suppose,  by  the  discoveries  of  natural  religion,  and 
by  the  promulgation  of  the  moral  law  under  the  Old 
Testament  dispensation.  The  third  is  accomplished  by 
the  revelation  of  the  facts  of  the  New  Testament,  and 
Bpecially  by  the  revelation  of  God  as  the  author  of  a 
new  and  a  remedial  dispensation. 

Hence  we  see  that  the  sources  of  moral  light,  irre 
Bpective  of  conscience,  are, 

1.  The  precepts  of  natural  religion. 

2.  The  precepts  and  motives  of  the  sacred  Scriptures. 
From  what  has  been  remarked  in  the  present  chapter, 

a  few  inferences  naturally  arise,  which  I  will  insert  in 
this  place. 

It  is  mentioned  above  tliat  the  evil  consequences  of 
doing  wrong  are  manifestly  of  two  kinds.  First,  those 
connected  with  an  action  as  right  or  wrong,  and  arising 
froia  the  present  constitution  of  things ;  and,  secondly, 


116  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

those  resulting  from  the  action  as  innocent  or  guilty; 
that  is,  as  wilfully  violating  or  not  violating  the  obliga- 
tions due  to  our  Maker. 

Now,  from  this  plain  distinction  we  see, 

1.  That  no  sin  can  be  of  trifling  consequence.  The 
least  as  well  as  the  greatest  being  a  violation  of  au 
obligation  more  sacred  and  awful  than  we  can  conceive, 
must  expose  us  to  punishment  more  dreadful  than  we 
can  comprehend.  If  it  be  said  the  thing  in  itself  is  a 
trifle,  the  answer  is  obvious :  How  wicked  must  it  be, 
for  the  sake  of  a  trifle  to  violate  so  sacred  and  solemn 
an  obligation  as  that  which  binds  us  to  our  Creator  ! 

2.  Hence  we  see  how  unfounded  is  the  assertion 
sometimes  made, that  God  could  not,' for  the  momentary 
actions  of  this  short  life,  justly  inflict  upon  us  any 
severe  or  long-enduring  punishment.  If  an  act,  whether 
long  or  short,  be  a  violation  of  our  obligations  to  God ; 
if  ill-desert  be  according  to  the  greatness  of  the  obliga- 
tion violated ;  and  if  no  one  can  pretend  to  compre- 
hend the  vastness  of  the  obligations  which  bind  the 
creature  to  the  Creator  ;  then  no  one  can,  a  priori^ 
pretend  to  decide  what  is  the  punishment  justly  due  to 
every  act  of  wilful  wickedness,  —  especially  when  it  is 
remembered  that  a  single  act  of  sin  transforms  man's 
nature,  and  renders  him  permanently  a  rebel  against 
God.  It  is  evident  that  no  one  can  decide  this  question 
but  he  who  fully  knows  the  relation  between  the  parties  ; 
that  is,  the  Creator  himself. 

3.  Since  every  impure,  revengeful,  deceitful  or  envi- 
ous thought  is  a  violation  of  our  obligations  to  our 
Maker,  and  much  more  the  words  and  actions  to  which 
these  thoughts  give  rise ;  and  since  even  the  imperfect 
conscience  of  every  individual  accuses  him  of  countless 
instances,  if  not  of  habits,  of  such  violation  ;  if  the  pre- 
ceding observations  be  just,  it  is  manifest  that  our 
present  moral  condition  involves  the  elements  of  much 
that  is  alarming.  It  surely  must  be  the  duty  of  every 
reasonable  man  to  inquire,  with  the  deepest  solicitude, 
whether  any  way  of  escape  from  punishment  and  any 
means  of  moral  renovation  have  been  revealed  by  the 


IMPERFECTION  OF  CONSCIEXCE.  117 

Hciiig  against  whom  we  have  sinned ;  and  if  any  such 
levelation  have  been  made,  it  must  be  our  most  solemn 
duty  to  conform  our  lives  to  such  principles  as  shall 
enable  us  to  avail  ourselves  of  its  provisions. 

4.  The  importance  of  this  duty  will  be  still  more  clearly 
evident  if  we  consider  that  the  present  is  a  state  of  pro- 
bation, in  which  alone  moral  change  is  possible,  and 
which  must  speedily  terminate  in  a  state  by  necessitj 
unchangeable  ;  for  which,  also,  the  present  state  there- 
fore offers  us  the  only  opportunity  of  preparation.  To 
neglect  either  to  possess  ourselves  of  all  the  knowledge 
in  our  power  on  this  subject,  or  to  neglect  to  obey  any 
reasonable  precepts  which  afford  the  least  probability  of 
improving  our  condition  for  the  future,  seems  a  degree 
of  folly  for  which  it  is  really  impossible  to  find  an  ade- 
quate epithet. 

5.  Nor  does  it  render  this  folly  the  less  reprehensible 
for  a  man  gravely  to  assert  that  we  do  not  know  any- 
thing about  the  future  world,  and  therefore  it  is  need- 
less to  inquire  respecting  it.  This  is  to  assert,  without 
inquiry,  what  could  only  be  reasonably  asserted  after 
the  most  full  and  persevering  inquiry.  No  man  can 
reasonably  assert  that  we  know  nothing  respecting  the 
other  world  until  he  has  examined  every  system  of 
religion  within  his  knowledge,  and  by  the  fair  and 
legitimate  use  of  his  understanding  shown  conclusively 
that  none  of  them  throw  any  light  upon  the  subject. 
By  what  right,  therefore,  can  a  man  utter  such  an 
assertion,  who  at  the  outset  declares  that  he  will  exam- 
hie  none  of  them  ?  What  should  we  think  of  the  man 
who  declared  that  he  would  not  study  astronomy,  for 
that  no  one  knew  more  about  the  heavens  than  he  did 
himself?  Yet  many  men  neglect  to  inform  themselves 
on  the  subject  of  religion  for  no  better  reason.  It  is  very 
remarkable  that  men  do  not  perceive  the  absurdity  of  an 
assertion  respecting  religion^  which  they  would  imme- 
diately pei'ceive  if  uttered  respecting 'aw^^/u'/zg*  else. 


CHAPTER  VII. 


OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 


In  the  preceding  chapter  I  have  endeavored  to  illus- 
trate the  nature  of  our  moral  constitution,  and  to  show 
that,  in  our  present  state,  conscience,  unassisted,  mani- 
festly fails  to  produce  the  results  which  seem  to  have 
Deen  intended,  and  which  are  necessary  to  our  attain- 
ing the  happiness  which  is  put  within  our  power,  and 
to  our  avoiding  the  misery  ^o  which  we  are  exposed. 
That  some  additional  light  will  be  granted  to  us,  and 
that  some  additional  moral  power  will  be  imparted, 
seems  clearly  not  improbable.  This  I  suppose  to  have 
been  done  by  the  truths  of  natural  and  revealed  religion. 
In  the  present  chapter  I  shall  treat  of  natural  religion 
under  the  following  heads : 

1.  The  manner  in  which  we  may  learn  our  duty  by 
the  light  of  nature. 

2.  The  extent  to  which  our  knowledge  of  duty  can  bo 
carried  by  this  mode  of  teaching. 

3.  The  defects  of  the  system  of  natural  religion. 


SECTION  /. 

OF  THE  MANNER  IN  WHICH  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY  BY  THl 
LIGHT  OF  NATURE. 

In  treating  upon  this  subject  it  is  taken  for^^gpmted, 

1.  That  there  is  an  intelligent  and   universal  First 

OauBOy  who  made  us  as  we  are,  and  made  all  things 


HOW  WE  MAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY.  139 

around  us  capable  of  affecting  us,  both  as  iudividuals 
and  as  societies,  as  they  do. 

2.  That  He  had  a  design  in  so  making  us,  and  in  con 
etitutuig  the  relations  around  us  as  they  are  constituted  ; 
and  that  a  part  of  that  design  was  to  intimate  to  us  his 
will  concerning  us. 

3.  That  we  are  capable  of  observing  these  relations, 
and  of  knowing  how  various  actions  affect  us  and  affect 
others. 

4.  And  that  we  are  capable  of  learning  the  desigu 
with  which  these  various  relation?  were  constituted ;  and, 
specially,  that  part  of  the  design  wliich  was  to  intimate 
to  us  the  will  of  our  Creator. 

The  application  of  these  self-evident  principles  to  the 
subject  of  duty  is  easy.  We  know  that  we  are  so  made 
as  to  derive  happiness  from  some  courses  of  conduct, 
and  to  suffer  unhappiness  from  others.  Now,  no  one 
can  doubt  that  the  intention  of  our  Creator  in  these 
cases  vras  that  we  should  pursue  the  one  course  and 
avoid  the  other.  Or,  again,  we  are  so  made  that  we  are 
rendered  unhappy,  on  the  whole,  by  pursuing  a  course 
of  conduct  in  some  particular  manner,  or  beyond  a  cer- 
tain degree.  This  is  an  intimation  of  our  Creator  re- 
specting the  manner  and  the  degree  in  which  he  designs 
us  to  pursue  that  course  of  conduct. 

Again,  as  has  been  said  before,  society  is  necessary, 
not  merely  to  the  happiness,  but  to  the  actual  existence, 
of  the  race  of  man.  Hence  it  is  necessary,  in  estimat- 
ing the  tendency  of  actions  upon  our  own  happiness,  to 
extend  our  view  beyond  the  direct  effect  of  an  action 
upon  ourselves.  Thus,  if  we  cannot  perceive  that  any 
evil  would  result  to  ourselves  from  a  particular  course 
of  action,  yet,  if  it  would  tend  to  injure  society,  specially 
if  it  would  tend  to  destroy  society  altogether,  we  may 
hence  arrive  at  a  clear  indication  of  the  will  of  our  Cre- 
ator concerning  it.  As  the  destruction  of  society  would 
be  the  destruction  of  the  individual,  it  is  as  evident  that 
God  does  not  intend  us  to  do  what  would  injure  society, 
as  that  he  does  not  intend  us  to  do  what  would  injure 
our  own  bodies,  or  diminish  our  individual  happiness. 


120  THFORETICAL  ETHICS. 

And  the  principle  of  limitation  suggested  above  applies 
in  the  same  manner  here  ;  that  is,  if  a  course  of  conduct, 
pursued  in  a  certain  manner,  or  to  a  certain  extent,  bt 
beneficial  to  society,  and  if  pursued  in  another  manner, 
or  beyond  a  certain  extent,  is  injurious  to  it ;  the  indi- 
cation is  in  this  respect  clear  as  to  the  will  of  our  Maker 
respecting  us. 

To  apply  this  to  particular  cases.  Suppose  a  man 
were  in  doubt  whether  or  not  drunkenness  were  agree 
able  to  the  will  of  his  Maker.  Let  us  suppose  that  in- 
temperate drinking  produces  present  pleasure,  but  that 
it  also  produces  subsequent  pain  ;  and  that,  by  contin- 
uance in  the  habit,  the  pleasure  becomes  less,  and  the 
pain  greater  ;  and  that  the  pain  affects  various  powers 
of  the  mind,  and  different  organs  of  the  body.  Let  a 
man  look  around  him  and  survey  the  crime,  the  vice, 
the  disease,  and  the  poverty,  which  God  has  set  over 
against  the  momentary  gratification  of  the  palate,  and 
the  subsequent  excitement  which  it  produces.  Now, 
whoever  will  look  at  these  results,  and  will  coni^idcr 
that  God  had  a  design  in  creating  things  to  affect  us 
as  they  do,  must  be  as  fully  convinced  that,  by  these 
results,  he  intended  to  forbid  intemperance,  as  though 
he  had  said  so  by  a  voice  from  heaven.  The  same  prin- 
ciple may  be  applied  to  gluttony,  libertinism,  or  any 
other  vice. 

Another  example  may  be  taken  from  the  case  of  re- 
venge. Revenge  is  that  disposition  which  prompts  us 
to  inflict  pain  upon  another  for  the  sake  of  alleviat  big 
the  feeling  of  personal  degradation  consequent  upoD  an 
injury.  Now,  suppose  a  man,  inflamed  and  excited  by 
this  feeling  of  injury,  should  inflict  upon  the  other  party 
pain,until  his  excited  feeling  was  gratified,  the  injured 
party  would  then  manifestly  become  the  injurer ;  and 
thus  the  original  injurer  would  be,  by  the  same  rule, 
entitled  to  retaliate.  Thus  revenge  and  retaliation 
would  go  on  increasing  until  the  death  of  one  of  the 
parties.  The  duty  of  vengeance  would  then  devolve 
upon  the  surviving  friends  and  i  datives  of  the  deceased, 
and  the  circle  would  widen  until  it  involved  whole  triboa 


HOW  WE  aiAY  LEARN  OUR  DUTY.  121 

or  nations.  Thus  the  indulgence  of  this  one  evil  pas- 
sion would  in  a  few  generations  render  the  thronged 
city  an  unpeopled  solitude.  Nor  is  this  a  mere  imagin- 
ary case.  The  Indians  of  Nortli  America  are  known  to 
have  considered  the  indulgence  of  revenge  not  merely 
as  innocent,  but  also  as  glorious,  and  in  some  sense 
obligatory.  The  result  was, that,  at  the  time  of  the  dis- 
covery of  tills  continent,  they  were  universally  engaged 
in  wars,  and,  according  to  the  testimony  of  their  oldest 
and  wisest  chiefs,  their  numbers  were  rapidly  diminish- 
ing. And  hence,he  who  observes  the  effect  of  revenge 
upon  society  must  be  convinced,  that  He  who  formed 
the  constitution  under  which  we  live  must  have  intended 
by  these  effects  to  have  forbidden  it  as  clearly  as  though 
He  had  made  it  known  by  language.  He  has  given  us 
an  understanding,  by  the  simplest  exercise  of  which 
we  arrive  at  this  conclusion. 

It  is  still  further  to  be  observed,  that,  whenever  a 
course  of  conduct  produces  individual,  it  also  produces 
social  misery  ;  and  whenever  a  course  of  conduct  vio- 
lates the  social  laws  of  our  being,  it  of  necessity  pro- 
duces individual  misery.  And  hence  we  see  that  both 
of  these  indications  are  combined  to  teach  us  the  same 
lesson  ;  that  is,  to  intimate  to  us  what  is  and  what  is 
not  the  will  of  God  respecting  our  conduct. 

Hence  we  see  that  two  views  may  be  taken  of  an 
action  when  it  is  contemplated  in  the  light  of  nature : 
first,  as  affecting  ourselves ;  and,  secondly,  as  affecting 
both  ourselves  and  society,  but  specially  tlie  latter.  It 
is  in  this  latter  view  that  we  introduce  the  doctrine  of 
general  consequences.  We  ask,  in  order  to  determine 
w  liat  is  our  duty,  Wliat  would  be  the  result,  if  tliis  or 
tliat  action  were  universally  practised  among  men  ?  Or, 
how  would  it  affect  the  happiness  of  individuals,  and  of 
the  whole  ?  By  the  answer  to  these  questions  we  as- 
certain what  is  the  will  of  God  in  respect  to  that  action, 
or  that  course  of  action.  When  once  the  will  of  God  is 
ascertained,  conscience,  as  we  have  shown,  teaches  us 
that  we  are  under  the  highest  obligation  to  obey  it. 
Tluis,  from  the  consideration  of  the  greatest  amount  of 
11 


122  theoketical  ethics. 

happiness,  we  arrive  at  the  knowledge  of  our  duty,  not 
directly,  but  indirectly.  The  feeling  of  moral  obligation 
does  not  arise  from  i\\Q  simple  fact  tJiat  such  a  course  of 
conduct  will  or  will  not  produce  the  greatest  amount  of 
happiness^  but  from  the  fact  that  this  tendency  shows 
us  what  is  the  will  of  our  Creator ;  and  we  are,  by  the 
j)rinciples  of  our  nature,  under  the  highest  possible  obli- 
gation to  obey  that  will. 

It  must  be  evident  that  a  careful  observation  of  the 
results  and  tendencies  of  actions,  and  of  different  courses 
of  conduct,  will  teach  us,  in  very  many  respects,  the 
laws  of  our  moral  nature  ;  that  is,  what  in  these  respects 
is  the  will  of  our  Creator.  Now,  these  laws,  thus  arrived 
at,  and  reduced  to  order  and  arrangement,  form  the 
system  of  natural  religion.  So  far  as  it  goes,  every  one 
must  confess  such  a  system  to  be  valuable  ;  and  it, 
moreover,  rests  upon  as  sure  and  certain  a  basis  as  any 
system  of  laws  whatever. 

To  all  this,  however,  I  know  but  of  one  objection  that 
can  be  urged.  It  is,  that  pain  is  not,  of  necessity,  puni- 
tive or  prohibitory ;  and  that  it  may  be  merely  monitory 
or  advisory. 

To  this  it  may  be  answered,  that  this  distinction,  were 
it  ever  so  true,  does  not  invalidate  the  views  which  we 
have  taken.  It  matters  not  whether  the  pains  which 
we  suffer  from  an  action  be  monitory  or  prohibitory ; 
either  plainly  indicates  the  will  of  the  Creator,  and  this 
is  all  that  he  desires  to  make  known  to  us.  Having 
done  this,  he  leaves  us,  as  free  and  responsible  agents, 
to  take  our  own  choice,  and  act  according  to  our  own 
will.  He  makes  known  to  us  in  this  manner  his  will, 
but  he  does  not  prevent  us  from  acting  at  variance  with 
it  if  we  so  choose,  —  being,  however,  always  responsible 
io  him  for  our  actions. 

From  what  has  been  said,  I  think  we  may  safely  con- 
vAude : 

1.  That  God  has  given  to  man  a  moral  and  an  intel- 
lectual constitution,  by  which  he  may  be  admonished 
of  his  duty. 

2.  That  he  allows  man  to  act  freely,  and  to  do  either 
rig:ht  or  wrong,  as  he  chooses. 


HOW  FAR  WE  MAY  DISCOVER  OITR  DUTY.  123 

5.  That  he,  in  the  present  life,  has  connected  pleas- 
ure with  the  doing  of  right,  and  pain  with  the  doing 
of  wrong ;  and  that  these  pleasures  and  pains  affect 
both  the  individual  and  society. 

4.  And  hence  that,  from  an  attentive  observation  of 
the  results  of  actions  upon  individuals  and  upon  soci- 
ety, we  may  ascertain  what  is  the  will  of  God  concern- 
ing us. 

6.  And  for  all  the  opportunities  of  thus  ascertaining 
Lis  will  by  his  dealings  with  men. —  that  is,  by  the  light 
of  nature  —  God  holds  all  his  creatures  responsible. 


SECTION  II. 


HOW  FAR  WE  MAY  DISCOVER  OUR  DUTY  BY  THE  LIGHT  OF 
NATURE. 


It  has  been  shown  that  we  may,  by  observing  the 
results  of  our  actions  upon  individuals,  and  upon  so- 
ciety, ascertain  wliat  is  the  will  of  our  Creator  concern- 
ing us.  In  this  manner  we  may  discover  much  moral 
truth,  which  would  be  unknown  were  we  left  to  the 
guidance  of  conscience  unassisted ;  and  we  may  derive 
many  motives  to  virtue  which  would  otherwise  be  inof>- 
erative. 

I.  By  the  light  of  nature  we  discover  much  moral 
truth  which  could  never  be  discovered  by  conscience 
unassisted. 

1.  Conscience  indicates  to  us  our  obligations  to  others 
when  our  relations  to  them  are  discovered,  and  impels 
us  toward  that  course  of  conduct  which  the  understand- 
ing points  out  as  corresponding  with  these  obligations. 
But  there  are  many  obligations  which  conscience  seems 
not  to  point  out  to  men,  and  many  ways  of  fulfilling 
these  obligations  which  the  understanding  does  not 
clrirly  indicate.  ITi  these  respects  we  may  be  greatly 
af  ijted  l>y  natural  religion. 


124  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

Thus,  I  doubt  wliether  the  unassisted  conscieri'^o 
would  teach  the  wrong  of  polygamy  or  of  divorce.  Tho 
Jews,  even  at  the  time  of  our  Saviour,  had  no  concep- 
tion that  a  marriage  contract  was  obligatory  for  lile. 
But  any  one  who  will  observe  the  effects  of  polygamy 
upon  families  and  societies,  can  have  no  doubt  that 
the  precept  of  the  gospel  on  this  subject  is  the  moral 
law  of  the  system  under  which  we  are.  So,  I  do  not 
know  that  unassisted  conscience  would  remonstrate 
against  what  might  be  called  reasonable  revenge,  or 
the  operation  of  the  Lex  Talionis,  But  he  who  will 
observe  the  consequences  of  revenge,  and  those  of  for- 
giveness of  injuries,  will  have  no  difficulty  in  deciding 
which  course  of  conduct  has  been  indicated  as  his  duty 
by  his  Maker. 

2.  The  extent  of  obligations  previously  known  to 
exist  is  made  known  more  clearly  by  the  light  of  na- 
ture. Conscience  might  teach  us  the  obligations  to 
love  our  friends,  or  our  countrymen,  but  it  might  not 
go  further.  The  results  of  dilBferent  courses  of  conduct 
would  clearly  show  that  our  Creator  intended  us  to 
love  all  men  of  every  nation,  and  even  our  enemies. 

3.  It  is  by  observing  the  results  of  our  actions  that 
we  learn  the  limitations  which  our  Creator  has  affixed 
to  our  desires,  as  we  have  shown  in  the  chapter  on  hap- 
piness. The  simple  fact  that  gratification  of  our  desires, 
beyond  a  certain  limit,  will  produce  more  misery  than 
happiness,  addresses  itself  to  our  self-love^  and  forms  a 
reason  why  that  limit  should  not  be  transgressed.  The 
fact  that  this  limit  was  fixed  by  our  Creator,  and  that 
lie  has  thus  intimated  to  us  his  will,  addresses  itself  to 
our  conscience^  and  places  us  under  obligation  to  act  as 
he  has  commanded,  on  pain  of  his  displeasure. 

4.  In  many  cases,  where  the  obligation  is  acknowl- 
edged, we  might  not  be  able,  without  the  light  of  nat- 
ural religion,  to  decide  in  what  manner  it  could  best  bo 
discharged.  Tims  a  man  wlio  felt  conscious  of  his 
obligations  as  a  parent,  and  wished  to  discharge  them, 
would  derive  much  valuable  information  by  inquiring 
what  mode  of  exhibiting  parental  love  had  produced 


HOW  FAR  WE  MAY  DISCOVER  OTTR  DUTY.  125 

the  happiest  results.  He  would  hence  be  able  the 
better  to  decide  what  was  obligatory  upon  him. 

In  this  manner  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  much  valu- 
able knowledge  of  moral  truth  might  be  acquired,  be- 
yond what  is  attainable  by  unassisted  consciejice.  But 
this  is  not  all. 

II.  Natural  religion  presents  additional  motives  to  the 
practice  of  virtue. 

1.  It  does  this,  in  the  first  place,  by  more  clearly 
setting  before  us  the  rewards  o^  virtue  and  the  punish- 
ments of  vice.  Conscience  forewarns  us  against  crime, 
and  inflicts  its  own  peculiar  punishment  upon  guilt; 
but  natural  religion  informs  us  of  the  additional  con- 
sequences, independent  of  ourselves,  which  attach  to 
moral  action,  according  to  the  constitution  under  which 
we  are  created.  Tims,  conscience  might  forewarn  a 
man  against  dishonesty,  and  might  inflict  upon  him  the 
pains  of  remorse,  if  he  had  stolen ;  but  its  monition 
would  surely  derive  additional  power  from  an  observa- 
tion of  the  effect  which  must  be  produced  upon  individ- 
uals and  societies  by  the  practice  of  this  immorality, 
and  also  by  the  contrary  eifects  which  must  arise  from 
the  opposite  virtue. 

2.  Still  further.  Natural  religion  presents  us  with 
more  distinct  and  affecting  views  of  the  character  of 
God  than  could  be  obtained  without  it.  One  of  the 
first  aspirations  of  a  human  soul  is  after  an  intelligent 
First  Cause ;  and  the  most  universal  dictate  of  con- 
science is,  that  this  First  Cause  ought  to  be  obeyed. 
Hence  every  nation,  how  rude  soever  it  be,  has  its  gods, 
and  its  religious  services.  But  such  a  notion  of  the 
Deity  is  cold  and  inoperative  when  compared  witli  that 
wliicli  may  be  derived  from  an  intelligent  observation 
of  the  laws  of  nature,  physical  and  moral,  which  we  see 
pervading  the  universe  around  us.  In  every  moral  law 
which  has  been  written  on  the  page  of  this  world's  his- 
tory, we  discover  a  new  lineament  of  the  character  of 
(he  Deity.  Every  moral  attribute  of  God  which  wo 
liscover  imposes  upon  us  a  new  obligation,  and  pre- 
ents  an   additional  motive  why  wo  should   ^^^o  on(i 

11* 


126  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

serve  him.  Hence  we  see  that  the  knowledge  rf  God, 
derived  from  the  study  of  nature,  is  adapted  to  add 
greatly  to  the  impulsive  power  of  conscience. 

We  see,  then,  how  large  a  field  of  moral  knowledge 
is  spread  open  before  us,  if  we  only  in  a  suitable  man- 
ner apply  our  understandings  to  the  works  of  God 
around  us.  He  has  arranged  all  things  for  the  pur- 
pose of  teaching  us  these  lessons,  and  he  has  created 
our  intellectual  and  moral  nature  expressly  for  the 
purpose  of  learning  them.  If,  then,  we  do  not  use  the 
powers  which  he  has  given  us  for  the  purpose  for 
which  he  has  given  them,  he  holds  us  responsible  for 
the  result.  Thus  said  the  prophet :  "  Because  they 
regard  not  the  works  of  the  Lord,  neither  consider  the 
operation  of  his  hands,  therefore  he  shall  destroy  them, 
and  not  build  them  up."  Thus  the  Scriptures  else- 
where declare  all  men  to  be  responsible  for  the  correct 
use  of  all  the  knowledge  of  duty  which  God  had 
set  before  them.  St.  Paul,  Rom.  i.  19,  20,  asserts, 
"  That  which  may  be  known  of  God,  is  mianifest  in  [or 
to]  them,  for  God  hath  showed  it  to  them:  so  that 
[or  therefore]  they  are  without  excuse."  Thus  he  also 
declares,  "  They  that  sin  without  law  [that  is,  without 
a  written  revelation]  shall  perish  without  law."  And 
thus  we  come  to  the  general  conclusion,  that  natural 
religion  presents  to  all  men  a  distinct  and  impo»'tant 
means  of  knowing  the  character  and  will  of  God.  and 
the  obligations  and  duties  of  man ;  and  that  for  <;hia 
knowledge  all  men  are  justly  held  responsible. 


SECTION   III. 

DEFECTS  OF  THE  SYSTEM  OF  NATURAL  RELIGION. 

\ 

I.  Without  any  argument  on  the  subject,  th^*  insuf 
ficicncy  of  natural  religion  as  a  means  of  human  refor 
mation  may  be  readily  made  manifest  hj  facts. 


DEFECTS  IN  NATURAL  EELIGION.  127 

1 .  Trie  facts  on  which  natural  religion  rests,  and  the 
intellectual  power  to  derive  the  moral  laws  from  tho 
facts,  have  been  in  the  possession  of  man  from  the  be- 
ginning. Yet  the  whole  history  of  man  has  exhibited 
a  constant  tendency  to  moral  deterioration.  This  is 
proved  by  the  fact  that  every  people,  not  enlightened 
by  revelation,  consider  the  earliest  period  of  their  his- 
tory as  the  period  of  their  greatest  moral  purity.  Then 
the  gods  and  men  held  frequent  intercourse ;  this  inter- 
course, in  consequence  of  the  sins  of  men,  has  since 
been  discontinued.  That  was  the  golden  age ;  the 
subsequent  ages  have  been  those  of  brass  or  of  iron. 
The  political  history  of  men  seems  to  teach  the  same 
lesson.  In  the  early  ages  of  national  existence,  sparse- 
ness  of  population,  mutual  fear,  and  universal  poverty, 
have  obliged  men  to  lay  the  foundations  of  society  in 
principles  of  justice,  in  order  to  secure  a  national  exist- 
ence. But  as  soon  as,  under  such  a  constitution, 
wealth  had  increased,  population  had  become  dense, 
and  progress  in  arts  and  arms  had  rendered  a  nation 
fearless,  the  anti-social  tendencies  of  vice  have  shown 
themselves  too  powerful  for  the  moral  forces  by  which 
they  have  been  opposed.  The  bonds  of  society  have 
been  gradually  dissolved,  and  a  nation  rich  in  the  spoils 
of  an  hundred  triumphs  becomes  the  prey  of  some 
warlike  and  more  virtuous  horde,  which  takes  possession 
of  the  spoil,  merely  to  pursue  the  same  career  to  a  more 
speedy  termination. 

2  The  systems  of  religion  of  the  heathen  may  be 
fairly  considered  as  the  legitimate  result  of  all  the 
moral  forces  which  are  in  operation  upon  man,  irre- 
spective of  revelation.  They  show  us,  not  what  man 
might  have  learned  by  the  proper  use  of  his  faculties  in 
the  study  of  duty,  but  what  he  has  always  actually 
learned.  Now,  these  systems,  so  far  from  having  any 
tendency  to  make  man  better,  have  a  manifest  tendency 
to  make  him  worse.  Their  gods  were  of  the  most  prof- 
ligate and  demoralizing  character.  Had  natural  religion 
succeeded  in  instilling  into  the  minds  of  men  true  ideas 
01*  virtue  and  duty,  their  imaginations  in  forming  con- 


128  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

Opt' ^.  IS  of  deities  would  have  invested  them  with  far 
d  ffervut  attributes. 

3.  The  ethical  systems  of  philosophers,  it  is  true,  not 
unfrequently  presented  sublime  and  pure  conceptions 
of  the  Deity.  But  as  instruments  of  moral  reformation 
they  were  clearly  inoperative.  Thoy  were  extremely 
imperfect  in  everything  which  relates  to  our  duties  to 
man,  and  specially  in  everything  which  relates  to  our 
duty  to  God.  They  offered  no  sufficient  motives  to  obe- 
dience ;  they  were  established  on  subtle  reasonings, 
which  cculd  not  be  comprehended  by  the  common  peo- 
ple ;  and  they  imposed  no  obligation  upon  their  disci- 
ples to  disseminate  them  among  others.  Hence  they 
were  never  extensively  known  beyond  the  small  circle 
of  meditative  students ;  and  by  these  they  were  consid- 
ered rather  as  matters  of  doubtful  speculation  than  of 
practical  benefit ;  adapted  rather  to  the  cultivation  of 
intellectual  acuten^ss  than  to  the  reformation  of  moral 
conduct.  I  ihink  vhat  any  one,  on  reading  the  ethical 
disquisitions  of  th3  ancients,  must  be  struck  with  the 
fact  that  honost,  simple,  and  ardent  love  of  truth 
seems  to  have  furnished  no  motive  whatever  to  their 
investigations,  and  that  its  place  was  supplied  by  mere 
curiosity,  or  love  of  the  new,  the  refined,  and  even  the 
paradoxical. 

And  hence,  as  might  be  expected,  these  ethical  sys- 
tems made  no  converts  from  vice  to  virtue.  From  the 
era  of  which  of  the  syst<}ms  of  ancient  ethics  can  any 
reformation  be  dated  ?  Where  are  their  effects  recorded 
in  the  moival  history  of  mm  ?  Facts  have  abundantly 
proved  them  to  be  utterly  destitute  of  any  power  over 
tlxe  conscience,  or  of  any  p.*actical  influence  over  tho 
conduct. 

4.  Nor  can  this  failure  be  attributed  to  any  want  of 
intellectual  cultivation.  Duii^ig  a  large  portion  of  tho 
period  of  which  we  have  spoken,  the  human  mind  had 
in  many  respects  attained  to  as  high  a  state  of  perfection 
as  it  has  attained  at  any  subsequent  age.  Eloquence, 
poetry,  rhetoric,  nay,  some  of  ihe  severer  sciences, 
VGTQ  studied  with  a  success  which  has  never  since 


DEFECTS  IX  NATURAL  RELIGIOIT.  128 

been  surpassed.  This  is  universally  confessed.  Yet 
what  progress  did  the  classic  ages  make  in  morals  ? 
And  hence  we  think  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  hu 
man  mind,  even  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances, 
lias  never,  when  unassisted  by  revelation,  deduced  from 
the  course  of  things  around  us  any  such  principles  of 
duty,  or  motives  to  the  performance  of  it,  as  were  suffi- 
cient to  produce  any  decided  effect  upon  the  moral 
character  of  man. 

And  hence,  were  we  unable  to  assign  the  cause  of  this 
failure,  yet  the  fact  of  the  failure  alone  is  sufficient  to 
prove  the  necessity  of  some  other  means  for  arriving  at 
a  knowledge  of  duty  than  is  afforded  by  the  light  of 
nature. 

II.  But,  secondly,  the  causes  of  this  insufficiency 
may  in  many  respects  be  pointed  out.  Among  them 
are  obviously  the  following : 

1.  The  mode  of  teaching  natural  religion  is  by  expe- 
rience. We  can  form  no  opinion  respecting  the  results 
of  two  opposite  courses  of  action  until  they  are  both 
before  us.  Hence  we  cannot  certainly  know  what  the 
law  is  except  by  breaking  it.  Hence  the  habit  of  viola- 
tion must,  in  some  sense,  be  formed  before  we  know  what 
the  law  is  which  we  violate.  Consequently,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  natural  religion  must  always  bo 
much  behind  the  age,  and  must  always  utter  its  precepts 
to  men  who  are  in  some  manner  fixed  in  the  habit  of 
violating  them. 

2.  There  are  many  moral  laws  in  which  the  conneo 
tion  between  the  transgression  and  the  punishment  can- 
not be  shown,  except  in  the  more  advanced  periods  of 
society.  Such  is  the  fact  in  respect  to  those  laws  which 
can  be  ascertained  only  by  extended  and  minute  observa- 
tion ;  and,  of  course,  a  state  of  society  in  which  knowl- 
edge is  widely  disseminated,  and  the  experience  of  a 
large  surface,  and  for  a  long  period,  is  necessary  to 
establish  the  fact  of  the  connection  between  this  par- 
ticidar  violation  and  this  particular  result.  In  the 
meantime,  mankind  will  be  suffering  all  the  consequent 
CCS  of  vice ;  and  the  courses  of  conduct  which  are  tho 


130  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

causes  of  misery  will  be  interweaving  themselves  with 
the  customs,  habits,  and  interests  of  every  class  of 
society.  Thus  it  too  often  happens  that  the  knowledge 
is  with  great  difficulty  acquired ;  and  when  acquired, 
unfortunately  comes  too  late  to  effect  a  remedy. 

3.  A  still  more  radical  deficiency,  however,  in  natural 
religion  is,  that  it  is  from  its  nature  incapable  of  teach- 
ing facts.  It  can  teach  only  laws  and  tendencies. 
From  observing  what  has  been  done,  and  how  it  has 
been  done,  it  can  infer  that  if  the  same  thing  were 
done  again,  and  done  in  the  same  manner,  it  would 
be  attended,  in  all  places  and  at  all  times,  if  under  the 
same  conditions,  with  the  same  results.  But  as  to  a 
fact — that  is,  whether  an  action  were  actually  performed 
at  some  other  place  or  time,  or  whether  it  ever  would 
be  —  natural  religion  can  give  us  no  information.  Thus 
we  know  by  experience  that  if  a  man  fall  from  a  preci- 
pice he  will  be  destroyed  ;  but  whether  a  man  ever  did 
so  fall,  much  less  whether  A  or  B  did  fall  from  it,  we 
can  never  be  informed  by  general  principles.  Thus, 
from  the  fact  that  we  see  guilt  punished  in  this  world, 
we  infer  from  natural  religion  that  it  will  at  some  time 
be  punished  in  this  world  ;  we  infer,  though  not  so  cer- 
tainly, that  it  will  also  bd  punished  in  another  world, 
\i  there  be  another  world.  But  of  the  fact  whether 
there  be  another  world,  natural  religion  can  give  us  no 
certain  information ;  much  less  can  it  give  us  any  in- 
formation respecting  the  question  whether  God  has 
actually  done  anything  to  remedy  the  evils  of  sin,  and 
vary  those  sequences  which,  without  a  remedy,  experi- 
ence shows  us  to  be  inevitable. 

4.  Hence  natural  religion  must  derive  all  its  certain 
motives  from  the  present  world.  Those  from  the  other 
world  are,  so  far  as  it  is  concerned,  in  their  nature 
contingent  and  uncertain.  And  hence  it  loses  all  that 
power  over  man,  which  would  be  derived  from  the 
certain  knowledge  of  our  existence  after  death,  of  tlie 
nature  of  that  existence,  and  of  what  God  has  done  for 
our  restoration  to  virtue  and  happiness.  All  these 
being  facts,  can  never  be  known  except  by  lan^age; 


DEFECTS  IN  NATURAT.  RELIGIOIT.  131 

that  is,  by  revelation.  They  must  always  remain  in 
utter  incertitude  so  long  as  we  are  left  to  the  teach- 
ings of  natural  religion. 

We  see,  then,  that  natural  religion  is  obliged  to  meet 
the  impulsions  of  this  world  solely  by  motives  from  this 
world.  Nay,  more ;  it  is  obliged  to  resist  the  power 
of  the  present,  of  passion  strengthened  and  confirmed 
by  habit,  by  considerations  drawn  from  the  distant,  the 
future,  and  what  may  seem  to  be  the  uncertain.  Hence 
its  success  must  be  at  best  but  dubious,  even  when  its 
power  is  exerted  upon  those  least  exposed  to  the  allure- 
ments of  vice.  Who  does  not  see  that  it  is  utterly  vain 
to  hope  for  success  from  such  a  source,  in  our  attempts 
to  reform  men  in  general  ?  Every  one  who  is  at  all 
acquainted  with  the  history  of  man,  must  be  convinced 
that  nothing  less  powerful  than  the  whole  amount  of 
motive  derived  from  the  knowledge  of  an  endless  ex- 
istence, has  ever  been  found  a  sufficient  antagonist 
force  to  the  downward  and  headlong  tendencies  of 
appetite  and  passion. 

And  hence,  from  the  fact  of  the  recorded  failure  of 
natural  religion  as  a  means  of  reformation,  and  from 
the  defects  inherent  in  its  very  nature  as  a  means  of 
moral  improvement,  there  seems  clearly  to  exist  a  great 
need  of  some  additional  moral  force  to  correct  the 
moral  evils  of  our  nature.  It  is  surely  not  improbable 
that  some  additional  means  of  instruction  and  improve- 
ment may  have  been  granted  to  our  race  by  a  mercifuj 
Creator. 


tu- 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

RELATION  BETWEEN  NATURAL  AND  REVEALED  RELIGION. 

If  what  we  have  said  be  true,  the  defects  of  natural 
religion  would  lead  us  to  expect  that  some  other  means 
of  moral  instruction  would  be  afforded  us.  And,  in- 
deed, this  is  the  conclusion  at  which  some  of  che  wisest 
heathen  philosophers  arrived,  from  a  consideration  of 
that  utter  ignorance  of  futurity  in  which  they  were 
of  necessity  plunged,  by  the  most  attentive  study  of 
natural  religion.  They  felt  convinced  that  the  Deity 
would  not  have  constructed  a  system  of  moral  teaching 
which  led  to  impervious  darkness,  unless  he  intended 
out  of  that  very  darkness,  at  some  period  or  other,  to 
manifest  light. 

But  still  more  :  I  think  that  an  attentive  observation 
of  what  natural  religion  teaches,  aii^««f  its  necessary 
and  inherent  defects,  would  afford  us.  aome  grounds  of 
expectation  respecting  the  nature  oi .  that  revelation 
which  should  be  made.  If  we  can  discover  the  moral 
necessities  of  our  race,  and  can  also  discover  in  what 
respects  { nd  for  what  reason  the  means  thus  far  em- 
ployed have  failed  to  relieve  them,  we  may  with  cer- 
tainty predict  some  of  the  characteristics  which  must 
mark  any  system  which  should  be  devised  to  accom- 
plish a  decided  remedy. 

For  example  : 

1.  It  is  granted  that  natural  religion  docs  teach  us 
some  unquestionable  truths.  Now,  no  tinitli  can  be 
inconsistent  with  itself.  And  hence  it  miulit  be  ex- 
pected that  whenever  natural  and  revealed  religion 
treated  upon  the  same  subjects  they  would  teach  in 
perfect  harmony.     The  second  instructor  may  teach 


NATURAL  AND  REYE.\.LED  RELIGION.  133 

more  than  tlio  first ;  but  so  far  as  tliey  give  instruction 
on  the  same  subjects,  if  botli  teacli  the  truth,  they  must 
both  teach  the  same  lesson. 

2  It  is  natural  to  expect  that  a  revelation  would 
give  us  much  information  upon  tlie  subject  of  duty, 
wliich  could  not  be  learned  by  the  liglit  of  nature. 
Thus,  it  might  be  expected  to  make  known  more  clearly 
to  us  than  we  could  otherwise  learn  them,  the  obliga- 
tions by  which  we  are  bound  to  our  fellow-men  and 
to  God,  and  also  the  manner  in  which  those  obligations 
are  to  be  discharged. 

3.  That  it  would  present  us  with  motives  to  virtue, 
in  addition  to  those  made  known  by  the  light  of  nature. 
We  have  seen  that  the  motives  of  natural  religion  are 
derived  from  this  world,  and  are  in  their  nature  insuf- 
ficient. We  should  expect  that  those  in  a  revelation 
would  be  drawn  from  some  other  source.  And  still 
more,  as  natural  religion  may  be  considered  to  have 
exhausted  the  motives  of  this  world,  it  is  surely  not 
unreasonble  to  expect  that  a  revelation^  leaving  this 
world,  would  draw  its  motives  principally  from  another, 
if  it  revealed  to  us  the  fact  that  another  world  existed. 

4.  We  should  not  expect  that  the  Deity  would  em- 
ploy a  second  and  additional  means  to  accomplish  what 
could  be  done  by  any  modification  of  the  means  first 
employed.  Hence,  if  a  revelation  were  made  to  men, 
we  might  reasonably  expect  that  it  would  make  known 
to  us  such  truths  as  could  not,  in  the  nature  of  the 
case,  be  communicated  by  natural  religion. 

These  are,  I  think,  just  anticipations.  At  any  rate, 
I  think  it  must  be  admitted  that  if  a  system  of  reli- 
gion, purporting  to  be  a  revelation  from  Heaven,  met 
all  these  expectations,  its  relations  to  natural  religion 
not  only  would  present  no  argument  against  its  truth, 
but  would  create  a  strong  d  priori  presumption  in  its 
favor. 

Now,  these  expectations  are  all  fully  realized  in  tlio 
By  stem  of  religion  contained  in  the  Scriptures  of  the 
Old  and  New  Testaments. 

1.  The  truths  of  revealed  religion  harmonize  perfectly 
12 


134  THEORETICAL  ETIHCS. 

with  those  of  natural  religion.  The  difference  between 
them  consists  in  this,  —  that  the  one  teaches  plainly, 
what  the  other  teaches  by  inference  ;  the  one  takes  up 
the  lesson  where  the  other  leaves  it,  supplies  its  defects, 
and  adds  to  it  other  and  vitally  important  precepts. 
Nay,  so  perfect  is  the  harmony  between  them,  that  it 
may  safely  be  asserted  that  not  a  single  precept  of  nat- 
ural religion  exists  which  is  not  also  found  in  the  Bible  ;^ 
and  still  more,  that  the  Bible  is  every  day  directing  us 
to  new  lessons,  taught  us  by  nature,  which  but  for  its 
information  would  never  have  been  discovered.  So 
complete  is  this  coincidence  as  to  afford  irrefragabl& 
proof  that  the  Bible  contains  the  moral  laws  of  the 
universe ;  and  hence,  that  the  Author  of  the  universe 
—  that  is,  of  natural  religion  —  is  also  the  author  of 
the  Scriptures. 

2.  The  holy  Scriptures,  as  has  just  been  intimated, 
give  us  much  information  on  questions  of  duty  which 
could  not  be  obtained  by  the  light  of  nature.  Under 
this  remark  may  be  classed  the  scriptural  precepts  re- 
specting the  domestic  relations  ;  respecting  our  duties 
to  enemies,  and  to  men  in  general ;  and  especially 
respecting  our  obligations  to  God,  and  the  manner  in 
which  he  may  most  acceptably  be  worshipped. 

3.  The  Scriptures  present  motives  to  the  practice  of 
virtue,  additional,  generically  different  from  those  of 
natural  religion,  and  of  infinitely  greater  power. 

1.  The  motives  to  virtue,  from  consequences  in  this 
world,  are  strengthened  by  a  clearer  development  of 
the  indissoluble  connection  between  moral  cause  and 
effect,  than  is  made  known  by  natural  religion. 

2.  In  addition  to  these  motives,  we  are  assured  of 
our  existence  after  death  ;  and  eternal  happiness  and 
eternal  misery  are  set  forth  as  the  desert  of  virtue  and 
vice. 

3.  The  Scriptures  reveal  to  us  the  Deity  as  assuming  * 
new  relations  to  us,  and  devising  a  most  merciful  way 
for  our  redemption :    by  virtue  of  this  new  relation, 
establishing  a  new  ground  of  moral  obligation  between 
tlie  race  of  man  and  himself,  and  thus  adding  a  power 


NATURAL  AXD  REVEALLD  RELIGION.  135 

to  the  impulsion  of  conscience,  of  which  natural  reli- 
gion must,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  be  destitute. 

4.  It  is  manifest  that  much  of  the  above  knowledge 
which  the  Scriptures  reveal  is  of  the  nature  of  fact, 
and  therefore  could  not  be  communicated  to  us  by 
experience,  or  in  the  way  of  general  laws,  but  must  bo 
made  known  by  language,  that  is,  by  revelation. 

Thus  the  existence  of  a  state  of  being  after  death, 
the  doctrine  of  the  resurrection,  of  a  universal  and 
impartial  judgment,  of  an  endless  state  of  rewards  and 
punishments,  of  a  remedial  dispensation,  by  which  the 
connection  between  guilt  and  punishment  may  be  con- 
ditionally severed  ;  the  doctrine  of  the  atonement,  and 
the  way  in  which  a  man  may  avail  himself  of  the  ben- 
efits of  this  remedial  dispensation  —  all  these  are  man- 
ifestly of  great  practical  importance  in  a  scheme  of 
moral  reformation  ;  and  yet,  all  of  them  being  of  the 
nature  oi  facts,  they  could  be  made  known  to  man  in 
no  other  way  than  by  language. 

Now,  as  these  seem  clearly  to  be  just  anticipations  re- 
specting any  system  which  should  be  designed  to  supply 
the  evident  defects  of  natural  religion,  and  as  all  these 
anticipations  are  realized  in  the  system  of  reUgion  con- 
tained in  the  Scriptures,  each  one  of  these  anticipations 
thus  realized  furnishes  a  distinct  a  priori  presumption 
in  favor  of  the  truth  of  revealed  religion.  We  do  not 
pretend  that  any,  or  that  all  of  these  considerations, 
prove  the  Scriptures  to  be  a  revelation  from  God. 
This  proof  is  derived  from  other  sources.  What  we 
would  say  is  this :  that  from  what  we  know  of  God's 
moral  government  by  the  light  of  nature,  it  is  mani- 
festly probable  that  he  would  give  us  some  additional 
instruction,  and  that  that  instruction  would  be,  in  va- 
rious important  respects,  analogous  to  that  contained 
in  the  holy  Scriptures.  And  we  hence  conclude  that 
although  it  were  granted  —  which,  however,  need  not 
be  granted  —  that,  were  there  no  antecedent  facts  in 
the  case,  it  might  seem  unlikely  that  God  would  con- 
descend to  make  a  special  revelation  of  his  will  to  men  ; 
yet,  when  the  antecedent  facts  are  properly  considered^ 


136  THEORETICAL  ETmCS. 

this  presumption,  if  it  ever  could  be  maintained,  is 
no^  precisely  reversed,  and  that  there  now  exists  a  fair 
presumption  that  such  a  revelation  mould  actually  be 
made.  And  hence  we  conclude  that  a  revelation  of  the 
will  of  God  by  language  is  not,  as  many  persons  sup- 
pose, an  event  so  unlikely  that  no  evidence  can  be  con- 
ceived sufficiently  strong  to  render  it  credible ;  but  that 
it  is,  on  the  contrary,  an  event  which,  from  all  that  we 
know  of  God  already,  is  essentially  probable  ;  and  that  it 
is,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  as  fairly  within  the  limits  of 
evidence  as  any  other  event,  and  when  proved,  on  the 
ordinary  principles  of  evidence,  is  as  much  entitled  to 
belief  as  any  other  event.  And  hence  we  conceive  that 
when  men  demand,  in  support  of  the  truth  of  revealed 
religion,  evidence  unlike  to  that  which  is  demanded  in 
support  of  any  other  event,  —  that  is,  evidence  of  which 
they  themselves  cannot  define  the  nature,  —  they  de- 
mand what  is  manifestly  unreasonable,  and  proceed 
upon  a  presumption  wholly  at  variance  with  all  the 
known  facts  in  tlie  case. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES. 

This  would  seem  to  be  tlie  place  in  which  to  present 
the  proof  of  the  authenticity  of  the  holy  Scriptures  as 
a  revelation  from  God.  This,  however,  being  only  a 
particular  exemplification  of  the  general  laws  of  evi- 
dence, it  belongs  rather  to  the  course  of  instruction 
in  Intellectual  Philosophy.  It  will  therefore  be  here 
omitted.  We  shall,  in  the  remainder  of  these  remarks, 
take  it  for  granted  that  the  scriptures  of  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments  contain  a  revelation  from  God  to 
man ;  that  these  books  contain  all  that  God  has  been 
pleased  to  reveal  unto  us  by  language  ;  and,  therefore, 
all  which  is  recorded  in  language  that  is  ultimate  in 
morals,  and  that  is,  by  its  own  authority,  binding  upon 
the  conscience.  Taking  this  for  granted,  we  shall  in 
the  present  chapter  consider,  first,  what  the  Scriptures 
contain ;  and,  second,  how  we  may  ascertain  our  duty 
from  the  Scriptures. 


SECTION  I. 

A  VIEW  OF  THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES. 

The  holy  Scriptures  are  contained  in  two  separate 
volumes,  entitled  the  Old  and  the  New  Testaments. 
These  volumes  have  each  a  distinct  object,  and  yet 
their  objects  are  in  perfect  harmony ;  and  together 
they  contain  all  that  could  be  desired  in  a  revelation  to 
the  human  race. 

12* 


loS  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

The  design  of  the  Old  Testament  mainly  is  to  reveal 
a  system  of  simple  law  ;  to  exhibit  the  results  of  such  a 
system  upon  the  human  race  ;  and  to  direct  the  minds 
of  men  to  the  remedial  dispensation  which  was  to  fol- 
low. 

It  is  here  worthy  of  special  remark,  that  the  law  of 
God  was  first  made  known  to  a  rude  and  ignorant  peo- 
ple. Its  moral  precepts  were  at  first  few  and  dm  pie ; 
and  after  these  had  become  known,  others  were  from  time 
to  time  added,  as  the  hearers  were  able  to  bear  them. 
Thus,  in  the  beginning,  many  practices  were  not  for- 
bidden which  were  afterwards  disallowed.  Various 
rites  were  at  one  time  established,  which  at  a  later 
time  were  annulled.  Thus,  by  repeated  and  increasing 
manifestations  of  moral  truth,  the  nation  was  prepared 
for  that  fulness  of  time  in  which  the  whole  will  of  God 
was  revealed,  not  only  to  the  Hebrews,  but  to  thorn, 
and  through  them,  to  the  whole  human  race.  Thus 
*'  God  who,  at  sundry  times  and  in  divers  manners, 
spake  in  times  past  to  the  fathers  by  the  prophets,  hath 
in  these  last  days  spoken  to  us  by  his  Son"  from  heaven. 
*'  And  the  times  of  this  ignorance  God  winked  at,  but 
now  commandeth  all  men  everywhere  to  repent."  Our 
Saviour  particularly  alludes  to  the  progressive  develop- 
ment of  the  moral  law,  from  the  time  in  which  it  was 
first  made  known  by  Moses.  "  Moses,  for  the  hardness 
of  your  hearts,  suffered  you  to  put  away  your  wives,  but 
from  the  beginning  it  was  not  so.  But  /say  unto  you, 
whosoever  shall  put  away  his  wife,  except  it  be  for 
fornication,  and  marry  another,  committeth  adultery. 
It  hath  been  said  by  them  of  old  time,  Thou  shalt  not 
forswear  thyself,  but  shalt  perform  to  the  Lord  thine 
oaths  ;  but  /say  to  you,  sivear  not  at  all ^^^  etc. 

In  accomplishing  this^  design,  it  contains  several  dis- 
tinct parts. 

I.  An  account  of  the  creation  of  the  world,  of  the 
creation  and  fall  of  man,  and  a  brief  history  of  the  race 
of  man  until  the  deluge.  The  cause  of  this  deluge  is 
Btated  to  be,  the  universal  and  intense  wickedness  ot 
man. 


A  VIEW  OF  THE  HOLY  SCRIPTURES.  139 

2  The  account  of  the  separation  of  a  particular 
family,  the  germ  of  a  nation  designed  to  be  the  deposi- 
taries of  the  revealed  will  of  God,  and  the  history  of 
this  nation,  from  the  call  of  Abraham  until  the  return 
from  the  captivity  in  Babylon  —  a  period  of  about  fifteen 
hundred  years. 

3.  The  system  of  laws  which  God  gave  to  this  nation. 
These  la^  s  may  be  comprehended  under  three  classes  : 

Moral  laws,  or  those  which  arise  from  the  immutable 
relations  existing  between  God  and  man. 

Civil  laws,  or  those  enacted  for  the  government  of 
civil  society  ;  adapted  specially  to  the  Jewish  Theocracy, 
or  that  form  of  government  in  which  God  was  specially 
recognized  as  King. 

Ceremonial  laws.  These  were  of  two  kinds :  First, 
those  which  were  intended  to  keep  this  nation  separate 
from  other  nations  ;  and,  second,  those  intended  to 
prefigure  events  which  were  to  occur  under  the  second 
or  new  dispensation. 

4.  Various  events  in  their  history,  discourses  of 
prophets  and  inspired  teachers,  prayers,  odes  of  pious 
men ;  all  tending  to  illustrate  what  are  the  effects  of  a 
system  of  moral  law  upon  human  nature,  even  when 
placed  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances ;  and 
also  to  exhibit  the  effects  of  the  religious  principle 
upon  the  soul  of  man  under  every  variety  of  time  and 
condition. 

The  result  of  all  this  series  of  moral  means  seems  to 
be  this :  God,  in  various  modes  suited  to  their  con- 
dition, made  known  his  will  to  the  whole  human  race. 
They  all,  with  the  exception  of  a  single  family,  becamo 
so  corrupt  that  he  destroyed  them  by  a  general  deluge. 
Be  then  selected  a  single  family,  and  gave  them  his 
written  law,  and,  by  peculiar  enactments,  secluded 
them  from  all  other  nations,  that  the  experiment  might 
be  made  under  the  most  favorable  circumstances.  At 
the  same  time,  the  effects  of  natural  religion  were  tried 
among  the  heathen  nations  that  surrounded  them. 
The  result  was,  a  clear  demonstration  that,  under  tho 
conditions  of  being  in  which  man  was  created,  any 


140  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

reformation  was  hopeless,  and  that,  unless  some  other 
conditions  were  revealed,  the  race  would  perish  by  its 
own  vicious  and  anti-social  tendencies,  and  onter  the 
other  world  to  reap  the  reward  of  its  guilt  forever. 
While  this  is  said  to  be  the  main  design  of  the  Old 
Testament,  it  is  not  to  be  understood  that  this  is  its 
whole  design.  It  was  intended  to  be  introductory  to 
the  new  dispensation,  and  also  to  teach  those  to  whom 
it  was  addressed  the  way  of  salvation.  Hence  allu- 
sions to  the  principal  events  in  the  new  dispensation 
are  everywhere  to  be  met  with.  Hence,  also,  assuran- 
ces of  pardon  are  made  to  the  penitent,  and  God  is 
represented  as  ready  to  forgive  ;  though  the  procuring 
cause  of  our  pardon  is  not  explicitly  stated,  but  only 
alluded  to  in  terms  which  could  not  be  fully  understood 
until  the  remedial  dispensation  was  accomplished. 

The  design  of  the  New  Testament  is  to  reveal  to  the 
race  of  man  the  new  conditions  of  being  under  which 
it  is  placed  by  virtue  of  a  remedial  dispensation. 

In  pursuance  of  this  design,  the  New  Testament  con- 
tains, 

1.  A  narrative  of  the  life  and  death,  resurrection  and 
ascension,  the  acts  and  conversations  of  Jesus  of  Naza- 
reth,—  a  Being  in  whom  the  divine  and  human  natures 
were  mysteriously  united,  —  who  appeared  on  earth  to 
teach  us  whatever  was  necessary  to  be  known  of  our 
relations  to  God,  and  by  his  obedience  to  the  law,  and 
voluntary  sufferings  and  death,  to  remove  the  obstacles 
to  our  pardon  which,  under  the  former  dispensation, 
existed  in  consequence  of  the  holiness  of  God. 

2.  A  brief  narrative  of  the  facts  relating  to  the 
progress  of  the  Christian  religion,  for  several  years  after 
the  ascension  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth. 

3.  The  instructions  which  his  immediate  followers  or 
apostles,  by  divine  inspiration,  gave  to  the  men  of  their 
own  time,  and  which  were  rendered  necessary  in  conse- 
quence of  their  ignorance  of  the  principles  of  religion, 
or  the  weakness  of  their  virtue  and  the  imperfection  of 
their  faith. 

The  whole  of  this  volume,  taken  together,  teaches  us 


HOW  TO  LEARN  OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE  SCRIPTURES.     1 41 

tlie  precepts,  the  sanctions,  and  the  rewards  of  the  law 
of  God,  with  as  great  distinctness  as  wo  conld  desire  ; 
and  also  a  way  of  salvation,  on  different  grounds  from 
that  revealed  both  by  natural  religion  and  by  the  Old 
Testament ;  a  way  depending  for  merit  upon  the  doings 
and  sufferings  of  another,  but  yet  available  to  us  on  no 
other  conditions  than  those  of  supreme,  strenuous,  and 
universal  moral  effort  after  perfect  purity  of  thought 
and  word  and  action. 

This,  being  a  remedial  dispensation,  is  in  its  nature 
final.  We  have  nO  reason  to  expect  any  other ;  nay, 
the  idea  of  another  would  be  at  variance  with  the 
belief  of  the  truth  of  this.  And  hence  the  Scriptures 
of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments  contain  all  that  God  has 
revealed  to  us  by  language  respecting  his  will.  What 
is  contained  here  alone  is  binding  upon  the  conscience. 
Or,  in  the  words  of  Chillingworth,  "  The  Bible  —  thf 
Bible,  the  religion  oe  Protestants." 


SECTION  II, 

IN  WHAT  MANNER  ARE  WE  TO  ASCERTAIN  OUR  DUTY  FROM  THB 
HOLY  SCRIPTURES  ? 

Taking  it  for  granted  that  the  Bible  contains  a  reve- 
lation of  the  mil  of  God,  such  as  is  stated  in  the  pre- 
ceding section,  it  will  still  be  of  importance  for  us  to  de- 
cide how  we  may  at  certain  from  the  study  of  it  what  God 
really  requires  of  us.  Much  of  it  is  mere  history,  con- 
taining an  unvarnished  narration  of  the  actions  of  good 
and  of  bad  men.  Much  of  it  has  reference  to  a  less 
enlightened  age,  and  to  a  particular  people,  set  apart 
from  other  people  for  a  special  and  pecuhar  purpose. 
Much  of  it  consists  of  exhortations  and  reproofs  addressed 
to  this  people  in  reference  to  the  laws  tlien  existing, 
but  which  have  been  since  abrogated.  Now,  amidst 
this  variety  of  instructions,  given  to  men  at  different 
times,  and  of  different  nations,  it  is  desirable  that  the 


142  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

principles  be  settled  by  which  we  may  learn  what  por- 
tion of  this  mass  of  instruction  is  binding  upon  the 
conscience  at  the  present  moment.  My  object  in  the 
following  section  is  to  ascertain,  as  far  as  possible,  the 
principles  by  which  we  are  to  be  guided  in  such  an 
inquiry. 

When  a  revelation  is  made  to  us  by  language,  it  is 
taken  for  granted  that  whatever  is  our  duty  will  be 
signified  to  us  by  a  command ;  and  hence  what  is  not 
commanded,  is  not  to  be  considered  by  us  as  obligatory. 
Did  we  not  establish  this  limitation,  everything  recorded 
—  as,  for  instance,  all  the  actions  both  of  good  and  of  bac^ 
men  —  might  be  regarded  as  authority  ;  and  thus  a  rev 
elation,  given  for  the  purpose  of  teaching  us  our  duty, 
might  be  used  as  an  instrument  to  confound  all  di» 
tinction  between  right  and  wrong. 

The  ground  of  moral  obligation,  as  derived  from  ft 
revelation,  must  therefore  be  a  command  of  God, 

Now,  a  command  seems  to  involve  three  ideas  : 

1.  That  an  act  be  designated.  This  may  be  by  the 
designation  of  the  act  itself,  as  for  instance,  giving  bread 
to  the  hungry ;  or  else  by  the  designation  of  a  temper 
of  mind,  as  that  of  universal  love,  under  which  the  above 
act,  and  various  other  acts,  are  clearly  comprehended. 

2.  That  it  be  somehow  signified  to  be  the  will  of  God 
that  th  is  act  be  performed.  Without  this  intimation,  every 
act  that  is  described,  or  even  held  up  for  our  reproba 
tion,  might  be  quoted  as  obligatory. 

3.  That  it  be  signified  that  we  are  included  within  thr 
number  of  those  to  whom  the  command  is  addressed 
Otherwise  all  the  commandments  t'  the  patriarchs  and 
prophets,  whether  ceremonial,  symbolical,  or  individual, 
would  be  binding  upon  every  one  who  might  read  them. 
And  hence,  in  general,  wliosoever  urges  upon  us  any 
duty  as  the  command  of  God  revealed  in  the  Bible,  must 
show  that  God  has  somewhere  commanded  that  action 
to  be  done,  and  that  he  has  commanded  us  to  do  it. 

This  principle  will  exclude, 

1.  Everything  which  is  mere/^  history.  Muchofthi* 
Bible  contains  a  mere  narrative  of  facts.    For  the  truth 


HOW  TO  LEARN  OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE  SCRIPTURES     U3 

of  this  narrative  the  veracity  of  the  Deity  is  pledged. 
We -may  derive  from  the  account  of  God's  dealings 
lessons  of  instruction  to  guide  us  in  particular  cases, 
and  from  the  evil  conduct  of  men,  matter  of  warning. 
But  the  mere  fact  that  anything  has  been  done  and  re 
corded  in  the  Scripture,  by  no  means  places  us  undei 
obligation  to  do  it. 

2.  It  excludes  from  being  obligatory  upon  all  what 
has  been  commanded,  but  which  can  be  shown  to  have 
been  intended  only  for  individuals  or  for  nations,  and 
not  for  the  whole  human  race.  Thus,  many  commands 
are  recorded  in  the  Scriptures  as  having  been  given  to 
individuals.  Such  was  the  command  to  Abraham,  to 
offer  up  his  son  ;  to  Moses,  to  stand  before  Pharaoh ;  to 
Samuel,  to  anoint  Saul  and  David ;  and  a  thousand 
others.  Here,  evidently,  the  Divine  direction  was 
exclusively  intended  for  the  individual  to  whom  it  was 
given.  No  one  can  pretend  that  he  is  commanded  to 
offer  up  his  son  because  Abraham  was  so  commanded. 

Thus,  also,  many  of  the  commands  of  God  in  the  Old 
Testament  were  addressed  to  nations.  Such  were  the 
directions  to  the  Israelites  to  take  possession  of  Canaan  ; 
to  make  war  upon  the  surrounding  nations ;  to  keep 
tlie  ceremonial  law ;  and  so  of  various  other  instances. 
Now,  of  such  precepts  it  is  to  be  observed,  1.  They  aro 
to  be  obeyed  only  at  the  time  and  in  the  manner  in  which 
tliey  were  commanded.  Thus  the  Jews  at  present 
would  have  no  right,  in  virtue  of  the  original  command, 
to  expel  the  Mahometans  from  Palestine,  though  the 
command  to  Joshua  was  a  sufficient  warrant  for  expel- 
ling the  Canaanites  at  the  time  in  which  it  was  given. 
2.  They  are  of  force  only  to  those  to  whom  they  wen 
given.  Thus,  supposing  the  ceremonial  law  was  not 
abolished ;  as  it  was  given  specially  to  Jews,  and  to  no 
one  else,  it  would  bind  no  one  but  Jews  now.  Suppos- 
ing it  to  be  abolished,  it  of  course  now  binds  no  one. 
For  if,  when  in  force,  it  was  obligatory  on  no  one  but  the 
Jews,  and  was  nothing  to  any  one  else,  when  it  is  abol- 
ished as  to  them,  it  is  nothing  to  any  one.  Such  is 
the  teaching  of  St.  Paul  on  this  subject. 


114  THEORETICAL  ETHICS. 

3.  It  would  exclude  whatever  was  done  by  inspired 
men,  if  it  was  done  without  the  addition  of  being  some- 
how commanded.  Thus,  the  New  Testament  was  man- 
ifestly intended  for  the  whole  human  race,  and  at  all 
times ;  and  it  was  written  by  men  who  were  inspired  by 
God  to  teach  us  his  will.  But  still,  their  example  is 
not  binding  per  se  ;  that  is,  we  are  not  under  obligation 
to  perform  an  act  simply  because  they  have  done  it, 
Tlius,  Paul  and  the  other  apostles  kept  the  Feast  of 
Pentecost;  but  this  imposes  no  such  obligation  upon 
us.  Paul  circumcised  Timothy;  but  this  imposes  no 
obligation  upon  us  to  do  likewise  :  for  upon  another 
occasion  he  did  not  circumcise  Titus.  The  examples 
of  inspired  men  in  the  New  Testament  would,  unless 
exception  be  made,  prove  the  lawfulness  of  an  act; 
but  it  could  by  no  means  establish  its  obligatoriness. 

This  principle  will  include  as  obligatory  — 

1.  Whatever  has  been  enjoined  as  the  will  of  God 
upon  man  as  man,  in  distinction  from  what  has  been 
enjoined  upon  men  as  individuals  or  as  nations.  The 
command  may  be  given  us,  1.  By  God  himself,  as  when 
he  proclaimed  his  law  from  Mount  Sinai ;  or,  2.  By  the 
Mediator  Christ  Jesus ;  or,  3.  By  any  persons  divinely 
commissioned  to  instruct  us  in  the  will  of  God ;  as 
prophets,  apostles,  or  evangelists.  This  includes,  as 
obhgatory  on  the  conscience,  simply  what  is  proved  to 
be  intended,  according  to  the  established  principles  of 
iiiterpr elation.  But  it  by  no  means  includes  anything 
which  man  may  infer  from  what  is  thus  intended. 
Any  idea  which  man  adds  to  the  idea  given  in  the 
Scriptures,  is  the  idea  of  man,  and  has  no  more  obliga- 
tion on  the  conscience  of  his  fellow-men  than  any  other 
idea  of  man. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  granting  that  nothing  but  a 
divine  command  is  obligatory  on  the  conscience,  yet,  as 
general  and  particular  commandments  in  the  Scriptures 
are  frequently,  in  a  considerable  degree,  blended  to- 
gether, how  may  we  learn  to  distinguish  that  part 
which  is  obligatory  upon  us  from  that  which  is  in  its 
nature  local  and  peculiar?  In  attempting  to  answer 
this  Question,  I  would  suggest  — 


HOW  TO  LEARN  OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE  SCRIPTURES.     145 

Thar  the  distinction  of  nations  or  individuals  is  no- 
where adverted  to  in  the  New  Testament..  Its  precepts 
are  clearly  intended  for  men  of  all  ages  and  nations ; 
and  hence  tliey  never  involve  anything  eitlier  local  or 
peculiar,  but  are  universally  binding  upon  all.  The 
question  must  therefore  refer  to  the  Old  Testament. 

If  we  confine  ourselves,  then,  to  the  Old  Testament, 
this  question  may  be  decided  on  che  following  principles  : 

1.  In  by  fai  the  greater  number  of  cases,  we  shall  be 
able  to  decide  by  reference  to  the  nature  of  the  Jewish 
commonwealth  —  a  temporary  or  preparatory  dispensa- 
tion, which  was  to  cease  when  that  to  which  it  was  pre- 
paratory had  appeared. 

2.  The  New  Testament  being  thus  intended  for  the 
whole  human  race,  and  being  a  final  revelation  of  the 
will  of  God  to  man,  may  be  supposed  to  contain  all  the 
moral  precepts,  both  of  natural  religion  and  of  the  Old 
Testament,  together  with  whatever  else  it  was  impor- 
tant to  our  salvation  that  we  should  know.  If,  then,  a 
revelation  has  been  made  in  the  Old  Testament  which 
is  repeated  in  the  New  Testament,  we  shall  be  safe  in 
making  the  later  revelation  the  criterion  by  which  we 
shall  judge  respecting  the  precepts  of  the  earlier.  That 
is  to  say,  no  precept  of  the  old  Testament,  which  is  not 
either  given  to  man  as  man,  or  which  is  not  either 
repeated,  or  its  obligations  acknowledged  under  the 
new  dispensation,  is  binding  upon  us  at  the  present 
day.  This  principle  is,  1  think,  avowed,  in  substance 
by  the  Apostle  Paul,  in  various  places  in  his  epistles. 
While  he  repeatedly  urges  the  moral  precepts  of  the 
Old  Testament  as  of  unchanging  obligation,  he  speaks 
of  everything  else,  so  far  as  moral  obligation  is  con- 
cerned, as  utterly  annihilated. 

Such,  then,  are  the  means  afforded  to  us  by  our 
Creator  for  acquiring  a  knowledge  of  our  duty.  They 
are,  first,  natural  religion  ;  second,  the  Old  Testament, 
or  a  dispensation  of  law  ;  third,  the  gospel,  a  remedial 
dispensation,  or  a  dispensation  of  grace. 

The  relation  existing  between  our  moral  power  and 
13 


146  THEORETICAL   ETHICS. 

these  means  of  moral  cultivation  may,  I  suppose,  be 
stated  somewhat  as  follows  : 

1.  By  conscience  we  attain  a  feeling  of  moral  obli- 
gation towards  the  various  beings  to  whom  we  are  re- 
lated. The  elements  of  this  feeling  are  developed  as 
soon  as  we  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  existence  and 
attributes  of  those  beings,  and  the  relation  in  which  w& 
stand  to  them.  Such  elements  are,  the  feeling  of  obli- 
gation of  reciprocity  to  man,  and  of  universal  love  and 
obedience  to  our  Creator. 

2.  In  order  to  illustrate  the  relations  in  which  we 
stand  to  other  beings,  created  and  uncreated,  as  well  as 
to  teach  us  his  character  and  his  will  concerning  us, 
God  has  given  us  other  means  of  instruction. 

1.  He  has  so  arranged  and  governed  all  the  events 
of  this  world  as  to  illustrate  his  character  by  his  deal- 
ings with  men ;  and  he  has  given  us  powers,  by  which 
we  may,  if  we  will,  acquire  the  knowledge  thus  set  be- 
fore us.  The  fact  that  we  may  acquire  this  knowledge 
of  the  will  of  God,  and  that  we  are  so  constituted  as  to 
feel  that  we  ought  to  do  the  will  of  God,  renders  ua 
responsible  for  obedience  to  all  the  light  which  we  may 
acquire. 

2.  In  the  utter  failure  of  this  mode  of  instruction  to 
reclaim  men,  God  has  seen  fit  to  reveal  his  will  to  us 
by  language.  Here  the  truth  is  spread  before  us,  with- 
out the  necessity  of  induction  from  a  long  and  previous 
train  of  reasoning.  This  knowledge  of  the  will  of  God, 
thus  obtained,  renders  man  responsible  for  the  addi- 
tional light  thus  communicated. 

In  the  same  manner,  when  this  means  failed  to  pro- 
duce any  important  moral  result,  a  revelation  has  been 
made,  instructing  us  still  further  concerning  our  duties 
to  God,  his  character  and  will ;  and,  above  all,  inform- 
ing us  of  a  new  relation  in  which  the  Deity  stands  to 
us,  and  of  those  new  conditions  of  being  under  which 
we  are  placed.  And  we  are,  in  consequence  of  our 
moral  constitution,  rendered  responsible  for  a  conduct 
corresponding  to  all  this  additional  moral  light,  and 
consequent  moral  obligation. 


HOW  TO  LEARN  OUR  DUTY  FROM  THE  SCRIPTURES.     147 

And  still  more :  in  pity  to  our  blindness  and  weak- 
ness, God  has  invited  us  to  ask  him,  with  childlike 
confidence,  for  all  the  aid  that  we  need ;  and  he  has 
assured  us  that,  by  his  Spirit,  he  will  unfold  to  us  the 
knowledge  of  our  duty,  and  strengthen  us  to  perform 
it.  Thus,  weak,  blind,  and  erring  though  we  are,  we 
may  freely  come  to  the  fountain  of  all  wisdom  and 
holiness,  and  derive  all  that  will  enable  us  to  serve  him 
acceptably  here,  and  prepare  us  to  dwell  with  him  in 
glory  hereafter. 

Now,  if  it  be  remembered  that  we  are  under  obliga- 
tions greater  than  we  can  estimate  to  obey  the  will  of 
God,  by  what  manner  soever  signified,  and  that  we  are 
under  obligation,  therefore,  to  obey  him,  if  he  had  given 
us  no  other  intimation  of  his  will  than  merely  the  mo- 
nition of  coniscience  unassisted  by  natural  or  revealed 
religion,  how  greatly  must  that  obligation  be  increased 
when  these  additional  means  of  information  are  taken 
into  the  account  I  And  if  the  guilt  of  our  disobedi- 
ence bo  in  proportion  to  the  knowledge  of  our  duty, 
and  if  that  knowledge  of  our  duty  be  so  great  that  we 
cannot  readily  conceive  how,  consistently  with  the  con- 
ditions of  our  being,  it  could  have  been  greater,  wo 
may  judge  how  utterly  inexcusable  must  be  every  one 
of  our  transgressions.  Such  does  the  Bible  represent 
to  be  the  actual  condition  of  man  ;  and  hence  it  every- 
where treats  him  as  under  a  just  and  awful  condem- 
nation—  a  condemnation  from  which  there  is  no  hope 
of  escape  but  by  means  of  the  special  provisions  of  a 
remedial  dispensation. 

It  belongs  to  theology  to  treat  of  the  nature  of  this> 
remedial  dispensation.  We  shall,  therefore,  attempt 
no  exhibition  either  of  its  character  or  its  provisions 
beyond  a  simple  passing  remark,  to  show  its  connections 
with  our  present  subject. 

The  law  of  God,  as  revealed  in  the  Scriptures,  rep- 
tesents  our  eternal  happiness  as  attainable  upon  the 
simple  ground  of  perfect  obedience,  and  perfect  obedi- 
ence upon  the  principles  already  explained.  But  this, 
in  our  present  state,  is   manifestly  unattainable.     A 


148  THEORETICAL   ETHICS. 

single  sin,  both  on  the  ground  of  its  violation  of  the 
conditions  on  which  our  future  happiness  was  sus- 
pended, as  well  as  by  the  effects  which  it  produces 
upon  our  whole  subsequent  moral  character  and  our 
capacity  for  virtue,  renders  our  loss  of  happiness  inevi- 
table. Even  after  reformation,  our  moral  attainment 
must  fall  short  of  the  requirements  of  the  law  of  God, 
and  thus  present  no  claim  to  the  Divine  favor.  For 
this  reason  our  salvation  is  made  to  depend  upon  the 
obedience  and  merits  of  another.  But  we  are  entitled 
to  hope  for  salvation  upon  the  ground  of  the  merit  of 
Christ,  solely  upon  the  condition  of  yielding  ourselves 
up  in  entire  obedience  to  the  whole  law  of  God.  **  He 
that  saith,  I  know  him,  and  keepeth  not  his  command- 
ments, is  a  liar,  and  the  truth  is  not  in  him  "  (John 
ii.  4).  And  hence  aknowledgeof  the  law  of  God  is  of  just 
as  great  importance  to  us  under  a  remedial  dispensa- 
tion as  under  a  dispensation  of  law  ;  not  on  the  ground 
that  we  are  to  be  saved  by  keeping  it  without  sin,  but 
on  the  ground  that,  unless  the  will  of  God  be  the  habit- 
ually controlling  motive  of  all  our  conduct,  we  are 
destitute  of  the  elements  of  that  character  to  which 
the  blessings  of  the  remedial  dispensation  are  promised. 
Hence,  under  the  one  dispensation,  as  well  as  under 
the  other,  though  on  different  grounds,  the  knowledge 
of  the  law  of  God  is  necessary  to  our  happiness  both 
here  and  hereafter. 


BOOK  II. 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS, 


PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 


In  the  preceding  pages  it  has  been  my  design  to 
ilhistrate  the  moral  constitution  of  man,  and  to  point 
out  the  sources  from  which  that  truth  emanates  which 
is  addressed  to  his  moral  constitution.  My  design  in 
the  present  book  is  to  classify  and  explain  some  of  the 
principal  moral  laws  under  which  God  has  phiced  us  in 
our  present  state.  We  shall  derive  these  laws  from 
natural  or  from  revealed  religion,  or  from  both,  as  may 
be  most  convenient  for  our  purpose. 

The  Scriptures  declare  that  the  whole  moral  law  is 
contained  in  the  single  word,  Love. 

The  beings  to  whom  man  is  related  in  his  present 
state  are,  so  far  as  this  subject  is  concerned,  God  his 
Creator,  and  man  his  fellow-creature.  Hence,  the  moral 
obligations  of  men  are  of  two  kinds  :  first,  Love  to  God, 
or  Piety  ;  second,  Love  to  Man,  or  Morality. 

This  book  will  therefore  be  divided  into  two  parts,  in 
which  those  two  subjects  will  be  treated  of  in  their 
order. 


PART   I. 

OF   LOVE    TO    GOD,  .OR   PIETY. 


CHAPTER    I. 


THE  GENERAL  OBLIGATION  TO  SUPREME  LOVE  TO  GOD. 

The  scriptural  precept  on  this  subject  may  be  found 
recorded  in  various  passages.  It  is  in  these  words : 
'*  Thou  shalt  love  the  Lord  thy  God  with  all  thy  heart, 
and  with  all  thy  soul,  and  with  all  thy  mind,  and  with 
all  thy  strength."  See  Matthew  xxii.  37 ;  Mark  xii. 
30  ;  Luke  X.  27. 

Li  order  to  illustrate  this  precept,  I  shall  consider, 
firsts  the  relation  which  exists  between  us  and  the 
Deity  ;  secondly^  the  rights  and  obligations  which  that 
relation  imposes  ;  and,  thirdly^  the  facts  in  our  constitu- 
tion which  show  that  these  are  manifestly  the  law  of 
our  being. 

I.  The  relation  which  exists  between  God  and  us. 

1.  He  is  our  Creator  and  Preserver.  A  few  years 
since,  and  weliad  no  existence.  Within  a  few  more 
years,  and  this  whole  system  of  which  we  form  a  part 
had  no  existence.  Over  our  own  existence  neither  we 
nor  any  created  thiug  has  any  more  than  the  semblance 
of  power.  We  are  upheld  in  being  by  the  continued 
act  of  Omnipotence.  Not  only  we  ourselves,  but  every 
faculty  which  we  and  which  all  creatures  enjoy,  was 
created,  and  is  continually  upheld,  by  the  same  Crea- 
tor. Nor  this  alone  ;  all  the  circumstances  by  which  we 
are  surrounded,  and  all  the  modifications  of  external 


152  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

nature,  of  what  sort  soever  they  may  be,  whether  phys- 
ical, intellectual,  social,  or  moral,  are  equally  created 
and  sustained  by  God,  and  derive  their  powers  to  render 
us  happy  or  wise  or  good  purely  from  his  provident 
care,  and  from  the  exertion  of  his  omnipotent  and 
omnipresent  goodness.  The  relation  therefore  existing 
between  the  Deity  and  us  is  that  of  dependence,  mora 
profound,  universal,  and  absolute,  than  we  are  able 
adequately  to  comprehend,  upon  a  Being  absolutely  and 
essentially  independent,  omniscient,  omnipotent,  and  all 
providing. 

2.  The  Deity  has  revealed  himself  to  us  as  a  Being 
in  whom  are  united,  by  the  necessity  of  his  existence, 
every  perfection  of  which  the  human  mind  can  conceive, 
and  every  perfection  that  can  possibly  exist,  how  much 
soever  they  may  transcend  the  powers  of  our  conception. 
To  him  belong,  from  the  necessity  of  his  being,  al- 
mighty power,  omniscient  wisdom,  unchanging  veracity, 
inflexible  justice,  transcendent  purity,  illimitable  benev- 
olence, and  universal  love.  Not  only  does  he  treasure 
up  within  himself  all  that  can  be  conceived  of  every 
perfection,  but  he  is  the  exhaustless  fountain  from 
which  emanates  all  of  these  attributes  that  exists 
throughout  this  wide  creation.  As  every  object  that  we 
Bee  in  nature  is  seen  only  by  the  reflection  of  the  rays 
of  the  sun,  so  every  exhibition  of  goodness  which  we 
behold  in  creatures  is  nothing  but  the  reflection  of 
the  perfections  of  Him  who  is  the  Father  of  lights,  with 
whom  is  neither  variableness  nor  the  shadow  of  a  turn- 
ing. The  relation,  therefore,  in  this  respect  which 
exists  between  us  and  the  Creator,  is  that  which  exists 
between  beings  whom  he  has  formed  to  admire  and  love 
all  these  perfections,  and  the  uncreated  Being  in  whom 
they  all  exist,  in  a  degree  infinitely  surpassing  all  that 
it  is  in  our  power  to  conceive. 

3.  This  creative  power,  and  this  incomprehensible 
wisdom,  have  been  exerted,  in  obedience  to  all  these 
transcendent  moral  perfections,  for  the  production  of 
our  best  good,our  highest  temporal  and  eternal  happi- 
ness ;  nay,  they  have  been  as  fully  exerted  in  behalf  of 


OBLIGATION  TO  SUPREME  LOVE  TO  GOD.     153 

our  race  as  though  there  were  no  other  race  in  exist- 
ence ;  and  in  behalf  of  each  one  of  us  as  though  each 
individual  were  the  only  being  created  within  thia 
illimitable  universe.  And  upon  all  this  exertion  of 
goodness  towards  us  we  have  not  the  semblance  of  a 
claim ;  for  God  was  under  no  manner  of  obligation  to 
create  us,  much  less  to  create  us  capable  of  that  happi- 
ness which  we  enjoy.  The  relation,  therefore,  in  this 
respect  existing  between  us  and  the  Deity,  is  that 
between  beings  who,  without  any  claim  whatever,  are 
at  every  moment  receiving  the  results  of  the  exercise 
of  every  conceivable  perfection,  and  a  Being  who  is 
moved  thus  to  conduct  towards  them  by  nothing  but 
his  own  independent  goodness. 

II.  From  these  relations  existing  between  creatures 
and  the  Creator  there  arise  various  rights  of  the  Crea- 
tor, and  various  obligations  of  the  creature. 

Every  one  who  will  reflect  upon  this  subject  must  be 
convinced  that,  inasmuch  as  these  relations  are  en- 
tirely beyond  the  range  of  human  analogies,  and  also 
manifestly  beyond  the  grasp  of  finite  conception,  they 
must  involve  obligations  in  their  very  nature  more 
profound  and  universal  than  we  can  adequately  com- 
prehend ;  and  that,  therefore,  no  conception  of  ours  can 
possibly  transcend  their  solemnity  and  awfulness.  As 
in  our  present  state  we  are  so  little  able  to  understand 
them,  or  even  to  inquire  after  them,  we  see  the  need 
of  instruction  concerning  them  from  Him  who  alone  of 
all  beings  that  exist  can  fathom  their  depth  or  measure 
their  immensity.  Let  us,  therefore,  inquire.  What  are 
the  claims  which,  in  his  revealed  Word,  God  asserts 
over  us,  and  what  are  the  obligations  which  in  his  sight 
bind  us  to  him  ? 

1.  By  virtue  of  his  relation  to  us  as  Creator ,  he 
asserts  over  us  the  right  of  unlimited  proprietorship. 
Inasmuch  as  we  are  his  creatures^  we  are  his  in  the 
highest  and  most  extensive  sense  in  which  we  can  con- 
ceive of  the  idea  of  possession.  Neither  we  ourselves, 
nor  anything  which  we  seem  to  possess,  are  our  own. 
Even  our  wills  are  not  our  own ;  but  he  claims  that  we 


154  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

shall  only  will  precisely  what  he  wills.  Our  faculties, 
of  what  sort  soever,  are  not  our  own.  He  claims  that 
from  the  commencement  of  our  existence  they  be  used 
precisely  in  the  manner,  for  the  purposes,  and  within  the 
limits  that  he  shall  direct.  Not  only  does  God  assert 
this  right  in  his  word,  but  we  find  that  he  actually 
exercises  it.  Without  regard  to  what  we  will,  he  does 
his  pleasure  in  the  armies  of  heaven  and  among  the 
inhabitants  of  the  earth.  He  gives  or  tal^es  from  us 
health,  possessions,  friends,  faculties,  life  ;  and  hegiveth 
not  account  of  any  of  his  matters;  that  is,  he  manifestly 
acts  upon  the  principle  that  he  is  the  Sovereign  and 
rightful  Proprietor  both  of  ourselves  and  of  all  that  we 
seem  to  ourselves  to  possess. 

2.  And  thus,  on  the  other  hand,  God  asserts  that  we 
are  all  under  obligations,  greater  and  more  solemn  than 
we  can  possibly  conceive,  to  render  to  him  that  entire 
obedience  and  submission  which  his  essential  right 
over  us  renders  manifestly  his  due. 

This  right,  and  the  correspondent  obligation,  have 
respect  to  two  classes  of  duties.  The  first  class  is  that 
which  respects  simply  our  relations  to  him^  and  which 
would  be  obligatory  upon  us,  although  each  one  of  us 
were  the  only  created  being  in  the  universe.  The 
second  class  of  duties  respects  our  fellow-creatures. 
If  we  could  suppose  moral  creatures  to  exist  without  a 
Creator,  there  would  yet  be  duties  which,  from  their 
constitution  as  moral  creatures^  they  would  owe  to  each 
other.  But,  inasmuch  as  every  creature  is  the  creature 
of  God,  he  has  made  the  duties  which  they  owe  to 
each  other  a  part  of  their  duty  to  him.  That  is  to  say, 
he  requires  us,  who  are  his  creatures,  and  who  are  un- 
der univei-sal  obligations  to  him,  to  treat  our  fellow- 
creatures,  who  are  also  his  creatures,  and  under  his 
protection,  in  such  a  manner  as  he  shall  direct.  He  is 
the  Father  of  us  all,  and  he  requires  that  every  one  of 
his  children  conduct  himself  towards  others,  who  are 
also  his  children,  as  he  shall  appoint.  And  hence  the 
duties  which  are  required  of  us  to  our  fellow-creatures 
are  required  of  us  under  a  twofold   obligation;  first. 


OBLIGATION   TO   SUPREME   LOVE   TO   GOD.  115 

that  arising  from  our  relation  to  God,  and,  secondly, 
that  arising  from  our  relation  to  our  fellows.  And 
hence  there  is  not  a  single  act  which  we  are  under 
ohligation  <o  perform  which  we  are  not  also  under 
obligation  to  perform  from  the  principle  of  obedience 
to  our  Creator.  Thus  the  obligation  to  act  religiously y 
or  piously,  extends  to  the  minutest  action  of  our  lives  ; 
and  no  action  of  any  sort  whatever  can  be,  in  the  full 
acceptation  of  the  term,  virtuous,  —  that  is,  be  entitled 
to  the  praise  of  God,  —  which  does  not  involve  in  its 
motives  the  temper  of  filial  obedience  to  the  Deity. 
And  still  more,  as  this  obligation  is  infinitely  superior 
to  any  other  that  can  be  conceived,  an  action  performed 
from  the  conviction  of  any  other  obligation,  if  this 
obligation  be  excluded,  fails  in  vastly  the  most  impor- 
tant respect ;  and  must,  by  the  whole  amount  of  this 
deficiency,  expose  us  to  the  condemnation  of  the  law 
of  God,  whatever  that  condemnation  may  be. 

And,  once  more  :  we  are  taught  in  the  Scriptures 
that  the  relation  in  which  we  stand  to  the  Deity  places 
us  under  such  obligations  that,  while  our  whole  and 
uninterrupted  service  is  thus  due  to  God,  we  can,  after 
it  is  all  performed,  in  no  manner  bring  him  under  any 
obligation  to  us.  This  I  suppose  to  be  the  meaning  in- 
tended by  our  Saviour  in  the  parable,  Luke  xvii.7-iO  : 
"  But  which  of  you,  having  a  servant  ploughing  or  feed- 
ing cattle,  will  say  unto  him  b^^-and-by,  when  he  is 
come  from  the  field,  Go  and  sit  down  to  meat?  and 
will  not  rather  say  unto  him.  Make  ready  wherewith  I 
may  sup,  and  gird  thyself  and  serve  me,  until  I  have 
eaten  and  drunken ;  and  afterward  thou  shaft  eat  and 
drink?  DoihliQ  thank  that  servant  because  he  hath 
done  the  things  that  were  commanded  him?  I  suppose 
not.  So  likewise  ye,  when  ye  have  done  all  the  things 
which  are  commanded  yo-u,  say.  We  are  unprofitable 
servants  ;  we  have  done  that  which  was  our  duty  to  do." 
That  is,  the  obligation  of  the  servant  is  not  fulfilled  by 
doing  any  one  tiling^  but  only  b}'  occupying  his  whole 
time  and  exerting  his  whole  power  to  its  full  extent 
iu  doing  Tvhatever  is  commanded  him.     And  when  alJ 


156  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

this  is  done,  such  is  the  relation  between  the  parties, 
that  he  has  placed  the  Master,  God,  under  no  obliga- 
tion ;  he  has  only  discharged  a  duty ;  he  has  merely 
paid  a  debt.  Nor  is  it  possible,  from  the  nature  of  the 
relation,  that  he  should  ever  do  anything  more.  Such, 
I  think,  every  one  will  acknowledge,  upon  reflection,  to 
be  the  relation  existing  between,  us  and  our  Creator. 

And  hence  we  see  that  a  failure  in  duty  to  God  on 
the  part  of  the  creature  must  be  remediless.  At  every 
moment  he  is  under  obligation  to  the  full  amount  of 
his  ability,  and  when  this  whole  amount  of  obligation 
is  discharged,  he  has  then  simply  fulfilled  his  duty. 
Hence  no  act  can  have  any  retrospective  effect ;  that 
is,  it  cannot  supply  the  deficiencies  of  any  other  act. 
This  would  be  the  case  even  if  his  moral  powers  were 
not  injured  by  sin.  But  if  we  add  this  other  element, 
and  reflect  that  by  sin  our  moral  powers  are  perma- 
nently injured,  —  that  is,  our  capacity  for  virtue  is  di- 
minished according  to  the  laws  of  our  constitution,  — 
by  how  much  more  is  it  evident  that,  under  a  system 
of  mere  law,  a  single  failure  in  our  duty  to  God  must 
be  of  necessity  fatal !  What  shall  we  then  say  of  a 
life  of  which  every  act  is,  when  strictly  considered,  by 
confession  a  moral  failure? 

2.  God  has  revealed  himself  to  us  as  a  being  en- 
dowed with  every  attribute  of  natural  and  moral  eX" 
ceUence;  and  in  virtue  of  the  relation  which  on  this 
account  he  sustains  to  us,  a  new  form  of  obligation  is 
imposed  upon  us. 

We  are  evidently  formed  to  love  whatever  is  beauti- 
ful, and  to  admire  whatever  is  great  in  power  or  excel- 
lent in  wisdom.  This  is  too  evident  to  need  illustnttion. 
But  we  are  so  made  as  to  love  and  admire  still  more 
the  cause  from  which  all  these  emanate.  W^e  admire 
the  tragedies  of  Shakspeare,  and  the  epic  of  Milton  ; 
but  how  much  more  the  minds  in  which  these  works 
were  conceived,  and  by  which  they  were  executed  I 
Now,  all  that  we  see  in  creation,  whether  of  beauty  or 
loveliness  or  grandeur,  is  the  work  of  the  Creator.  It 
all  existed  in  his  conceptions  before  it  existed  ^u  fact. 


OBLIGATION  TO  SUPREME  LOVE  TO  GOD.     157 

iVor  this  alone.  The  powers  by  which  we  perceive, 
and  are  affected  by,  these  exhibitions,  all  proceed  from 
him,  and  both  the  external  qualities  and  the  internal 
susceptibilities  are  upheld  by  his  all-sustaining  energy. 
Thus  every  feeling  of  love  or  of  admiration  which 
we  exercise,  involves,  from  the  constitution  of  our 
nature,  the  obligation  to  exercise  these  feelings  in  a 
higher  degree  towards  Him  who  is  the  author  of  all. 
But  as  He  is  the  author  not  only  of  whatever  is  lovely 
or  glorious  that  we  see,  but  of  all  that  we  have  ever 
seen ;  not  only  of  all  that  we  have  ever  seen,  but  of 
all  that  has  ever  existed ;  not  only  of  all  that  has  ever 
existed,  but  of  all  that  ever  can  exist ;  by  how  much 
are  we  under  obligation  to  love  Him  better  than  all 
things  else  that  we  know  I  and  by  how  much  more 
than  any  individual  form  of  excellence  with  which  it 
is  possible  for  us  ever  to  become  acquainted  I 

Again,  God  reveals  himself  to  us  as  the  possessor  of 
every  moral  attribute  in  infinite  perfection.  In  him 
are  united,  by  the  necessity  of  his  nature,  absolute  and 
infinite  justice,  holiness,  mercy,  compassion,  goodness, 
and  truth.  Now,  we  are  manifestly  formed  to  love 
and  admire  actions  emanating  from  such  attributes 
as  thoy  are  exhibited  on  earth,  and  specially  the  moral 
characters  of  those  by  whom  such  actions  are  per- 
formed. We  are  not  only  formed  to  do  this,  but  we  are 
specially/  formed  to  do  it.  We  are  created  with  an  im- 
pulsion to  exercise  these  affections,  and  we  are  con- 
scious that  this  is  the  highest  impulsion  of  our  nature. 
Now,  whatever  we  see  of  moral  excellence  on  earth 
springs  from  him  as  its  first  and  original  cause.  He 
created  the  circumstances  under  which  it  exists,  and 
created,  with  all  its  powers,  the  being  by  whom  it  is 
displayed.  Nor  this  alone.  He  possesses,  essentially, 
and  in  an  infinite  degree,  and  without  the  possibility 
of  imperfection,  every  moral  attribute.  If,  then,  the 
highest  impulsion  of  our  nature  teaches  us  to  love  and 
venerate  these  attributes,  even  as  they  are  displayed  in 
their  impcrleetion  on  carlh,  by  how  much  more  are  wo 
under  obliofation  to  love  these  attributes  as  they  are 
14 


158  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

possessed  by  our  Father  who  is  in  heaven  I  If  a  s'ngl« 
act  of  justice  deserves  our  veneration,  how  much  more 
should  we  venerate  that  justice  which  has  governed 
this  universe  without  the  shadow  of  a  spot  from  eter- 
nity I  If  a  single  act  of  purity  deserves  our  regard, 
with  what  awe  should  we  adore  the  holiness  of  Him  in 
whose  sight  the  heavens  are  unclean  !  If  a  single  act 
of  benevolence  deserve  our  love,  with  what  affection 
should  we  bow  before  Him  who  from  eternity  has  been 
pouring  abroad  a  ceaseless  flood  of  blessedness,  over 
the  boundless  universe  by  which  He  is  surrounded  I 

And  yet  more,  I  think  it  is  manifest  that  we  are  so 
constituted  as  to  be  under  obligations  to  love  such  at- 
tributes as  I  have  mentioned,  entirely  aside  from  the 
consideration  of  their  connection  with  ourselves.  We 
admire  justice  and  benevolence  in  men  who  existed 
ages  ago,  and  in  countries  with  which  we  have  no  in- 
terests in  common.  And  thus  tliese  obligations  to  love 
and  adore  these  attributes  in  the  Deity  would  exist  in 
full  force,  irrespective  of  the  fact  of  our  receiving  any 
benefit  from  them.  And  our  Creator  might,  and  justly 
wouhl,  require  of  us  all  these  affections  of  which  I 
have  spoken,  did  these  moral  attributes  exist  in  some 
other  being  besides  himself.  The  obligation  is  sus- 
tained upon  the  simple  consideration,  that  we  are 
constituted  such  moral  beings  as  we  are,  and  that  an- 
other Being  exists,  endowed  with  attributes  in  this 
particular  manner  corresponding  to  our  moral  consti- 
tution. By  how  much  is  this  obligation  increased  by 
the  consideration  that  He  in  whom  these  attributes 
exist  stands  to  us  in  the  relation  of  Creator  I 

3.  As,  by  the  constitution  of  our  moral  nature,  we 
arc  under  obligation  to  love  whatever  is  morally  excel- 
lent, irrespective  of  any  benefit  which  we  may  derive 
from  it  ourselves ;  so  when  this  moral  excellence  is 
intentionally  the  source  of  happiness  to  us,  we  are 
under  the  additional  obligation  to  gratitude,  or  a  desire 
to  do  something  which  shall  please  Him  from  whom  our 
happiness  has  proceeded.  This  obligation  is  so  mani- 
festly recognized  as  one  of  the  instinctive  impulses  of 


OBLIGATION   TO   SUPREME   LOVE   TO   GOD.  159 

our  nature,  that  whilst  we  merely  esteem  him  who  acts 
ill  obedience  to  it,  the  neglect  of  it,  without  the  exhibi- 
tion of  the  positively  opposite  temper,  is  always  met  by 
the  feeling  of  intense  moral  reprobation. 

Now,  since  whatever  of  favor  we  receive  from  others 
is  derived  from  them  merely  as  second  causes,  it  all 
originates  essentially  from  the  first  and  all-pervading 
Cause.  Whatever  gratitude  we  feel,  therefore,  towards 
creatures  is  in  the  highest  possible  sense  due  to  God, 
from  whom  it  all  really  emanates. 

But  how  small  is  that  portion  of  the  happiness  which 
we  enjoy  which  is  conferred  by  the  favor  of  our  fellows  / 
Immeasurably  the  greater  part  is  the  direct  gift  of  our 
Creator.  The  obligation  to  gratitude  is  in  proportion 
to  the  amount  of  benefits  conferred  and  the  disinterest- 
edness of  the  goodness  from  which  they  have  proceeded. 
By  these  elements  let  us  estimate  the  amount  of  obli- 
gation of  gratitude  to  God. 

As  the  Deity  is  essentially  independent  of  all  his 
creatures,  and  as  he  has  created  us  from  nothing,  and 
as  he  has  created,  also,  all  the  circumstances  under 
which  we  exist,  he  can  be  under  no  obligation  to  us, 
nor  can  our  relation  to  him  ever  be  of  any  other  sort 
than  that  of  recipients  of  favor,  which  wo  can  by  no 
possibility  merit  or  repay. 

Under  such  circumstances,  a  sensation  of  happiness 
for  a  single  moment,  even  if  it  terminated  with  that  sin- 
gle moment,  would  be  a  cause  for  gratitude  so  long  as 
it  could  be  remembered.  How  much  more  if  this  form 
of  happiness  continued  throughout  our  whole  extent  of 
being !  The  enjoyment  of  one  form  of  happiness,  say 
of  that  derived  from  a  single  sense,  would  deserve  our 
gratitude ;  how  much  more  that  derived  from  all  our 
senses,  and  specially  that  derived  from  the  combination 
of  them  all !  The  enjoyment  of  ever  so  transient  a 
sensation  of  intellectual  happiness  would  deserve  our 
gratitude  ;  how  much  more  that  of  a  permanent  consti- 
tution, which  was  a  source  of  perpetual  intellectual 
hiippiness,  and  specially  a  constitution  involving  a  great 
variety  of  forms  of  intellectual  happiness  !  Thus,  also. 


160  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

a  single  emotion  of  moral  happiness  would  deserve  out 
gratitude;  how  much  more  a  constitution  formed  for 
perpetual  moral  happiness  I  And  yet  more,  if  these 
forms  of  happiness,  taken  singly,  would  be  each  a  cause 
of  perpetual  and  increasing  gratitude,  how  much  more 
a  constitution  by  which  the  very  relations  which  they 
sustain  to  each  other  become  a  source  of  additional  and 
increased  happiness  I  Add  to  this,  that  the  external 
world  is  itself  adjusted  to  all  these  powers  and  suscep- 
tibilities of  man,  and  each  adjustment  is  manifestly 
intended  for  our  best  good.  And  add  to  this,  that  such 
are  the  conditions  of  being  under  which  we  are  placed, 
that  if  we  only  use  these  powers  according  to  the  will 
of  God,  and  to  the  nature  which  he  has  given  us,  —  that 
is,  in  such  a  way  as  to  promote  our  highest  happiness 
here, — we  shall  be  advanced  to  a  state  of  happiness  more 
excellent  and  glorious  than  any  of  which  we  can  con- 
ceive;  and  we  shall  be  fixed  in  it  unchangeably  and 
forever.  Now,  if  a  single  act  of  disinterested  goodness 
and  undeserved  favor  deserve  our  gratitude  forever, 
what  limits  can  be  set  to  the  intensity  of  that  grateful 
adoration  which  should  throughout  our  whole  being 
pervade  our  bosoms  towards  Him  from  whom  every 
blessing  is  perpetually  flowing  in  so  exhaustless  a  flood 
of  unfathomable  goodness? 

Such,  then,  are  the  obligations  to  love  and  gratitude 
which,  in  addition  to  that  of  obedience,  we  owe  to  our 
Creator.  But  it  deserves  to  be  remarked  that  these 
forms  of  obligation  reciprocally  involve  each  other. 
For  if  we  possess  that  temper  of  entire  obedience  which 
springs  from  a  recognition  of  the  universal  right  of  the 
Creator  over  us,  wo  shall  dedicate  our  affections  to  him 
as  entirely  as  owv  will;  that  is,  we  shall  love  only  what 
he  commands,  and  just  as  he  has  commanded ;  that  is, 
we  shall  not  only  do  his  will,  but  we  shall  love  to  do  it, 
not  only  on  account  of  what  he  is  in  himself  ,  but  also 
on  account  of  what  he  is  and  always  has  been  to  us. 
The  language  of  our  hearts  will  be.  Father,  not  our  will 
but  thine  be  done.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  if  we  love 
his  character  and  attributes  as  they  deserve,  we  shall 


OBLIGATION  TO  SUPREME  LOVE  TO  GOD.     161 

love  to  perform  actions  which  are  in  harmony,  with  these 
attributes  ;  that  is,  which  spring  from  the  same  disposi- 
tions in  ourselves.  In  other  words,  w^e  shall  love  to  act 
in  perfect  accordance  with  the  will  of  God.  And  still 
more,  if  we  are  penetrated  with  a  proper  conviction  of 
the  obligations  of  gratitude  under  which  we  are  placed, 
we  shall  love  to  please  our  Supreme  Benefactor ;  and 
the  only  way  in  which  we  can  do  this  is  by  implicitly 
obeying  his  commands. 

It  was  remarked,  in  a  former  part  of  this  work,  that 
happiness  consists  in  the  exercise  of  our  sensitiveness 
upon  its  appropriate  objects.  Now,  that  man  has  moral 
sentiments  —  that  is,  that  he  is  formed  to  derive  happi- 
ness from  the  contemplation  of  moral  qualities,  and 
specially  from  the  love  of  those  beings  in  whom  these 
moral  qualities  reside — is  too  evident  to  need  argument. 
It  is  also  evident  that  this  is  the  highest  and  most  ex- 
alted form  of  happiness  of  which  he  is  susceptible.  But 
created  beings,  and  the  moral  qualities  of  created  beings, 
are  not  the  objects  adapted  to  his  moral  sensitiveness. 
This  power  of  our  being  finds  its  appropriate  object  in 
nothing  less  than  in  supreme  and  unlimited  and  infinite 
moral  perfection.  And  yet  more,  the  moral  susceptibil- 
ity of  happiness  expands  by  exercise,  and  the  uncreated 
object  to  which  it  is  directed  is,  by  necessity,  unchang- 
able,  eternal,  and  infinite.  A  provision  is  thus  made 
for  the  happiness  of  man,  eternal  and  illimitable  ;  that 
is  to  say,  not  only  is  it  evident  from  the  constitution  of 
man  that  he  is  made  to  love  God,  but  also  that  he  is 
made  to  love  him  infinitely  more  than  anything  else ; 
to  be  happier  from  loving  him  than  from  loving  any- 
thing else ;  and  also  to  be  more  and  more  intensely 
happy,  from  loving  him,  throughout  eternity. 

Thus  in  general,  from  the  relations  which  we  sustain 
to  God,  we  are  under  more  imperative  obligations  than 
we  are  able  to  conceive  to  exercise  towards  him  that 
temper  of  heart  which  is  perhaps,  in  the  language  of 
men,  best  expressed  by  the  term,  a  filial  disposition  ;  that 
is,  a  disposition  to  universal  obedience,  pervaded  by  the 
spirit  of  supreme  and  grateful  afiection.     This  temper 


162  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

of  heart  is  that  generically  denominated  in  the  Scrip- 
tures, faith*  In  the  New  Testament  it  is  somewhat 
modified  by  the  relations  in  which  we  stand  to  God,  in 
consequence  of  the  provisions  of  the  remedial  dispensa- 
tion. 

Now,  all  these  dispositions  would  be  requires  of  U8 
if  we  w^ere  sinless  beings,  and  possibly  no  others  would 
be  required.  The  same  are  manifestly  our  duty,  after 
we  have  sinned  ;  for  our  sin  changes  neither  the  char- 
acter of  God,  nor  his  claim  upon  our  obedience  and 
afiection.  A  child  who  has  done  wrong  is  not  under 
any  the  less  imperative  obligation  to  exercise  a  filial 
disposition  towards  a  parent.  But  suppose  a  creature 
to  have  sinned,  it  is  manifest  that  he  would  be  under 
obligations  to  exercise  another  moral  disposition.  He 
ought  to  regret  his  fault,  not  on  account  of  its  conse- 
quences to  himself,  but  on  account  of  the  violation  of 
moral  obligation,  which  is  the  essence  of  its  guiltiness. 
Acknowledging  its  utter  wrongfulness,  justifying  God, 
and  taking  all  the  blame  of  his  act  upon  himself,  he 
ought  to  hate  his  own  act,  and  from  such  feelings  to  the 
act,  as  well  as  from  the  temper  of  filial  obedience  to 
God,  commence  a  life  of  moral  purity.  Such  is  repent- 
ance.  This  is  the  temper  of  heart  which  the  Scrip- 
tures teach  us  that  God  requires  of  us  as  smners, 

III.  Such,  then,  is  the  obligation  under  which,  by 
our  creation,  we  stand  to  God.  It  would  be  easy  to 
show  that  this  is  the  only  principle  of  action  suited  to 
our  nature  under  the  present  constitution. 

For,  1.  As  we  live  under  a  constitution  of  law,  that 
is,  under  which  every  action  is  amenable  to  law,  and 
since  to  every  action  is  aflSxcd,  by  omnipotent  power 
and  unsearchable  wisdom,  rewards  or  punishments, 
both  in  this  life  and  also  in  the  other,  and  as  these 
consequences  can  by  no  power  of  ours  be  severed  from 
the  action,  it  is  manitcst  that  we  can  attain  to  happiness 
and  escape  from  misery  only  by  perfectly  obeying  the 
will  of  our  Creator.  And  yet  more,  since  we  are  crea- 
tures endowed  with  will  and  the  power  of  choice,  wa 
never  can  be  completely  happy  unless  we  act  as  wt 


OBLIGATION  TO  SUPREME  LOVE  TO  GOD.     163 

choose ;  that  is,  unless  we  obey  because  we  love  to  obey 
Hence,  from  the  elements  of  our  constitution  it  is  evi 
dent  we  can  be  happy  on  no  other  principles  thanthost* 
of  perfect  obedience  to  God,  and  obedience  emanating 
from  and  pervaded  by  love. 

2.  The  same  truth  is  evident  from  a  consideration 
of  the  relations  which  every  individual  sustains  to  the 
whole  race  of  man.  It  manifestly  enters  into  the  con- 
stitution under  which  we  exist  that  every  individua! 
shall  have  a  power  over  society,  both  for  good  and  foi 
evil,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  in  its  nature  illimitable. 
That  such  is  the  fact  will  be  evident  to  every  one  who 
will  reflect  for  a  moment  upon  the  results  emanating 
from  the  lives  of  St.  Paul,  Luther,  Howard,  Clarkson, 
or  Wilberforce  ;  and  of  Alexander,  Julius  Caesar,  Vol- 
taire, Lord  Byron,  or  Napoleon.  Now,  it  is  only  ne- 
cessary to  recollect  that  the  being  possessed  of  this 
power  is  by  nature  utterly  ignorant  of  the  future ; 
wholly  incapable,  even  dupng  life,  and  much  more 
after  death,  of  controlling  and  directing  the  conse- 
quences of  his  actions  ;  and  still  more,  that  he  is  fallible, 
—  that  is,  liable  not  only  to  err  from  ignorance,  but  also 
from  a  wrong  moral  bias ;  and  we  must  be  convinced 
that  the  exercise  of  this  power  could  never  be  safe  for 
his  fellows  unless  it  were  under  the  supreme  direction 
of  a  Being  who  knew  the  end  from  the  beginning,  and 
who  was  by  his  very  nature  incapable  of  wrong. 

From  what  has  been  said  it  will  follow  that  our  duty 
to  God  forbids  — 

1.  Idolatry;  that  is,  rendering  supreme  homage  to 
any  other  being  than  the  Deity. 

2.  Eeudering  obedience  to  any  creature  in  opposition 
to  the  will  of  the  Creator. 

3.  Yielding  obedience  to  our  own  will,  or  gratifying 
our  own  desires,  in  opposition  to  his  will. 

4.  Loving  anything  which  he  has  forbidden. 

5.  Loving  anything  which  he  has  allowed  us  to  lovo 
in  a  manner  and  to  a  degree  that  he  has  forbidden. 

Each  of  these  topics  is  susceptible  of  extended  illus- 
tration.    As,  however,  they  are  discussed  in  full  in 


1G4  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

works  on  theology,  to  which  science  they  more  particu- 
larly belong,  we  shall  leave  them  with  this  simple  enu- 
meration. 

In  treating  of  the  remainder  of  this  subject,  we  shall, 
therefore,  consider  only  the  means  by  which  the  love 
of  God,  or  piety,  may  be  cultivated.  These  are  three  : 
1st.  A  spirit  of  devotion.  2d.  Prayer.  3d.  The  ob- 
servance of  the  Sabbath. 


CHAPTEE  II. 

THE   CULTIVATION  OF  A  DEVOTIONAL   SPIRIT. 

From  what  has  already  been  said,  it  will  be  seen  that 
the  relation  which  we  sustain  to  God  imposes  upon  us 
the  obligation  of  maintaining  such  an  habitual  temper 
towards  him  as  shall  continually  incite  us  to  do  what- 
ever will  please  hira.  It  is  natural  to  suppose  that  our 
Creator  would  have  placed  us  under  such  circumstances 
as  would,  from  their  nature,  cultivate  in  us  such  a 
temper.  Such  we  find  to  be  the  fact.  We  are  sur- 
rounded by  objects  of  knowledge  which,  not  merely  by 
their  existence,  but  also  by  their  ceaseless  changes, 
remind  us  of  the  attributes  of  God,  and  of  the  obliga- 
tions under  which  we  are  placed  to  him.  A  devotional 
spirit  consists  in  making  the  moral  use  which  is  in- 
tended, of  all  the  objects  of  intellection  that  come  within 
our  experience  or  our  observation. 

1.  Our  existence  is  dependent  on  a  succession  of 
changes,  which  are  taking  place  at  every  moment  in 
ourselves,  over  which  we  have  no  power  whatever,  but 
of  which  each  one  involves  the  necessity  of  the  existence 
and  the  superintending  power  of  the  Deity.  The  exist- 
ence of  the  whole  material  universe  is  of  the  same  na- 
ture. Now,  each  of  these  changes  is,  with  infinite  skill, 
adapted  to  the  relative  conditions  of  all  the  beings 
whom  they  afi'ect ;  and  they  are  subjected  to  laws  which 
are  most  evident  expressions  of  almighty  power,  of  un- 
searchable wisdom,  and  of  exhaustless  goodness.  Were 
we  merely  intellectual  beings,  it  would  not  be  possible 
for  us  to  consider  anything  more  than  these  laws  them- 
selves ,  but,  inasmuch  as  we  are  intellectual,  and  also 


166  THEORETICAL   ETHICS. 

moral  beings,  we  are  capable  not  only  of  considering 
the  laws,  but  also  our  obligations  to  the  Creator  from 
whom  such  laws  are  the  emanations.  As  everything 
which  we  can  know  teaches  a  lesson  concerning  God, 
if  we  connect  that  lesson  with  everything  which  we 
learn,  everything  will  bo  resplendent  with  the  attributes 
of  Deity.  By  using  in  this  manner  the  knowledge 
which  is  everywhere  spread  before  us,  we  shall'habitu- 
ally  cultivate  a  devout  temper  of  mind.  Thus  **  the 
heavens  will  declare  unto  us  the  glory  of  God,  and  the 
firmament  will  show  his  handy-work ;  thus  day  unto 
day  will  utter  speech,  and  night  unto  night  show  forth 
knowledge  of  him,'' 

2.  Nor  is  this  true  of  physical  nature  alone.  The 
whole  history  of  the  human  race  teaches  us  the  same 
lesson.  The  rewards  of  virtue  and  the  punishments 
of  vice,  as  they  are  beheld  in  the  events  which  befall 
both  individuals  and  nations,  all  exhibit  the  attributes 
of  the  Deity.  It  is  he  that  **  stillcth  the  noise  of  the 
seas,  the  noise  of  their  waves,  and  the  tumult  of  the 
people."  <*  The  Lord  reigneth  ;  let  the  earth  rejoice  : 
let  the  multitude  of  isles  be  glad  thereof.  Clouds  and 
darkness  are  round  about  him;  righteousness  and 
judgment  are  the  habitation  of  his  throne."  His  for- 
bearance and  long-suffering,  and  at  the  same  time  his 
inflexible  justice,  his  love  of  right,  and  his  hatred  of 
wrong,  are  legibly  written  in  every  page  of  individual 
and  national  history.  And  hence  it  is  that  every  fact 
which  we  witness  in  the  government  of  moral  beings 
has  a  twofold  chain  of  connections  and  relations.  To 
the  mere  political  economist  or  the  statesman  it  teaches 
the  law  by  which  cause  and  effect  are  connected.  To 
the  pious  man  it  also  teaches  the  attributes  of  that 
Being  who  has  so  connected  cause  and  effect^  and  who, 
amidst  all  the  intricate  mazes  of  human  motive  and 
social  organization,  carries  forward  his  laws  with  un- 
changing certainty  and  unerring  righteousness.  Now, 
it  is  by  observing  not  merely  the  law,  but  the  moral 
lesson  derived  from  the  law;  it  is  by  observing  not 
merely  the  connections  of  events  with  each  other,  but 


THE    CULTIVATION   OF   A   DEVOTIONAL   SPIRIT.       1G7 

also  their  connection  with  the  great  First  Cause,  that  a 
devotional  spirit  is  to  be  cultivated. 

And  hence  we  see  that  knowledge  of  every  kind,  if 
suitably  improved,  has,  in  its  very  nature,  a  tendency 
to  devotion.  If  we  do  not  thus  use  it,  we  sever  it  frona 
its  most  important  connections.  We  act  simply  as 
intellectual,  and  not  as  moral  beings.  We  act  contrary 
to  the  highest  and  most  noble  principles  of  our  consti- 
tution. And  hence  we  see  how  progress  in  knowledge 
really  places  us  under  progressive  obligations  to  im- 
provement in  piety.  This  should  be  borne  in  mind  by 
every  man,  and  specially  by  every  educated  man.  For 
this  improvement  of  our  knowledge  God  holds  us  ac- 
countable. **  Because  they  regard  not  the  works  of 
the  Lord,  nor  consider' the  operations  of  his  hand,  there- 
lore  will  he  destroy  them." 

3.  But  if  such  are  the  obligations  resting  upon  us 
from  our  relation  to  the  works  of  Nature  and  Provi- 
dence, how  much  are  these  obligations  increased  by 
our  knowledge  of  God,  as  it  is  presented  to  us  by  rev- 
elation !  1  suppose  that  a  person  acquainted  with  the 
laws  of  optics,  who  had  always  stood  with  his  back  to  the 
sun,  might  acquire  much  important  knowledge  of  the 
nature  of  light,  and  of  the  path  of  the  sun  through  the 
heavens,  by  reasoning  from  the  reflection  of  that  light 
observed  in  the  surrounding  creation.  But  how  un- 
certain would  be  this  knowledge,  compared  with  that 
which  he  would  acquire  by  looking  directly  upon  the 
sun,  and  tracing  his  path  by  his  own  immediate  obser- 
vation !  So  of  llevelation  !  Here  we  are  taught  by 
language  that  truth  which  we  otherwise  could  learn 
only  by  long  and  careful  induction.  God  has  hero 
made  known  to  us  his  attributes  and  character.  Hero 
he  has  recorded  his  law ;  here  he  has  written  a  portion 
of  the  history  of  our  race,  as  a  specimen  of  his  provi- 
dential dealings  with  men ;  and  here  he  has,  more  than 
all,  revealed  to  us  a  remedial  dispensation,  by  which  our 
sins  may  be  forgiven,  and  we  be  raised  to  higher  and 
more  glorious  happiness  than  that  which  we  have  lost. 
It  surely  becomes  us,  then,  specially  to  study  the  Bible, 


108  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

not  merely  as  a  book  of  antiquities,  or  a  choice  col- 
lection of  poetry,  or  an  inexhaustible  storehouse  of 
wisdom  ;  but  for  the  more  important  purpose  of  ascer- 
taining the  character  of  God,  and  our  relations  to  him, 
and  of  thus  cultivating  towards  him  those  feelings  of 
filial  and  reverential  homage  which  are  so  manifestly 
our  duty,  and  which  such  contemplations  are  in  their 
nature  so  adapted  to  foster  and  improve. 

4.  A  devout  temper  is  also  cultivated  by  the  exercise 
of  devotion.  The  more  we  exercise  the  feeUng  of 
veneration,  of  love,  of  gratitude,  and  of  submission 
towards  God,  the  more  profound  and  pervading  and 
intense  and  habitual  will  these  feelings  become.  And 
unless  the  feelings  themselves  be  called  into  exercise,  it 
will  be  in  vain  that  we  are  persuaded  that  we  ought  to 
exercise  them.  It  is  one  thing  to  be  an  admirer  of 
devotion,  and  another  thing  to  be  really  devout.  It 
becomes  us,  therefore,  to  cultivate  these  feelings,  by 
actually  exercising  towards  God  the  very  tempers  of 
mind  indicated  by  our  circumstances  and  our  pro- 
gressive knowledge.  Thus  submission  to  his  will, 
thankfulness  for  his  mercies,  trust  in  his  providence, 
reliance  on  his  power,  and  sorrow  for  our  sins,  should 
be,  not  the  occasional  exercise,  but  the  established  habit 
ot"  our  souls. 

5.  By  the  constitution  of  our  nature,  a  most  inti- 
mate connection  exists  between  action  and  motive ; 
between  the  performance  of  an  action  and  the  principle 
from  which  it  emanates.  The  one  cannot  long  exist 
without  the  other.  True  charity  cannot  long  exist  in 
the  temper  unless  we  perform  acts  of  charity.  Medi- 
tation upon  goodness  will  soon  become  eflete  unless  it 
be  strengthened  by  good  works.  So  the  temper  of 
devotion  will  be  useless,  nay,  the  profession  of  it  must 
of  necessity  be  hypocritical,  unless  it  produce  obedi- 
ence to  God  and  universal  love  to  man.  By  this 
alone  is  its  existence  known  ;  by  this  alone  can  it  be 
successfully  cultivated.  The  more  perfectly  our  wills 
are  subjected  to  the  will  of  God,  and  our  whole  course 
of  conduct  regulated  by  his  commands,  the  more  ar- 


THE   CULTIVATION    OF    A    DEVOTIONAL   SPIRIT.       169 

dent  will  be  our  devotion,  and  the  more  filial  the  temper 
from  which  our  actions  proceed. 

6.  It  is  scarcely  necessar}^  to  observe,  that  as  peni- 
tence is  a  feelino:  resultinoj  from  a  conviction  of  violated 
obligation,  it  is  to  be  cultivated,  not  merely  by  consid- 
ering the  character  of  God,  but  also  our  conduct  towards 
him.  The  contrast  between  his  goodness  and  compas- 
sion and  our  ingratitude  and  rebellion,  is  specially 
adapted  to  fiii  us  wath  humility  and  self-abasement, 
and  also  with  sorrow  for  all  our  past  trangressions. 
Thus  said  the  prophet :  "  Woe  is  me,  for  I  am  a  man  of 
unclean  lips;  and  I  dwell  in  the  midst  of  a  people  of 
unclean  lips; /or  mine  eyes  have  seen  the  King,  the 
Lord  of  Hosts. ^^ 

Lastly.  It  is  surely  unnecessary  to  remark,  that 
such  a  life  as  this  is  alone  suited  to  the  character  of 
man.  If  God  have  made  us  capable  of  deriving  our 
highest  happiness  from  him,  and  have  so  constituted 
the  universe  around  us  as  perpetually  to  lead  us  to 
this  source  of  happiness,  the  most  unreasonable,  un- 
grateful, and  degrading,  not  to  say  the  most  guilty 
course  of  conduct  which  we  can  pursue,  must  be  to 
neglect  and  abuse  this,  the  most  noble  part  of  our 
constitution,  and  to  use  the  knowledge  of  the  world 
around  us  for  every  other  purpose  than  that  for  which 
it  was  created.  Let  every  frivolous,  thoughtless  human 
being  reflect  what  must  be  his  condition  when  he, 
whose  whole  thoughts  are  limited  by  created  things, 
shall  stand  in  the  presence  of  Him,  **  before  whose  face 
the  heavens  and  the  earth  shall  fleo  away,  and  there  be 
no  place  left  for  them  " ! 
16 


CHAPTEE  III. 


OP  PEAYER. 

In  the  present  chapter  we  shall  treat  of  the  naturet 
the  obligation,  and  the  utility  of  prayer. 

I.  The  nature  of  prayer. 

Prayer  is  the  direct  intercourse  of  the  spirit  of  man 
with  the  spiritual  and  unseen  Creator.  *'  God  is  a 
spirit,  and  those  that  worship  him  must  worship  him 
in  spirit  and  in  truth." 

It  consists  in  the  expression  of  our  adoration,  the 
acknowledgment  of  our  obligations,  the  offering  up  of 
our  thanksgivings,  the  confession  of  our  sins,  and  in 
supplication  for  the  favors,  both  temporal  and  spiritual, 
which  we  need;  being  always  accompanied  with  a 
suitable  temper  of  mind. 

This  temper  of  mind  presupposes  — 

1.  A  solemn  conviction  of  the  character  and  attri- 
butes of  God,  and  of  the  relations  which  he  sustains 
to  us. 

2.  A  conviction  of  the  relations  which  we  sustain  to 
him,  and  of  our  obligations  to  him. 

3.  An  affecting  view  of  our  sinfulness,  helplessness, 
and  misery. 

4.  Sincere  gratitude  for  all  the  favors  which  we  have 
received. 

5.  A  fixed  and  undissembled  resolution  to  obey  the 
commands  of  God  in  future. 

6.  Unreserved  submission  to  all  his  will. 

7.  Unshaken  confidence  in  his  veracity. 

8.  Importunate  desires  that  our  petitiors,  specially 
for  spiritual  bleswngs,  should  be  granted. 


OF   PRAYER.  171 

9.  A  soul  at  peace  with  all  mankind. 

Illustrations  of  all  these  dispositions,  from  the  prayers 
recorded  in  the  holy  Scriptures,  as  well  as  the  precepts 
by  which  they  arc  enforced,  might  be  easily  adduced. 
£  presume,  however,  they  are  unnecessary.  I  will  only 
remark,  that  it  is  not  asserted  that  all  these  dispositions 
are  always  to  be  in  exercise  at  the  same  time,  but  only 
juch  of  them  as  specially  belong  to  the  present  nature 
)f  our  supplications. 

Inasmuch  as  we  are  dependent  on  God,  not  only  for 
wll  th^8  blessings  which  we  derive  directly  from  his  hands, 
but  also  for  all  those  which  arise  from  our  relations  to 
each  other,  it  is  manifestly  proper  that  we  confess  our 
sins,  and  supplicate  his  favor,  not  only  as  individuals, 
but  as  societies.  Hence  prayer  may  be  divided  into 
Individual,  Domestic,  and  Social. 

Individual  prayer.  As  the  design  of  this  institution 
is  to  bring  us,  as  individuals,into  direct  communion 
with  God,  to  confess  our  personal  infirmities,  and  to 
cultiyate  personal  piety,  it  should  be  strictly  in  private. 

We  are  commanded  to  pray  to  our  Father  in  secret. 
It  should,  moreover,  be  solemn,  unreserved,  and,  in 
general,  accompanied  with  the  reading  of  the  holy 
Scriptures.  As,  moreover,  this  direct  communion  with 
the  unseen  Creator  is  intended  to  be  the  great  antago- 
nist force  to  the  constant  pressure  of  the  things  seen 
and  temporal,  it  should  be  habitual  and  frequent. 

Domestic  prayer.  As  the  relation  sustained  by  parents 
and  children  is  the  source  of  many  and  peculiar  bless- 
ings ;  as  the  relation  involves  peculiar  responsibilities, 
in  the  fulfilment  of  which  we  all  need  special  guidance 
and  direction,  there  is  a  peculiar  propriety  in  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  God  in  connection  with  this  relation. 
The,  importance  of  this  duty  is  specially  urged  upon  us 
by  its  cflfect  upon  the  young.  It  associates  with  religion 
all  the  recollections  of  childhood,  and  Jill  the  sympathies 
of  home.  It  gives  to  parental  advice  the  sanction  of 
religion,  and  in  after-life  recalls  the  mind  to  a  convic- 
tion of  duty  to  God,  with  all  the  motives  drawn  from 
a  iather's  care  and  a  mother's  tenderness. 


172  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

Social  prayer.  Inasmuch  as  all  our  social  and  civil 
blessings  are  the  gift  of  God,  it  is  meet  that  we  should, 
as  societies,  meet  to  acknowledge  them.  This  is  one  of 
the  most  important  duties  of  the  Sabbath  day.  It  will 
therefore  be  more  fully  treated  of  under  that  branch 
of  the  subject. 

Since  prayer  is  the  offering  up  of  our  desires,  etc., 
with  a  suitable  temper  of  heart,  it  is  manifest  that  the 
question  whether  a  form  of  prayer,  or  extemporary 
prayer,  should  be  used,  is  merely  one  of  expediency, 
and  has  no  connection  with  morals.  We  are  under 
obligation  to  use  that  which  is  of  the  greatest  spiritual 
benefit  to  the  individual.  Private  prayer  should,  how- 
ever, I  think,  be  expressed  in  the  words  of  the  supplicant 
himself. 

II.   The  duty  of  prayer. 

The  duty  of  prayer  may  be  seen  ivom.  the  conditions 
of  our  being,  and/rom  the  holy  Scriptures, 

I.  The  conditions  of  our  being. 

1.  We  are  utterly  powerless,  ignorant  of  the  futni3, 
essentially  dependent  at  the  present  and  for  the  future, 
and  are  miserably  sinful.  We  need  support,  direction, 
wisdom,  pardon,  and  purification.  These  can  come 
from  no  other  being  than  God,  who  is  under  no  obliga- 
tion to  confer  them  upon  us.  What  can  be  more  mani- 
festly  proper  than  that  we  should  supplicate  the  Father 
of  the  universe  for  those  blessings  which  are  necessary, 
not  only  for  our  happiness,  but  for  our  existence  ;  and 
that  we  should  receive  every  favor  with  a  devout  ac- 
knowledgment of  the  terms  on  which  it  is  bestowed? 

2.  Inasmuch  as  we  are  sinners,  and  have  forfeited  the 
blessings  which  we  daily  receive,  what  can  be  more  suit- 
able than  that  we  should  humbly  thank  that  Almighty 
power  from  whom  comes  such  an  inexhaustible  supply 
of  goodness  to  us  so  utterly  undeserving?  And  what 
more  obligatory  than  to  ask  the  pardon  of  our  Creator 
for  those  sins  of  omission  and  of  commission  with  which 
we  are  ever}^  hour  chargeable  ? 

3.  Specially  is  this  our  duty,  when  we  reflect  that  this 
very  exorcise  of  habitual  reliance  upon  God  is  necessary 


OP   PRATER.  173 

to  our  happiness  in  our  present  state,  and  that  the  tem- 
per which  it  presupposes  is  essential  to  our  progress  in 
virtue. 

That  such  is  the  dictate  of  our  moral  constitution  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  all  men  who  have  any  notion 
of  a  Supreme  Being,  under  any  circumstances,  acknowl- 
edge it  as  a  duty,  and,  in  some  form  or  other,  profess  to 
practise  it.  And  besides  this,  all  men,  even  the  most 
abandoned  and  profligate,  when  in  danger,  pray  most 
earnestly.  This  has  been  the  case  with  men  who,  in 
health  and  safety,  scofi'at  religion  and  ridicule  the  idea 
of  moral  obligation.  But  it  is  evident  that  it  can  be 
neither  more  proper  nor  more  suitable  to  pray  when 
we  are  in  danger,  than  to  pray  at  any  other  time ;  for 
our  relations  to  God  are  always  the  same,  and  we  are 
always  essentially  dependent  upon  him  for  everything, 
both  temporal  and  spiritual,  that  we  either  enjoy  at  the 
present,  or  hope  for  in  the  future.  It  is  surely  as 
proper  to  thank  God  for  those  met'cies  ivhich  we  receive 
every  moment^  as  to  deprecate  those  judgments  hy  which 
loe  are  occasionally  alarmed, 

2.  The  duty  of  prayer  as  taught  in  the  Scriptures. 

The  Scriptures  treat  of  prayer  as  a  duty  arising  so 
immediately  out  of  our  relations  to  God,  and  our  obli- 
gations to  him,  as  scarcely  to  need  a  positive  precept. 
Every  disposition  of  heart  which  we  are  commanded  to 
exercise  towards  God,  presupposes  it.  Hence  it  is  gen- 
erally referred  to,  incidentally,  as  one  of  w4iich  the  obli- 
gation is  already  taken  for  granted.  Precepts,  however, 
are  not  wanting  in  respect  to  it.  I  here  only  speak  of 
the  general  tendency  of  the  Scripture  instructions. 

1.  It  is  expressly  commanded  :  *'  Pray  without  ceas- 
ing.^' **  In  every  thing  giving  thanks,  for  this  is  the 
will  of  God  in  Christ  Jesus  concerning  you."  '*/7i  all 
thingsy  by  prayer  and  supplication,  let  your  request  be 
made  known  unto  God  "  (Phil.  iv.  6).  **  I  exhort  that 
supplications  and  prayers,  intercessions  and  giving  of 
thanks,  be  made  /or  ell  men;  for  this  is  good  and  ac" 
2ej)table  in  thesight  of  God  our  Saviour  "(1  Tim. ii. 1-3). 

2.  God  declares  it  to  be  a  principal  condition  on  which 
15* 


174  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

he  will  bestow  favors.  **  If  any  man  lack  wisdom,  let 
him  ask  of  God,  who  giveth  to  all  men  liberally,  and 
iipbraideth  not,  and  it  shall  be  given  him  "  (James  i.  5). 
**  Ask,  and  it  shall  be  given  you ;  seek,  and  ye  shall 
find  ;  knock,  and  it  shall  be  opened  unto  you  ;  for  every 
one  that  asketh,  receiveth ;  and  he  that  seeketh,  findeth  ; 
and  to  him  that  knocketh,  it  shall  be  opened.  Or,  what 
man  is  there  of  you,  whom  if  his  son  ask  bread,  will  he 
give  him  a  stone?  or  if  he  ask  a  fish,  will  he  give  him 
a  serpent?  If  ye  then,  being  evil,  know  how  to  give 
good  gifts  to  your  children,  how  much  more  shall  your 
Father  that  is  in  heaven  give  good  things  to  them  that 
ask  him?'^  (Matthew  vii.  7-11.)  Now,  it  is  too  obvi- 
ous to  need  a  remark,  that  God  would  not  have  con- 
nected so  important  consequences  with  prayer  unless 
he  meant  to  inculcate  it  as  a  universal  duty. 

3.  The  Scriptures  make  the  habit  of  prayer  the 
mark  of  distinction  between  the  righteous  and  the 
wicked  ;  between  the  enemies  and  the  friends  of  God. 
Thus  the  wicked  say :  *'  What  is  the  Almighty,  that 
we  should  serve  him?  or  what  profit  shall  we  have,  if 
we  call  upon  him?"  (Job  xxi.  15.)  "The  wicked, 
through  the  pride  of  his  countenance,  will  not  seek  after 
God.  God  is  not  in  all  his  thoughts  "  (Psalms  x.  4). 
On  the  contrary,  righteous  persons,  those  whom  God 
approves,  are  specially  designated  as  those  who  call 
upon  him, 

4.  Examples  of  the  prayers  of  good  men  are  in  the 
Scriptures  very  abundant.  In  fact,  a  large  part  of  the 
Bible  is  made  up  of  the  prayers  and  praises  of  those 
whom  God  has  held  up  for  our  imitation.  To  tran- 
scribe these  would  be  to  transcribe  extensive  portions 
of  the  sacred  books. 

5.  The  Bible  abounds  with  examples,  recorded  by 
God,  of  special  answers  to  prayer  of  every  kind  that 
can  be  conceived.  There  are  examples  of  the  success- 
ful prayer  of  individuals  for  temj^oral  and  for  spiritual 
blest>ings,  both  for  themselves  and  for  others  ;  of  indi- 
vidual prnyers  for  nations,  and  of  nations  for  them- 
selves ;  of  individuals  for  societies,  and  of  societies  for 


OF   PRATER.  175 

individuals ;  and,  indeed,  of  men  in  all  the  circum- 
stances in  which  they  can  be  placed,  for  every  blessing 
and  under  every  variety  of  relation.  Now,  what  God 
has,  at  so  great  length,  and  in  so  great  a  variety  of 
ways,  encouraged  us  to  do,  must  be  not  only  a  privi- 
lege, but  a  duty. 

In  a  word,  the  Bible  teaches  us,  on  this  subject,  that 
our  relation  to  God  is  infinitely  nearer  and  more  uni- 
versal than  that  in  which  we  can  possibly  stand  to  any 
other  being.  He  allows  us,  with  the  simplicity  and 
confidence  of  children,  to  unbosom  all  our  cares,  to 
make  known  all  our  wants,  and  express  all  our  thanks, 
with  unreserved  freedom  to  him.  He  assures  us  that 
this  exercise,  and  the  temper  from  which  it  springs, 
and  which  it  cultivates,  is  most  acceptable  to  him. 
And,  having  thus  condescended  to  humble  himself  to 
our  situation,  he  holds  us  as  most  ungrateful,  proud, 
insolent,  and  sinful,  if  we  venture  to  undertake  any 
business  or  receive  auy  favor  without  holding  direct 
and  childlike  communion  with  him. 

6.  Under  the  remedial  dispensation,  a  special  encour- 
agement is  given  to  prayer.  We  are  there  taught  that 
though  we  are  unworthy  of  the  blessings  which  we  need, 
yet  we  may  ask  and  receive,  for  the  sake  of  the  Medi- 
ator. *'  Whatsoever  ye  shall  ask  the  Father  in  my 
name  he  will  give  it  you."  The  death  of  Christ  is  also 
held  forth  as  our  special  ground  of  confidence  in  prayer : 
'*  He  that  spared  not  his  own  Son,  but  gave  him  up  for 
us  all,  how  shall  he  not,  with  him,  freely  give  us  all 
things?"  And  yet  more,  we  are  informed  that  it  is 
the  special  ofiice  of  the  exalted  Mediator  to  intercede 
for  us  before  the  throne  of  God.  Greater  encourage- 
ments than  these  to  prayer  could  not  possibly  be  con- 
ceived. 

HI.    The  utility  of  prayer. 

This  may  be  shown  — 

1.  From  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God.  He  would 
not  require  anything  of  us  which  was  not  for  our  good. 

2.  The  utility  of  prayer  is  seen  from  the  tempers  of 
mind  which  it  presupposes.     We  have  already  shown 


176  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

what  these  tempers  of  mind  are.    Now,  it  must  be  evi 
dent  to  every  one  that  the  habitual  exercise  of  these 
dispositions  must  be,  in  the  nature  of  the  case,  in  the 
highest  degree  beneficial  to  such  creatures  as  we. 

3.  The  utility  of  prayer  is  also  evident  from  its  con- 
nection with  our  reception  of  favors  from  God. 

a.  In  the  government  of  this  world,  God  establishes 
such  connections  between  cause  and  effect,  or  antece- 
dent and  consequent,  as  he  pleases.  lie  has  a  perfect 
right  to  do  so.  The  fact  that  one  event  is  the  antece- 
dent of  another,  involves  not  the  supposition  of  any 
essential  power  in  the  antecedent,  but  merely  the 
supposition  that  God  has  placed  it  in  that  relation  to 
something  that  is  to  follow. 

b.  The  bestowment  of  favors  is  one  event.  God  has 
a  right  to  ordain  whatever  antecedent  to  this  event  he 
chooses.  We  are  not  competent  to  say  of  any  event 
that  it  cannot  be  the  antecedent  to  the  bestowment  of 
favors,  any  more  than  that  rain  cannot  be  the  antece- 
dent to  the  growth  of  vegetation. 

c.  Since,  then,  any  event  whatever  may  be  the  ante- 
cedent to  any  other  event  whatever,  we  are  surely  not 
competent  to  say  that  prayer  cannot  be  the  antecedent 
to  the  bestowment  of  favors,  any  more  than  to  say  this 
of  anything  else.  It  is  surely,  to  say  the  least  of  it, 
aa  good  as  any  other  antecedent,  if  God  saw  fit  so  to 
ordain. 

d.  But,  since  God  is  a  moral  Governor,  and  must 
therefore  delight  in  and  reward  virtuous  tempers,  there 
is  a  manifest  moral  propriety  in  his  making  these  tem- 
pers the  antecedent  to  his  bestowment  of  blessings. 
Nay,  we  cannot  conceive  how  he  would  be  a  righteous 
moral  Governor  unless  he  did  do  so.  And  hence  we 
see  that  the  supposition  that  God  bestows  blessings  in 
answer  to  prayer,  which  he  would  not  bestow  on  any 
other  condition,  is  not  only  not  at  variance  with  any  of 
his  natural,  but  that  it  is  even  demanded  by  his  moral 
attributes. 

e.  But,  inasmuch  as  God  has  revealed  to  us  the  fact 
that  this  is  the  condition  on  which  he  bestows  the  most 


OF   PRAYER.  177 

valuable  of  his  gifts,  and  as  he  has  bound  himself  by 
his  promise  to  reward  abundantly  all  who  call  upon 
him,  the  utility  of  prayer,  to  creatures  situated  as  we 
are,  is  as  manifest  as  our  necessities  are  urgent,  both 
for  time  and  for  eternity. 

4.  And,  finally,  there  can  be  no  clearer  evidence  of 
the  goodness  of  God  than  just  such  a  constitution  as 
this.  God  promises  favors  in  answer  to  prayer ;  but 
prayer,  as  we  have  seen,  is  one  of  the  most  efficient 
means  of  promoting  our  moral  perfection  ;  that  is,  our 
highest  happiness ;  that  is  to  say,  God  promises  us 
favors  on  conditions  which,  in  themselves,  involve  the 
greatest  blessings  which  we  could  possibly  desire. 
Bishop  Wilson  beautifully  remarks,  **  How  good  is  God, 
"who  will  not  only  give  us  what  we  pray  for,  but  will 
reward  us  for  going  to  him  and  laying  our  wants  before 
him  I " 

That  a  man  will,  however,  receive  everything  he  asks 
for,  and  just  as  he  asks  for  it,  is  by  no  means  asserted 
in  an  unlimited  sense ;  but  only  that  which  he  prays 
for  in  a  strict  sense.  True  prayer  is  the  offering  up 
of  our  desires  in  entire  subjection  to  the  will  of  God ; 
that  is,  desiring  that  he  will  do  what  we  ask,  if  he  in 
his  infinite  wi^^dom  and  goodness  sees  that  it  will  be 
best.  Now,  if  we  ask  tlius^  our  prayer  will  be  granted, 
for  thus  he  has  promised  to  do  for  us.  Hence  our 
prayers  respecting  temporal  blessings  are  answered 
only  contingently  ;  that  is,  under  this  condition.  But 
our  prayers  respecting  spiritual  blessings  are  answered 
absolutely ;  for  God  has  positively  promised  to  give 
his  Holy  Spirit  to  them  that  ask  him. 

If  God  have  allowed  us  thus  to  hold  the  most  inti- 
mate and  unreserved  communion  with  him ;  and  if  he 
have  promised,  on  this  condition,  to  support  us  by  his 
power,  to  teach  us  by  his  wisdom,  to  purify  us  by  his 
Spirit,  and  to  work  in  us  all  those  tempers  which  be 
sees  will  best  prepare  us  for  the  highest  state  of  future 
felicity  —  what  can  be  more  ennobling  and  more  lovciy 
than  a  prayerful  liie  ?  and  what  more  ungrateful  and 
sinful  than  a  life  of  thoughtless  irreverence  and  impi- 


178  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

ety?  Is  not  the  single  fact  of  living  without  habitual 
prayer  a  conclusive  evidence  that  we  have  not  the  love 
of  God  in  us  ?  that  we  are  living  in  habitual  violation 
of  every  obligation  that  binds  us  to  our  Maker?  and 
that  we  are,  therefore,  under  the  solemn  condemnation 
of  his  most  holy  law  ? 


CHAPTEE  IV. 


THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH. 

This  is  the  second  special  means  appointed  by  our 
Creator  for  the  purpose  of  cultivating  in  us  suitable 
moral  dispositions.  We  shall  treat,  first,  Of  the  original 
iyistltution  of  the  Sabbath ;  secondly,  Of  the  Mosaic  Sab-/ 
bath;  thirdly,  Of  the  Christian  /Sabbath, 

Although  the  Sabbath  is  a  positive  institution,  and 
therefore  the  proof  of  its  obligation  is  to  be  sought  for 
entirely  from  revelation,  yet  there  are  indications  in  the 
present  constitution  that  periods  of  rest  are  necessarj'- 
both  for  man  and  forj^east.  The  recurrence  of  night,  and 
the  necessity  of  repose,  show  that  the  principle  of  rest 
enters  into  the  present  system  as  much  as  that  of  labor. 
And,  besides,  it  is  found  that  animalg  which  are  allowed 
one  day  in  seven  for  rest,  live  longer,  and  enjoy  better 
health,  than  those  which  are  worked  without  intermis- 
sion. The  same  may,  to  a  considerable  degree,  be  said 
of  man.  The  late  Mr.  Wilberforce  attributed  his  length 
of  life,  and  the  superiority  of  health  which  he  enjoyed 
over  that  of  his  political  contemporaries,  mainly  to  his 
resolute  and  invariable  observance  of  the  Sabbath  day ;  a 
duty  which,  unfortunately,  they  too  frequently  neg- 
lected. 

I  shall  not  go  into  the  argument  on  this  subject  in 
detail,  as  the  limits  of  the  present  Avorkwill  not  admit 
of  it,  but  shall  merely  give  what  seem  to  me  the  results. 
To  those  Avho  wish  to  examine  the  question  of  the  obli- 
gation of  the  Sabbath  at  large,  I  would  recommend  the 
valuable  treatise  of  Mr.  J.  J.  Gurney,  on  the  history, 
authority,  and  use  of  the  Sabbath ;  from  which  much 
of  the  present  article  is  merely  an  abridgment. 


( 


180  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

y  I.  Of  the  original  institution  of  the  Sabbath, 
y  First,  The  Divine  authority  for  the  institution  of  the 
'-Sabbath  is  found  in  Genesis  ii.  1-3:  *'Thus  tlio 
heavens  and  the  earth  were  finished,  and  all  the  hosts 
of  them ;  and  on  the  seventh  day  Goi  ended  his  work 
which  he  had  made,  and  he  rested  on  the  seventh  day 
from  all  his  works  which  he  had  made.  And  God 
blessed  the  seventh  day,  and  sanctified  it ;  because  that 
in  it  he  had  rested  from  all  his  work  which  God  had 
created  and  made." 

Now,  concerning  this  passage,  we  remark : 
^     1.  It  Avas  given  to  our  first  parents  ;  that  is,  to  the 
whole  human  race. 

2.  God  blessed  it ;  that  is,  bestowed  upon  it  a  pecu- 
liar blessing,  or  made  it  a  source  of  peculiar  blessings  to 
man.  {Such,  surely,  must  be  that  day  which  is  given  in 
order  to  cultivate  in  ourselves  moral  excellence,  and 
prepare  us  for  the  happiness  of  heaven.  He  sanctified 
it ;  that  is,  set  it  apart  from  a  common  to  a  sacred  and 
religious  use. 
4^  3.  The  reason  is  a  general  one;  God  rested.  This 
has  no  reference  to  any  peculiar  people,  but  seems  in 
the  light  of  an  example  from  God  for  all  the  human 
race. 

4.  The  nature  of  the  ordinance  is  general.  God 
sanctified  it;  that  is,  the  day.  The  act  refers  not  to  any 
particular  people,  but  to  the  day  itself. 
V.  5.  The  object  to  be  acco7nplished  is  general,  and  can 
apply  to  no  one  people  more  than  to  another.  If  it  be 
rest,  all  men  equally  need  it.  If  it  be  moral  cultiva- 
tion, surely  no  people  has  ever  existed  who  did  not 
require  such  a  means  to  render  them  better. 

Secondly,  There  are  indications  that  the  hebdoma- 
dal division  of  time  was  observed  by  the  patriarchs 
before  the  time  of  Moses,  and  that  the  Sabbath  was 
regarded  as  the  day  for  religious  worship. 

a.  Genesis  iv.  3  :  '*  And  in  process  of  time,  it  camo 
to  pass  that  Cain  brought  of  the  fruit  of  the  ground  an 
oHering  to  the  Lord."  The  words  rendered  "  in  pro- 
cess of  time,"  literally  signify  ''  at  the  cud  of  days  ;*' 


\ 


THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH.       181 

or,  **  at  the  cutting  off  of  days ; "  that  fs,  as  T  think 
probable,  at  the  close,  as  we  should  say,  of  a  section  of 
days  ;  a  veiy  natural  expression  for  the  end  of  a  week. 
If  this  be  the  meaning,  it  would  seem  to  refer  to  the 
division  of  time  just  previously  mentioned,  and  also  to 
the  use  of  this  day  for  religious  worship. 

h,  Noah  seems  to  have  observed  the  same  hebdoma-  7 
dal  division  of  time.  The  command  to  enter  into  the  ^ 
ark  was  given  seven  days  before  the  flood  came.  (Gen- 
esis vii.  4-10.)  So  he  allowed  seve/i  days  to  elapse 
between  the  times  of  sending  forth  the  dove.  (Genesis 
viii.  10-12.)  Now,  I  think  that  these  intimations  show 
that  this  division  of  time  was  observed  according  to  the 
original  command  ;  and  we  may  well  suppose  that  with 
it  was  connected  the  special  time  for  religious  worship. 
Thus,  also,  Joseph  devoted  seven  days,  or  a  whole  week, 
to  the  mourning  for  his  father. 

c.  The  next  mention  of  the  Sabbath  is  shortly  after     , 
the  Israelites  had  left  Egypt,  and  were  fed  with  manna  \ 
in  the  wilderness.     (Exodus  xvi.  22-30. )     As  the  pas-  ^ 
sage  is  of  considerable  length,  I  need  not  quote  it.     I 
would,  however,  remark  : 

a.  It  occurs  before  the  giving  of  the  law ;  and,  7^ 
therefore,  the  obligatoriness  of  the  Sabbath  is  hereby 
acknowledged,  irrespective  of  the  Mosaic  law. 

b.  When  first  alUided  to,  it  is  spoken  of  as  a  thing 
known.  God  first,  without  referring  to  *the  Sabbath, 
informs  Moses  that  on  the  sixth  day  the  Israelites 
should  gather  twice  as  much  manna  as  on  any  other 
day.  ijFrom  this  it  seems  that  the  division  of  time  by 
weeks  was  known  ;  and  that  it  was  taken  for  granted 
that  they  would  know  the  reason  for  the  making  of 
this  distinction,  u  In  the  whole  of  the  narration  there 
is  no  precept  given  for  the  keeping  of  the  day ;  but 
they  are  reproved  for  not  suitably  keeping  it,  as  though 
it  were  an  institution  with  which  they  ought  to  have 
been  familiar. 

Besides  these,  there  are  many  indications  in  the  ear- 
liest clasi^ics  that  the  Greeks  and  llonians  observed  the 
hebdomadal  division  of  time ;  and  also  that  the  sev.. 


182  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

enth  day  was  considered  peculiarly  sacred.  This  seems 
to  have  been  the  case  in  the  time  of  Hesiod.  The  same 
is  supposed  to  have  been  the  fact  in  regard  to  the  north- 
ern nations  of  Europe,  from  which  we  are  immediately 
descended.  The  inference  which  seems  naturally  to 
arise  from  these  facts  is,  that  this  institution  was  origi- 
nally observed  by  the  whole  human  race ;  and  that  it 
was  transmitted,  with  different  degrees  of  care,  by  dif- 
ferent nations,  until  the  period  of  the  commencement 
of  our  various  historical  records. 

From  the  above  facts  I  think  we  are  warranted  in 
the  conclusion  that  the  seventh  day,  or  perhaps,  gener- 
ally, the  seventh  part  of  time,  was  originally  set  apart 
for  a  religious  purpose,  by  our  Creator,  for  the  whole 
human  race ;  that  it  was  so  observed  by  the  Hebrews 
previously  to  the  giving  of  the  law  ;  and  that,  probably, 
the  observance  was,  in  the  infancy  of  our  race,  uni- 
versal. 

Ij    II.   The  Mosaic  Sabbath . 

^-  The  precept  for  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath,  at  the 
giving  of  the  law,  is  in  these  words  :  **  Remember  the 
Sabbath  day  to  keep  it  holy.  Six  days  shalt  thou  labor 
and  do  all  thy  work  ;  but  the  seventh  is  the  Sabbath  of 
the  Lord  thy  God  ;  in  it  thou  shalt  not  do  any  work, 
thou,  nor  thy  son,  nor  thy  daughter,  nor  thy  man-ser- 
vant, nor  thy  maid-servant,  nor  thy  cattle,  nor  thy 
stranger  thjit  'is  within  thy  gates  ;  for  in  six  days  the 
Lord  made  heaven  and  earth,  the  sea,  and  all  that  in 
them  is,  and  rested  the  seventh  day.  Wherefore  the 
Lord  blessed  the  seventh  day  and  hallowed  it "  (Exo- 
dus XX.  9-11). 

Now,  concerning   this   precept,   there    are   several 
things  worthy  of  remark  : 
/      1.  It  is  found  in  the  law  of  the  ten  commandments , 
^  which  is  always  referred  to  in  the  Scriptures  as  contain- 
ing the  sum  of  the  moral  precepts  of  God  to  man.    Our 
I  Saviour  and  the  apostles,  who  made  the  most  decided 
[  distinction  between  moral  and  ceremonial  observances, 
^  never  allude  to  the  law  of  the  ten  commandments  in 
any  other  manner  than  as  of  permanent  and  universal 


/ 


THE  OBSERVANCE  OF  THE  SABBATH       183 

obligation.  Ll^ow,  I  know  of  no  reason  which  can  bo 
assigned  why  this  precept  should  be  detached  from  all 
the  rest,  and  considered  as  ceremonial,  when  the  whole 
of  these,  taken  together,  are  allowed  by  universal  con- 
sent to  have  been  quoted  as  moral  precepts  by  Christ 
and  his  apostles  A  Besides,  our  Saviour  expressly  de- 
clares that  '*  the  octhbath  was  rnade  for  man  ;  "  that  is, 
for  man  in  general,  for  the  whole  human  race ;  and, 
consequently,  that  it  is  binding  upon  the  whole  race ; 
that  is,  that  it  is  a  precept  of  universal  obligation. 

2.  The  reasons  given  for  observing  it  are  the  same  as 
^ those  given  at  the  time  of  its  first  institution.  Inas- 
^much  as  these  reasons  are  in  their  nature  general,  we 

should  naturally  conclude  that  the  obligation  which  it 
imposes  is  universal. 

3.  This  commandment  is  frequently  referred  to  by 
the  prophets  as  one  of  high  moral  obligation ;  the 
most  solemn  threatenings  are  uttered  against  those  who 
profane  it ;  and  the  greatest  rewards  promised  to  those 
who  keep  it.  See  Isaiah  Ivi.  2-6  ;  Jeremiah  xvii.  24, 
25  ;  Nehemiah  xiii.  15-21. 

/      4.  In  add  itiou  to  rest  from  labor,  the  meeting  togethei 

/  for  worship  and   the  reading  of  the  Scriptures  was 

(  made  a  part  of  the  duty  of  the  Sabbath  day.     Six  days 

/  shall  work  be  done  ;  but  the  seventh  is  the  Sabbath  of 

/   rest  —  a  holy  convocation.     (Leviticus  xxiii.  3.)    Thus 

'    also  Moses  of  old  time  hath  in  every  city  them  that 

preach  him,  being  read  in  the  synagogues  every  Sabbath 

day,     (Acts  xv.  21.) 

1  Besides  this  reeuaction  of  the  Sabbath  day,  in  the 
Mosaic  law  there  were  special  additions  made  to  its 
observance  which  belong  to  the  Jews  alone,  and  which 
were  a  part  of  their  civil  or  ceremonial  law.  With 
this  view  other  reasons  were  given  for  observing  it, 
and  other  rites  were  added.     Thus,  for  instance  : 

1.  It  was  intended  to  distinguish  them  from  the  sur- 
rounding idolatrous  nations.     (Exodus  xxxi.  12-17.) 

2.  It  was  a  memorial  of  their  deliverance  from 
^ryP^-     (Deuteronomy  V.  15.) 

3.  And  with  these  views  the  principle  of  devoting 


184  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

the  seventh  part  of  time  was  extended  also  to  years ; 
every  seventh  year  being  a  year  of  rest. 

4.  The  violation  of  the  Sabbath  was  punished  with 
death  by  the  civil  magistrate. 

Now,  whatever  is  in  its  nature  local,  and  designed  for 
a  particular  purpose,  ceases  whenever  that  purpose  is 
accomplished.  Hence  these  civil  and  ceremonial  obser- 
vances cease  with  the  termination  of  the  Jewish  polity  ; 
while  that  which  is  moral  and  universal,  that  which 
'*  was  made  for  man,"  and  not  specially  for  the  Jews, 
remains  as  though  the  ceremonial  observances  had 
never  existed.  I  think  that  this  view  of  the  subject  is 
also  confirmed  by  the  example  and  precept  of  Christ, 
who  gave  directions  concerning  the  manner  in  which 
the  Sabbath  was  to  be  kept,  and  also  was  himself  accus-  ^ 
tomed  to  observe  the  day  for  the  purposes  of  religious  I 
worship.  **  As  his  custom  was,  he  went  into  the  syna- 
gogue on  the  Sabbath  day,  and  stood  up  to  read" 
(Luke  iv.  16.  See  also  Matthew  xii.  2-13).  When 
our  Lord,  also,  in  teaching  the  mode  in  which  the  Sab- 
bath is  to  be  kept,  specifies  what  things  it  is  lawful  to 
do  on  the  Sabbath  day,  he  clearly  proceeds  upon  the 
principle  that  it  was  lawful  to  do  things  on  other  days 
which  it  would  not  be  lawful  to  do  on  the  /Sabbath  day, 

III.   The  Christian  Sabbath. 

We  shall  consider  here,  first,  the  day  on  which  the 
Christian  Sabbath  is  to  be  kept ;  second,  the  manner 
in  which  it  is  to  be  kept. 

First.  The  day  on  which  the  Christian  Sabbath  is 
to  be  kept. 

First.  There  are  indications,  from  the  facts  which 
transpired  on  the  first  day  of  the  week,  that  it  was  to 
be  specially  honored  under  the  new  dispensation. 

1.  Our  Saviour  arose  on  that  day  from  the  dead, 
having  accomplished  the  work  of  man's  redemption. 

2.  On  this  day  he  appeared  to  his  apostles,  a  week 
from  his  resurrection,  at  which  time  he  had  his  conver- 
sation with  Thomas. 

3.  On  this  day,  also,  occurred  the  feast  of  Pentecost, 
when  the  Spirit  was  in  so  remarkable  a  manner  poured 


THE  OBSERVANCE  OP  THE  SABBATH.      185 

out,  and  when  the  new  dispensation  emphatically  com- 
menced. 

Second,  That  the  primitive  Christians,  in  the  days  ot 
the  apostles,  were  accustomed  to  observe  this  day  as 
their  day  of  weekly  worship,  is  evident  from  several 
passages  in  the  New  Testament,  and  also  from  the 
earliest  ecclesiastical  records. 

1.  That  the  early  disciples  were  accustomed  to  meet 
statedly  to  worship  and  celebrate  the  Lord's  Supper,  is 
evident  from  1  Corinthians  xvi.  1,  2. 

2.  That  these  meetings, also, were  held  on  the  first  day 
of  the  week,  is  also  further  evident  from  Acts  xx.  6- 11 ; 
where  we  are  informed  that  in  Troas  the  Christians 
met  on  the  first  day  of  the  week  to  break  bread,  —  that 
is,  to  celebrate  the  Lord's  Supper,  —  and  to  receive  re- 
ligious instruction.  From  these  passages  we  see  that 
this  custom  had  already  become  universal,  not  merely 
in  the  neighborhood  of  Jerusalem,  but  throughout  the 
regions  in  which  the  Christian  religion  was  promulgated. 

3.  Again  (Revelation  i.  10),  it  is  observed  by  John  : 
«*  I  was  in  the  Spirit  on  the  Lord^s  dayJ*^  From  this 
remark  it  is  probable  that  John  kept  this  day  with  pecu- 
liar solemnity.  It  is  certain  that  the  day  had  already 
obtained  a  particular  name  —  a  name  by  which  it  has 
continued  to  be  distinguished  in  every  subsequent  age. 

Besides  these  allusions  to  the  day  from  the  New  Tes- 
tament, there  are  various  facts  bearing  upon  the  sub- 
ject from  uninspired  historians. 

1.  The  early  Fathers  frequently  refer  to  this  day  as 
the  day  set  apart  for  religious  worship,  and  allude  to 
the  difference  between  keeping  this  day  and  keeping 
the  seventh,  or  Jewish  Sabbath,  specially  on  the  ground 
of  its  being  the  day  of  our  Saviour's  resurrection. 

2.  Pliny,  in  his  letter  to  Trajan,  remarks  that  the 
Christians  *'  were  accustomed,  on  a  stated  day^  to  meet 
before  daylight,  and  to  repeat  among  themselves  a 
hymn  to  Christ,  as  to  a  god,  and  to  bind  themselves 
by  a  sacred  obligation  not  to  commit  any  wickedness, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  to  abstain  from  thefts,  robberies, 
and  adulteries ;  also  not  to  violate  their  promise  or 


186  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

deny  a  pledge  ;  after  which  it  was  their  custom  to  sep- 
arate, and  meet  again  at  a  promiscuous  and  harmless 
meal."  It  is  proper  here  to  remark  the  exact  coin- 
cidence between  this  account,  from  the  pen  of  a  heathen 
magistrate,  and  the  account  given  of  the  keeping  of 
the  day  in  the  passages  where  it  is  mentioned  m  the 
New  Testament. 

3.  That  this  stated  day  was  the  first  day  of  the  week, 
or  the  Lord's  day,  is  evident  from  another  testimony. 
So  well  known  was  the  custom  of  the  early  Christians 
on  this  subject,  that  the  ordinary  question  put  by  their 
persecutors  to  the  Christian  martyrs  was,  **  Hast  thou 
kept  the  Lord's  day  ?  " — Dominicum  servasti?  To  which 
the  usual  answer  was,  *'  I  am  a  Christian:  I  cannot 
omit  it." —  Christianus  sum:  tnlermittere  non possum, 

4.  It  is,  however,  manifest  that  the  Jews,  who  were 
strongly  inclined  to  blend  the  rites  of  Moses  with  the 
Christian  religion,  at  first  kept  the  seventh  day ;  or, 
what  is  very  probable,  at  first  kept  both  days.  The 
apostles  declared  that  the  disciples  of  Jesus  were  not 
under  obligation  to  observe  the  seventh  day.  See 
Colossians  ii.  16,  17.  Now,  as  the  observance  of  the 
Sabbath  is  a  precept  given  to  the  whole  human  race  ; 
as  it  is  repeated  in  the  Mosaic  law  as  a  moral  precept ; 
as  the  authority  of  this  precept  is  recognized  both  by 
the  teaching  and  example  of  Christ  and  his  apostles  ;  as 
the  apostles  teach  that  the  keeping  of  the  seventh  dai 
is  not  obligatory;  and  as  they  did  keep  the  first  day 
as  a  da}^  of  religious  worship,  —  it  seems  reasonable  to 
conclude  that  they  intended  to  teach  that  the  first  day 
was  that  which  we  are,  as  Christians,  to  observe. 

5.  From  these  considerations  we  feel  warranted  to 
conclude  that  the  first  day  of  the  week  was  actually 
l^ept  by  the  inspired  apostles  as  the  Christian  Sabbath. 
Their  example  is  sufficient  to  teach  us  that  the  keeping 
of  this  day  is  acceptable  to  God  ;  and  we  are,  on  this 
ground,  at  libeiiy  (o  keep  it  as  the  Sabbath.  If,  how- 
ever, any  other  person  be  dissatisfied  with  these  reasons, 
and  feel  under  obligation  to  observe  the  seventh  day,  I 
see  no  precept  in  the  Word  of  God  to  forbid  him. 


THE   OBSERVANCE   OF  THE   SABBATH.  187 

6.  If,  however,  as  seems  to  me  to  be  the  case,  both 
days  are  allowable,  —  that  is,  if  I  have  sujEcient  reason 
to  believe  that  either  is  acceptable  to  God ;  but  if,  by 
observing  the  first  day,  I  can  enjoj^  more  perfect  leisure, 
and  suffer  less  interruption,  and  thus  better  accomplish 
the  object  of  the  day  ;  and  if,  besides,  I  have  the  exam- 
ple of  inspired  apostles  in  favor  of  this  observance, — 
I  should  decidedly  prefer  to  observe  the  first  day.  Nay, 
I  should  consider  the  choice  of  that  day  as  obligatory. 
For,  if  I  am  allowed  to  devote  either  day  to  the  wor- 
ship of  God,  it  is  surely  obligatory  on  me  to  worship 
God  on  that  day  on  which  I  can  best  accomplish  the 
very  object  for  which  the  day  was  set  apart. 

If  it  be  asked  when  this  day  is  to  begin,  I  answer, 
that  I  presume  we  are  at  liberty  to  commence  this  day 
at  the  same  time  that  we  commence  other  days ;  for 
the  obvious  reason,  that  thus  we  can  generally  enjoy 
the  quiet  of  the  Sabbath  with  less  interruption. 

Secondly.  Of  the  rnanner  in  which  the  Christian 
Sahhath  is  to  he  observed. 

The  design  for  which  the  Sabbath  was  instituted,  I 
suppose  to  be,  to  set  apart  a  portion  of  our  time  for  the 
uninterrupted  worship  of  God,  and  the  preparation  of 
our  souls  for  eternity ;  and  also  to  secure  to  man  and 
beast  one  day  in  seven  as  a  season  of  rest  from  labor. 

Hence  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  forbids  — 

1.  All  labor  of  body  or  mind,  of  which  the  immediate 
object  is  not  the  worship  of  God  or  our  own  religious 
improvement.  The  only  exceptions  to  this  rule  are 
works  of  necessity  or  of  mercy.  The  necessity,  how- 
ever, must  be  one  which  is  imposed  by  the  providence 
of  God,  and  not  by  our  own  will.  Thus  a  ship,  when 
on  a  voyage,  may  sail  on  the  Sabbath,  as  well  as  on  any 
other  day,  without  violating  the  rule.  The  rule,  how- 
ever, would  be  violated  by  commencing  the  voyage  on 
the  Sabbath,  because  here  a  choice  of  days  is  in  the 
power  of  the  master. 

2.  The  pursuit  of  pleasure^  or  of  any  physical  or 
merely  intellectual  gratification.  Hence  the  indul- 
gence of  our  appetites  in  such  manner  as  to  prevent 


188  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

US  from  free  and  buoyant  spiritual  contemplation,  rid- 
ing or  journeying  for  amusement,  the  merely  social 
pleasure  of  visiting,  the  reading  of  books  designed  for 
the  gratification  of  the  taste  or  of  the  imagination,  are 
all,  by  the  principles  of  the  command,  forbidden. 
3.  The  labor  ot"  those  committed  to  our  charge. 

a.  The  labor  of  servants.  Their  souls  are  of  as 
much  value  as  our  own,  and  they  need  the  benefit  of 
this  law  as  much  as  ourselves.  Besides,  if  this  portion 
of  their  time  be  claimed  by  our  Creator,  we  have  no 
right  to  purchase  it,  nor  have  they  a  right  to  negotiate 
it  away.  Works  of  necessity  must  of  course  be  per- 
formed ;  but  these  should  be  restricted  within  the  limits 
prescribed  by  a  conscientious  regard  to  the  object  and 
design  of  the  day. 

b.  Brutes  are,  by  the  fourth  commandment,  included 
in  the  law  which  ordains  rest  to  all  the  animate  crea- 
tion. They  need  the  repose  which  it  grants,  and  they 
are  entitled  to  their  portion  of  it. 

On  the  contrary,  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  enjoins  the 
employment  of  the  day  in  the  more  solemn  and  immediate 
duties  of  religion, 

a.  Reading  the  Scriptures,  religious  meditation, 
prayer  in  private,  and  also  the  special  instruction  in 
religion  of  those  committed  to  our  charge.  And  hence 
it  enjoins  such  domestic  arrangements  as  are  consistenl 
with  these  duties. 

b.  Social  worship.  Under  the  Mosaic  and  Christiac 
dispensation,  this  was  an  important  part  of  the  duties 
of  the  day.  As  the  setting  apart  of  a  particular  day  to 
be  universally  observed,  involves  the  idea  of  social  as 
well  as  personal  religion,  one  of  the  most  obvious  duties 
which  it  imposes  is  that  of  social  worship  ;  that  is,  of 
meeting  together  in  societies  to  return  thanks  for  our 
social  mercies,  to  implore  the  pardon  of  God  for  our 
social  sins,  and  beseech  his  favor  for  those  blessings 
which  we  need  as  societies,  no  less  than  as  individuals. 

The  importance  of  the  religious  observance  of  the 
Sabbath  is  seldom  sufficiently  estimated.  Every  atten- 
tive observer  has  remarked  that  the  violation  of  thi^ 


THE  OBSERVANCB  OF  THE  SABBATH,       189 

command  by  the  young  is  one  of  the  most  decided 
marks  of*  incipient  moral  degeneracy.  Religious  re- 
straint is  fast  losing  its  hold  upon  that  young  man  who, 
having  been  educated  in  the  fear  of  God,  begins  to  spend 
the  Sabbath  in  idleness,  or  in  amusement.  And  so 
also  of  communities.  The  desecration  of  the  Sabbath 
is  one  of  those  evident  indications  of  that  criminal  reck- 
lessness, that  insane  love  of  pleasure, and  that  subjection 
to  the  government  of  appetite  and  passion,  which  fore- 
bodes that  the  *'  beginning  of  the  end  "  of  social  happi- 
ness, and  of  true  national  prosperity,  has  arrived. 

Hence  we  see  how  imperative  is  the  duty  of  parents 
and  of  legislators  on  this  subject.  The  head  of  every 
family  is  obliged,  by  the  command  of  God,  not  only  to 
honor  this  day  himself,  but  to  use  all  the  means  in  his 
power  to  secure  the  observance  of  it  by  all  those  com- 
mitted to  his  charge.  He  is  thus  promoting  not  only 
his  own,  but  also  his  children's  happiness ;  for  nothing 
is  a  more  sure  antagonist  force  to  all  the  allurements 
of  vice,  as  nothing  tends  more  strongly  to  lix  in  the 
minds  of  the  young  a  conviction  of  the  existence  and 
attributes  of  God,  than  the  solemn  keeping  of  this  day. 
And  hence,  also,  legislators  are  false  to  their  trust,  who, 
either  by  the  enactment  of  laws,  or  by  their  example, 
diminish  in  the  least  degree,  in  the  minds  of  a  people, 
the  reverence  due  to  that  day  which  God  has  set  apart 
for  himself. 

The  only  question  which  remains  is  the  following : 

Is  it  the  duty  of  the  civil  magistrate  to  enforce  the 
observance  of  the  Sabbath  ? 

We  are  inclined  to  think  not,  and  for  the  following 
reasons : 

1.  The  duty  arises  solely  from  our  relations  to  God, 
and  not  from  our  relations  to  man.  Now,  our  duties 
to  God  are  never  to  be  placed  within  the  control  of 
human  legislation. 

2.  If  the  civil  magistrate  has  a  right  to  take  cogni- 
zance of  this  duty  to  God,  he  has  aright  to  take  cogni- 
zance of  every  other.  And  if  he  have  a  right  to  take 
cognizance  of  the  duty,  he  has  a  right  to  prescribe  in 


190  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

what  manner  it  shall  be  discharged  ;  or,  if  he  see  fit,  to 
forbid  the  observance  of  it  altogether.  The  concession 
of  this  right  would  therefore  lead  to  direct  interference 
with  liberty  of  conscience. 

3.  The  keeping  of  the  Sabbath  is  a  moral  duty. 
Hence,  if  it  be  acceptably  observed,  it  must  be  a  volun- 
tary service.  But  the  civil  magistrate  can  never  do 
anything  more  than  produce  obedience  to  the  external 
precept,  which,  in  the  sight  of  God,  would  not  be  the 
keeping  of  the  Sabbath  at  all.  Hence,  to  allow  the  civil 
magistrate  to  enforce  the  observance  of  the  Sabbath, 
would  be  to  surrender  to  him  the  control  over  the  con- 
science, without  attaining  even  the  object  for  which  the 
surrender  was  made. 

4.  It  is,  however,  the  duty  of  the  civil  magistrate  ta 
protect  every  individual  in  the  undisturbed  right  of 
worshipping  God  as  he  pleases.  This  protection  every 
individual  has  a  right  to  claim,  and  society  is  under 
obligation  to  extend  it.  And  also,  as  this  is  a  leisure 
day,  and  is  liable  to  various  abuses,  the  magistrate  has 
a  right  to  prevent  any  modes  of  gratification  which 
would  tend  to  disturb  the  peace  of  society.  This  right 
is  acknowledged  in  regulations  respecting  other  days 
of  leisure  and  rejoicing,  and  there  can  be  no  reason  why 
it  should  not  be  exercised  in  respect  to  the  Sabbath. 

5.  And,  lastly,  the  law  of  the  Sabbath  applies  equally 
to  societies  and  to  individuals.  An  individual  is  for- 
bidden to  labor  on  the  Sabbath,  or  to  emjploy  another 
person  to  labor  for  him.  The  rule  is  the  same  when 
applied  to  any  number  of  individuals ;  that  is,  to  a 
society.  Hence  a  society  has  no  right  to  employ  per- 
sons to  labor  for  them,  except  when  labor  is  demanded 
by  necessity  or  benevolence. 


PART    II 


DUTIES  TO  MAN.  — RECIPROCITY  AND 
BENEVOLENCE. 


^ 


DiyisiON  I. 

THB    DUTY    OF    RECIPROCITY.  — GENERAL    PRINCIPLE    ILLU3. 
TRATED,  AND  THE  DUTIES  OF  RECIPROCITY  CLASSIFIED. 

It  has  beeu  already  observed  that  our  duties  to  both 
God  and  man  are  all  enforced  by  the  obligation  of  love 
to  God.  f  By  this  we  mean  that,  in  consequence  of  our 
moral  constitution,  we  are  under  obligation  to  love  our 
fellow-men,  because  they  are  our  fellow-men;  and  we 
are  also  under  obligation  to  love  them  because  we  have 
been  commanded  to  love  them  by  our  Father  who  is  in 
heaven. \  The  nature  of  this  obligation  may  be  illus- 
trated by  a  familiar  example.  ^Every  child  in  a  family 
is  under  obligation  to  love  its  parent.  >  And  every  child 
is  bound  to  love  its  brother,  both  because  he  is  its 
brother,  and  also  because  this  love  is  a  duty  enforced 
by  the  relation  in  which  they  both  stand  to  their  common 
parent. 

The  relation  in  which  men  stand  to  each  other  is 
essentially  the  relation  of  equality  ;  not  equality  of  con-^ 
diiioTiy  but  equality  of  right. 

Every  human  being  is  a  distinct  and  separately  ac- 
countable individual.  To  each  one  God  has  given  just 
such  means  of  happiness,  and  placed  him  under  just 
Buch  circumstances  for  improving  those  means  of  hap- 
piness, as  it  has  pleased  him.     To  one  he  has  given 


( 


102  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

wealth ;  to  another,  intellect ;  to  another,  physical 
strength ;  to  another,  health  ;  and  to  all  in  different 
degrees.  In  all  these  respects  the  human  race  presents 
a  scene  of  the  greatest  possible  diversity.  So  far  as 
natural  advantages  are  concerned,  we  can  scarcely  find 
two  individuals  who  are  not  created  under  circum- 
stances widely  dissimilar. 

But,  viewed  in  another  light,  all  men  are  placed 
under  circumstances  of  perfect  equality.  Each  sepa- 
rate individual  is  created  with  precisely  the  same  right 
to  use  the  advantages  with  which  God  has  endowed 
him  as  every  other  individual.  This  proposition  seems 
to  me  in  its  nature  so  self-evident  as  almost  to  preclude 
the  possibility  of  argument.  The  truth  that  every  man 
HAS  A  RIGHT  TO  HIMSELF,  cau  hardly  be  rendered  more 
evident  by  argument.  It  is  of  the  nature  of  a  moral 
axiom. 

The  only  reason  that  I  can  conceive  on  which  any 
one  could  found  a  plea  for  inequality  of  rights  —  that 
is,  for  a  right  in  one  man  to  appropriate  to  himself  the 
faculties  or  means  of  happiness  of  another,  —  must  be 
inequality  of  condition,  ^ut  this  can  manifestly  create 
no  diversity  of  righi^(  I  may  have  been  endowed  with 
better  eyesight  than  my  neighbor ;  but  this  evidently 
gives  me  no  right  to  put  out  his  eyes,  or  to  interfere 
with  his  right  to  derive  from  them  whatever  of  happi- 
ness the  Creator  has  placed  within  his  power.  I  may 
have  greater  muscular  strength  than  my  neighbor ;  but 
this  oivesme  no  right  to  break  his  arms,  or  to  diminish 
in  any  manner  his  ability  to  use  them  for  the  produc- 
tion of  his  own  happiness. 

Besides,  this  supposition  involves  direct  and  manifest 
contradiction  ;  for  the  principle  asserted  is,  that  superi- 
ority of  condition  confers  superiority  of  right.  But,  if 
this  be  true,  then  every  kind  of  superiority  of  condition 
must  confer  correspondent  superiority  ot  right.  Supe- 
riority in  muscular  strength  must  confer  it  as  much  as 
superiority  of  intellect  or  of  wealth,  and  must  confer  it 
in  the  ratio  of  that  superiority.  In  that  case,  if  A,  on 
the  ground  of  intellectual  superiority,  have  a  right  to 


THE   DDTY   OF   RECIPROCITY.  193 

improve  his  own  means  of  happiness  by  diminishing 
those  which  the  Creator  has  given  to  B,  B  would  have 
the  same  right  over  A,  on  the  ground  of  superiority  of 
muscular  strength  ;  while  C  would  have  a  correspon- 
dent right  over  them  both,  on  the  ground  of  superiority 
of  wealth  ;  and  so  on  indefinitely.  And  these  rights 
would  change  every  day,  according  to  the  relative  situ-  \ 
ation  of  the  respective  parties.  That  is  to  say,  as  right 
is  in  its  nature  exclusive,  all  the  men  in  the  universe 
have  an  exclusive  right  to  the  same  thing,  while  the 
right  of  every  one  absolutely  annihilates  that  of  every 
other.  What  is  the  meaning  of  such  an  assertion  I 
leave  it  for  others  to  determine. 

But  let  us  look  at  man  in  another  point  of  light. 

1.  We  find  all  men  possessed  of  the  same  appetites 
and  passions  ;  that  is,  of  the  same  desires  for  external 
objects,  and  the  same  capacity  for  receiving  happiness 
from  the  gratification  of  these  desires.  We  do  not  say 
that  all  men  possess  them  all  in  an  equal  degree  ;  but 
only  that  all  men  actually  possess  them  all,  and  that 
their  happiness  depends  upon  the  gratification  of  them, 

2.  These  appetites  and  passions  are  created,  so  far 
as  they  themselves  are  exclusively  concerned,  without 
limit.  Gratification  generally  renders  them  both  more 
intense  and  more  numerous.  Such  is  the  case  with  the 
love  of  wealth,  the  love  of  power,  the  love  of  sensual 
pleasure,  or  with  any  of  the  others. 

3.  These  desires,  however,  may  ^e  gratified  in  such 
a  manner  as  not  to  interfere  with  the  right  which  every 
other  man  has  over  his  own  means  of  happiness.  Thus, 
1  may  gratify  my  love  of  wealth  by  industry  and  fru- 
gality, while  I  conduct  myself  towards  every  other  man 
with  entire  honesty.  I  may  gratify  my  love  of  science, 
without  diminishing  in  any  respect  the  means  of  knowl- 
edge possessed  by  another.  And,  on  the  other  hand, 
1  am  created  with  the  physical  power  to  gratify  my 
desires  in  such  a  manner  as  to  interfere  with  the  right 
which  another  has  over  the  means  or  happiness  which 
God  has  given  him.  ^  Thus,  I  have  a  physical  power  to 
gnitify  my  love  of  wealth  by  stealing  the  property  of 


194  ^  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

another,  as  well  as  to  gratify  it  by  earning  property  for 
myself.  I  have,  by  the  gift  of  speech,  the  physical 
power  to  ruin  the  reputation  of  another  for  the  sake  of 
gratifying  my  own  love  of  approbation.  I  have  the 
physical  power  to  murder  a  man  for  the  sake  of  using 
his  body  to  gratify  my  love  of  anatomical  knowledge. 
And  so  of  a  thousand  cases. 

4.  And  hence  we  see  that  the  relation  in  which  hu- 
man beings  stand  to  each  other  is  the  following :  Every 
individual  is  created  with  a  desire  to  use  the  means  of 

V  happiness  which  God  has  given  him,  in  such  manner 
/  as  he  thinks  will  best  promote  that  happiness ;  and  of 
this  manner  he  is  the  sole  judge.  Every  individual  is 
endowed  with  the  same  desires,  which  he  may  gratify 
in  such  manner  as  will  not  interfere  with  his  neighbor's 
means  of  happiness ;  but  each  individual  has  also  the 
physical  power  of  so  gratifying  his  desires  as  will  in- 
terfere with  the  means  of  happiness  which  God  has 
granted  to  his  neighbor. 

5.  From  this  relation  it  is  manifest  that  every  man 
is  under  obligation  to  pursue  his  own  happiness  in  such 
manner  only  as  will  leave  his  neighbor  in  the  undis- 
turbed exercise  of  that  common  right  which  the  Crea- 
tor has  equally  conferred  upon  both  ;  that  is,  to  restrain 
his  physical  power  of  gratifying  his  desires  within  such 
limits  that  he  shall  interfere  with  the  rights  of  no  other 
being;  because  in  no  other  manner  can  the  evident 
design  of  the  Creator  —  the  common  happiness  of  ail 
— be  promoted. 

That  this  is  the  law  of  our  being  may  be  shown  from 
other  considerations : 

1.  By  violating  it,  the  happiness  of  the  aggressor  is 
not  increased,  while  that  of  the  sufferer  is  diminished ; 
while  by  obeying  it,  the  greatest  amount  of  happiness 
of  which  our  condition  is  susceptible  is  secured :  be- 
cause, by  obeying  it,  every  one  derives  the  greatest 
possible  advantage  from  the  gifts  bestowed  upon  him 
by  the  Creator. 

2.  Suppose  any  other  rule  of  obligation ;   that  is, 
1  tiiat  a  man  is  not  under  obligation  to  observe  with  this 


THE  DUTY   OF   RECIPROCITY.  195 

exactitude  the  rights  of  his  neighbor.  Where  shall  the 
limit  be  fixed?  If  violation  be  allowed  in  a  small 
degree,  why  not  in  a  great  degree?  and  if  he  may 
interfere  with  one  right,  why  not  with  all?  And,  as 
all  men  come  under  the  same  law,  this  principle  would 
lead  to  the  same  absurdity  as  that  of  which  we  have 
before  spoken  ;  that  is,  it  would  abolish  the  very  idea 
of  right;  and,  as  every  one  has  an  equal  liberty  of  vio- 
lation, would  surrender  the  whole  race  to  the  dominion 
of  unrestrained  desire. 

3.  If  it  be  said  that  one  class  of  men  is  not  under 
the  obligation  to  observe  this  rule  in  its  conduct  towards 
another  class  of  men,  then  it  will  be  necessary  to  show 
that  the  second  class  are  not  men,  that  is,  human 
beings ;  for  these  principles  apply  to  men  as  men :  and 
the  simple  fact  that  a  being  is  a  man,  places  him 
within  the  reach  of  these  obligations,  and  of  their  pro- 
tection. Nay  more,  suppose  the  inferior  class  of  beings 
were  not  truly  men;  if  they  were  intelligent  moral 
agents,  I  suppose  that  we  should  be  under  the  same 
obligation  to  conduct  ourselves  towards  them  upon  the 
principle  of  reciprocity.  I  see  no  reason  why  an  angel 
would  have  a  right,  by  virtue  of  his  superior  nature,  to 
interfere  with  the  means  of  happiness  which  God  has 
conferred  upon  man.  By  parity  of  reasoning,  there- 
fore, superiority  of  rank  would  give  to  man  no  such 
power  over  an  inferior  species  of  moral  and  intelligent 
beings. 

And,  lastly,  if  it  be  true  that  the  Creator  has  given 
to  every  separate  individual  control  over  those  means 
of  happiness  which  he  has  bestowed  upon  him,  then  the 
simple  question  is.  Which  is  of  the  higher  authorit}^ 
this  grant  of  the  Creator,  or  the  selfish  desires  and  pas- 
sions of  the  creature  ?  for  these  are  really  the  notions 
which  are  brought  into  collision.  That  is  to  say,  ought 
the  grant  of  God  and  the  will  of  God  to  limit  my 
desires ;  or  ought  my  desires  to  vitiate  the  grant,  and 
set  at  defiance  the  will  of  God?  On  this  question  a 
moral  and  intelligent  creature  can  entertain  but  ouo 
opinion. 


1 


196  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

Secondly,  Let  us  examine  the  teaching  of  the  holy 
Scriptures  on  this  subject. 

The  precept  in  the  Bible  is  in  these  words  :  **  Thou 
Bhalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself." 

Two  questions  are  here  to  be  considered  :  First,  To 
whom  does  this  command  apply?  or,  in  other  words, 
Who  is  my  neighbor?  and,  secondly,  What  is  implied 
in  the  precept? 

1.  The  first  of  these  questions  is  answered  by  our 
Saviour  himself,  in  the  parable  of  the  good  Samaritan. 
(Luke  X.  25-37.)  He  there  teaches  us  that  we  are  to 
consider  as  our  neighbor,  notour  kinsman  or  our  fellow- 
citizen,  or  those  to  whom  we  are  bound  by  the  recep- 
tion of  previous  kindness,  but  the  stranger,  the  alien, 
the  hereditary  national  enemy  ;  that  is,  man  as  man: 
any  human  being  to  whom  we  may  in  any  manner  do 
good,  y  Every  man  is  our  neighbor,  and  therefore  wo 
are  under  obligation  to  love  every  man  as  ourselves, 

2.  What  is  the  import  of  the  command  to  love  such 
a  one  as  ourselves? 

The  very  lowest  meaning  that  we  can  assign  to  this 
precept  is  as  follows.  I  have  already  stated  that  God 
has  bestowed  upon  every  man  such  means  of  happiness 
as,  in  his  own  sovereign  pleasure,  he  saw  fit ;  and  that 
he  has  given  to  every  man  an  equal  right  to  use  those 
means  of  happiness  as  each  one  supposes  will  best  pro- 
mote his  own  well-being.  Besides  this,  every  one  lias 
an  instinctive  desire  thus  to  use  them.  He  cannot  bo 
happy  unless  this  desire  be  gratified,  and  he  is  pain- 
fully conscious  of  injury  if  this  right  be  interfered 
witii.  In  this  manner  he  loves  himself.  Now,  in  the 
same  manner  he  is  commanded  to  love  his  neighbor. 
That  is,  he  is  by  this  precept  obliged  to  have  the  same 
desire  that  his  neighbor  should  enjoy,  unmolested,  tho 
control  over  whatever  God  has  bestowed  upon  him,  as 
he  has  to  enjoy,  unmolested,  the  same  control  himself; 
and  to  feel  the  same  consciousness  of  injury  when  an- 
other man's  rights  are  invaded,  as  when  his  own  rights 
are  invaded.  With  these  sentiments,  he  would  be  just 
as  unwilling  to  violate  the  rights   of  another,  as   ho 


! 


THE   DUTY    OF   RECIPROCITY.  197 

would  be  to  suffer  a  violatiou  of  his  own.  That  thia 
view  of  the  subject  exhausts  the  command,  we  by  no 
means  assert ;  but  we  think  it  evident  that  the  lan- 
guage is  capable  of  a  no  less  comprehensive  meaning. 

The  same  precept  is  expressed  in  other  places,  under 
another  form  of  language:  **  All  things  whatsoever 
ye  would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do  ye  even  so 
unto  them ;  for  this  is  the  law  and  the  prophets " 
(Matthew  vii.  12). 

The  words  here,  as  in  the  former  case,  are  used  to 
denote  a  principle  of  universal  obligation  :  **  All  things 
whatsoever  ye  would  that  men  should  do  unto  you,  do 
ye  even  so  unto  them." 

The  precept  itself  teaches  us  to  estimate  the  rights  of 
others  by  the  consciousness  of  individual  right  in  our 
own  bosoms.  Would  we  wish  to  know  how  delicate  a 
regard  we  are  bound  to  entertain  towards  the  control 
which  God  has  given  to  others  over  the  means  of  hap- 
piness which  he  has  granted  to  them,  let  us  decide  the 
question  by  asking  how  tender  and  delicate  is  the  re- 
gard which  we  would  wish  them  to  entertain  towards 
us  under  similar  circumstances.  The  decision  of  the 
one  question  will  always  be  the  decision  of  the  other. 
And  this  precept  goes  a  step  further.  It  renders  it 
obligatory  on  every  man  to  commence  such  a  course  of 
conduct,  irrespectively  of  whatever  may  be  the  con- 
duct of  others  to  himself.  It  forbids  us  to  demand  more 
than  the  law  of  reciprocity  allows ;  it  commands  us 
always  to  render  it;  and,  still  more,  if  we  complain  to 
another  of  his  violation  of  the  law,  it  renders  it  imper- 
ative on  us,  while  we  urge  upon  him  a  change  of  con- 
duct, to  commence  by  setting  him  the  example.  And 
it  really,  if  carried  out  to  the  utmost,  would  preclude 
our  claim  upon  him,  until  we  had  ourselves  first  mani- 
fested towards  him  the  very  disposition  which  we  de- 
mand towards  ourselves.  The  moral  beauty  of  this 
precept  will  be  at  once  seen  by  any  one  who  will  take 
the  trouble  honestly  to  generalize  it.  He  will  imme- 
diately perceive  that  it  would  always  avert  injury  at 
the  very  outset ;  and,  by  rendering  both  parties  more 


198  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

virtuous,  would  tend  directly  to  banish  injury,  violence, 
and  wrong  from  the  earth. 

Thirdly,  This  law  of  universal  reciprocity  applies 
with  the  same  force  to  communities  as  to  individuals. 

Communities  are  composed  of  individuals,  and  can 
have,  in  respect  to  each  other,  no  other  rights  than  those 
of  the  individuals  who  constitute  them.  If  it  be  wrong 
for  one  man  to  injure  another  man,  it  must  be  equally 
wrong  for  two  men  to  injure  two  other  men ;  and  so 
of  any  other  number.  And,  moreover,  the  grant  of 
the  Creator  is,  in  both  cases,  under  the  same  circum- 
stances. God  has  bestowed  upon  nations  physical  and 
intellectual  advantages,  in  every  possible  degree  of 
diversity.  But  he  has  granted  to  them  all  an  equal 
right  to  use  those  advantages  in  such  manner  as  each 
one  may  suppose  will  best  conduce  to  the  promotion 
of  his  own  happiness. 

Hence  it  ;will  follow  — 

1.  That  the  precept  applies  as  universally  to  nations 
as  to  individuals.  Whenever  societies  of  men  treat  with 
each  other, — whether  powerful  with  weak,  or  polite 
with  rude,  civilized  with  savage,  or  intelligent  with  ig* 
norant ;  whether  friends  with  friends,  or  enemies  with 
enemies,  —  all  are  bound  by  the  law  of  reciprocity  to 
love  each  other  as  themselves,  and  to  do  unto  others 
in  all  things  whatsoever  they  would  desire  others  to 
do  unto  them. 

2.  And  hence,  also,  the  precept  itself  Is  as  obligatory 
upon  nations  as  upon  individuals.  Every  nation  is 
bound  to  exhibit  as  sensitive  a  regard  for  the  preserva- 
tion inviolate  of  the  rights  of  another  nation,  as  it 
exhibits  for  the  preservation  inviolate  of  its  own  rights. 
And  still  more,  every  nation  is  under  the  same  obliga- 
tion as  every  individual  to  measure  the  respect  and 
moderation  which  it  displays  to  others  by  the  respect 
and  moderation  which  it  demands  for  itself;  and  is 
also,  if  it  complain  of  violation  of  right,  to  set  the  first 
example  of  entire  and  perfect  reciprocity  and  fidelity. 
Were  this  course  pursued  by  individuals  and  nations, 
the  causes  of  collision  would  manifestly  cease,  and  the 


THE   DUTY  OP  RECIPROCITY.  19ft 

appeal  to  arms  would  soon  be  remembered  only  as  one 
of  the  strange  infatuations  of  by-gone,  barbarous,  and 
blood-thirsty  ages.  Chicanery,  intrigue  and  overreach- 
ing are  as  wicked  and  as  disgraceful  in  the  intercourse 
of  nations  and  societies  as  in  that  of  individuals  ;  and 
the  tool  of  a  nation  or  of  a  party  is  as  truly  contempti- 
ble as  the  tool  of  an  individual.  The  only  distinction 
which  I  perceive  is,  that  in  the  one  case  the  instrument 
of  dishonesty  is  ashamed  of  his  act,  and  dare  not  wear 
the  badge  of  his  infamy ;  while,  in  the  other  case,  even 
the  ambiguous  virtue  of  shame  has  been  lost,  and  the 
man  glories  in  the  brand  which  marks  him  for  a  villain. 


CLASSIFICATION  OF  THE  DUTIES  ARISING  FROM  THE  LAW 
OF  RECIPROCITY. 

The  duties  of  reciprocity  may  be  divided  into  three 
classes : 

Class  1.  Duties  to  men,  as  men. 

Class  2.  Duties  arising  from  the  constitution  op 

THE   SEXES. 

Class  3.  Duties  arising  from  the  constitution  of 
civil  society. 

Class  1.  Duties  to  men,  as  men. 
This  includes  Justice  and  Veracity. 
I.  Justice,  as  it  regards  1.  Liberty. 

2.  Property. 

3.  Character. 

4.  Reputation. 

n.    Veracity,     1.  Of  the  past  and  present. 
2.  Of  the  future. 

Class  2.  Duties  arising  from  the  costitution  of 
the  sexes. 
Including,  1.  General  duty  of  chastity. 

2.  The  law  of  marriage. 

3.  The  duties  and  rights  of  parents. 

4.  The  duties  and  risrhts  of  children. 


200  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

Class  3.     Duties  arising  from  the  constitution  of 

CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

1.  The  nature  of  civil  society. 

2.  The  mode  in  which  the  authority  of  civil  society 

is  maintained. 

3.  Of  forms  of  government, 

4.  Duties  of  magistrates. 

5.  Duties  of  citizens. 


CLASS  I. 

DUTIES  TO  MEN  AS  MEN. 

JUSTICE    AND    VERACITT. 

JUSTICE. 

Justice,  when  used  in  a  judicial  sense,  signifies  that 
temper  of  mind  which  disposes  a  man  to  administer 
rewards  and  punishments  according  to  the  character 
and  actions  of  the  object. 

It  is  also  used  to  designate  the  act  by  which  this 
administration  is  effected.  Thus  we  speak  of  a  judge 
who  administers  justice. 

In  the  present  case,  however,  it  is  used  in  a  more 
extensive  signification.  It  is  here  intended  to  designate 
that  temper  of  mind  which  disposes  us  to  leave  every 
other  being  in  the  unmolested  enjoyment  of  ihosfe  means 
of  happiness  bestowed  upon  him  by  his  Creator.  It  is 
also  frequently  used  for  the  exhibition  of  this  conduct 
in  outward  act.  Thus,  when  a  man  manifests  a  proper 
respect  for  the  rights  of  others,  we  say  he  acts  justly  ; 
when  he  in  any  manner  violates  these  rights,  we  say 
he  acts  unjustly. 

The  most  important  means  of  happiness,  which  God 
has  placed  in  the  power  of  the  individual,  are,  first. 
His  own  Person ;  second.  Property;  third,  Charac- 
ter ;  fourth,  Eeputation. 


CHAPTER  I. 

PERSONAL  LIBERTT. 

SECTION  I. 

OF  THE   NATURE   OF    PERSONAL  LIBERTT. 

Every  human  being  is,  by  his  constitution,  a  sepa- 
rate, distinct,  and  complete  system,  adapted  to  all  the 
purposes  ofself-government,  and  responsible,  separately, 
to  God  for  the  manner  in  which  his  powers  are  emj)loyed. 
Thus,every  individual  possesses  a  body,  by  which  he  is 
connected  with  the  physical  universe,  and  by  which  that 
universe  is  modified  for  the  supply  of  his  wants ;  an 
understanding  by  which  truth  is  discovered,  and 
by  which  means  are  adapted  to  their  appropriate 
ends ;  passions  and  desires,  by  which  he  is  excited  to 
action,  and  in  the  gratification  of  which  his  happiness 
consists  ;  conscience,  to  point  out  the  limit  within  which 
these  desires  may  be  rightfully  gratified ;  and  a  will, 
which  determines  him  to  action.  The  possession  of  these 
is  necessary  to  a  human  nature,  and  it  also  renders  every 
being  so  constituted  a  distinct  and  independent  indi- 
vidual. He  may  need  society,  but  every  one  needs  it 
equally  with  every  other  one;  and  hence  all  enter  into 
it  upon  terms  of  strict  and  evident  reciprocity.  If  the 
individual  use  these  powers  according  to  the  laws  im- 
posed by  his  Creator,  his  Creator  holds  him  in  this 
respect  guiltless.  If  he  use  them  in  such  a  manner  as 
not  to  interfere  with  the  use  of  the  same  powers  which 
God  has  bestowed  upon  his  neighbor,  he  is,  as  it  respects 
his  neighbor,  whether  that  neighbor  be  au  iudiv^idual  or 


NATtJRE    OF   PERSONAL  LIBERTY.  203 

the  community,  to  be  held  guiltless.  So  long  as  he 
uses  them  within  this  limit,  he  has  a  right,  so  far  as  his 
fellow-men  are  concerned,  to  use  them  in  the  most  un- 
limited sense,  suo  arbUrio,Sit  his  own  discretion.  His 
will  is  his  sufficient  and  ultimate  reason.  He  need 
assign  no  other  reason  for  his  conduct  than  his  own 
free  choice.  Within  this  limit  he  is  still  responsible  to 
God  ;  but  within  this  limit  he  is  not  responsible  to  man, 
nor  is  man  responsible/or  him.  In  other  words,  every 

MAN  HAS  A  RIGHT  TO  HIMSELF. 

1.  Thus,  a  man  has  an  entire  right  to  use  his  own 
body  as  he  will,  provided  he  do  not  so  use  it  as  to  inter 
fere  with  the  rights  of  his  neighbor.  He  may  go  where 
he  will,  and  stay  where  he  please  ;  he  may  work,  or  be 
idle ;  he  may  pursue  one  occupation,  or  another,  or  no 
occupation  at  all ;  and  it  is  the  concern  of  no  one  else, 
if  he  leave  inviolate  the  rights  of  every  one  else ;  that 
is,  if  he  leave  every  one  else  in  the  undisturbed  enjoy- 
ment of  those  means  of  happmess  bestowed  upon  him 
by  the  Creator. 

It  seems  almost  trifling  to  argue  a  point  which  is,  in 
its  nature,  so  evident,  upon  inspection.  If,  however, 
any  additional  proof  be  required,  the  following  consid- 
erations will  readily  suggest  themselves.  It  is  asserted 
that  every  individual  has  an  equal  and  ultimate  right 
with  every  other  individual  to  the  use  of  his  body,  his 
mind,  and  all  the  other  means  of  happiness  with  which 
God  has  endowed  him.  But  suppose  it  otherwise. 
Suppose  that  one  individual  has  a  right  to  the  body  or 
mind  or  means  of  happiness  of  another.  That  is,  sup- 
pose that  A  has  a  right  to  use  the  body  of  B  according 
to  his,  that  is,  A's  will.  Now,  if  this  be  true,  it  is  true 
universally ;  hence  A  has  the  control  over  the  body  of 
B,  and  B  has  control  over  the  body  of  C,  C  of  that  of 
D,  etc.,  and  Z  again  over  the  body  of  A  ;  that  is,  every 
separate  will  has  the  right  of  control  over  some  other 
body  or  intellect  besides  its  own,  and  has  no  right  of 
control  over  its  own  body  or  intellect.  Whether  such 
is  the  constitution  of  human  nature,  or,  if  it  be  not, 
whether  it  would  be  an  improvement  upon  the  present 
constitution,  may  easily  be  decided. 


204  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

And  if  it  be  said  that  to  control  one  man's  body  by 
another  man's  will  is  impossible,  for  that  every  man 
acts  as  he  will,  since  he  cannot  do  anything  nnless  he 
will  do  it,  it  may  be  answered  that  the  term  will  is  used 
here  in  a  different  sense  from  that  intended  in  the  pre- 
ceding paragraph.  Every  one  must  see  that  a  man 
who,  out  of  the  various  ways  of  employing  his  body,  set 
before  him  by  his  Creator^  chooses  that  which  he  pre- 
fers, is  in  a  very  different  condition  from  him  who  is 
debarred  from  all  choice,  excepting  that  he  may  do 
what  his  fellow-man  appoints,  or  else  must  suffer  what 
his  fellow-man  chooses  to  inflict.  Now,  the  true  condi- 
tion of  a  human  being  is  that  in  which  his  will  is  in- 
fluenced by  no  other  circumstances  than  those  which 
arise  from  the  constitution  under  which  his  Creator  has 
/  placed  him.  ^And  he  who  for  his  own  pleasure  places 
(  his  fellow-man  under  any  other  conditions  of  existence, 
/  is  guilty  of  the  most  odious  tyranny,  and  seems  to  me 
)  to  arrogate  to  himself  the  authority  of  the  Most  High 
l^God. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  that  in  this  case  the  individual 
may  become  chargeable  to  the  community.  To  this  I 
answer,  not  unless  the  community  assume  the  charge. 
If  every  man  be  left  to  himself,  but  only  is  obliged  to  re- 
spect the  rights  of  others  ;  if  he  do  not  labor,  a  remedy  is 
provided  in  the  laws  of  the  system  — he  will  very  soon 
starve ;  and  if  he  prefer  starvation  to  labor,  he  has  no 
one  to  blame  but  himself.  OVhile  the  law  of  reciprocity 
frees  him  from  the  control  of  society,  it  discharges  soci- 
ety from  any  responsibility  for  the  result  of  his  actions 
upon  himself.  I  know  that  society  sometimes  under- 
takes to  support  the  indigent  and  helpless,  and  to  re- 
lieve men  in  extreme  necessity.  This,  however,  is  a 
conventional  arrangement,  into  which  men  who  choose 
have  a  right  to  enter  ;  and,  having  entered  into  it,  they 
are  bound  by  its  provisions. 

2.  The  same  remarks  apply  to  the  use  of  the  intellect. 

If  the  preceding  observations  are  just,  it  will  follow 
that  every  man,  within  the  limit  before  suggested,  has 
n  right  to  use  his  intellect  as  he  will.     He  may  investi- 


NATURE   OF   PERSONAL  LIBERTY.  205 

gate  whatever  subjects  he  will,  and  in  what  mannei 
soever  he  will,  and  may  come  to  such  conclusions  as 
his  investigations  may  teach,  and  may  publish  those 
conclusions  to  those  who  are  willing  to  hear  them,  pro- 
vided he  interfere  with  the  happiness  of  no  other  human 
being.  The  denial  of  this  right  would  lead  to  the  same 
absurdities  as  in  the  former  case. 

If  it  be  said  that  the  individual  may,  by  so  doing, 
involve  himself  in  error,  and.  thus  diminish  his  own 
happiness,  the  answer  is  at  hand,  namely  ;  for  this  the 
constitution  of  things  provides  its  appropriate  and  ade- 
quate punishment.  He  who  imbibes  error,  suffers  in 
his  own  person  the  consequences  of  error,  which  are 
misfortune  and  loss  of  respect.  And  besides,  as  for  his 
happiness  society  is  not  in  this  case  responsible,  there 
can  be  no  reason,  derived  from  the  consideration  of  his 
happiness,  why  society  should  interfere  with  the  free 
use  of  this  instrument  of  happiness  which  the  Creator 
has  intrusted  solely  to  the  individual  himself. 

But,  it  may  be  asked,  Has  not  society  a  right  to 
oblige  men  to  acquire  a  certain  amount  of  intellectual 
cultivation?  I  answer,  men  have  a  right  to  form  a 
society  upon  such  conditions  as  they  please,  subject 
always  to  the  social  laws  under  which  God  has  placed 
us  ;  and  so  to  form  it  that  it  shall  be  necessary,  in  order 
to  enjoy  its  privileges,  for  the  individual  to  possess  a 
certain  amount  of  knowledge.  Having  formed  such  a 
society,  every  one  is  bound  by  its  provisions,  so  long  as 
he  remains  a  member  of  it ;  and  the  enforcing  of  its 
provisions  upon  the  individual  is  no  more  than  obligmg 
him  to  do  what  he,  for  a  sufficient  consideration,  volun- 
tarily contracted  to  do.  And  society  may  rightfully 
enforce  this  provision  in  either  of  two  ways :  it  may 
either  withhold  from  every  man  who  neglects  to  acquire 
this  knowledge  the  benefits  of  citizenship,  or  else  it  may 
grant  these  benefits  to  every  one,  and  oblige  everyone 
to  possess  the  assigned  amount  of  knowledge.  In  this 
case  there  is  no  violation  of  reciprocity ;  tor  the  same 
requirements  are  made  of  all,  and  every  one  receives 
his  full  equivalent,  in  the  results  of  the  same  law  upon 


206  PRACTICAL    ETHICS. 

others.  More  than  this  the  individual  could  not  justly 
require.  He  could  not  justly  demand  to  be  admitted 
to  rights  which  presuppose  certain  intellectual  attain- 
ments, and  which  can  only  be,  with  safety  to  others, 
enjoyed  by  those  who  have  made  these  attainments, 
unless  he  be  willing  to  conform  to  the  condition  neces- 
sary to  that  enjoyment.  And,  moreover,  the  elements 
of  a  common  education  are  necessary  to  every  one,  and 
they  must  be  acquired  before  the  human  being  arrives 
at  manhood.  If  a  parent  is  either  unable  or  unwilling 
to  provide  such  instruction  for  his  child,  society  may 
justly  interpose,  and  furnish  for  the  child  that  educa- 
tion of  which  the  selfishness  of  the  parent  would  de- 
prive it. 

3.  I  have  thus  far  considered  man  only  in  his  relations 
to  the  present  life.  So  far  as  I  have  gone,  I  have  en- 
deavored to  show  that,  provided  the  individual  interfere 
not  with  the  rights  of  others,  he  has  a  right  to  use  his 
own  body  and  mind  as  he  thinks  will  best  promote  his 
own  happiness  ;  that  is,  as  he  will.  But  if  he  has  this 
right,  within  these  limits,  to  pursue  his  present  happi- 
ness,  how  much  more  incontrovertible  must  be  his  riglit 
to  use  his  body  and  mind  in  such  manner  as  he  sup- 
poses will  best  promote  his  eternal  happiness  !  And 
besides,  if,  for  the  sake  of  his  own  happiness,  he  have 
a  right  to  the  unmolested  enjoyment  of  whatever  God 
has  given  him,  how  much  more  is  he  entitled  to  the 
same  unmolested  enjoyment  for  the  sake  of  obeying 
God,  and  fulfilling  the  highest  obligation  of  which  he 
is  susceptible  I 

We  say,  then,  that  every  man,  provided  he  does  not 
interfere  with  the  rights  of  his  neighbor,  has  a  right,  so 
far  as  his  neighbor  is  concerned,  to  worship  God,  or  not 
to  worship  him ;  and  to  worship  him  in  any  manner 
that  he  will ;  and  that  for  the  abuse  of  this  liberty  he 
is  accountable  only  to  God. 

If  it  be  said  that  by  so  doing  a  man  may  ruin  his  own 
soul,  the  answer  is  obvious  :  for  this  ruin  the  individual 
himself,  and  not  society,  is  responsible.  And,  more- 
over, as  religion  consists  in  the  temper  of  heart,  which 


NATURE    OF    PERSONAL   LIBERIT.  207 

force  cannot  affect,  and  not  in  external  observance, 
which  is  all  that  force  can  affect,  no  application  of  force 
can  change  our  relations  to  God,  or  prevent  the  ruin  in 
question.  All  application  of  force  must,  then,  be 
gratuitous  mischief. 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said  :  All  men  are  created 
with  an  equal  right  to  employ  their  faculties  of  body 
or  of  mind  in  such  manner  as  will  promote  their  own 
happiness  either  here  or  hereafter ;  or,  which  is  the 
same  thing,  every  man  has  a  right  to  use  his  own  pow- 
ers of  body  or  of  mind  in  such  manner  as  he  will,  pro- 
vided he  do  not  use  them  in  such  manner  as  to  inter- 
fere with  the  rights  of  his  neighbor. 

The  exceptions  to  this  law  are  easily  defined. 

1.  The  first  exception  is  in  the  case  of  infancy. 
By  the  law  of  nature,  a  parent  is  under  obligation 

to  support  his  child,  and  is  responsible  for  his  actions. 
He  has,  therefore,  a  right  to  control  the  actions  of  the 
child  so  long  as  this  responsibility  exists.  He  is  under 
obligation  to  render  that  child  a  suitable  member  of 
the  community ;  and  this  obligation  he  could  not  dis- 
charge unless  the  physical  and  intellectual  liberty  of 
the  child  were  placed  within  his  power. 

2.  As  the  parent  has  supported  the  child  during 
infancy,  he  has,  probably,  by  the  law  of  nature,  a  right 
to  his  services  during  youth,  or  for  so  long  a  period  as 
may  be  suflScient  to  insure  an  adequate  remuneration. 
When,  however,  this  remuneration  is  received,  the 
right  of  the  parent  over  the  child  ceases  forever. 

3.  This  right  he  may,  if  he  see  fit,  transfer  to  anoth- 
er, as  in  the  case  of  apprenticeship.  But  he  can  trans- 
fer the  right  for  no  longer  time  than  he  holds  it.  He 
can,  therefore,  negotiate  it  away  for  no  period  beyond 
that  of  the  child's  minority. 

4.  A  man  may  transfer  his  right  over  his  own  labor 
for  a  limited  time,  and  for  a  satisfactory  equivalent. 
But  this  transfer  proceeds  upon  the  principle  that  the 
original  right  vests  in  himself,  and  it  is  therefore  no 
violation  of  that  right.  He  has,  however,  no  right  to 
transfer  the  services  of  any  other  person  except  hia 


208  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

child ;  nor  of  his  child,  except  under  the  limitations 
above  specified. 

In  strict  accordance  with  these  remarks  is  the  mem- 
orable sentence  in  the  commencement  of  the  Declara- 
tion of  Independence,  *'  We  hold  these  truths  to  be 
self-evident :  that  all  men  are  created  equal ;  that  they 
are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  inalienable 
rights  ;  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty,  and  the  pur- 
suit of  happiness."  That  the  equality  here  spoken  of 
is  not  equality  in  the  means  of  happiness,  but  in  the 
right  to  use  them  as  we  will,  is  too  evident  to  need  illus- 
tration. 

Personal  liberty  may  be  violated  in  two  ways:  1. 
By  the  individual;  2.  By  society. 


SECTION  II. 

OF  THE  VIOLATION  OP  PERSONAL  LIBERTY  BY  THE  INDIVIDUAL, 

The  most  common  violation  of  personal  liberty  by 
the  individual  is  that  which  exists  in  the  case  of  domes- 
tic slavery. 

Domestic  slavery  can  only  be  justified  upon  one  of 
the  two  following  assumptions :  either,  1st,  that  slav- 
ery is  authorized  by  a  general  law,  under  which  human 
beings  are  constituted ;  or,  2d,  that,  in  some  manner, 
it  has  been  signified  to  us  by  the  Creator  that  one 
portion  of  the  human  race  is  made  to  be  the  slaves  of 
the  other  portion. 

Let  us  proceed  and  examine  these  assumptions  in 
detail. 

I.  It  is  afiirmed  that  one  of  the  laws  under  which 
we  have  been  created  is,  that  one  human  being  has  the 
riijht  to  reduce  another  human  beino:  to  the  condition 
called  slavery.  The  person  who  is  reduced  from  free- 
dom to  this  condition,  has  henceforth  no  right  over 
either  his  body  or  mind.     He  can  neither  go  nor  stay 


VIOLATION   OP   PERSONAL  LIBERTY.  209 

where  he  chooses .  He  can  neither  labor  nor  rest  for  his 
own  profit  or  pleasure,  but  must  in  both  obey  the  will 
of  another.  He  receives  no  wages,  for  he  is  disabled 
from  holding  any  property.  His  oath  can  never  be  taken 
in  evidence.  He  can  form  no  contract.  He  cannot 
marry ;  and  his  only  domestic  relation  is  that  of  concu- 
binage, subject  to  the  will  of  another.  He  has  no  right 
over  his  own  children ;  but  they  and  their  parents  may 
at  any  moment  be  separated  forever  from  each  other, 
at  the  will  of  him  who  has  thus  subjected  them.  The 
dominant  party  is  at  liberty  to  use  the  subjected  party 
in  such  manner  as  may  best  gratify  his  own  appetites 
and  will.  He  may  use  the  females  as  concubines  ;  his 
children  by  them  are  his  slaves,  and  are,  like  their 
mother,  chattels,  to  be  sold  to  the  highest  bidder. 
Resistance  to  such  authority  is  punishable  at  the  solo 
will  of  the  owner,  and,  if  he  please,  with  instant  death. 

It  may  be  supposed  that  a  human  being,  reduced  to 
this  condition,  if  his  mind  were  permitted  by  reading 
and  reflection  to  estimate  his  condition,  must  be  dis- 
satisfied with  it.  Hence  the  power  over  the  body  once 
conceded,  gives  to  the  dominant  party  the  right  over  the 
mind  of  the  other  party.  He  may  forbid  the  slave  to 
learn  to  read,  or  do  anything  whatever  for  his  own  im- 
provement. He  is  best  suited  to  his  condition  when  he 
is  merely  a  working  animal ;  and  anything  which  would 
render  him  less  valuable  in  this  respect  may  innocently 
be  prohibited. 

The  knowledge  of  his  relations  to  God  and  man,  as 
they  are  made  known  in  the  Scriptures,  would  tend  to 
the  same  result  as  intellectual  cultivation.  Nay,  more  ; 
if  there  be  a  God,  the  authority  of  the  dominant  party 
cannot  be  absolute.  He  who  has  been  enslaved  would 
learn  that  he  must  obey  God  rather  than  man ;  and 
hence,  in  many  cases,  must  refuse  to  obey  the  com- 
mands of  him  who  is  called  his  master.  Hence  the 
dominant  party  may  forbid  the  other  to  attain  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  Scriptures,  or  to  receive  religious 
instruction,  only  in  such  portions  or  in  such  manner 
as  he  may  appoint ;  or,  if  he  see  fit,  he  may  forbid  it 


210  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

altogether.  If,  in  obedience  to  what  he  considers  to  be 
the  will  of  God,  the  subject  party  refuse  to  obey,  he 
may  be  punished  with  stripes  at  the  will  of  the  other, 
or,  it  may  be,  with  death.  In  a  word,  it  has  been  de- 
cided by  an  eminent  judge,  in  the  highest  tribunal  of 
a  slaveholding  state,  that  a  colored  man  possc-ides  no 
right  which  a  white  man  is  under  obligation  to  respect. 

The  manner  in  which  the  one  party  obtains  this  ex- 
traordinary power  over  the  other  party  deserves  to  be 
remarked.  Men  go  to  Africa,  and  excite  wars  between 
the  native  tribes.  A  village  is  sacked  and  burned.  The 
aged  and  children,  being  useless,  are  slain.  The  able- 
bodied,  both  men  and  women,  are  seized,  driven  to  the 
coast,  and  sold  to  the  slave-trader.  They  are  then 
shipped,  under  circumstances  of  the  most  atrocious 
cruelty,  and  transported  to  a  port  in  Christendom.  As 
many  as  survive  the  horrors  of  the  passage  are  sold  by 
the  slave-dealer  to  the  citizens  of  a  Christian  country, 
and  all  the  right  which  he  acquired  over  them  by  the 
burning  of  their  village,  and  murdering  their  dearest 
relatives,  is  transferred  to  the  purchaser.  And  this 
power  is  supposed  to  continue  to  the  remotest  genera- 
tions.^ The  offspring  of  a  slave  mother  is  in  all  re- 
spects a  slave,  though  he  or  she  be  the  child  of  a  white 
man ;  nay,  even  of  its  master.  And  this  continues  in- 
definitely, even  though,  by  licentiousness,  it  comes  to 
pass  that  the  slave  is  as  white  as  his  owner :  and  no 
matter  how  small  a  portion  of  negro  blood  may  be  in 
his  veins,  he  remains  under  the  inexorable  slave  law. 
It  is  still  a  crime,  punishable  by  the  severest  penalty,  to 
teach  him  to  read  even  the  Word  of  God :  he  can  own 
no  property,  earn  for  himself  no  wages,  give  no  evi- 
dence, have  no  right  in  his  own  children,  and  is  not 
and  cannot  be  the  husband  of  their  mother. 

It  is  in  vain  to  say  that  these  powers  are  not  always 
exercised.  Of  course  they  are  not,  nor  are  the  powers 
we  possess  over  domestic  animals  always  used  to  the 
utmost.  But  we  prove  from  the  laws  on  the  statute 
book  that  they  are  all  conceded,  and,  what  is  more, 
they  are  in  very  many  cases  exercised ;  and  the  legal 


VIOLATION   OF   PERSONAL   LIBERTY.  211 

right  to  exercise  them  stands  unquestioned ;  and  the 
attempt  to  effect  any  modification  of  the  slave  laws  is 
universally  resisted  as  an  injurious  and  impertinent 
encroachment  on  the  rights  of  the  slave-owner. 

Now,  this  simple  statement  of  the  facts  would  seem 
sufficient  to  teach  us  that  such  an  institution  cannot 
be  in  obedience  to  the  will  of  the  Creator  —  most  holy, 
most  just,  and  most  merciful.  We  all  believe  that  God 
governs  the  universe  by  moral  laws,  and  that  moral 
laws,  in  his  estimation,  take  precedence  of  all  others. 
But,  on  the  principle  ca  which  domestic  slavery  is 
founded,  physical  force  takes  the  precedence  of  moral 
law.  It  supposes  that  a  man,  by  physical  force,  can 
reduce  another  to  a  condition  in  which  he  may  act 
towards  him  in  a  manner  which  would  be  wrong  had 
not  physical  force  been  exerted.  And,  again,  as  the 
parties  may  change  places  by  force,  it  follows  that  then 
the  moral  law  must  be  entirely  reversed.  The  sub- 
jected party  becomes  dominant ;  and  he,  again,  may  do 
the  reverse  of  what  he  had  a  right  to  do  before  the 
change  ;  and  the  once  dominant  party,  now  having  be- 
come subject,  must  submit  to  the  same  treatment  which 
it  before  ministered  to  the  other.  How  such  an  insti- 
tution can  consist  with  the  moral  government  of  a  holy 
God,  let  any  man  judge. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Can  it  be  supposed  that  a  God 
of  infinite  love  would  establish,  as  the  law  for  a  race 
of  intelligent  creatures,  a  rule  which  can  tend  only  to 
universal  and  endless  war?  Were  such  the  law  of 
humanity,  our  natural  condition  would  be  that  of  an 
internecine  strife  for  superiority,  both  in  nations  and 
individuals,  — every  man  striving  to  enslave  his  brother, 
and  every  nation  to  subdue  to  slavery  its  neighbor,  — 
and  the  parties  subdued  ever  striving  to  regain  what 
they  had  lost.  How  it  is  possible  to  reconcile  such  a 
law  with  the  character  of  the  all-loving  God,  I  cannot 
conceive. 

We  arrive  at  the  same  conclusions  by  an  observa- 
tion of  the  moral  and  economical  results  of  slavery. 

Its  effects  must  be  disastrous  on  the  morals  of  both 


212  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

parties.  By  presenting  objects  on  whom  passion  may 
be  satiated  without  resistance  and  without  redress,  it 
tends  to  cultivate  in  the  one  party,  pride,  anger,  cruelty, 
selfishness,  and  licentiousness.  By  accustoming  the 
other  party  to  submit  entirely  to  the  will  of  another,  it 
tends  to  abolish  in  him  all  moral  distinctions,  and  thus 
fosters  in  him  lying,  hypocrisy,  dishonesty,  and  a  will- 
ingness to  yield  himself  up  to  gratify  the  appetites  of 
another.  That  in  all  slaveholding  countries  there  are 
exceptions  to  this  remark,  and  that  in  some  men  moral 
principle  may  limit  the  efiect  of  these  tendencies,  may 
be  gladly  admitted  ;  yet,  that  such  is  the  tendency  of  the 
system  as  it  is,  we  think  no  reasonable  person  can  hesi- 
tate to  allow.  Thomas  Jefferson,  himself  a  slaveholder, 
mentions  them  as  the  evident  tendencies  of  slavery. 

The  effects  of  slavery  upon  national  wealth  are  obvious. 

Nations  can  increase  in  wealth  only  by  industry  and 
frugality.  By  labor  we  increase  production,  and  by 
economy  we  are  enabled  to  add  the  profits  of  the  pres- 
ent year  to  those  of  the  past.  The  greater  and  more 
universal  the  industry  and  economy  of  a  nation,  the 
more  rapid  will  be  its  progress  in  the  accumulation  of 
wealth,  and  all  the  means  of  physical  happiness. 

On  the  contrary,  slavery,  instead  of  imposing  upon  all 
the  necessity  of  labor,  restricts  the  number  of  laborers 
within  the  smallest  possible  limit,  by  treating  labor  as 
if  it  were  disgraceful. 

It  takes  from  this  diminished  company  of  laborers 
the  natural  stimulus  to  labor, — namely,  the  desire  in  man 
to  improve  his  condition, — and  substitutes  for  it  that  mo- 
tive which  is  the  least  operative  and  the  least  constant, 
—  the  fear  of  punishment,  without  the  consciousness  of 
moral  delinquency. 

It  removes  from  both  parties  the  disposition  and  the 
motives  to  frugality.  Neither  the  one  party  learns  fru- 
gality from  the  necessity  of  labor,  nor  the  other  from 
the  benefits  it  confers :  and  hence,  when  one  party 
wastes  from  ignorance,  and  the  other  because  he  can 
have  no  motive  to  economy,  capital  must  accumulate 
but  slowly,  if  indeed  it  accumulate  at  all. 


VIOLATION   OF   PERSONAL   LIBERTY.  213 

That  such  are  the  tendencies  of  slavery  is  manifest 
from  observation.  No  country  not  of  great  fertility  can 
long  sustain  a  slave  population.  Soils  even  of  more 
than  ordinary  fertility  cannot  sustain  it  long  after  their 
first  fertility  has  been  exhausted.  Some  of  the  most 
favored  districts  of  this  country,  under  the  system  of 
slavery,  have  become  steadily  less  instead  of  7nore  pro- 
ductive ;  and  hence  slavery  is  continually  migrating 
from  the  older  settlements  to  those  new  and  untilled 
regions,  where  the  accumulated  fertility  of  centuries  of 
vegetation  has  formed  a  soil  whose  productiveness  may 
for  a  while  sustain  an  institution  at  variance  with  the 
laws  under  which  we  have  been  created.  Many  of  the 
free  and  the  slave-holding  states  were  peopled  about  the 
same  time.  The  slave-holding  states  possessed  everj' 
advantage  of  soil  and  climate  over  their  neighbors ; 
and  yet  the  accumulation  of  capital,  the  progress  of  the 
people  in  general  intelligence,  as  well  as  the  improve- 
ment of  the  capabilities  of  the  soil,  have  been  greatly 
in  favor  of  the  latter.  If  any  one  doubt  whether  this 
difference  has  been  owing  to  the  use  by  one  party  of 
slave  labor,  let  him  ask  himself  what  would  have  been 
the  condition  of  the  slave -holding  states  at  this  mo- 
ment if  they  had  been  inhabited  from  the  beginning 
by  an  industrious  yeomanry ;  each  individual  owning 
his  own  land,  and  each  one  tilling  it  with  the  labor  of 
his  own  hands. 

These  considerations  seem  sufficiently  to  indicate  to 
us  the  will  of  the  Creator.  It  could  not  have  been  his 
intention  to  give  to  man  such  power  over  his  brother. 

We  may  briefly  look  upon  the  subject  from  another 
point  of  view. 

1 .  We  presume  every  man  holds  himself  amenable 
to  moral  law.  I  would,  then,  ask,  What  right  can  I  ac- 
quire over  another  by  burning  his  house  and  murder- 
ing nis  wife  and  children  ?  Yet  it  is  by  this  act,  or  acts 
like  it,  that  the  condition  of  a  man  is  changed  from  that 
of  a  freeman  to  that  of  a  slave.  Such  an  act  merits  the 
severest  punishment  IVom  God  and  man,  instead  of 
conferring  upon  the  perpetrator  the  semblance  of  right 


214  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

over  his  victim.  When  the  captor  sells  his  captire  to 
another,  he  has  no  right  which  he  can  transfer.  The 
buyer  can  have  no  other  right  than  the  captor ;  and  the 
captor  having  none,  the  buyer  must  be  in  the  same  con- 
dition. And  if  this  be  true  of  the  captive  himself,  how 
much  more  must  it  be  true  of  his  wife  and  children. 
Every  man  has  a  right  to  himself;  and  neither  the 
burning  of  a  man's  house,  the  murder  of  his  family, 
nor  the  payment  of  money  to  the  murderer,  can  in  the 
least  degree  invalidate  this  right. 

2.  If  this  be  the  law  of  humanity,  it  is  the  law  for  every 
man  ;  therefore  every  man  may  innocently  exercise  it. 
Every  man,  therefore,  who  by  force  can  reduce  his 
brother  to  this  condition,  may  do  it  rightfully.  Any 
nation  may,  in  like  manner,  reduce  another  nation  to 
bondage.  I  see  not  why  this  should  not  necessarily 
follow. 

3.  This  being  the  law  of  humanity,  it  applies  equally 
to  the  slave  as  to  any  other  man.  He  not  only  has  a 
right  to  freedom,  if  he  can  regain  it  by  force,  but  he 
has  the  right,  if  he  can  gain  it  by  force,  to  change  places 
with  his  master,  and  make  the  muster  his  slave.  And 
he  may  do  it  by  the  same  means.  He  was  reduced 
to  this  condition  by  the  burning  of  his  house  and  the 
murder  of  his  relatives  ;  he  has  an  equal  right  to  re- 
duce any  other  man  to  this  condition  by  the  same 
means.  So  far  as  I  perceive,  all  these  consequences 
flow  from  supposing  this  to  be  a  law  of  humanity.  We 
therefore  must  conclude  that  no  such  law  exists,  or 
could  ever  have  been  given  to  his  creatures  by  a  holy 
and  all-loving  Creator. 

n.  But,  in  the  second  place,  it  may  be  asserted  that 
this  is  not  a  universal  law,  affecting  equally  every  indi- 
vidual ;  but  that  it  is  special,  and  applies  only  to  a  por- 
tion of  the  race :  that  is,  that  to  one  portion  has  been 
given  the  right  to  reduce  another  portion  to  the  condi- 
tion of  slavery  This  assertion  has  been  sustained  by 
several  considerations. 

1.  It  has  been  said  that  negroes  —  the  persons  gener- 
ally enslaved  —  are  not  men.  It  is  granted  that  nations 


VIOLATION  OF  PERSONAL  LIBERTY.       215 

may  be  red,  brown,  olive,  or  tawny  and  be  men;  but 
that  if  black,  they  are  not  men.  It  is  allowed  that  they 
may  become  skilful  in  any  business ;  that  they  have 
immortal  souls,  and  may  become  exemplary  disciples 
of  Christ ;  but  that,  having  complexions  of  this  color, 
they  are  not  men.  The  simple  statement  of  this  rea- 
soning renders  any  argument  on  the  case  unnecessary. 

2.  It  is  said  that  negroes  are,  as  a  class,  degraded 
men  ;  stupid,  incapable  of  education,  and  fit  only  for  the 
simplest  forms  of  labor ;  and  therefore  we  may  rightfully 
reduce  them  to  the  condition  of  slavery. 

To  this  it  may  be  answered  — 

1.  We  deny  the  assertion  on  which  this  reasoning  is 
founded.  The  Africans  are  on  the  same  level  as  other 
barbarous  nations,  and  are  equally  capable  of  civiliza- 
tion. When  under  proper  influences,  they  have  attained 
to  civilization  as  readily  as  other  men. 

2.  If  they  are  thus  stupid  and  incapable  of  civiliza- 
tion, why,  in  all  the  slave  states,  is  it  made  a  crime  to 
attempt  to  teach  them  the  rudiments  of  education? 
This  assertion  can  never  be  made  with  any  effect  until 
they  have  been  allowed  the  same  opportunities  of  culti- 
vation as  other  men,  and  that  then  they,  as  a  class,  have 
shown  themselves  incapable  of  improvement. 

3.  But  suppose  the  assertion  to  be  true,  it  by  no 
means  justifies  the  inference  that  is  drawn  from  it. 
Suppose  it  to  be  true,  by  what  right  could  a  man  of 
ever  so  eminent  intelligence  reduce  to  slavery  his  neigh- 
bor who  is  ignorant,  dull  of  apprehension,  and  apparently 
incapable  of  high  cultivation  ?  By  what  right  can  a 
civilized  nation  reduce  a  barbarous  nation  to  slavery? 
Could  we  rightfully  have  reduced  the  Sandwich  Islanders 
to  slaverjs  instead  of  sending  missionaries  and  teachers 
to  raise  them  to  the  level  of  civilized  and  Christian 
communities,  such  as  they  really  are  now?  Could  we 
"rightfully  reduce  to  slavery  the  ignorant  foreigners 
who  are  arriving  daily  by  thousands  on  our  shores,  and 
who  are  commonly  in  nothing  superior  to  the  Africans 
now  among  us  ?  Is  it  not  our  duty,  as  men  and  as  Chris- 
tians, to  elevate  the  unfortunate,  the  ignorant,  and  the 


216  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

vicious  to  the  same  level  as  ourselves  ?  Did  the  Sa- 
maritan make  a  slave  of  the  wounded  and  helpless  trav- 
eller ?  And  shall  we  burn  the  house  of  a  simple  peasant, 
murder  his  family,  and  claim  a  right  by  this  crime  to 
consign  him  and  his  posterity  to  interminable  bondage  ? 
Our  own  ancestors  were  once  as  far  below  the  civili- 
zation of  Rome  as  the  Africans  are  below  our  own. 
Nay,  they  were  exposed  for  sale  in  the  slave  markets  of 
the  imperial  city.  Christianity  redeemed  them  from 
captivity,  and  carried  to  their  homes  the  benefits  of 
knowledge  and  the  blessings  of  religion,  thus  sowing 
the  seeds  of  which  the  eminence  of  Great  Britain  is 
now  the  legitimate  fruit.  Had  Ave  not  better  imitate 
their  example,  instead  of  sending  men  to  incite  these 
ignorant  people  to  murder  and  rapine,  and  consigning 
the  survivors  to  slavery,  from  the  horrors  of  which  there 
is  no  hope  of  escape  ? 

And  again.  Suppose  Africans  to  be  of  a  rank  inferior 
in  intelligence  to  ourselves,  what  authority  over  them 
does  this  difference  confer  upon  us  ?  The  various  races 
of  men  may  differ  in  natural  endowment.  Are  they 
all  but  one  created  to  be  the  slaves  of  the  most  highly 
endowed  nation  ?  Or,  if  only  some  are  created  to  be  the 
slaves  of  the  rest,  where  is  the  line  to  be  drawn,  on  the 
one  side  of  which  are  to  bo  the  masters,  and  on  the 
other  the  slaves?  It  is  said  that,  under  all  their  pres- 
ent disadvantages,  slaves  are  frequently  as  capable  as 
their  masters  of  managing  an  important  plantation. 
And,  besides,  we  suppose  that  there  exist  spiritual  be- 
ings, possessed  of  powers  vastly  superior  to  ours.  Does 
this  superiority  confer  upon  them  any  right  to  diminish 
the  means  of  happiness  which  God  has  conferred  upon 
us  ?  Great  and  powerful  as  they  are,  are  they  not  min- 
istering spirits  sent  forth  to  minister  to  those  who  are 
heirs  of  salvation?  If  these  glorious  beings  are  our 
ministers,  though  in  rank  we  be  so  far  below  them,  least 
of  all  could  we  suppose  them  to  have  authority  to  di- 
minish our  happiness  for  the  sake  of  increasing  their 
own. 

II.  But,  lastly,  it  has  been  said  that  slavery  has  been 


VIOLATION    OF   PERSONAL   LIBERTY.  217 

authorized  by  the  holy  Scriptures.  This  authority  is 
supposed  to  be  conferred  by  the  Word  of  God,  and 
from  that  we  have  a  right  to  reduce  our  Ibllow-men  to 
this  condition. 

1.  It  is  said  that  the  African  race  was,  immediately 
after  the  flood,  condemned  to  slavery  by  Noah ;  that 
this  malediction  was  a  prophecy ;  and  that  we  are 
authorized,  nay,  it  is  sometimes  said,  commanded,  to 
accomplish  its  fulfilment. 

NoAV,  with  regard  to  this  reason  for  slavery,  we  re- 
mark, in  the  first  place,  that  it  proceeds  upon  a  total 
misconception  of  the  object  of  prophecy.  A  prophecy 
informs  us  of  some  event  which  shall  occur  in  the  fu- 
ture, for  the  purpose  of  teaching  us  the  omniscience  of 
God.  By  the  prophet  Isaiah,  God  appeals  to  prophecy 
in  various  cases  for  this  very  purpose.  The  foretelling 
of  a  future  event  confers  upon  no  man  the  authority  to 
take  its  fulfilment  into  his  own  hands  ;  nor  is  the  proph- 
ecy that  a  deed  will  be  done,  any  authority  for  the  doing 
of  it.  No  event  was  ever  so  distinctly  foretold  as  the 
crucifixion  of  Christ,  and  yet  the  guilt  of  his  murder- 
ers has  always  been  considered  as  without  parallel. 
The  Apostle  Peter  declares,  **  Him,  being  delivered  by 
the  determinate  counsel  and  foreknowledge  of  God,  ye 
have  taken  and  with  loicked  hands  have  crucified  and 
slain."  The  part  which  Judas  should  take  in  this 
transaction  is  a  matter  of  prophecy  ;  and  yet  we  are  told, 
"  Good  had  it  been  for  that  man  if  he  had  never  been 
born." 

But  let  us  inquire.  Was  the  utterance  of  Noah  a 
'prophecy?  Was  it  anything  more  than  the  wish  of 
an  angry  man  ?  I  do  not  remember  that  Noah  is  ever 
in  the  Scriptures  referred  to  as  a  prophet.  Let  us, 
however,  turn  to  the  passage.  It  is  contained  in  Gene- 
sis ix.  20-25  :  ''And  Noah  planted  a  vineyard  ;  and  he 
drank  of  the  wine,  and  was  drunken  ;  and  he  was  un- 
covered in  his  tent.  And  Ham,  the  father  of  Canaan, 
saw  the  nakedness  of  his  father,  and  told  his  two 
brethren  without.  And  Shem  and  Japheth  took  a  gar- 
*ment,  and  laid  it  upon  their  shoulders,  and  went  back- 


S18  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

wards,  and  covered  the  nakedness  of  their  father.  And 
Noah  awoke  from  his  wine,  and  knew  what  his  younger 
son  had  done  unto  him  :  and  he  said,  Cursed  be  Canaan  ; 
a  servant  of  servants  shall  he  be  unto  his  brethren." 
This  curse  is  afterwards  twice  repeated,  saying  that 
Canaan  should  be  the  servant  of  both  jShem  and  Jajpheth, 
Now,  concerning  this  malediction,  we  remark,  first : 

1.  The  words  in  question  were  uttered  by  a  man  just 
awaking  out  of  a  drunken  sleep.  The  Holy  Spirit  in 
no  other  case  has  made  use  of  a  mind  in  this  condition 
for  the  purpose  of  revealing  to  us  the  will  of  God.  We 
could  never  believe  words  so  spoken  to  be  a  prophecy, 
unless  it  was  expressly  revealed. 

2.  The  malediction  refers  not  to  Ham,  but  to  Canaan. 
If  it  confers  authority  to  enslave  any  one,  it  is  only  to 
Canaan  that  it  refers ;  and  no  one,  unless  he  can  be 
proved  to  be  a  descendant  of  Canaan,  could,  in  virtue 
of  this  malediction,  even  if  it  were  a  curse  spoken  by 
God,  be  reduced  to  slavery.  It  may  also  be  observed, 
that  it  was  only  concerning  Shem  and  Japheth  that 
these  words  were  spoken  :  there  is  nothing  said  of  their 
descendants,  nor  of  the  descendants  of  Canaan. 

3.  If  it  be  said  that  though  Canaan  is  spoken  of, 
Ham  his  father  is  intended,  we  reply,  It  is  not  so  spo- 
ken ;  nor  do  we  know  of  any  reason  why  he  should 
mention  one  and  mean  another,  unless  it  be  that  he  had 
not  yet  quite  recovered  his  consciousness.  And,  if  it 
really  meant  Ham,  the  malediction  has  never  been  ful- 
filled. The  descendants  of  Ham,  as  they  are  given  us 
in  Genesis,  were  as  free  as  those  of  Shem  and  Japheth. 
Among  them  were  Assyria  and  Egypt,  who,  so  far  from 
being  slaves  to  the  Israelites,  were  their  grievous  op- 
pressors, and  to  the  latter  of  whom  Israel  was  in 
bondage  for  four  hundred  years.  Many  of  the  de- 
scendants of  Ham  were  among  the  most  powerful 
nations  of  antiquity.  It  seems  to  me  impossible  to 
find  any  justification  of  the  institution  of  slavery  from 
anything  that  Noah  ever  said  on  the  subject. 

2.  It  has  been  said  that  slavery  is  authorized  by  the 
law  of  Moses,  and  by  the  teaching  of  the  New  Testa- 


VIOLATION   OP   PERSONAL   LIBERTY.  219 

merit.  We  will  first  consider  the  bearing  of  the  law 
of  Moses. 

The  argument  on  this  subject  is  substantially  this  : 
Moses  recognized  without  rebuke  the  existence  of  slav- 
ery. He  made  various  laws  concerning  it,  and  even 
allowed  the  Hebrews  to  hold  slaves.  Whatever  God 
allows  at  one  time,  he  allows  for  all  times  ;  therefore 
"we  at  the  present  day  may,  without  ofience  to  him,  hold 
slaves,  and  plead  the  Mosaic  law  for  our  permission. 
To  us  it  seems  that  the  facts  are  neither  correctly  stated, 
nor  do  they  justify  the  inference  that  is  drawn  from 
them. 

The  facts  in  the  case  are  these : 

At  the  time  when  the  law  was  given  by  Moses,  slavery 
was  universal,  and  had  been  so  for  ages.  The  people 
for  whom  he  w^as  appointed  to  legislate, were  rude,  igno- 
rant and  sensual,  strongly  tending  to  idolatry,  and  much 
disposed,  when  anything  unfortunate  or  displeasing  oc- 
curred, to  leave  him  and  return  again  to  Egypt.  Many 
of  the  practices  which  they  had  brought  with  them  from 
Egypt,  though  wrong,  he  did  not  directly  prohibit ;  and 
our  Saviour  declares  that  he  treated  them  in  this  man- 
ner on  account  of  the  hardness  of  their  hearts.  Had 
he  at  once  directly  forbidden  their  cherished  practices, 
imless  a  miracle  had  interposed,  they  would  have  re- 
nounced his  authority  altogether.  While  he  allowed 
the  continuance  of  these  practices,  therefore,  he  placed 
them  under  such  restrictions  as  should  tend  ultimately 
to  abolish  them.  Such  was  the  course  which  he  pur- 
sued with  regard  to  individual  revenge.  He  did  not 
forbid  it,  but  established  in  its  place  the  cities  of  ref- 
uge. He  acted  iu  the  same  manner  with  respect  to 
divorce,  to  the  power  of  the  parent  over  the  child,  to 
polygamy,  and  other  things.  He  did  not  directly 
abolish  the  wrong,  but  placed  it  under  restrictions 
which  would  in  the  end  lead  to  its  disuse.  And 
in  general  he  acted  upon  the  principle  that  his  was  a 
preparatory  dispensation,  ou  which  light  should  shine 
at  successive  periods  of  the  future,  until  the  nation 
should  be  prepared  for  the  perfect  illumination  that  was 
to  break  forth  in  the  preaching  of  Jesus  of  Nazareth. 


220  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

Our  Saviour  manifestly  treats  the  Mosaic  law  as  stand- 
ing in  this  relation  to  himself. 

Now,  it  is  precisely  in  this  manner  that  Moses  deals 
with  slavery.  While  he  allows  its  existence,  and  says 
that  slaves  may  be  held,  he  is  very  explicit  as  to  the 
manner  in  which  a  slave  is  to  be  treated.  He  makes  a 
distinction  between  a  Hebrew  and  an  alien  slave ;  ho 
establishes  a  septennial  and  jubilee  year  of  release  ;  ho 
unites  the  slave  with  the  master  in  all  religious  service ; 
he  confers  upon  him  the  right  of  circumcision ;  he  en- 
forces kind  treatment  by  freeing  the  slaves  in  conse- 
quence of  blemishes  produced  by  punishment;  he 
forbids  the  Israelite  to  return  a  fugitive  slave  to  his 
master ;  he  enacts  that  if  a  man  bought  a  slave  girl 
for  the  wife  of  his  son,  be  must  deal  with  her  after  the 
manner  of  daughters ;  and  if  he  took  another  wife, 
her  food,  raiment,  and  duty  of  marriage  he  shall  not 
diminish ;  and  if  he  did  not  these,  then  he  shall  let  her 
go  free.  His  laws  respecting  usury,  and  various 
others,  are  of  the  same  tendency. 

1.  Now,  if  the  laws  of  Moses  furnish  authority  for 
slavery,  they  furnish  authority  for  just  such  slavery  as 
Moses  permitted,  and  no  other.  His  laws  respecting 
the  treatment  of  slaves,  their  rights  and  privileges,  are 
of  just  as  much  obligatoriness  as  the  permission  to  hold 
slaves  at  all.  If  Moses  authorizes  slavery  under  special 
limitations  and  no  other,  then  only  slavery  such  as  he 
permits  can  plead  his  authority.  But  every  one  sees 
that  to  place  slavery  under  such  laws  would  be  to 
abolish  it  in  a  single  generation. 

Let  us  not  be  deluded  by  the  use  of  a  word.  We 
find  slavery  permitted  iu  the  Pentateuch  ;  but  the  kind 
of  slavery  there  permitted  is  clearly  defined,  and  per- 
mission is  given  to  no  other.  But  men  seem  to  sup- 
pose that  they  may  establish  an  institution  under  such 
laws  as  they  please,  and  if  they  only  call  it  slavery, 
they  may  claim  for  it  the  authority  of  Moses.  Thus,  if 
Moses  allowed  a  Hebrew  to  buy  a  slave  girl  for  his  wife, 
or  the  wife  of  his  son,  and  was  bound  to  concede  to  her 
the  privileges  of  a  wife,  even  if  he  married  another ; 


VIOLATION   OF  PERSONAL   LIBERTY.  221 

therefore  a  man  may  brutally  violate  or  seduce  a  slave 
girl,  and  then  sell  his  own  offspriug  and  its  unfortunate 
mother  at  the  auction-block,  and  plead  in  justification 
the  authority  of  Moses. 

2.  If  the  laws  of  Moses  are  of  unchangeable  obliga- 
tion, then  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  select  here  and  there 
a  precept  which  we  profess  to  obey,  but  we  are  under 
obligation  to  obey  the  whole  of  them  :  and  we  may  in- 
dulge in  every  practice  which  they  tolerate.  The  laws 
of  circumcision,  the  passover,  the  going  up  to  Jeru- 
salem to  worship,  the  cities  of  refuge,  capital  punish- 
ment far  gathering  of  sticks  on  the  Sabbath,  are  as 
much  in  force  as  ever ;  and  we  may  innocently  institute 
the  laws  of  divorce,  polygamy,  as  well  as  slavery,  as 
among  the  first  elements  of  our  present  civilization. 

3.  If  the  precepts  and  examples  of  Moses  are  of  un- 
alterable obligation,  then  whatever  teaches  any  opposite 
doctrine  is  of  course  to  be  rejected.  Now,  the  New  Tes- 
tament is  in  many  respects  not  only  at  variance  with,  but 
in  opposition  to,  the  precepts  of  the  Old.  Nay,  our  Sa- 
viour himself,  in  various  cases,  not  only  annuls  the  law 
of  Moses,  but  inculcates  moral  precepts  directly  opposite 
to  it. 

Thus  says  our  Lord  :  *'  It  was  said  by  them  of  old 
time  —  but  /  say  unto  you."  Here  there  is  direct  and 
palpable  opposition.  One  or  the  other  must  be  aban- 
doned. If  the  laws  and  precepts  of  Moses  are  of 
unchangeable  obligation,  the  precepts  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment must  be  surrendered,  and  the  teachings  of  the  Sa- 
viour of  mankind  become  an  absolute  nullity.  To  such 
consequences  do  we  necessarily  arrive  if  we  take  the  laAv 
of  Moses  as  of  unalterable  obligation.  It  would  seem, 
then,  that  the  institution  of  slavery  can  find  no  support 
from  the  Hebrew  legislator. 

3.  And,  lastly,  it  has  been  said  that  the  institution 
of  slavery  is  sustained  by  the  teachings  of  the  New  Tes- 
tament. The  argument  presented  on  this  subject  is  on 
this  wise : 

In  the  New  Testament  we  find  slavery  nowhere 
directly  prohibited ;  the  duties  of  slaves  are  clearly  speci- 


222  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

fied  ;  and  we  also  find  that  the  Apostle  Paul  returned 
a  slave  to  his  master.  Slavery  is  therefore  in  harmony 
with  the  teachings  of  Christ  and  his  apostles. 

Now,  while  we  admit  the  above  statements  to  be  true, 
yet  they  are  by  no  means  the  whole  truth.  While  it  is 
true  that  the  New  Testament  does  not  prohibit  slavery 
(except  that  it  declares  that  man-stealers  can  never 
enter  the  kingdom  of  heaven) ,  it  inculcates  doctrines  en- 
tirely subversive  of  it.  It  teaches  us  the  doctrine  of  uni- 
versal humanity  —  that  the  whole  race  of  men  are  equal 
in  the  sight  of  God,  and  are  brethren  of  each  other ;  that 
Christ  died  for  the  whole  race  without  exception ;  that 
we  are  under  obligation  to  love  our  neighbor  as  our- 
selves ;  nay,  more,  that  we  are  to  imitate  the  love  of 
Christ  to  us,  and  love  the  evil  and  unthankful :  '*  As  I 
have  loved  you,  that  ye  love  one  another."  And  in  his 
account  of  the  decisions  of  the  last  day,  he  has  made 
the  evidence  of  our  love  to  him  to  depend  upon  our 
love  to  the  most  helpless  of  our  brethren  :  *'  Inasmuch 
as  ye  have  done  it  unto  the  least  of  these  my  brethren 
ye  have  done  unto  me."  But  still  more,  our  Saviour 
has  inculcated  such  duties  as  are  inconsistent  with  the 
existence  of  slavery.  He  has  taught  us  that  every  one 
of  our  race  is  a  distinct  individual,  responsible  first  of 
all  to  God.  Every  one  of  us  must  give  an  account  of 
himself  unto  God.  No  man  may  require  service  or 
impose  restrictions  on  another,  and  no  man  may  render 
service  to  another  which  is  at  variance  with  the  sover- 
eign will  of  God.  The  domestic  relations  are  under 
his  own  special  charge.  He  has  said  of  the  marriage 
relation,  '*  What  God  hath  joined  together,  let  not  man 
put  asunder ; "  and  he  who  forcibly  tears  asunder  those 
who  are  thus  united  for  life,  does  it  in  defiance  of  the 
command  of  the  eternal  God.  He  has  established  the 
obligations  of  parents  to  bring  up  their  children  in  the 
nurture  and  admonition  of  the  Lord.  And,  finally, 
God  requires  every  moral  creature  to  consecrate  to  his 
service  all  his  powers,  whether  of  body  or  mind,  and 
f(.r  so  living  he  will  be  held  responsible.  But  how  can 
a  man  live  thus  who  has  no  ri^rlit  to  himself;  but  who, 


VIOLATION  OF  PERSONAL  LIBERTY.  223 

in  the  government  of  his  body  and  mind,  is  subject  to 
the  will  of  another,  having  no  right  over  himself,  or  any- 
thing else  which  the  other  is  bound  to  respect? 

The  whole  of  the  facts,  then,  would  seem  to  teach  ns 
that  while  the  New  Testament  did  not  directly  prohibit 
slavery,  it  inculcated  moral  principles  which,  just  in  so 
far  as  they  are  believed  and  obeyed,  must  lead  t#  its 
entire  overthrow.  That  such  is  the  intention  of  our 
blessed  Redeemer  cannot,  we  think,  admit  of  a  doubt. 
We  know  what  slavery  was  at  the  time  of  our  Lord ; 
and  to  suppose  the  holy  Son  of  God  to  look  with  favor 
on  such  an  institution,  seems  almost  like  blasphemy. 

The  question  then  arises.  Why  did  the  Saviour  adopt 
this  method  of  abolishing  slavery  ?  Why  did  he  not  at 
once  prohibit  it,  and  declare  that  every  slave  through- 
out the  world  was  at  once  free  ? 

The  answer  is  apparent.  A  social  wrong,  such  as 
slavery,  could  be  peacefully  eradicated  only  by  chang- 
ing the  mind  of  both  master  and  slave,  by  teaching  the 
one  party  the  love  of  justice  and  the  fear  of  God,  and 
by  elevating  the  other  to  the  proper  level  of  individual 
responsibility.  Is  not  the  method  which  our  Saviour 
selected  the  only  one  by  which  the  overthrow  of  slav- 
ery could  be  peacefully  and  permanently  effected  ?  The 
prohibition  of  slavery  among  the  pagan  population  of 
the  time  could  have  led  to  nothing  but  servile  war ;  and 
nothing  essential  would  be  gained,  for  the  minds  of  men 
would  remain  as  before  ;  but  by  the  inculcation  of  true 
moral  principles,  slavery  would  fall  of  itself,  with  harm 
to  no  one,  while  both  parties  would  be  rendered  essen- 
tially better.  Can  anything  more  clearly  illustrate  the 
boundless  love  and  the  omniscient  wisdom  of  the  Sa- 
viour than  his  choice  of  this  method  for  the  accomplish- 
ment of  his  benevolent  purpose? 

We  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  gospel  was  designed 
not  for  one  race,  or  for  one  time,  but  for  all  races  and 
for  all  times.  It  looked  not  at  the  abolition  of  this 
form  of  evil  for  that  age  alone,  but  for  its  universal 
abolition.  Hence  the  important  object  of  its  author 
^vas  to  gain  it  a  lodgment  in  every  pait  of  the  known 


224  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

world,  so  that,  by  its  universal  diffusion,  it  mi<^ht  greatly 
and  peacefully  modify  and  subdue  the  evil  passions  of 
men,  and  thus  without  violence  work  a  revolution  in 
the  whole  mass  of  mankind.  In  this  manner  alone 
could  its  object,  a  universal  moral  revolution,  have 
been  accomplished.  For  if  it  had  forbidden  the  evil,  in- 
stead of  subverting  the  principle,  —  if  it  had  proclaimed 
the  unlawfulness  of  slavery,  and  taught  slaves  to  resist 
the  oppression  of  their  masters ,  —  it  would  instantly  have 
arrayed  the  two  parties  in  deadly  hostility.  Throughout 
the  civilized  world  its  announcement  would  have  been 
the  signal  of  servile  war,  and  the  very  name  of  the 
Christian  religion  would  have  been  forgotten  amidst  the 
agitation  of  universal  bloodshed.  The  fact,  under 
these  circumstances,  that  the  gospel  does  not  forbid 
slavery,  affords  no  reason  to  suppose  that  it  does  not 
mean  to  prohibit  it ;  least  of  all  does  it  afford  ground 
for  the  belief  that  Jesus  Christ  intended  to  authorize  it. 

Upon  these  principles  the  apostle  acted  in  the  case  of 
Onesimus.  By  the  civil  law,  Philemon  had  power  over 
his  service,  and  with  this  power  St.  Paul  would  not  in- 
terfere. He  wished  Philemon  to  have  an  opportunity  to 
act  in  the  case  according  to  the  principles  of  the  gospel. 
He  therefore  sends  him  back,  not  as  a  slave,  but  as 
a  brother  beloved;  and  enjoins  him  to  treat  Onesimus 
as  he  would  treat  the  apostle  himself,  *  *  Thou  there- 
fore receive  him  that  is  mine  own  bowels."  **  Receive 
him  as  myself."  What  kind  of  servitude  was, imposed 
on  Onesimus  after  this,  we  can  easily  judge.  It  is  in 
this  manner  that  slavery  was  intended  to  cease  every- 
where, by  the  obedience  to  the  principles  of  the  gospel. 

If  it  be  said  that  we  may  infer  the  innocence  of  the 
institution  from  the  fact  that  the  New  Testament  pre- 
scribes distinctly  the  conduct  proper  for  slaves,  we 
answer.  The  inference  is  by  no  means  justified  by  the 
premises.  We  are  commanded  to  return  good  for  evil, 
to  pray  for  them  that  dcspitefully  use  us,  and  when  we 
are  smitten  on  one  cheek  to  turn  also  the  other.  We 
ai  e  told  that  to  act  thus  is  well-pleasing  to  God.  When 
God  prescribes  the  course  of  conduct  that  will  bo  well- 


VIOLATION   OF  PLRSONAL  LIBERTT.  225 

pleasing  to  him,  he  by  no  means  acknowledges  the  right 
of  abuse  in  the  injurious  person,  but  expressly  de- 
clares, "Vengeance  is  mine,  and  I  will  repay,  saith  the 
Lord."  Thus  servants  are  commanded  to  be  obedient 
to  their  own  masters  in  singleness  of  heart  as  unto 
Christ,  with  good-will  doing  service  as  to  the  Lord  and 
not  unto  man,  that  they  may  adorn  the  doctrine  of  God 
our  Saviour  in  all  things.  The  manner  in  which  the 
duty  of  servants  is  inculcated  affords  no  ground  for  the 
assertion  that  the  gospel  authorizes  slavery,  any  more 
than  the  command  to  honor  the  king,  when  that  king 
was  Nero,  authorized  the  tyranny  of  the  emperor ;  or 
than  the  command  to  turn  the  other  cheek,  when  one  is 
smitten,  justifies  the  infliction  of  violence  by  an  inju- 
rious man. 

In  a  word,  if  the  principles  of  conduct  which  the 
gospel  inculcates  are  directly  at  variance  with,  the  exist- 
ence of  slavery ;  if  the  relations  which  it  establishes, 
and  the  obligations  which  it  enforces,  are  inconsistent 
with  its  existence  ;  if  the  manner  in  which  it  treats  it  is 
the  only  manner  which  could  lead  to  its  universal  exter- 
mination ;  and  if  it  inculcates  the  duty  of  slaves  on 
principles  which  have  no  connection  with  the  question 
of  the  right  of  masters  over  them,  —  I  think  it  must  be 
conceded  that  the  precepts  of  the  gospel  in  no  manner 
countenance,  but  are  entirely  opposed  to,  the  institution 
of  domestic  slavery. 

It  may  be  proper,  in  closing  this  discussion,  to  con- 
sider the  question,  What  is  the  duty  of  masters  and 
slaves  under  a  condition  of  society  in  which  slavery  now 
exists  ? 

1.  As  to  masters. 

If  the  system  be  wrong,  as  we  have  endeavored  to 
show ;  if  it  can  be  sustained  by  no  principle,  either  of 
natural  law  or  of  revealed  religion  ;  if  it  be  at  variance 
with  our  duty  both  to  God  and  man,  —  it  must  be  aban- 
doned. If  it  be  asked.  When?  I  ask,  again.  When  shall 
a  man  cease  to  do  wrong  ?  Is  not  the  answer.  Always  — - 
immediately?  If  a  man  is  injuring  us,  do  we  ever  doubt 
in  respect  to  the  time  when  he  ought  to  cease  ? 


226  PRACTICAL   ETHICS 

But  it  raay  be  said  that  immediate  abolition  would 
be  the  greatest  injury  to  the  slaves  themselves  ;  they 
are  incapable  of  self-support  and  of  self-government. 

Let  ns  inquire  into  the  facts.  They,  even  under  the 
most  nnfiivorable  circumstances,  have  supported  them- 
selves and  their  masters.  They  are  able-bodied,  and 
willing  to  work  for  wages.  If  they  are  fairly  paid  for 
their  labor,  they  are  as  able  and  willing  to  support  them- 
selves as  the  emigrants  who  arc  daily  landing  by  thou- 
sands upon  our  shores.  Labor  is  everj^where  needed  : 
they  are  willing  and  desirous  to  render  it  for  a  fair 
compensation,  and  this  compensation  will  enable  them 
to  take  care  of  themselves.  Place  them  under  the 
government  and  protection  of  good  and  wholesome  laws, 
and  they  are  disposed  to  be  peaceable  and  law-abiding 
citizens.  This  has  been  abundantly  proved  by  all  the 
fair  experiments  that  have  been  made  for  the  last  three 
or  four  years.  *  It  has  also  bee<i  proved  that  it  is  more 
profitable  to  employ  men  as  freemen,  and  at  fiiir  wages, 
than  to  employ  them  under  the  lash  as  slaves. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  the  laws  of  the  state  in  which  we 
live  will  not  permit  us  to  liberate  our  slaves,  and  if  we 
liberated  them  they  would  be  returned  again  to  bond- 
age. This  may  be  so  ;  but  I  ask.  Who  made  these  laws  ? 
Did  not  the  slave-holders  themselves?  and  cannot  they 
unmake  them  ?  We  cannot  surely  be  innocent  if  we 
oiu'selves  have  placed  it  out  of  our  power  to  do  right. 

But,  it  may  be  said,  we  are  in  favor  of  liberty  ;  but  we 
are  the  minority,  and  cannot  control  legislation  on  this 
subject.  I  ask,  again.  Have  we  yet  done  all  in  our 
power?  Have  we  obeyed  God  in  rendering  to  our 
slaves  that  Afhich  is  just  and  equal?  Have  we  treated 
them  as  human  beings,  soon,  with  ourselves,  to  stand 
before  the  judgment-seat  of  Christ?  Have  we  taught 
them  to  read  the  Word  of  God,  and  given  them  every 
opportunity  for  obedience  to  its  precepts  ?  And  yet 
more,  have  we  publicly  borne  testimony  against  this 
wrong,  and  done  all  in  our  power  to  change  the  legisla- 
ti  on  inider  the  protection  of  which  the  wrong  has  been 


VIOLATION   OF   PERSONAL  LIBERTY.  227 

peTpeiraterl  ?  Until  we  have  done  all  this,  we  cannot, 
surely,  he  innocent  of  the  guilt  of  slavery. 

The  duty  of  slaves  is  also  explicitly  made  known  in 
the  Bible.  The  Scripture  rule  is  this  :  it  matters  not 
how  a  man  treats  me,  I  am  bound  to  treat  him  justly, 
kindly,  and  faithfully.  They  are  thus  bound  to  obedi- 
ence, fidelity,  and  submission,  not  for  the  reason  that 
the  power  of  the  master  is  founded  in  right,  but  on  the 
ground  of  duty  to  God.  This  obligation  extends  to 
everything  but  matters  of  conscience.  When  a  master 
commands  a  slave,  or  any  one  else,  to  do  wrong,  he 
must  refuse  obedience,  and  suffer  the  consequences, 
looking  to  God  alone,  to  whom  vengeance  belongeth. 
Acting  upon  these  principles,  the  slave  may  attain  to 
the  highest  grade  of  virtue,  and  exhibit  a  sublimity 
and  purity  of  moral  character  which,  in  the  condition 
of  the  master,  is  to  him  wholly  unattainable. 

Thus  we  see  that  the  Christian  religion  not  only  for- 
bids slavery,  but  that  it  provides  the  only  method  in 
which,  after  it  has  been  once  established,  it  may  be 
abolished  with  entire  safety  and  benefit  to  both  parties. 
By  instilling  the  right  moral  dispositions  into  the  bo- 
som of  the  master,  and  of  the  slave,  it  teaches  the 
one  the  duty  of  reciprocity  and  universal  love,  and  the 
other  the  duty  of  faithfulness,  patience,  and  submission  ; 
and  thus,  without  disorder  and  revenge,  but  by  the  real 
moral  improvement  of  both  parties,  restores  both  to 
the  relation  towards  each  other  intended  by  the  Creator. 

If  any  one  will  reflect  on  these  facts,  and  remember 
the  moral  laws  of  the  Creator,  and  the  terrible  sanc- 
tions by  which  these  laws  are  vindicated,  and  also  the 
benevolent  provision  which  he  has  made  for  removing 
this  evil  after  it  has  been  once  established,  he  must,  I 
think,  be  convinced  of  the  imperative  obligation  resting 
upon  him  to  remove  it  without  delay.  The  Judge  of 
the  whole  earth  will  do  justice.  He  hears  the  cry  of 
the  oppressed,  and  he  will  in  the  end  terribly  deliver 
them.  The  throne  of  iniquity  can  have  no  fellowship 
with  him,  though  it  frame  mischief  by  a  law.  And, 
on  the  other  hand,  let  those  who  suffer  wrongfully  bear 


228  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

their  sufferings  with  patience,  committing  their  souls  to 
him  as  a  faithful  Creator. 


SECTION  III. 

THE  VIOLATION  OF  PERSONAL  LIBERTY  BY  SOCIETY. 

Society  may  violate  the  personal  rights  of  the  indi- 
vidual by  depriving  him  unjustly  of  his  liberty  or  prop- 
erty, or  any  of  his  means  of  physical  happiness.  This  is 
done  whenever  any  individual  is  imprisoned  or  pun- 
ished, except  for  crime. 

Let  us  commence  this  section  with  the  self-evident 
proposition,  Every  MAN  HAS  A  EIGHT  TO  HIMSELF ;  thatis, 
to  the  uncontrolled  use  of  all  his  powers,  both  natural 
and  spiritual.  If  it  be  asked  where  is  the  limit  to  this 
right,  I  answer,  in  its  universality.  Every  man  has 
precisely  the  same  right,  therefore  every  one  must  use 
his  own  risrht  in  such  a  manner  as  will  not  interfere 
with  the  same  right  bestowed  equally  upon  his  neighbor. 
The  gift  being  equal  and  universal,  can  only  be  enjoyed 
by  the  just  limitation  of  our  desires.  The  same  law 
which  forbids  me  to  encroach  on  the  rights  of  another, 
protects  me  from  the  encroachments  of  the  whole  soci- 
ety. Thus  the  precept,  Thou  shalt  not  covet,  lies  at  the 
foundation  of  all  human  liberty. 

But  the  passions  and  appetites  of  man  are  not  always 
under  the  control  of  conscience,  and  frequently,  to  the 
extent  of  his  power,  he  will  strive  to  possess  himself  of 
the  means  of  happiness  of  another.  From  this  disposi- 
tion arise  wars,  rapine,  dishonesty,  knavery,  licentious- 
ness, and  every  form  of  evil. 

In  order  to  limit  and  correct  this  fruitful  source  of 
evil  in  man,  we  find  him  endowed  with  a  natural  love  for 
society.  As  soon  as  human  beings  unite  in  a  community, 
even  in  its  rudest  form,  the  individual  commits  to  soci- 
ety the  protection  of  his  rights,  and  the  redress  of  his 
wrongs  ;  and  society  as  instinctively  assumes  the  oiEco 


VIOLATION    OF   PERSONAL   LIBERTY    BY   SOCIETY.      229 

I  bus  committed  to  it.  In  this  manner  wrong  may  be 
"eclressed,  not  by  the  passionate  sufferer  himself,  but  by 
^.he  calm  and  unprejudiced  decision  of  his  fellow-men. 
.\nd  now  the  individual  no  more  relies  on  his  single 
irm  for  the  redress  of  grievances,  but  he  can  command 
for  this  purpose  the  whole  power  of  the  community. 
The  more  perfectly  this  authority  is  committed  to  soci- 
ety, and  the  more  perfectly  the  society  justly  and  fear- 
lessly urges  it  for  the  establishment  of  right,  the  farther 
(s  a  community  advanced  in  true  civilization. 

We  see,  then,  the  true  function  of  society ;  it  is  to 
secure  to  every  individual  the  rights  bestowed  upon 
him  by  the  Creator,  and,  in  so  far  as  may  be,  to  reduce 
to  practice  the  axiom.  Every  man  has  a  right  to  himself. 

Societies,  under  whatever  form  of  government  they 
may  be  constituted,  have  always  tended  to  transcend  this 
their  legitimate  power.  Because  the  individual  is  unable 
to  resist  society,  society  has  been  prone  to  suppose  that 
its  right  was  commensurate  with  its  power,  and  that  it 
might  control  the  individual  at  its  own  will.  Hence 
the  almost  innumerable  forms  of  tyranny  and  oppres- 
sion which  it  would  seem  that  flesh  is  heir  to.  Govern- 
ments have  supposed  themselves  authorized  to  violate, 
at  their  convenience,  or  even  from  caprice,  the  dearest 
rights  of  the  individual.  Christianity  seems  first  to  havo 
revealed  the  truth  of  the  universal  brotherhood  of  man, 
and  ever  since,  with  greater  or  less  earnestness,  nations 
have  been  striving  for  such  a  government  as  shall  prop- 
erly estimate  the  rights  of  the  individual,  and  elevate 
the  masses  to  that  level  designed  for  them  by  a  merciful 
and  just  Creator. 

Society  may  violate  the  personal  rights  of  an  indi- 
vidual, — 

1.  By  depriving  him  of  his  physical  liberty,  etc. 

2.  Whenever,  although  he  may  be  accused  of  crime, 
he  is  imprisoned  or  punished  without  a  fair  and  impar- 
tial trial ;  for,  as  every  man  is  presumed  to  be  innocent 
until  he  shall  have  been  proved  to  be  guilty,  to  imprison 
or  molest  him  without  such  proof  is  to  imprison  or  mo- 
lest him  while  he  is  innocent.     This  remark,  however, 


230  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

does  not  apply  to  the  detention  of  prisoners  in  order 
to  trial.  The  detention  in  this  case  is  not  for  the  pur- 
poses of  punishment,  but  simply  to  prevent  escape,  and 
as  a  necessary  means  for  the  execution  of  justice  and 
the  redress  of  injury.  It  is  also  no  injustice  ;  for  it  is 
a  power  over  their  persons  which  the  individuals  have, 
for  mutual  good,  conceded  to  society. 

3.  Inasmuch  as  every  individual  has  the  right  to  go 
where  he  plea>!es,  under  the  limitations  above  specified, 
this  right  is  violated,  not  merely  by  confining  him  to  a 
particular  place,  but  also  by  forbidding  his  going  to  any 
particular  place  within  the  limits  of  the  society  to  which 
he  belongs,  or  by  forbidding  him  to  leave  it  when  and 
how  he  pleases.  As  his  connection  with  the  society  to 
which  he  belongs  is  a  voluntary  act,  his  simple  will  is 
an  ultimate  reason  why  he  should  leavve  it;  and  the 
free  exercise  of  this  will  cannot,  without  injustice,  bo 
restrained. 

4.  Society  may  violate  the  right  of  property  of  an 
individual  by  forbidding  him  to  choose  his  own  form  of 
labor,  or  imposing  restrictions  on  that  which  he  prefers. 
As  every  man  has  a  right  to  himself,  he  has  a  right  to 
the  use  of  all  his  powers,  and  the  right  to  use  them  as 
he  will,  if  he  work  no  injury  to  his  neighbor. 

The  great  clause  in  the  Magna  Charta  on  this  general 
subject,  is  in  these  memorable  words  :  '*  Let  no  freeman 
be  imprisoned,  or  disseized,  or  outlawed,  or  in  any  man- 
ner injured  or  proceeded  against  by  us,  otherwise  than 
by  the  legal  judgment  of  his  peers,  or  by  the  law  of  the 
land."  And  the  full  enjoyment  of  this  right  is  guaran- 
teed to  every  individual  in  this  country  and  in  Great 
Britain  by  the  celebrated  act  of  Habeas  Corpus ;  by 
which,  upon  a  proper  presentation  of  the  case  before  a 
judge,  the  judge  is  under  obligation,  if  there  be  cause, 
to  command  the  person  who  has  the  custody  of  another, 
to  bring  him  immediately  before  him  ;  and  is  also  obliged 
to  set  the  prisoner  at  large,  unless  it  appear  to  him  that 
he  is  deprived  of  his  liberty  for  a  satisfactory  reason. 

2.  Society  may  violate  the  rights  of  the  individual 
by  restraining  his  intellectual  liberty. 


YIOLATION    OF   PERSONAL   LIBERTY    BY   SOCIETY.       231 

I  have  before  stated  that  a  man  has  the  right  to  th© 
use  of  his  mtellect  in  such  manner  as  he  pleases,  pro- 
vided he  interfere  not  with  the  rights  of  others.  This 
includes,  first,  the  right  to  pursue  what  studies  he 
pleases  ;  and,  secondly,  to  pubUsh  them  when  and  where 
he  pleases,  subject  to  the  above  limitation. 

1.  This  right  is  violated,  first,  when  society,  or  gov- 
ernment, which  is  its  agent,  prohibits  any  course  of 
study  or  investigation  to  which  the  inclination  of  the 
individual  may  determine  him. 

2.  When  government  prohibits  him  from  publishing 
these  results,  and  from  attemptiug,  by  the  use  of  argu- 
ment, to  make  as  many  converts  to  his  opinions  as  he 
can,  in  both  cases  within  the  limits  specified.  If  it  be 
said  that  men  may  thus  be  led  into  en-or,  the  answer  is, 
For  this  error  the  individuals  themselves,  and  not  their 
neighbor,  are  responsible  ;  and  therefore  the  latter  has 
no  authority  to  interfere.  But  a  man  may  use  his  in- 
tellect in  such  manner  as  to  be  positively  injurious  to 
the  community  ;  in  how  far  is  it  right  for  society  to  in- 
terfere and  treat  the  injurious  use  of  his  intellect  as  a 
crime  ?  The  solution  of  this  question  is  by  no  means 
easy.  Let  us,  however,  endeavor  to  throw  upon  it  such 
light  as  we  are  able. 

1.  Suppose  a  man  to  publish  what  is  simply  false,  as  it 
was  supposed  that  Galileo  did  when  he  asserted  the 
movement  of  the  earth.  Here  every  man  has  the 
means  of  refutation  in  his  own  hands.  He  may  refute 
the  reasoning  for  himself,  and  then  the  falsehood  can 
do  him  no  harm,  and  the  refutation  may  be  a  benefit  to 
others.  Society  is  not,  in  such  a  case,  called  upon  to 
interfere. 

2.  Suppose  a  man  to  publish  not  only  what  is  false, 
but  what  is  wrong,  — teaching,for  instance,  that  moral 
distinctions  are  without  foundation,  that  the  right  of 
property  is  a  fiction,  and  that  self-control  is  a  useless 
hardship.  All  this  is  not  only  false,  but  wicked,  and 
can  tend  only  to  evil.  So  long,  however,  as  only  the 
attempt  is  made  to  change  the  opinions  of  men,  society 
has  no  right  to  interfere.     The  reasoning  can  be  shown 


232  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

to  be  false,  and  the  harm  can  be  thus  arrested.  Or,  if 
the  opinions  of  the  society  be  changed  by  argument, 
laws  will  be  altered,  and  a  peaceful  revolution  will  bo 
efiected. 

3.  But  suppose,  besides  attempting  to  change  the 
opinions  of  the  community,  he  endeavors  to  excite  men 
to  act  upon  his  principles  ;  to  set  aside  practically  the 
ideas  of  right  and  w^rong ;  and,  denying  the  right  of 
property,  urges  men  to  commence,  in  a  particular  place, 
the  pillage  of  their  neighbors.  The  men  who  had 
been  thus  excited  to  lawlessness  would,  of  course,  be 
condignl}^  punished  ;  and  it  seems  evidently  just  that 
he  who  excited  them  to  crime  should  share  in  their 
punishment,  as  but  for  him  the  crimes  would  never 
have  been  committed. 

4.  It  is  well  known  that  crime  of  every  kind  arisen 
from  the  undue  excitement  of  the  passions  and  appetites 
of  man.  He  who  uses  his  intellect  for  the  purpose  of 
thus  leading  men  into  crime,  as  by  the  publication  of 
writings  manifestly  intended  to  awaken  lust,  of  obscene 
pictures,  or  of  narratives  of  successful  wickedness,  is  cer- 
tainly guilty  of  a  crime  against  society,  and  the  crime 
is  deserving  of  punishment. 

5.  Society  is  bound  to  protect  the  rights  which  have 
been  committed  to  it,  and  of  which  it  has  assumed  the 
protection.  Among  these  is  certainly  reputation.  The 
reputation  which  a  man  has  established  that  he  is  capa- 
ble and  desirous  of  doing  well,  is  frequently  of  more 
value  than  money.  That  may  be  destroyed  by  false  and 
malicious  slander.  It  certainly  becomes  the  commu- 
nity to  come  to  his  aid,  and  render  such  award  as  may 
establish  him  in  his  true  standing,  and  render  it  for 
the  interest  of  the  slanderer  to  leave  the  honor  of  his 
neighbor  untarnished. 

But  it  may  be  objected,  that  a  society  constituted  on 
these  principles  might  check  the  progress  of  free  in- 
quiry, and,  under  the  pretext  of  injurious  tendency, 
limit  the  liberty  of  fair  discussion. 

To  this  it  may  be  answered  — 

It  is  no  objection  to  a  rule,  that  it  is  capable  of 


VIOLATION   OF   PERSONAL  LIBERTY   BY   SOCIETY.      233 

abusp  ;  for  this  objection  will  apply  to  all  laws  and  to 
all  arrangements  that  man  has  ever  devised.  In  the 
present  imperfect  condition  of  human  nature,  it  is  fre- 
quently sufficient  that  a  rule  prevents  greater  evil  than 
it  inflicts. 

It  is  granted  that  men  may  suppose  a  discussion  in- 
jurious when  it  is  not  so,  and  may  thus  limit,  unne- 
cessarily, the  freedom  of  inquiry.  But  let  us  see  in 
what  manner  this  abuse  is  guarded  against. 

The  security,  in  this  case,  is  the  trial  by  jury.  When 
twelve  men,  taken  by  lot  from  the  whole  community, 
sit  in  judgment,  and  especially  when  the  accused  has 
the  right  of  excepting,  for  cause,  to  as  many  as  he  will, 
he  is  sure  of  having  at  least  an  impartial  tribunal. 
These  judges  are  themselves  under  the  same  law  which 
they  administer  to  others.  As  it  is  not  to  be  supposed 
that  they  would  wish  to  abridge  their  own  personal 
liberty,  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  they  would  be 
willing  to  abridge  it  for  the  sake  of  interfering  with 
that  of  their  neighbor.  The  question  is,  therefore, 
placed  in  the  hands  of  as  impartial  judges  as  the  na- 
ture of  the  case  allows.  To  such  a  tribunal  no  reason- 
able man  can  on  principle  object.  To  their  decision 
every  candid  man  would,  when  his  duty  to  God  did 
not  forbid,  readily  submit. 

Now,  as  it  must  be  granted  that  no  man  has  a  right 
to  use  his  intellect  to  the  injury  of  a  community,  the 
only  question  in  any  particular  case  is,  whether  the 
use  complained  of  is  actually  injurious,  and  injurious 
in  such  a  sense  as  to  require  the  interference  of  society. 
It  surely  does  not  need  argument  to  show  that  the 
unanimous  decision  of  twelve  men  is  more  likely  to 
be  correct  than  the  decision  of  one  man  ;  and  specially 
that  the  decision  of  twelve  men,  who  have  no  personal 
interest  in  the  affair,  is  more  likely  to  be  correct  than 
that  of  one  man,  who  is  liable  to  all  the  influences  of 
personal  vanity,  love  of  distinction,  and  pecuniary 
emolument.  There  surely  can  be  no  question  whether, 
in  a  matter  on  which  the  deaiest  interests  of  othera 
are  concerned,  a  man  is  to  be  a  judge  in  his  own  case, 


234  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

or  whether  as  impartial  a  tribunal  as  the  ingenuity  of 
man  has  ever  devised  shall  judge  for  him.  If  it  be 
said  that  twelve  impartial  men  are  liable  to  error,  and 
by  consequence  to  do  injustice,  it  may  be  answered, 
How  much  more  liable  is  one  and  he  a  partial  man,  to 
err  and  to  do  injustice  !  If,  then,  a  system  of  trial  of 
this  sort  not  only  must  prevent  more  injury  than  it 
inflicts,  but  is  free  from  all  liability  to  injury,  except 
such  as  results  from  the  acknowledged  imperfections  of 
our  nature,  the  fault,  if  it  exist,  is  not  in  the  rule,  but 
in  the  nature  of  man,  and  must  be  endured  until  the 
nature  of  man  be  altered. 

And  I  cannot  close  this  discussion  without  remarking 
that  a  most  solemn  and  imperative  duty  seems  to  me  to 
rest  uponjudges,  legislators,  jurors,  and  prosecuting  offi- 
cers, in  regard  to  this  subject.  We  hear  at  the  present 
day  very  much  about  the  liberty  of  the  press,  the 
freedom  of  inquiry,  and  the  freedom  of  the  human 
Intel  lect .  Al  1  these  are  precious  blessings  —  by  far  too 
precious  to  be  lost.  But  it  is  to  be  remembered  that 
no  liberty  can  exist  without  restraint ;  and  the  remark 
is  as  true  of  intellectual  as  of  physical  liberty.  A& 
there  could  be  no  physical  liberty  if  every  one,  both 
bad  and  good,  did  what  he  would,  so  there  would  soon 
be  no  liberty,  either  physical  or  intellectual,  if  everj^ 
man  were  allowed  to  publish  what  he  would. 

The  danger  to  liberty  is  preeminently  greater,  at  the 
present  day,  from  the  licentiousness  than  from  the  re- 
striction of  the  press.  It  therefore  becomes  all  civil 
and  judicial  officers  to  act  as  the  guardians  of  society, 
and,  unawed  by  popular  clamor,  and  unseduced  by 
popular  favor,  resolutely  to  defend  the  people  against 
their  worst  enemies.  Whatever  may  be  the  form  of  a 
government,  it  cannot  long  continue  free  after  it 
has  refused  to  acknowledge  the  distinction  between  the 
liberty  and  the  licentiousness  of  the  press.  And  much 
as  we  may  execrate  a  profligate  writer,  let  us  remember 
that  the  civil  officer  who,  from  pusillanimity,  refuses  tc 
exercise  the  power  placed  in  his  hands  to  restrain  abuse 
deserves  at  least  an  equal  share  of  our  execration. 


VIOLATION   OP   RELIGIOUS   LIBERTY   BY  SOCIETY.      235 

SECTION  IV. 

THE   VIOLATION  OP   RELIGIOUS   LIBERTY   BY  SOCIETY. 

The  right  of  religious  liberty  may  be  violated  by 
Bociety. 

We  have  before  said  that  every  individual  has  the 
right  to  pursue  his  own  happiness  by  worshipping  his 
Creator  in  any  way  that  he  pleases,  provided  he  do  not 
interfere  with  the  rights  of  his  neighbor. 

This  includes  the  following  things  :  He  is  at  liberty 
to  worship  God  in  any  form  that  he  deems  most  accept- 
able to  him  ;  to  worship  individually  or  socially ;  and 
to  promote  that  form  of  worship  which  he  considers 
acceptable  to  God,  by  the  promulgation  of  such  senti- 
ments as  he  believes  to  be  true,  provided  he  leave  the 
rights  of  his  neighbors  unmolested  ;  and  this  liberty  is 
not  to  be  restricted  unless  such  molestation  be  made 
manifest  to  a  jury  of  his  peers. 

As  a  man  is  at  liberty  to  worship  God  individually 
or  in  societies  collected  for  that  purpose,  if  his  object 
can  be  secured,  in  his  own  opinion,  by  the  enjoyment  of 
any  of  the  facilities  for  association  granted  to  other 
men  for  innocent  purposes,  he  is  entitled  to  them,  just 
as  other  men  are.  The  general  principle  applicable  to 
the  case  I  suppose  to  be  this  :  A  man,  in  consequence 
of  being  religious,  that  is,  of  worshipping  God,  acquires 
no  human  right  whatever ;  for  it  is,  so  far  as  his  fellow- 
men's  right  are  concerned,  the  same  thing  whether  he 
worship  God  or  not.  And  on  the  other  hand,  in  con- 
sequence of  being  religious,  he  loses  no  right,  and  for 
the  same  reason.  And,  therefore,  as  men  are  entitled 
to  all  innocent  facilities  which  they  need  for  preaecut- 
ing  an  innocent  object,  a  religious  man  has  the  same 
right  to  these  facilities  for  promoting  his  object ;  and  it 
is  the  business  of  no  one  to  inquire  whether  this  be 
religious,  scientific,  mechanical,  or  any  other,  so  long 
ns  it  is  merely  innocent. 

Now,  this  right  is  violated  by  society  — 


23b  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

1.  By  forbidding  the  exercise  of  all  religion,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  French  Revolution. 

2.  By  forbidding  or  enforcing  the  exercise  of  any 
form  of  religion.  In  so  far  as  an  act  is  reb'gious,  society 
has  no  right  of  control  over  it.  If  it  interfere  with  the 
rights  of  others,  this  puts  it  within  the  control  of  society, 
and  this  alone,  and  solely  for  this  reason.  The  power 
of  society  is  therefore,  in  this  case,  exercised  simply 
on  the  ground  of  injury  jperjpetrated  and  proved,  and 
not  on  account  of  the  truth  or  falseness,  the  goodness 
or  badness,  of  the  religion  in  the  sight  of  the  Creator. 

3.  By  inflicting  disabilities  upon  men,  or  depriving 
them  of  any  of  their  rights  as  men,  because  they  are 
or  are  not  religious.  This  violation  occurs  in  all  cases 
in  which  society  interferes  to  deny  to  religious  men  the 
same  privileges  for  promoting  their  happiness  by  way 
of  religion  as  they  enjoy  for  promoting  their  happiness 
in  any  other  innocent  way.  Such  is  the  case  when 
religious  societies  are  denied  the  right  of  incorporation 
with  all  its  attendant  privileges,  for  the  purposes  of 
religious  worship,  and  the  promotion  of  their  religious 
opinions.  Unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  enjoyment 
of  such  privileges  interferes  with  the  rights  of  others, 
the  denial  of  them  is  a  violation  of  religious  liberty. 
Depriving  clergymen  of  the  elective  franchise  is  a  vio- 
lation of  a  similar  character. 

4.  By  placing  the  professors  of  any  peculiar  form  of 
religion  under  any  disabilities ;  as,  for  instance,  ren- 
dering them  ineligible  to  office,  or  in  any  manner  mak- 
ing a  distinction  between  them  and  any  other  professors 
of  religion,  or  any  other  men.  As  society  has  no  right 
to  inflict  disabilities  upon  men  on  the  ground  of  their 
worshipping  God  in  general,  by  consequence,  it  has  no 
right  to  inflict  disabilities  on  the  ground  of  worshipping 
God  in  any  manner  in  particular.  If  the  ivhole  subject 
is  without  the  control  of  society,  a  part  of  it  is  also 
without  its  control.  Diflferent  modes  of  worship  may 
be  more  or  less  acceptable  to  God  ;  but  this  gives  to  no 
man  a  right  to  interfere  with  those  means  of  happiness 
which  God  has  conferred  upon  any  other  man. 


VIOLATION   OF   KELIGIOUS   LIBERTY   BY   SOCIETY.      237 

The  question  may  arise  here  whether  society  has  a 
right  to  provide  by  law  for  the  support  of  religious 
instruction.  I  answer,  If  the  existence  of  religioua 
instruction  be  necessary  to  the  existence  of  society,  and 
if  there  be  no  other  mode  of  providing  for  its  support 
but  by  legislative  enactment,  then,  I  do  not  see  any 
more  violation  of  principle  in  such  enactment  than  in 
that  for  the  support  of  common  schools  ;  provided  that 
no  one  were  obliged  to  attend  unless  he  chose,  and  that 
every  one  were  allowed  to  pay  for  that  form  of  worship 
which  he  preferred.  There  are  other  objections,  how- 
ever, to  such  a  course,  aside  from  that  arising  from 
the  supposed  violation  of  civil  liberty. 

1.  It  cannot  be  shown  that  religious  teachers  cannot 
be  supported  without  legislative  aid.  The  facts  teach 
a  difierent  result. 

2.  The  religion  of  Christ  has  always  exerted  its 
greatest  power  when,  entirely  unsupported,  it  has  been 
left  to  exert  its  own  peculiar  effect  upon  the  consciences 
of  men. 

3.  The  support  of  religion  by  law  is  at  variance  with 
the  genius  of  the  gospel.  The  gospel  supposes  every 
man  to  be  purely  voluntary  in  his  service  of  God,  in 
his  choice  of  the  mode  of  worship,  of  his  religious 
teachers,  and  of  the  compensation  which  he  will  make 
to  them  for  their  services.  Now,  all  this  is  reversed  in 
the  supposition  of  a  ministry  supported  by  civil  power. 
We  therefore  conclude  that,  although  such  support 
might  be  provided  without  interference  with  civil  lib- 
erty, it  could  not  be  done  without  violation  of  the  spirit 
of  the  gospel.  That  is,  though  the  state  might  be  de- 
sirous of  affording  aid  to  the  church,  the  church  is 
bound,  on  principle,  resolutely  and  steadfastly  to  pro- 
test against  in  any  manner  receiving  it. 

4.  And  I  think  that  the  facts  will  show  that  this  view 
of  the  subject  is  correct.  The  clergy,  as  a  profession, 
are  better  remunerated  by  voluntar^'  support  than  by 
legal  enactment.  When  the  people  themselves  arrange 
the  matter  of  compensation  with  their  clergymen,  there 
aic  no  rich  and  overgrown  benefices,  but  there  are  also 


238  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

but  few  miserably  poor  curacies.  The  minister,  if  he 
deserve  it,  generally  lives  as  well  as  his  people.  If  it 
be  said  that  high  talent  should  be  rewarded  by  elevated 
rank  in  this  profession,  as  in  any  other,  I  answer,  that 
such  seems  to  me  not  to  be  the  genius  of  the  gospel. 
The  gospel  presents  no  inducements  of  worldly  rank  or 
of  official  dignity,-  and  it  scorns  to  hold  out  such  mo- 
tives to  the  religious  teacher.  I  answer,  again,  official 
rank  and  luxurious  splendor,  instead  of  adding  to,  take 
from,  the  real  influence  of  a  teacher  of  religion.  They 
tend  to  destroy  that  moral  hardihood  which  is  necessary 
to  the  success  of  him  whose  object  it  is  to  render  men 
better,  and,  while  they  surround  him  with  all  the 
insignia  of  power,  enervate  that  very  spirit  on  which 
moral  power  essentially  depends.  And,  besides,  a  re- 
ligion supported  by  the  government  must  soon  become 
the  tool  of  the  government ;  or,  at  least,  must  be  in- 
volved and  implicated  in  every  change  which  the  gov- 
ernment may  undergo.  How  utterly  at  variance  this 
must  be  with  the  principles  of  Him  who  declared,  *«  My 
kingdom  is  not  of  this  world,"  surely  need  not  be 
illustrated. 


CHAPTEE    II. 

JUSTICE   IN  RESPECT    TO  PROPERTT. 

SECTION    I. 

THE   RIGHT    OF   PROPERTT. 

I.  In  considering  the  right  of  property,  we  have  occa- 
sion to  refer  again  to  the  axiom,  of  which  we  have  before 
Bpolien,  namely,  Every  man  has  a  right  to  himself. 

The  right  to  one's  self  includes  the  right  to  use  our 
faculties,  whether  of  body  or  mind,  as  we  will,  for  the 
promotion  of  our  own  happiness.  Inasmuch,  however, 
as  this  right  is  universal,  it  is  evident  that  it  can  on]y 
be  universally  enjoyed  when  every  man  so  uses  his  fac- 
ulties as  not  to  interfere  with  the  similar  and  equal 
right  of  his  neighbor.  The  right  of  property,  there- 
fore, thus  understood,  is  the  right  to  use  our  faculties  as 
we  choose,  provided  we  so  use  them  as  not  to  interfere 
with  the  similar  rights  of  another. 

If  we  are  possessed  of  this  right  over  our  own  facul- 
ties both  of  body  and  mind,  we  have  also  aright  to  the 
result  which  may  be  produced  by  the  innocent  use  of 
them.  Thus,  if  upon  unappropriated  land,  by  my 
labor  and  skill,  I  raise  a  crop  of  wheat,  that  wheat  is 
mine,  and  I  may  use  it  as  I  will,  provided  I  use  it  inno- 
cently. My  skill  and  labor  become  indissolubly  united 
with  this  product,  and  no  one  can  present  the  shadow 
of  a  claim  to  it,  or  in  the  least  invalidate  my  right. 
Mj-  right  is  exclusive,  and  bars  out  every  other  claim- 
ant, whether  it  be  an  individual  or  society. 

I  say  it  bars  out  society.     To  thid,  however,  there 


210  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

may  seem  to  be  a  single  exception.  It  is  the  office  of 
society  to  confirm  me  in  this  right.  But  society  can- 
not do  this  without  the  expense  of  providing  means  and 
agents.  It  may,  therefore,  justly  claim  of  me  an  equi- 
table portion  of  the  public  expense,  and  enforce  this 
claim  by  the  means  placed  in  its  power. 

This  right  is  so  obvious  that  it  scarcely  seems  neces- 
sary to  illustrate  it.  A  few  considerations,  however, 
may  tend  to  show  its  universality  and  importance. 

1.  All  men,  as  soon  as  they  begin  to  think,  even  in 
early  youth  and  infancy,  perceive  this  relation  of  prop- 
erty; They  cannot  define  it,  but  they  know  what  it  is. 
They  immediately  appropriate  certain  things  to  them- 
selves ;  they  feel  injured  if  their  control  over  them  is 
interfered  with,  and  are  conscious  of  guilt  if  they  vio- 
late the  similar  right  of  others. 

2.  Society  everywhere,  among  its  first  acts,  protects 
the  right  of  property  of  the  individual.  It  always  treats 
the  offender  as  guilty  of  wrong,  and  punishes  him 
accordingly.  The  Hebrew  law  enjoined  twofold  restitu- 
tion in  cases  of  theft,  and  modern  law  inflicts  fines  or 
imprisonment  for  the  same  offence. 

3.  The  existence  and  progress  of  society,  nay,  the 
very  existence  of  our  race,  depends,  essentially,  upon 
the  acknowledgment  of  this  right. 

Wore  not  every  individual  entitled  to  the  results  of 
his  labor,  and  to  the  exclusive  enjoyment  of  the  benefits 
of  these  results  — 

1.  No  one  would  labor  any  more  than  was  s':5iciont 
for  his  own  individual  subsistence,  because  he  would 
have  no  more  right  than  any  other  person  to  the  value 
which  he  had  created. 

2.  Hence  there  would  be  no  accumulation  ;  of  course, 
no  capital,  no  tools,  no  provision  for  the  future,  no 
houses,  and  no  agriculture.  Each  man,  alone,  would 
be  obliged  to  contend  at  the  same  time  with  the  ele- 
ments, with  wild  beasts,  and  also  with  hisrapacious  fel- 
low-men. The  human  race,  under  such  circumstances, 
could  not  long  exist. 

3.  Under  such  circumstances  the  race  of  man  must 


THE    RIGHT   OF   PROPERTY.     ^  24t 

fepeedily  perish,  or  its  existence  be  prolonged,  even  in 
favorable  climates,  under  every  accumulation  of  wretch- 
edness. Progress  would  be  out  of  the  question,  and 
the  only  change  which  could  take  place  would  be  that 
arising  from  the  pressure  of  heavier  and  heavier  pen- 
ury, as  the  spontaneous  productions  of  the  earth  became 
rarer  from  improvident  consumption,  without  any  cor- 
respondent labor  for  reproduction. 

4.  It  needs  only  to  be  remarked,  in  addition,  that  just 
in  proportion  as  the  right  of  property  is  held  inviolate, 
just  in  that  proportion  civilization  advances,  and  the 
comforts  and  conveniences  of  life  multiply.  Hence  it 
is  that  in  free  and'  well-ordered  governments,  and  spe- 
cially during  peace,  property  accumulates,  all  the  orders 
of  society  enjo}^  the  blessings  of  competence,  the  arts 
flourish,  science  advances,  and  men  begin  to  form  some 
conception  of  the  happiness  of  which  the  present  sys- 
tem is  capable.  And,  on  the  contrary,  under  despotism, 
when  law  spreads  its  protection  over  neither  house, 
land,  estate,  nor  life,  and  specially  during  civil  wars, 
industry  ceases,  capital  stagnates,  the  arts  decline,  the 
people  starve,  population  diminishes,  and  men  rapidly 
tend  to  a  state  of  barbarism. 

The  holy  Scriptures  treat  of  the  right  of  property 
as  a  thing  acknowledged,  and  direct  their  precepts 
against  every  act  by  which  it  is  violated,  and  also 
against  the  tempers  of  mind  from  which  such  violation 
proceeds.  The  doctrine  of  revelation  is  so  clearly  set 
forth  on  this  subject  that  I  need  not  delay  for  the  sake 
of  dwelling  upon  it.  It  will  be  sufficient  to  refer  to  the 
prohibitions  in  the  decalogue  against  stealing  and  cov- 
eting, and  to  the  various  precepts  in  the  New  Testament 
respecting  our  duty  in  regard  to  our  neighbor's  pos- 
sessions. 

I  proceed,  in  the  next  place,  to  consider  — 

II.  The  modes  in  which  the  right  of  property  may 
be  acquired.  These  may  be  divided  into  two  classes: 
6rst,  direct ;  second,  indirect. 

First.     Direct. 

1.  By  the  immediate  gift  of  God. 


242  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

When  God  has  given  me  a  desire  for  any  object,  and 
has  spread  this  object  before  me,  and  there  is  no  rational 
creature  to  contest  my  claim,  I  may  take  that  obiect, 
and  use  it  as  I  will,  subject  only  to  the  limitation  of 
those  obligations  to  him  and  to  my  fellow-creatures 
which  have  been  before  specified.  On  this  principle  is 
founded  my  right  to  enter  upon  wild  and  unappropri- 
ated lands,  to  hunt  wild  game,  to  pluck  wild  fruit,  to 
take  fish,  or  any  thing  of  this  sort.  This  right  is  suffi- 
cient to  exclude  the  right  of  any  subsequent  claimant ; 
for,  if  it  has  been  given  to  me,  that  act  of  gift  is  valid 
until  it  can  be  shown  by  another  that  it  has  been  an- 
nulled. A  grant  of  this  sort,  however,  applies  only  to 
an  individual  so  long  as  he  continues  the  locum  (enens, 
and  no  longer.  He  has  no  right  to  enter  upon  unap- 
propriated land,  and  leave  it,  and  then  claim  it  after- 
ward by  virtue  of  his  first  possession.  Were  it  other- 
wise, any  individual  might  acquire  a  title  to  a  whole 
continent,  and  exclude  from  it  all  the  rest  of  his  species. 

2.  Bt/  (he  labor  of  our  hands. 

We  have  had  occasion  before  to  refer  to  the  fact  that 
every  man  has  a  right  to  himself;  that  is,  he  has  a  right 
to  all  the  powers  and  faculties  of  his  body  and  mind. 
He  may  use  them  as  he  will,  only  not  to  the  injury  of 
the  rights  of  others,  Tbe  product  arising  from  the 
innocent  use  of  his  powers  is  his  own.  When  he  unites 
the  exercise  of  his  faculties  with  any  matter  not  before 
in  the  possession  of  another,  that  matter  becomes  his 
own,  and  he  may  use  it  as  he  will.  Thus,  if  I  raise  s 
crop  of  wheat  upon  land  not  previously  appropriated 
that  wheat  is  mine.  No  reason  can  possibly  be  con- 
ceived why  any  other  being  should  raise  a  claim  to  it 
which  could  extinguish  or  even  interfere  with  mine. 

This,  however,  is  not  meant  to  assert  that  a  man  hat, 
a  right  to  anything  more  than  to  the  results  of  his  labor. 
He  has  no  right,  of  course,  to  the  results  of  the  labor 
of  another.  If,  by  my  labor,  I  build  a  mill,  and  employ 
a  man  to  take  the  charge  of  it,  it  does  not  follow  that 
he  has  a  right  to  all  the  profits  of  the  mill.  If  I,  by 
my  labor  and  frugality,  earn  money  to  purchase  a  farm, 


THE   RIGHT  OP  PROPERTY.    .  243 

and  hire  a  laborer  to  work  upon  it,  it  does  not  follow 
that  he  has  a  right  to  all  the  produce  of  the  farm.  The 
profit  is,  in  this  case,  to  be  divided  between  us.  He 
has  a  right  to  the  share  which  fairly  belongs  to  his  la- 
bor^ and  I  have  a  right  to  the  share  that  belongs  to  me, 
as  the  proprietor  and  possessor  of  that  which  is  the  re- 
sult of  my  antecedent  labor.  It  would  be  as  unjust  for 
him  to  have  the  whole  'profit  as  for  me  to  have  the  whole 
of  it.  It  is  fairly  a  case  of  partnership,  in  which  each 
party  receives  his  share  of  the  result,  upon  conditions 
previously  and  voluntarily  agreed  upon.  This  is  the 
general  principle  of  wages, 

(Secondly,  The  right  of  property  may  be  acquired 
indirectly. 

1.  By  exchange. 

Inasmuch  as  I  have  an  exclusive  right  to  appropriate 
innocently  the  possessions  which  I  have  acquired  by  the 
means  stated  above,  and,  inasmuch  as  every  other  man 
has  the  same  right,  we  may,  if  we  choose,  voluntarily 
exchange  our  right  to  particular  things  with  each  other. 
If  I  cultivate  wheat,  and  my  neighbor  cultivates  corn, 
and  we,  both  of  us,  have  more  of  our  respective  pro- 
duction than  we  wish  to  use  for  ourselves,  we  ma}^  on 
such  terms  as  we  can  agree  upon,  exchange  the  one  for 
the  other.  Property  held  in  this  manner  is  held  right- 
fully. This  exchange  is  of  two  kinds  :  first,  barter, 
where  the  exchange  on  both  sides  consists  of  com- 
modities ;  and  second,  bargain  and  sale,  where  one  of 
the  parties  gives  and  the  other  receives  money  for  hia 
property. 

2.  By  gift. 

As  I  may  thus  rightfully  part  with,  and  another  party 
rightfully  receive  my  property,  for  an  equivalent  ren- 
dered, so  I  may,  if  I  choose,  part  with  it  without  an 
equivalent;  that  is,  merely  to  gratify  my  feelings  of 
benevolence,  or  affection,  or  gratitude.  Here  I  volun- 
tarily confer  upon  another  the  right  of  ownership,  and 
he  may  rightfully  recei  ve  and  occupy  it. 

3.  By  will. 

As  I  have  the  right  to  dispose  of  my  property  as  I 


244  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

please  during  my  lifetime,  and  may  exchange  it  or 
give  it  as  I  will  at  any  time  previous  to  my  decease,  so 
1  may  give  it  to  another  on  the  condition  that  he  shall 
not  enter  into  possession  until  after  my  death.  Prop- 
erty acquired  in  this  manner  is  held  rightfully. 

4.  By  inheritance. 

Inasmuch  as  persons  frequently  die  without  making 
a  will,  society,  upon  general  principles,  presumes  upon 
the  manner  in  which  the  deceased  would  have  dis- 
tributed his  property  had  he  made  a  w^ill.  Thus,  it  is 
supposed  that  he  would  distribute  his  wealth  among  his 
widow  and  children  ;  or,  in  failure  of  these,  among  his 
relations  by  blood  ;  and  in  proportions  corresponding  to 
their  degree  of  consanguinity.  Property  may  be  right- 
fully acquired  in  this  manner. 

5.  By  possession. 

In  many  cases,  although  a  man  have  no  moral  right 
to  property,  yet  he  may  have  a  right  to  exclude  others 
from  it ;  and  others  are  under  obligation  to  leave  him 
unmolested  in  the  use  of  it.  Thus,  a  man  may  by  in- 
heritance come  into  possession  of  an  estate  of  which  the 
rightful  owners  have  all  died.  Now,  although  the  pres- 
ent holder  has  no  just  title  to  the  property,  yet,  if  it 
were  to  be  taken  from  him  and  held  by  another,  the 
second  would  have  no  better  title  than  the  first ;  and  a 
third  person  w^ould  have  the  same  right  to  dispossess 
the  second,  and  in  turn  be  himself  dispossessed,  and  so 
on  forever  ;  that  is,  there  would  be  endless  controversy, 
without  any  nearer  approximation  to  justice  ;  and  hence 
it  is  better  that  the  case  be  left  as  it  was  in  the  first 
instance  ;  that  is,  in  general,  possession  gives  a  right, 
so  far  as  man  is  concerned,  to  unmolested  enjoyment, 
unless  some  one  else  can  establish  a  better  title. 

6.  And  hence,  in  general,  I  believe  it  will  hold  that 
while  merely  the  laws  of  society  do  not  give  a  man  any 
moral  right  to  property,  yet,  when  these  laws  have  once 
assigned  it  to  him,  this  simple  fact  imposes  fi  moral  ob* 
ligation  upon  all  other  men  to  leave  him  in  the  undis- 
turbed possession  of  it.  I  have  no  more  right  to  set 
lire  to  the  house  of  a  man  who  has  defrauded  an  orphan 


THE   RIGHT   OF   PROPERTY.    -       ,  245 

to  obtain  it,  than  I  have  to  set  fire  to  the  house  of  any 
other  man. 

To  sum  up  what  has  been  said  :  Property  may  be 
originally  acquired  either  by  the  gift  of  God,  or  by  our 
own  labor  :  it  may  be  subsequently  acquired  either  by 
exchange,  or  by  gift  during  life,  or  by  will ;  but  in 
these  cases  of  transfer  of  ownership,  the  free  consent  of 
the  original  oivner  is  necessary  to  render  the  transfer 
morally  right ;  and,  lastly,  where  the  individual  has  not 
acquired  property  justl}^,  the  mere  possession,  though 
it  alters  not  his  moral  right  to  possession,  yet  it  is  a 
sufficient  bar  to  molestation,  unless  some  other  claimant 
can  prefer  a  better  title.  These,  I  think,  comprehend 
the  most  important  modes  by  which  the  right  of  prop- 
erty can  be  acquired. 

That  principles  somewhat  analogous  to  these  are  in 
accordance  with  the. laws  of  God,  is,  I  think,  evident 
from  observation  of  the  history  of  man.  The  more 
rigidly  these  principles  have  been  carried  into  active 
operation,  the  gveater  amount  of  happiness  has  been 
pecured  to  the  individual,  the  more  rapidly  have  nations 
advanced  in  civilization,  and  the  more  successfully  have 
they  carried  into  effect  every  means  of  mental  and 
moral  cultivation.  The  first  steps  that  were  taken  in 
the  recovery  of  Europe  from  the  misery  of  the  dark 
ages,  consisted  in  defining  and  establishing  the  right 
of  property  upon  the  basis  of  equitable  and  universal 
law.  Until  something  of  this  sort  is  done,  no  nation 
van  emerge  from  a  state  of  barbarism.^ 

And  hence  we  see  the  importance  of  an  able,  learned, 
ujj/ight,  and  independent  judiciary,  and  the  necessity 
to  national  prosperity  of  carr3dng  the  decisions  of  law 
into  universal  and  impartial  eflect.  It  not  unfrequently 
happens  that,  for  the  purposes  of  party,  the  minds  of 
the  people  are  inflamed  against  the  tribunals  whoso 
duty  it  is  to  administer  justice  ;  or  else,  on  the  other 
hand,  for  the  same  purpose,  a  flagrant  violation  of  jus- 
tice by  a  popular  favorite  is  looked  upon  as  harmless. 
Let  it  be  remembered  that  society  must  be  dissolved 

»  Robertson's  Preliminary  Dissertation  to  the  History  of  Charic*  V. 


246  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

iiDiess  the  supremacy  of  the  law  be  maintained.  *  *  The 
voice  of  the  law  "  will  cease  to  be  *  *  the  harmon}^  of  the 
world,"  unless  **  all  things,"  both  high  and  low,  **  do 
her  reverence."  How  often  has  even-handed  justice 
commended  the  chalice  to  the  lips  of  the  demagogue, 
and  he  has  been  the  first  to  drink  of  that  cup  which  he 
supposed  himself  to  be  mingling  for  others  ! 


SECTION  II. 


KODES  IN  WHICH  THE   RIGHT  OF   PROPERTY  MAT  BE  VIOLATED 
BY  THE   INDIVIDUAL. 

Part  I.  When  the  transfer  of  property  is  permanent. 

I  have  already  remarked  that  the  right  of  property, 
so  far  as  it  extends,  is  exclusive  both  of  the  individual 
and  of  society.  This  is  true  in  respect  to  both  parties. 
Thus,  whatever  I  own,  I  own  exclusively  both  of  society 
and  of  individuals  ;  and  whatever  either  individuals  or 
Bociety  own,  they  own  exclusively  of  me.  Hence  the 
right  of  property  is  equally  violated  by  taking  viciously 
either  public  or  private  property ;  and  it  is  equally 
violated  by  taking  viciously,  whether  the  aggressor  be 
the  public  or  an  individual.  And,  moreover,  it  is  ex- 
clusive to  the  fall  amount  of  lohat  is  owned.  It  is, 
therefore,  as  truly  a  violation  of  the  right  of  property 
to  take  a  little  as  to  take  much  ;  to  purloin  a  book  or  a 
penknife  as  to  steal  money  ;  to  steal  fruit  as  to  steal  a 
horse  ;  to  defraud  the  revenue  as  to  rob  my  neighbor ; 
to  overcharge  the  public  as  to  overcharge  my  brother ; 
to  cheat  the  post-office  as  to  cheat  my  friend. 

It  has  already  been  observed,  that  a  right  to  the 
property  of  another  can  be  acquired  only  by  his  own 
voluntary  choice.  This  follows  immediately  from  the 
definition  of  the  right  of  property.  But,  in  order  to 
render  this  choice,  of  right,  available,  it  must  be  in- 
fluenced by  no  motives  presented  wrongfully  by  the 


VIOLATION   OP  THE   RIGHT  OF   PROPERTY.  247 

receiver.  Thus,  if  I  demand  a  man's  purse  on  the 
alternative  that  I  will  shoot  him  if  he  deny  me,  he 
may  surrender  it  rather  than  be  shot ;  but  I  have  no 
right  to  present  such  an  alternative,  and  the  consent  of 
the  owner  renders  it  no  less  a  violation  of  the  right  of 
property.  If  I  inflame  a  man's  vanity  in  order  to  in- 
duce him  to  buy  of  me  a  coach  which  he  does  not  want, 
the  transaction  is  dishonest ;  because  I  have  gained  his 
will  by  a  motive  which  I  had  no  right  to  use.  So  if  I 
represent  an  article  in  exchange  to  be  different  from 
what  it  is,  I  present  a  false  motive,  and  gain  his  con- 
sent by  a  lie.  And  thus,  in  general,  as  I  have  said, 
a  transfer  of  property  is  morally  wrong  where  the  con- 
sent of  the  owner  is  obtained  by  means  of  a  vicious  act 
on  the  part  of  the  receiver. 

The  right  of  property  may  be  violated  — 

1.  By  taking  property  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
owner,  or  theft.  It  is  here  to  be  remembered  that  the 
consent  of  the  owner  is  necessary  to  any  transfer  of 
property.  We  do  not  vary  the  nature  of  the  act  by 
persuading  ourselves  that  the  owner  will  not  care  about 
it,  or  that  he  would  have  no  objection,  or  that  he  will 
not  know  it,  or  that  it  will  never  injure  him  to  lose  it. 
All  this  may  or  may  not  be  ;  but  none  of  it  varies  the 
moral  character  of  the  transaction.  The  simple  ques- 
tion is.  Has  the  owner  consented  to  the  transfer?  If  he 
have  not,  so  long  as  this  circumstance,  essential  to  a 
righteous  transfer,  is  wanting,  whatever  other  circum- 
stances exist,  it  matters  not  —  the  taking  of  another's 
property  is  theft. 

2 .  By  taking  the  property  of  another  by  consent  ^;^o- 
lently  obtained. 

Such  is  the  case  in  highway  robbery.  Here  we  wick- 
edly obtain  control  over  a  man's  life,  and  then  offer 
him  the  alternative  of  death  or  delivery  of  his  property. 
Inasmuch  as  the  consent  is  no  more  voluntary  than  if 
wc  tied  his  hands  and  took  the  money  out  of  his  pocket, 
the  violation  of  property  is  as  great.  And,  besides 
this,  we  assume  the  power  of  life  and  death  over  an 
individual  over  vhom  we  have  no  ri^fht  whatever.     In 


248  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

this  case  in  fact,  wc  assume  the  unlimited  control  over 
the  life  and  possessions  of  another,  and  on  pain  of 
death  oblige  him  to  surrender  his  property  at  our  will. 
As  here  there  is  a  double  and  aggravated  violation  of 
right,  it  is  in  all  countries  considered  deserving  of  con- 
dign punishment,  and  is  generally  rendered  a  capital 
ofience. 

3.  By  consent  frail  dnlendi/  obtained,  or  cheating. 

This  may  be  of  two  kinds  : 

1.  Where  no  equivaleyit  is  offered,  as  when  a  beggar 
obtains  money  on  false  pretences. 

2.  Where  the  equivalent  is  different  from  what  it  pur- 
ports to  he;  or  where  the  consent  is  obtained  by  an 
immoral  act  on  the  part  of  him  who  obtains  it.  As  this 
includes  by  far  the  greatest  number  of  violations  of  the 
law  of  property,  it  will  require  to  be  treated  of  some- 
what at  length. 

We  shall  divide  it  into  two  parts  :  —  1.  Where  the 
equivalent  is  material;  2.  Where  the  equivalent  is  im- 
material. 

I.  Where  THE  EQUIVALENT  IS  MATERIAL.  This  is  of 
two  kinds;  —  1.  Where  the  transfer  is  perpetual;  2. 
Where  the  transfer  is  temporary. 

First.  Where  the  transfer  qf  property  on  both  sides 
is  perpetual.     This  includes  the  laiv  of  buyer  and  seller. 

The  principal  laws  of  buyer  and  seller  will  be  seen 
from  a  consideration  of  the  relation  in  which  they  stand 
to  each  other.  The  seller,  or  merchant,  is  supposed  to 
devote  his  time  and  capital  to  the  business  of  supplying 
his  neighbors  with  articles  of  use.  For  his  time,  risk, 
interest  of  money,  and  skill,  he  is  entitled  to  an  advance 
on  his  goods ;  and  the  buyer  is  under  a  correspondent 
obligation  to  allow  that  advance,  except  in  the  case 
of  a  change  in  the  market  price,  to  be  noticed  subse- 
quently. 

Iloncc,  1.  The  seller  is  under  obligation  to  furnish 
goods  of  the  same  quality  as  that  ordinarily  furnished 
at  the  same  prices.  He  is  paid  lor  his  skill  in  purchas- 
ing, and  of  course  he  ought  to  possess  that  skill,  or  to 
suiier  the  consequences.     If  he  furnish  goods  of  Una 


VIOLATION   OP  THE   RIGHT   OF   PROPERTY.  249 

quality,  and  they  are,  so  far  as  his  knowledge  extends, 
free  from  any  defect,  lie  is  under  obligation  to  do  noth- 
ing more  than  to  offer  them.  He  is  under  no  obliga- 
tions to  explain  their  adaptation,  and  direct  the  judg- 
ment of  the  buyer.  Having  furnished  goods  to  the  best 
of  his  skill,  and  of  the  ordinary  quality,  his  responsi- 
bility ceases,  and  it  is  the  business  of  the  buyer  to 
decide  whether  the  article  is  adapted  to  his  wants.  If, 
however,  the  seller  have  purchased  a  bad  article,  and 
have  been  deceived,  he  has  no  right  to  sell  it  at  the  reg- 
ular price,  on  the  ground  that  he  gave  as  much  for  it  as 
for  what  should  have  been  good.  The  error  of  judg- 
ment was  his,  and  in  his  own  profession  ;  and  he  must 
bear  the  loss  by  selling  the  article  for  what  it  is  worth. 
That  this  is  the  rule  is  evident  from  the  contrary  case. 
If  he  had,  by  superior  skill,  purchased  an  article  at 
much  less  than  its  value,  he  would  consider  himself 
entitled  to  the  advantage,  and  justly.  Where  he  is 
entitled,  however,  to  the  benefit  of  his  skill,  he  must, 
under  correspondent  circumstances,  suffer  from  the 
want  of  it.  Hence  we  say  that  a  seller  is  under  obliga- 
tion to  furnish  goods  at  the  market  price,  and  of  the 
market  quality,  but  is  under  no  obligation  to  assist  the 
judgment  of  the  buyer,  unless  the  article  for  sale  is 
defective,  and  then  he  is  under  obligation  to  reveal  it. 

The  only  exception  to  this  rule  is  when,  from  the 
conditions  of  the  sale,  it  is  known  that  no  guaranty  is 
offered  ;  as  when  a  horse  is  sold  at  auction  without  any 
recommendation.  Here  every  man  knows  that  he  bu^'S 
at  his  own  risk,  and  bids  accordingly. 

2.  Every  one  who  makes  it  a  business  to  sell,  is  not 
only  hound  to  sell,  but  is  also  at  libertt/  to  sell,  at  the 
market  price.  That  he  is  at  liberty  to  sell  is  equally 
evident ;  for  as  he  is  obliged  to  sell  without  remunera- 
tion, or  even  with  loss  if  the  article  fall  in  price  while 
in  his  possession,  so  he  is  at  liberty  to  sell  it  at  above  a 
fair  remuneration  if  the  price  of  the  article  advances. 
As  he  must  suffer  in  case  of  the  fall  of  merchandise,  he 
is  entitled  to  the  correspondent  gain  if  merchandise 
rises  :  and  thus  his  chance  on  both  sides  is  equalized. 


250  PRACirCAL   ETHICS. 

Besides,  by  allowing  the  price  of  an  article  to  rise  with 
its  scarcity,  the  rise  itself  is  in  the  end  checked  ;  since, 
by  attracting  an  unusual  amount  of  products  to  the 
place  of  scarcity,  the  price  is  speedily  reduced  again  to 
the  ordinary  and  natural  equilibrium  of  supply  and 
demand. 

It  should,  however,  be  remarked  that  this  rule  applies 
mainly  to  those  whose  occupation  it  is  to  traffic  in  the 
article  bought  and  sold.  A  dealer  in  china-ware  is 
bound  to  sell  china-ware  at  the  market  price  ;  but  if  a 
man  insist  upon  buying  his  coat,  he  is  under  no  such 
obligation,  for  this  is  not  his  occupation.  Should  he  put 
himself  to  inconvenience  by  selling  his  apparel  to  gratify 
the  whim  of  his  neighbor,  he  may,  if  he  will,  charge  an 
extra  price  for  this  inconvenience.  The  rule  applies  in 
any  other  similar  case.  It  would,  however,  become  an 
honest  man  fairly  to  state  that  he  did  not  sell  at  the 
market  price,  but  that  he  charged  what  he  chose,  as  a 
remuneration  for  his  trouble. 

3 .  The  seller  has  no  right  to  influence  the  will  of  the 
buyer  by  any  motives  aside  from  those  derived  from  the 
real  value  of  the  article  in  question. 

Thus,  he  has  no  right  to  appeal  to  the  fears,  or  hopes, 
or  avarice  of  the  buyer.  This  rule  is  violated  when, 
in  dealings  on  the  exchange,  false  information  is  circu- 
lated for  the  purpose  of  raising  or  depressing  the  price 
of  stocks.  It  is  violated  by  speculators  who  monopolize 
an  article  to  create  an  artificial  scarcity,  and  thus  raise 
the  price,  while  the  supply  is  abundant.  The  case  is 
the  same  when  a  salesman  looks  upon  a  stranger  who 
enters  his  store,  and  deliberately  calculates  how  he  shall 
best  influence  and  excite  and  mislead  his  mind,  so  as 
to  sell  the  greatest  amount  of  goods  at  the  most  exorbi- 
tant profit.  And,  in  general,  any  attempt  to  influence 
the  mind  of  the  purchaser  by  motives  aside  from  those 
derived  from  the  true  character  of  the  article  for  sale, 
arc  always  doubtful,  and  generally  vicious. 

These  remarks  have  been  made  with  respect  to  the 
seller.  But  it  is  man ifest  that  they  are  j ust  as  applicable 
to  the  buyer.    Both  parties  are  under  equally  imperative 


VIOLATION  OF   THE   RIGHT  OF  PROPERTY.  251 

and  correspondent  obligations.  If  the  seller  be  bound 
to  furnish  an  article  of  ordinary  quality,  and  to  sell  it  at 
the  market  price,  —  that  is,  if  he  be  obliged  to  exert  his 
skill  for  the  benefit  of  the  buyer,  and  to  charge  for  that 
skill  and  capital  no  more  than  a  fair  remuneration, — 
then  the  buyer  is  under  the  same  obligation  freely  and 
willingly  to  pay  that  remimeration.  It  is  disgraceful  to 
him  to  wish  the  seller  to  labor  for  him  for  nothing,  or 
for  less  than  a  fair  compensation.  If  the  seller  has  no 
right  by  extraneous  considerations  to  influence  the 
motives  of  the  buyer,  the  buyer  has  no  right  by  any 
such  considerations  to  influence  the  motives  of  the  seller. 
The  buyer  is  guilty  of  fraud  if  he  underrate  the  seller's 
goods,  or  by  any  of  the  artifices  of  traflic  induces  him 
to  sell  at  less  than  a  fair  rate  of  profit.  **  Tis  naught, 
'tis  naught,  saith  the  buyer ;  but  when  he  goeth  his 
way,  then  he  boasteth."  Such  conduct  is  as  dishonest 
and  dishonorable  now  as  it  was  in  the  days  of  Solomon. 

It  has  also  been  observed  above,  that  when  the  seller 
knows  of  any  defect  in  his  product,  he  is  bound  to  de- 
clare it.  The  same  rule,  of  course,  applies  to  the  buyer. 
If  he  know  that  the  value  of  the  article  has  risen,  with- 
out the  possibility  of  the  owner's  knowledge,  he  is  bound 
to  inform  him  of  this  change  in  its  value.  The  sale  is 
otherwise  fraudulent.  Hence  all  purchases  and  sales 
efiected  in  consequence  of  secret  information  procured 
in  advance  of  our  neighbor,  are  dishonest.  If  property 
rise  in  value  by  the  providence  of  God  while  in  my 
neighbor's  possession,  that  rise  of  value  is  as  much  his 
as  the  property  itself;  and  I  may  as  honestly  deprive 
him  of  the  one  without  an  equivalent  as  of  the  other. 

The  ordinary  pleas  by  which  men  excuse  themselves 
for  the  violation  of  the  moral  law  of  property  are  weak 
and  wicked.  Thus,  when  men  sell  articles  of  a  diflerent 
quality  from  that  which  their  name  imports,  —  as  when 
wines  or  liquors  are  diluted  or  compounded,  when  the 
ordinary  weight  or  measure  is  curtailed,  or  where  em- 
ployers defraud  ignorant  persons  of  their  wages,  as  I 
am  told  is  frequently  the  case  with  those  who  employ 
various  classes  of  laborers, — it  is  common  to  hear  it 


252  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

remarked,  *'  The  competition  is  so  great  that  we  could 
Bell  nothing  unless  we  adopted  these  methods ; "  or 
else,  '*  The  practice  is  universal ;  and  if  we  did  not  do 
thus,  other  persons  would,  and  so  the  evil  would  not 
be  diminished."  To  all  this  it  is  sufficient  to  reply : 
The  law  of  God  is  explicit  on  this  subject.  *'Thou 
shalt  love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself ;  "  and  God  allows  of 
no  excuses  for  the  violation  of  his  commands.  "  He 
hath  showed  it  unto  them :  therefore  they  are  without 
excuse."  These  pleas  are  either  true  or  false.  It  false, 
they  ought  to  be  abandoned.  If  true,  then  the  traffic 
itself  must  be  given  up  ;  for  no  man  has  any  right  to  be 
engaged  in  any  pursuit  in  violation  of  the  laws  of  God. 

A  bargain  is  concluded  when  both  parties  have  sig^ 
nified  to  each  other  their  ivill  to  make  the  transfer ;  that 
is,  that  each  chooses  to  part  with  his  own  property,  and 
to  receive  the  property  of  the  other  in  exchange. 
Henceforth,  all  the  risk  of  loss  and  all  the  chances  of  gain 
are  of  course  mutually  transferred,  although  the  articles 
themselves  remain  precisely  as  they  were  before.  If  a 
merchant  buy  a  cargo  of  tea  —  after  the  sale,  no  matter 
where  the  tea  is,  the  chances  of  loss  or  gain  are  his ; 
and  they  are  as  much  his  in  one  place  as  in  another. 

So,  if  the  article,  after  the  sale,  have  become  injured 
before  I  take  actual  possession  of  it,  I  bear  the  loss ; 
because,  the  right  of  ownership  being  vested  in  me,  I 
could  have  removed  it  if  I  chose,  and  no  one  had  a 
right,  without  my  direction,  to  remove  it. 

The  only  exception  to  this  exists  in  the  case  where, 
by  custom  or  contract,  the  obligation  to  deliver  is  one 
of  the  conditions  of  the  sale.  Here  the  seller,  of  course, 
charges  more  for  assuming  the  responsibility  to  deliver, 
and  he  is  to  bear  the  risk,  for  which  he  is  fairly  paid. 
It  is  frequently  a  question,  When  is  the  act  of  delivery 
completed  ?  This  must  be  settled  by  precedent,  and 
can  rarely  be  known  in  any  country  until  a  decision 
is  had  in  the  courts  of  law.  As  soon  as  such  a  case  is 
adjudicated,  the  respective  parties  govern  themselves 
accordingly. 


VIOLATION   OF   THE   RIGHT   OF   PROPERTY.  253 

Part  II.  When  the  transfer  of  property  is  temporary/. 
In  this  case  the  borrower  pays  a  stipulated  equivalent 
for  the  use  of  it. 

That  he  should  do  so  is  manifestly  just,  because  the 
property  in  the  hands  of  the  owner  is  capable  of  pro- 
ducing an  increase,  and  the  owner,  if  he  held  it,  would 
derive  the  benefit  of  that  increase.  If  he  part  with  this 
benefit  for  the  advantage  of  another,  it  is  just  that  the 
other  should  allow  him  a  fair  remuneration.  If  the 
borrower  could  not,  after  paying  this  remuneration, 
grow  richer  than  he  would  be  without  the  use  of  his 
neighbor's  capital,  he  would  not  borrow.  But,  inas- 
much as  he  by  the  use  of  it  can  be  benefited  after  pay- 
ing for  the  use,  no  reason  can  be  conceived  why  he 
should  not  pay  for  it. 

The  remuneration  paid  for  the  use  of  capital  in  the 
form  of  money  is  called  interest;  when  in  the  form  of 
land  or  houses,  it  is  called  rent. 

The  principles  on  which  the  rate  of  this  remuneration 
is  justly  fixed,  are  these  :  The  borrower  paj^s,  first,  for 
the  use  ;  and,  secondly,  for  the  risk. 

1.  For  the  use. 

Capital  is  more  useful,  that  is,  it  is  capable  of  pro- 
ducing a  greater  remuneration,  at  some  times  than  at 
others.  Thus  a  flour-mill  in  some  seasons  is  more 
productive  than  in  others.  Land  in  some  places  is  ca- 
pable of  yielding  a  greater  harvest  than  in  others.  And 
thus  at  difi*erent  times  the  same  property  may  be  ca- 
pable of  bringing  in  a  very  diflferent  income.  And  in 
general,  where  the  amount  of  capital  to  be  loaned  is 
great,  and  the  number  of  those  who  want  to  borrow 
small,  the  interest  will  be  low  ;  and  where  the  number 
of  borrowers  is  great,  and  the  amount  of  capital  small, 
the  rate  of  interest  will  be  high.  The  reasons  of  all 
this  are  too  obvious  to  need  illustration. 

2.  For  the  risk. 

When  an  owner  parts  with  his  property,  it  is  put 
under  the  control  of  the  borrower,  and  passes,  of  course, 
beyond  the  control  of  the  owner.  Here  there  arises  a 
risk  over  which  he  has  no  control.     It  varies  with  tha 


254  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

character  of  the  borrower  for  prudence  and  skill,  and 
with  the  kind  of  business  in  which  he  is  eno^asred. 
Property  in  ships  is  exposed  to  a  greater  risk  than  prop- 
erty in  land.  A  man  would  consider  the  chance  of 
having  his  property  returned  much  better,  if  employed 
jn  the  building  of  dwelling-houses,  than  in  the  manu- 
facture of  gunpowder.  Now,  as  all  these  circumstances 
of  risk  may  enter  more  or  less  into  every  loan,  it  is 
evident  that  they  must,  in  justice,  vary  the  rate  at  which 
a  loan  may  be  procured.  The  risk  is  frequently  re- 
moved by  the  custom  of  endorsing.  Here  another 
guarantees  for  the  borrower  the  payment  of  his  note. 
If  the  endorser  be  good,  there  is  then  no  risk  to  be  paid 
for.  The  endorser  who  assumes  the  risk  is,  however, 
entitled  to  a  fair  remuneration. 

Hence  I  think  that  the  rate  of  interest  of  every  sort, 
being  liable  to  so  many  circumstances  of  variation, 
should  not  in  any  case  be  fixed  by  law,  but  should  be 
left  in  all  cases  to  the  discretion  of  the  parties  concerned. 

This  remark  applies  as  well  to  loans  of  mon^y  as  to 
loans  of  other  property,  because  the  reasons  apply  just 
as  much  to  these  as  to  any  other.  If  it  be  said  men 
may  charge  exorbitant  interest,  I  reply,  so  they  may 
charge  exorbitant  rent  for  houses,  and  exorbitant  hire 
for  horses.  And  I  ask,  How  is  this  evil  of  exorbitant 
charges  in  other  cases  remedied  ?  The  answer  is  plain. 
We  allow  a  perfectly  free  competition,  and  then  the 
man  who  will  not  loan  his  property  unless  at  an  exor- 
bitant price,  is  underbidden,  and  his  own  rapacitj^  de- 
feats and  punishes  itself. 

And,  on  the  contrary,  by  fixing  alegal  rate  of  interest, 
we  throw  the  whole  community  into  the  power  of  those 
who  are  willing  to  violate  the  law.  For,  as  soon  as  the 
actual  value  of  money  is  more  than  the  legal  value, 
those  who  consider  themselves  under  obligation  to  obey 
the  laws  of  the  land,  will  not  loan  ;  for  they  can  employ 
their  property  to  better  advantage.  Hence,  if  all  were 
obedient  to  the  law,  as  soon  as  projierty  arrived  at  this 
point  of  value,  loans  would  instantly  and  universally 
cease.     But  as  some  persons  are  willing  to  evade  the 


VIOLATION    OF   THE   RIGHT   OF   PROPERTY.  255 

law,  they  will  loan  at  illegal  interest ;  and  as  the  capital 
of  those  who  are  conscientious  is  withdrawn  from  the 
market,  and  an  artificial  scarcity  is  thus  produced,  those 
who  are  not  conscientious  have  it  in  their  power  to 
charge  whatever  they  choose. 

Again :  when  we  pay  for  money  loaned,  we  pay,  first, 
for  the  use,  and  second  for  the  risk;  that  is,  we  pay 
literally  a  premium  of  insurance.  As  both  of  these 
vary  with  difference  of  time,  and  with  different  indi- 
viduals, there  is  a  double  reason  for  variation  in  the 
rate  of  interest.  When  we  have  a  house  insured,  we 
pay  only  for  the  risk  ;  and  hence  there  is  here  only  a 
single  cause  of  variation.  But  while  all  governments 
have  fixed  the  rate  of  interest  by  law,  they  have  never 
fixed  the  rate  of  insurance;  which,  being  less  variable, 
is  more  properly  subject  to  a  fixed  rule.  This  is  surely 
inconsistent ;  is  it  not  also  unjust? 

Nevertheless,  for  the  sake  of  avoiding  disputes  and 
errors  of  ignorance,  it  might  be  wise  for  society  te  enact 
by  hiw  what  shall  be  the  rate  of  interest  in  cases  where 
no  rate  is  otherwise  specified.  This  is  the  extent  of  its 
proper  jurisdiction  ;  and  doing  anything  further  is,  I 
think,  not  only  injurious  to  the  interests  of  the  com- 
munity, but  also  a  violation  of  the  right  of  property. 
While,  however,  I  hold  this  to  be  true,  I  by  no  means 
hold  that,  the  laws  remaining  as  they  are,  any  individ- 
ual is  justified  in  taking  or  giving  more  than  the  legal 
rate  of  interest.  When  conscience  does  not  forbid,  it  is 
the  business  of  a  good  citizen  to  obey  the  laws  ;  and  the 
faithful  obedience  to  an  unwise  law  is  generally  the 
surest  way  of  working  its  overthrow. 

We  shall  now  proceed  to  consider  the  laws  which 
govern  this  mode  of  transfer  of  property. 

The  loan  of  money. 

1.  The  lender  is  bound  to  demand  no  more  than  a 
fair  remuneration  for  the  use  of  his  capital,  and  for  the 
risk  to  which  it  is  exposed. 

2.  He  is  bound  to  make  use  of  no  unlawful  means 
to  influence  the  decision  of  the  borrower.  The  princi- 
ples here  are  the  same  as  those  which  should  govern 


256  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

the  permanent  exchange  of  property.  All  rumors  ana 
false  alarms,  and  all  combinations  of  capitalists  to  raise* 
by  a  monopoly  the  price  of  money,  are  manifestly  dis- 
honest ;  nor  are  they  the  less  so  because  many  persons 
may  enter  into  them,  or  because  they  have  the  skill  or 
tlie  power  to  evade  the  laws  of  the  land. 

3.  The  horroiver  is  bound  to  pay  a  just  equivalent, 
as  I  have  stated  above  ;  and  he  is  equally  forbidden  to 
use  any  dishonest  motives  to  influence  the  decision  of 
the  lender. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  the  risk  of  the  property  is  one  part  of 
the  consideration  for  which  the  owner  receives  remuner- 
ation, and  as  this  is  in  every  case  supposed  to  be  a  spe- 
cified quantity,  the  borrower  has  no  right  to  expose  the 
property  of  another  to  any  risk  not  contemplated  in  the 
contract.  Hence  he  has  no  right  to  invest  it  in  a  more 
hazardous  trade,  or  to  employ  it  in  a  more  hazardous 
speculation,  than  that  for  which  he  borrowed  it ;  and 
if  he  do,  he  is  using  it  in  a  manner  for  which  he  has 
paid  no  equivalent.  He  is  also  under  obligation  to  take 
all  the  care  to  avoid  losses  which  he  would  take  if  tbe 
property  were  his  own ;  and  to  use  the  same  skill  to 
conduct  his  afiairs  successfully.  When,  however,  the 
risk  is  removed  by  endorsing,  so  far  as  the  lender  is 
concerned,  he  may  use  it  at  his  discretion. 

5.  He  is  also  bound  to  repay  the  loan  exactly  accord- 
ing to  the  terms  specified  in  the  contract.  This  requires 
that  he  pay  the  full  sum  promised,  and  that  be  pay  it 
precisely  at  the  time  promised.  A  failure,  iu  either 
case,  is  a  breach  of  the  contract. 

The  question  is  often  asked,  whether  a  debtor  is  mor- 
ally liberated  by  an  act  of  insolvency.  I  think  not,  if 
he  ever  afterwards  have  the  means  of  repayment.  It 
may  be  said,  this  is  oppressive  to  debtors  ;  but,  we  ask 
is  not  the  contrary  principle  oppressive  to  creditors  ? 
and  are  not  the  rights  of  one  partyjust  as  valuable,  and 
just  as  much  rights,  as  those  of  the  other?  It  may 
also  be  remarked  that,  were  this  principle  acted  upon, 
there  would  be  fewer  debtors,  and  vastly  fewer  insol- 
vents.    The  amount  of.  money  actually  lost  by  insoi- 


VIOLATION  OF  THE   RIGHT   OF   PROPERTT.  257 

fency  is  absolutely  enormous  ;  and  it  is  generally  lost 
by  causeless,  reckless  speculation,  by  childish  and  inex 
cusable  extravagance,  or  by  gambling  and  profligacy, 
which  are  all  stimulated  into  activity  by  the  facility  of 
credit,  and  the  readiness  with  which  debts  may  be  can 
celled  by  acts  of  insolvency.  The  more  rigidly  contracts 
are  observed,  the  more  rapidly  will  the  capital  of  a 
country  increase,  the  greater  will  be  the  inducements 
to  industry,  and  the  stronger  will  be  the  barriers  against 
extravagance  and  vice. 

Of  the  loan  of  other  property , 

The  principles  which  apply  in  this  case  are  very  sim- 
ilar to  those  which  have  been  already  stated. 

1.  The  lender  is  bound  to  furnish  an  article  which, 
so  far  as  he  knows,  is  adapted  to  the  purposes  of  the 
borrower ;  that  is,  if  the  thing  borrowed  has  any  in- 
ternal defect,  he  is  bound  to  reveal  it.  If  I  loan  a 
horse  to  a  man  who  wishes  to  ride  forty  miles  to-day, 
which  I  know  is  able  to  go  but  thirty,  it  is  a  fraud.  If 
I  let  to  a  man  a  house  which  I  know  to  be  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  a  nuisance,  or  to  be  in  part  uninhabitable 
from  smoky  chimneys,  and  do  not  inform  him,  it  is 
fraud.  The  loss  in  the  value  of  the  property  is  mine, 
and  I  have  no  right  to  transfer  it  to  another. 

2.  So  the  lender  has  a  right  to  charge  the  market 
price  arising  from  the  considerations  of  use,  risk,  and 
variation  in  supply  and  demand.  This  depends  upon 
the  same  principles  as  those  already  explained. 

3.  The  borrower  is  bound  to  take  the  same  care  of 
the  property  of  another  as  he  would  of  his  own ;  to 
put  it  to  no  risk  difterent  from  that  specified  or  under- 
stood in  the  contract;  and  to  pay  the  j)rice,  upon  the 
principle  stated  above.  Neither  party  has  any  right  to 
influence  the  other  by  any  motives  extraneous  to  the 
simple  business  of  the  transfer. 

4.  The  borrower  is  bound  to  return  the  property 
loaned  precisely  according  to  the  contract.  This  in- 
cludes both  time  and  condition.  He  must  return  it  at 
the  time  specified,  and  in  the  condition  in  which  ho 
received  it,  ordinary  wear  and  tear  only  excepted.    If 


258  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

I  hire  a  house  for  a  year,  and  so  damage  its  paper  and 
paint  that,  before  it  can  be  let  again,  it  will  cost  half  the 
price  of  the  rent  to  put  it  in  repair,  it  is  a  gross  fraud. 
I  have  by  negligence,  or  other  cause,  defrauded  the 
owner  of  half  his  rent.  It  is  just  as  immoral  as  to 
l^ay  him  the  whole,  and  then  pick  his  pocket  of  the 
half  of  what  he  had  received . 

The  important  question  arises  here,  If  a  loss  happen 
while  the  property  is  in  the  hands  of  the  borrower,  on 
whom  shall  it  fall?  The  principle  I  suppose  to  be  this  : 

1.  If  it  happen  while  the  property  is  subject  to  the 
use  specified  in  the  contract,  the  owner  bears  it ;  because 
it  is  to  be  supposed  that  he  foresaw  the  risk,  and  re- 
ceived remuneration  for  it.  As  he  was  paid  for  the 
risk,  he  of  course  has  assumed  it,  and  justly  suffers  it. 

2.  If  the  loss  happen  in  consequence  of  any  use  not 
contemplated  in  the  contract,  then  the  borrower  suffers 
it.  He  having  paid  nothing  for  insurance  against  this 
risk,  there  is  nobody  but  himself  to  sustain  it,  and  he 
sustains  it  accordingly.  Besides,  were  any  other  prin- 
ciple adopted,  it  must  put  an  end  to  the  whole  business 
of  loaning ;  for  no  one  would  part  with  his  property 
temporarily,  to  be  used  in  any  manner  the  borrower 
pleased,  and  be  himself  responsible  for  all  the  loss. 
If  a  horse  die  while  I  am  using  it  well,  and  for  the 
purpose  specified,  the  owner  suffers.  If  it  die  by  care- 
less driving,  I  suffer  the  loss.  He  is  bound  to  furnish 
a  good  horse,  and  I  a  competent  driver. 

3.  So,  on  the  contrary,  if  a  gain  arise  unexpectedly. 
If  this  gain  was  one  which  was  contemplated  in  the 
contract,  it  belongs  to  the  borrower.  If  not,  he  has  no 
equitable  claim  to  it.  If  I  hire  a  farm,  I  am  entitled, 
without  any  additional  charge  for  rent,  to  all  the  ad- 
vantages arising  from  the  rise  in  the  price  of  wheat,  or 
from  my  own  skill  in  agriculture.  But  if  a  mine  of 
coal  be  discovered  on  the  farm,  I  have  no  right  to  the 
benefit  of  working  it,  for  I  did  not  hire  the  farm  foi 
this  purpose. 

The  case  of  insurance. 

Here  no  transfer  of  property  is  made,  and,  of  course. 


VIOLATION   tJF   THE   RIGET   OF   PROPERTT.  258 

nothing  is  paid  for  use.  But  the  owner  chooses  to 
transfer  the  risk  of  use  from  himself  to  others,  and  to 
pay  for  their  assuming  this  risk  a  stipulated  equiva- 
lent. The  loss  to  society,  of  property  insured,  is  just 
the  same  as  when  it  is  uninsured.  A  town  is  just 
as  much  poorer  when  property  is  destroyed  that  is 
insured,  provided  it  be  insured  in  the  town,  as  though 
no  insurance  were  effected.  The  only  difference  is, 
that  the  loss  is  equalized.  Ten  men  can  more  easily 
replace  one  hundred  dollars  apiece,  who  have  nine 
hundred  remaining,  than  the  eleventh  can  replace  his 
whole  property  of  one  thousand. 

The  rule  in  this  case  is  simple.  The  insured  is 
bound  fully  to  reveal  to  the  insurer  every  circumstance 
within  his  knowledge  which  could  in  any  measure  af- 
fect the  value  of  the  risk ;  that  is  to  say,  the  property 
must  be,  so  far  as  he  knows,  what  it  purports  to  be, 
and  the  risks  none  other  than  such  as  he  reveals  them. 
If  he  expose  the  property  to  other  risks,  the  insurance 
is  void  ;  and  the  underwriter,  if  the  property  be  lost, 
refuses  to  remunerate  him;  and  if  it  be  safe,  he  re- 
turns the  premium.  If  the  loss  occur  within  the  terms 
of  the  policy,  the  insurer  is  bound  fully  and  faithfully 
to  make  remuneration,  precisely  according  to  the  teims 
of  the  contract. 

As  to  the  rate  of  insurance,  very  little  need  be  said. 
It  varies  with  every  risk,  and  is  made  up  of  so  many 
conflicting  circumstances,  that  it  must  be  agreed  upon 
by  the  parties  themselves.  When  the  market  in  this 
species  of  traffic  is  unrestrained  by  monopolies,  the 
price  of  insurance,  like  that  of  any  other  commodity, 
will  regulate  itself. 

Part  III.  The  case  next  to  be  considered  is  that 
in  which  the  equivalent  is  immaterial ;  as  where  one 
party  pays  remuneration  for  some  service  rendered  by 
the  other. 

The  principal  cases  here  are  these  :  That  of  master 
and  servant,  and  that  of  principal  and  agent. 

1.  Of  master  and  servant. 


260  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

a.  The  master  is  bound  to  allow  to  the  servant  a 
fair  remuneration.  This  is  justly  estimated  by  uniting 
the  considerations  of  labor,  skill,  and  fidelity,  varied  by 
the  rise  and  fall  of  the  price  of  such  labor  in  the  mar- 
ket. As  this,  however,  would  be  liable  to  inconvenient 
fluctuation,  it  is  generally  adjusted  by  a  rate  agreed 
upon  by  the  parties. 

6.  He  is  bound  to  allow  him  all  the  privileges  to 
which  moral  law  or  established  usage  entitles  him, 
unless  something  different  from  the  latter  has  been  stip- 
ulated in  the  contract ;  and  he  is  at  liberty  to  require 
of  him  service  upon  the  same  principles. 

c.  The  servant  is  bound  to  perform  the  labor  as- 
signed him  by  usage  or  by  contract  (matters  of  con- 
science only  excepted),  with  all  the  skill  which  he 
possesses,  making  the  interests  of  the  employer  his  own. 
If  either  party  fail, — that  is,  if  the  master  demand 
service  for  which  he  does  not  render  compensation,  or 
if  the  servant  receive  wages  for  which  he  does  not 
render  the  stipulated  equivalent,  —  there  is  a  violation 
of  the  right  of  property.  Thus,  also,  there  is  a  viola- 
tion of  right  if  the  master  do  not  fulfil  the  terms  of 
the  contract  just  as  it  was  made  ;  as,  for  instance,  if  he 
do  not  pay  a  servant  punctually.  When  the  service  is 
performed,  the  wages  belong  to  the  servant,  and  the 
master  has  no  more  right  to  them  than  to  the  property 
of  any  one  else.  Thus  saith  St.  James  :  **  The  hire  of 
your  laborers  that  have  reaped  your  fields,  that  is  kept 
back  by  fraud,  crieth,  and  the  cry  is  come  into  the  ears 
of  the  Lord  of  Sabaoth."  And,  on  the  contrary,  the 
servant  is  bound  to  use  his  whole  skill  and  economy  in 
managing  the  property  of  his  master ;  and  if  he  destroy 
it  by  negligence  or  fault,  he  ought  to  make  restitution. 

2.  Oi  principal  and  agent. 

It  frequently  happens  that,  in  the  transaction  of  busi- 
ness, duties  devolve  upon  an  individual  which  are  to 
be  discharged  in  different  places  at  the  same  time.  In 
other  cases,  in  consequence  of  the  division  of  labor,  he 
requires  something  to  be  done  for  him  which  another 
person  can  do  better  than  himself.      In  both  cases. 


VIOLATION   OF   THE   RIOHT   OF   PROPERTY.  261 

either  from  necessity,  or  for  his  own  convenience  and 
interest,  he  employs  other  men  as  agents. 

Agencies  are  of  two  kinds  ;  first,  where  the  principal 
simply  employs  another  to  fulfil  his  own  (that  is,  the 
principal's)  will.  Here  the  principal's  will  is  the  rule, 
both  as  to  the  object  to  be  accomplished,  and  the  man- 
ner in  which,  and  the  means  whereby,  it  is  to  be  ac- 
complished. Secondly,  where  the  principal  designates 
only  the  objects  to  be  accomplished,  reposing  special 
trust  in  the  skill  and  fidelity  of  the  agent  as  to  the 
means  by  which  it  is  to  be  accomplished.  Such  I  sup- 
pose to  be  the  case  in  regard  to  professional  assistance 

The  laws  on  this  subject  respect, ^r**^,  the  relation 
existing  between  the  principal  and  the  community ; 
and,  secondly,  the  relation  existing  between  the  prin- 
cipal and  agent. 

I.  The  principal  is  bound  by  the  acts  of  the  agent 
while  the  agent  is  employed  in  the  business  for  which 
the  principal  has  engaged  him ;  but  he  is  responsible 
no  further. 

Thus,  it  is  known  that  a  merchant  employs  a  clerk 
to  receive  money  on  his  account.  For  his  clerk's 
transactions  in  this  part  of  his-  affairs  he  is  responsible  ; 
but  he  would  not  be  responsible  if  money  were  paid  to 
his  porter  or  coachman,  because  he  does  not  employ 
them  for  this  purpose.  Hence,  if  the  clerk  be  unfaith- 
ful, and  secrete  the  money,  the  merchant  suffers  :  if  the 
coachman  receive  the  money,  and  be  unfaithful,  the 
payer  suffers.  It  is  the  merchant's  business  to  employ 
suitable  agents  ;  but  it  is  the  business  of  his  customers 
to  apply  to  those  agents  only  whom  he  has  employed. 

An  important  question  arises  here,  namely.  When 
is  it  to  be  understood  that  a  principal  has  employed  ai 
agent?  It  is  generally  held  that,  if  the  principal  ac- 
knowledge himself  responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  agent, 
he  is  hereafter  held  to  be  responsible  for  similar  acts, 
until  he  gives  notice  to  the  contrary. 

II.  Laws  arising  from  the  relation  subsisting  between 
the  principal  and  the  agent. 

1 .  The  laws  respecting  compensation  are  the  same  a3 


262  PRACTICAL   ETEICS. 

those  already  specified,  and  therefore  need  not  be 
repeated. 

2.  The  agent  is  bound  to  give  the  same  care  to  the 
afitiirs  of  tiie  principal  as  to  his  own.  He  is  another 
self,  and  should  act  in  that  capacity.  The  necessity  of 
this  rule  is  apparent  from  the  fact  that  no  other  rule 
could  be  devised,  either  by  which  the  one  party  would 
know  what  justly  to  demand,  or  the  other  when  the 
demands  of  justice  were  fulfilled. 

Hence,  if  an  agent  do  not  give  all  the  care  to  the 
afiairs  of  his  principal  that  he  would  do  to  his  own,  and 
loss  occur,  he  ought  to  sustain  it.  If  a  lawyer  lose  a 
cause  through  negligence  or  palpable  ignorance,  he 
ought,  in  justice,  to  suffer  the  consequences.  He  re- 
ceives fees  for  conducting  the  cause  to  the  best  of  his 
ability,  and,  by  undertaking  to  conduct  it,  puts  it  out 
of  the  power  of  the  client  to  employ  any  one  else. 
Thus,  if  he  neglect  it,  and  by  neglecting  it  his  client  is 
worse  off  than  if  he  had  not  undertaken  it,  he  accepts 
fees  for  really  injuring  his  neighbor.  He  ought  to  bear 
the  loss  which  has  occurred  by  his  own  fault. 

A  question  frequently  arises  here  of  considerable  im- 
portance. It  is.  When  is  he  obliged  to  obey  the  in- 
structions of  his  principal,  and  when  is  he  obliged  to 
act  without  regard  to  them  ?  Although  this  question 
comes  only  inclirectly  under  the  right  of  property,  it 
may  be  as  well  to  notice  it  here  as  anywhere  else. 

The  question,  I  suppose,  is  to  be  answered  by  decid- 
ing to  which  of  the  above  specified  kinds  of  agencies 
the  case  to  be  considered  belongs. 

1.  If  it  be  simple  agency,  —  that  is,  where  the  agent 
undertakes  merely  to  execute  the  will  of  the  principal, 
and  in  the  manner  and  by  the  means  specified  by  the 
principal, — he  must  obey  implicitly  (conscience  only  ex- 
cepted) ,  unless  some  fact  material  to  the  formation  of  a 
judgment  has  come  to  light,  after  giving  the  order, 
which,  if  known,  would  have  necessarily  modified  the 
intention  of  the  principal.  This  is  the  law  of  the  mili- 
tary service.  Here,  even  when  the  reason  for  disobe- 
dience of  oi'ders  is  ever  so  clear,  and  an  agent  disobeys, 


VIOLATION   OF   THE   RIGHT   OF  PROPERTY.  263 

he  does  it  at  his  own  risk ;  and  hence  the  modifying 
facts  should  be  obvious  and  explicit  in  order  to  justify 
a  variation  from  the  instructions. 

2.  When  the  agency  is  of  the  other  kind,  and  the 
will  of  the  principal  is  only  supposed  to  direct  the  end, 
while  the  means  and  manner  are  to  be  decided  upon  by 
the  professional  skill  of  the  agent,  I  suppose  that  the 
agent  is  not  bound  to  obey  the  directions  of  his  princi- 
pal. He  is  supposed  to  know  more  on  the  subject,  and 
to  be  better  able  to  decide  what  will  benefit  his  principal 
than  the  principal  himself;  and  he  has  no  right  to  in- 
jure another  man,  even  if  the  other  man  desire  it ;  nor 
has  he  a  right  to  lend  himself  as  an  instrument  by  which 
another  man,  by  consequence  of  his  ignorance,  shall 
injure  himself.  Besides,  every  man  has  a  professional 
reputation  to  sustain,  on  which  his  means  of  living  de- 
pend. He  has  no  right  to  injure  this  for  the  sake  of 
gratifying  another,  especially  when,  by  so  gratifying 
the  other,  he  shall  ruin  himself  also.  A  physician  has* 
no  right  to  give  his  patient  drugs  which  will  poison  him, 
because  a  patient  wishes  it.  A  lawyer  has  no  right  to 
bring  a  cause  into  court  in  snch  a  manner  as  will  insui  e 
the  loss  of  it,  because  his  client  insists  upon  it.  The 
professional  agent  is  bound  to  conduct  the  business  of 
his  profession  to  the  best  of  his  ability.  This  is  the  end 
of  his  responsibility.  If  it  please  his  client,  well.  If 
not,  the  relation  must  cease,  and  the  principal  must 
find  another  agent. 

A  representative  in  Congress  is  manifestly  an  agent 
of  the  latter  of  these  two  classes.  He  is  chosen  on 
account  of  his  supposed  legislative  ability.  Hence  he 
is  a  strictly  professional  agent,  and  on  these  principles 
he  is  under  no  obligation  to  regard  the  instructions  of 
his  constituents.  He  is  merely  bound  to  promote  their 
best  interests  ;  but  the  manner  of  doing  it  is  to  be  decided 
by  his  superior  skill  and  ability. 

But,  secondly,  is  he  bound  to  resign  his  seat  if  he 
differ  from  them  in  opinion?  This  is  a  question  to  be 
decided  by  the  constitution  of  the  country  under  which 
he  acts.     Society,  that  is,  the  whole  nation,  have  a  right 


201  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

to  form  a  government  as  they  will,  and  to  choose  repre- 
sentatives during  good  behavior^  —  that  is ,  for  as  long  a 
time  as  they  and  their  representatives  entertain  the 
same  views,  —  or,  setting  aside  this  mode  for  reasons 
which  may  seem  good  to  themselves,  to  elect  them  for 
a  certain  period  of  service,  Now,  if  they  have  chosen 
the  latter  mode,  they  have  bound  themselves  to  abide 
by  it,  and  have  abandoned  the  former.  If  they  elect 
him  during  pleasure,  he  is  so  elected.  If  they,  on  the 
contrary,  elect  him  for  two  years  or  for  six  years,  lieis 
so  elected.  And  so  far  as  I  can  discover,  here  the 
question  rests.  It  is  in  the  power  of  society  to  alter 
the  tenure  of  office  if  they  please  ;  but  until  it  be  al- 
tered, neither  party  can  claim  anything  more  or  different 
from  what  that  tenure  actually  and  virtually  expresses. 
Here,  however,  it  is  understood  that  the  representative 
i%^in  good  faiths  using  his  best  skill  for  the  good  of  his 
constituents.  If  he  act  difierently,  from  selfishness  or 
venality,  he  has  violated  the  conditions  on  which  he 
was  elected,  and  is  bound  to  resign  immediately. 


SECTION   III. 


THE    RIGHT   OF   PROPERTY  AS    VIOLATED  BY  SOCIETY. 

I  have  already  stated  that  whatever  a  man  possesses, 
he  possesses  exclusively  of  every  man  and  of  all  men. 
He  has  a  right  to  use  his  property  in  such  a  manner  as 
will  promote  his  own  happiness,  provided  he  do  not 
interfere,  with  the  rights  of  others.  But  with  this  right 
society  may  interfere  as  well  as  individuals  ;  and  the 
mjury  is  here  the  greater,  inasmuch  as  it  is  remediless. 
In  this  world  the  individual  knows  of  no  power  superior 
to  society,  and  from  its  decisions,  even  when  unjust,  he 
has  no  appeal.  A  few  suggestions  on  this  part  of  the 
subject  will  close  the  present  chapter. 

I  have  mentioned  that  the  individual  has  a  right  to 


RIGHT   OF   PROPERTY   AS   VIOLATED    BY   SOCIETY.    2G5 

use  his  property,  innocently,  as  he  will,  exclusively  of 
any  man  or  of  all  men.  It  is  proper  to  state  here  that 
this  right  is  apparently  moditied  by  his  becoming  a 
member  of  society.  When  men  form  a  civil  society, 
they  mutually  agree  to  confer  upon  the  individual  cer- 
tain benefits  upon  certain  conditions.  But  as  these 
benefits  cannot  be  attained  without  incurring  some  ex- 
penses,— as,  for  instance,  those  of  courts  of  justice,  legis- 
lation, etc.,  — it  is  just  that  every  individual  who  enters 
the  society,  and  thus  enjoys  these  benefits,  should  pay 
his  portion  of  the  expense.  By  becoming  a  member  of 
society  he  renders  himself  answerable  for  his  portion  of 
that  burden,  without  the  incurring  of  which  society 
could  not  exist.  He  demands  the  benefit  of  laws  and 
of  protection ;  bul  he  has  no  right  to  demand  what 
other  men  have  purchased,  unless  he  will  pay  for  it  an 
equitable  price. 

From  these  principles  it  will  follow  that  society  has  a 
natural  right  to  require  every  individual  to  contribute 
his  portion  of  those  expenses  necessary  to  the  existence 
of  society. 

Besides  these,  however,  the  members  of  a  society  have 
the  power  to  agree  together  to  contribute  for  objects 
which,  if  not  essential  to  the  existence,  are  yet  impor- 
tant to  the  well-being  of  society.  If  they  so  agree,  they 
are  bound  to  fulfil  this  agreement ;  for  a  contract  be- 
tween the  individual  and  society  is  as  binding  as  one 
between  individual  and  individual.  Hence,  if  such  an 
agreement  be  made,  society  has  a  right  to  enforce  it. 
This,  however,  by  no  means  decides  the  question  of  the 
original  wisdom  of  any  particular  compact ;  much  less 
is  it  meant  to  be  asserted  that  the  individual  is  bound 
by  the  acts  of  a  majority,  when  that  majority  has  ex- 
ceeded its  power.  These  subjects  belong  to  a  subse- 
quent chapter.  What  is  meant  to  be  asserted  here  is, 
that  there  may  arise  cases  in  which  society  may  right- 
fully oblige  the  individual  to  contribute  for  purposes 
which  are  not  absolutely  necessary  to  the  existence  of 
society,  as  for  education,  making  roads,  etc. 

Whatever,  however,  is  not  necessary  to  the  existence 


266  PBACTICAL  ETHICS. 

of  society,  is  not  in  the  power  of  society,  unless  it  has 
been  conferred  upon  it  by  the  will  of  the  individual. 
That  this  is  the  rule  is  evident  from  the  necessity  of  the 
case.  No  other  rule  could  be  devised  which  would  not 
put  the  property  of  the  individual  wholly  in  the  power 
of  society  ;  or,  in  other  words,  absolutely  destroy  the 
liberty  of  the  individual. 

If  such  be  the  facts,  it  will  follow  that  society  has  % 
right  over  the  property  of  the  individual  for  all  pur- 
poses  necessary  to  the  existence  of  society ;  and,  sec- 
ondly, in  all  respects  in  which  the  individual  has  con- 
ferred that  power,  but  only  for  the  purposes  for  which 
it  was  conferred. 

And  hence,  1.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  individual  to  hold 
his  property  always  subject  to  these  conditions ;  and, 
for  such  purposes,  freely  to  contribute  his  portion  of 
that  expense  for  which  he,  in  common  with  others,  is 
receiving  an  equivalent.  No  one  has  any  more  right 
than  another  to  receive  a  consideration  without  making 
a  remuneration. 

2.  The  individual  has  a  right  to  demand  that  no  im- 
positions be  laid  upon  him,  unless  they  come  under  the 
one  or  the  other  of  these  classes. 

3.  He  has  a  right  to  demand  that  the  burdens  of 
society  be  laid  upon  individuals  according  to  some  equi- 
table law.  This  law  should  be  founded,  as  nearly  as 
possible,  upon  the  principle  that  each  one  should  pay 
m  proportion  to  the  benefits  which  he  receives  from  the 
protection  of  society.  As  these  benefits  are  cither  per- 
sonal or  pecuniary ,  and  as  those  which  are  personal  are 
equal,  it  would  seem  just  that  the  variation  should  be 
m  proportion  to  property. 

If  these  principles  be  just,  it  is  evident  that  society 
may  violate  the  right  of  individual  property  in  the  fol- 
lowing ways : 

1.  By  taking  through  the  means  of.  government, 
which  is  its  agent,  the  property  of  the  individual,  arbi- 
trarily, or  merely  by  the  will  of  the  executive.  Such  is 
sometimes  the  nature  of  exactions  in  despotic  govera- 
meuts. 


BIGHT   OF   PROPERTY   AS   VIOLATED    BY  SOCIETY.      267 

2.  When,  by  arbitrary  will  or  by  law,  it  takes  the 
property  of  the  individual  for  purposes  which,  whether 
good  or  bad,  are  not  necessary  to  the  existence  of  soci- 
ety, when  the  individuals  of  society  have  not  consented 
that  it  be  so  appropriated.  This  consent  is  never  to  be 
presumed,  except  in  the  case  of  necessary  expenditures, 
as  has  been  shown.  Whenever  this  plea  cannot  be  made 
good,  society  has  no  right  to  touch  the  property  of  the 
individual,  unless  it  can  show  the  constitutional  provis- 
ion. Were  our  government  to  levy  a  tax  to  build 
churches,  it  would  avail  nothing  to  say  that  churches 
were  wanted,  or  that  the  good  of  society  demanded  it ; 
it  would  be  an  invasion  of  the  right  of  property,  until 
the  article  in  the  constitution  could  be  shown  granting 
to  the  government  power  over  property  for  this  very 
purpose. 

3.  Society,  even  when  the  claim  is  just,  may  violate 
the  rights  of  the  individual  by  adopting  an  inequitable 
rule  in  the  distribution  of  the  public  burdens.  Every 
individual  has  an  equal  right  to  employ  his  property 
unmolested,  in  just  such  manner  as  will  innocently 
promote  his  own  happiness  ;  that  is,  it  is  to  society  a 
matter  of  indificrence  in  what  way  he  employs  it.  Pro- 
vided it  be  innocent,  it  does  not  come  within  the  view 
of  society.  Hence,  in  this  respect,  all  modes  of  employ 
ing  it  are  equal.  And  the  only  question  to  be  consid- 
ered, in  adjusting  the  appropriation,  is.  How  much  does 
he  ask  society  to  protect  ?  And  by  this  rule  it  should,  as 
we  have  said  before,  be  adjusted.  If,  then,  besides  this 
rule,  another  be  adopted,  and  an  individual  be  obliged, 
besides  \i\^  pro  ?'a^a  proportion,  to  bear  a  burden  levied 
on  his  par'dcular  calling,  to  the  exemption  of  another, 
he  has  a  right  to  complain.  He  is  forced  to  bear  a 
double  burden,  and  one  portion  of  the  burden  is  laid 
for  a  cause  over  which  society  professes  itself  to  have 
no  jurisdiction. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  the  value  of  property  depends  upon 
the  unrestrained  use  which  I  am  allowed  to  make  of  it 
for  the  promotion  of  my  individual  happiness,  society 
interferes  with  the  right  of  property  if  it  in  any  man- 


268  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

ner  abridge  any  of  these.  One  man  is  rendered  happy 
by  accumulation,  another  by  benevolence  ;  one  by  pro- 
moting science,  another  by  promoting  religion.  Each 
one  has  a  right  to  use  what  is  his  own  exactly  as  he 
pleases.  And  if  society  interfere,  by  directing  the 
manner  in  which  he  shall  appropriate  it,  it  is  an  act  of 
injustice.  It  is  as  great  a  violation  of  property,  for 
instance,  to  interfere  with  the  purpose  of  the  individual 
in  the  appropriation  of  his  property  for  religious  pur- 
poses, as  it  is  to  enact  that  a  farmer  shall  keep  but  three 
cows,  or  a  manufacturer  employ  but  ten  workmen. 


CHAPTEE  III. 

JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  CHARACTER. 

Character  is  the  present  intellectual,  social,  and 
moral  condition  of  an  individual.  It  comprehends  his 
actual  acquisitions,  his  capacities,  his  habits,  his  tenden- 
cies, his  moral  feelings,  and  everything  which  enters 
into  a  man's  state  for  the  present,  or  his  powers  for 
attaining  to  a  better  state  in  the  future. 

That  character,  in  this  sense,  is  by  far  the  most  im* 
portant  of  all  the  possessions  which  a  man  can  call  his 
own,  is  too  evident  to  need  discussion.  It  is  the  source 
of  all  that  be  either  suffers  or  enjoys  here,  and  of  all 
that  he  either  fears  or  hopes  for  hereafter. 

If  such  be  the  fact,  benevolence  would  teach  us  the 
obligation  to  do  all  in  our  power  to  improve  the  charac- 
ter of  our  neighl)or.  This  is  its  chief  ofnce.  This  is 
the  great  practical  aim  of  Christianity.  Eeciprocity 
merely  prohibits  the  infliction  of  any  injury  upon  the 
character  of  another. 

The  reasons  of  this  prohibition  are  obvious.  No  man 
can' injure  his  own  character  without  violating  the  lawa 
of  God,  and  also  creating  those  tendencies  which  result 
in  violation  of  the  laws  of  man.  He  who  in  any  man- 
ner becomes  voluntarily  the  cause  of  this  violation  is 
a  partaker  —  and  not  unfrequently  the  largest  par- 
taker —  in  the  guilt.  As  he  who  tempts  another  to 
suicide  is,  in  the  sight  of  God,guilty  of  murder,  so  he 
who  instigates  another  to  wickedness,  by  producing 
those  states  of  mind  which  necessarily  lead  to  it,  is  in 
the  sight  of  God  held  responsible  in  no  slight  degree 
for  the  result. 


270  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

Again  :  consider  the  motives  which  lead  men  to  injure 
the  character  of  each  other.  These  are  either  pure 
malice  or  reckless  self-gratification. 

First,  malice.  Some  men  so  far  transcend  the  ordi- 
nary limits  of  human  depravity  as  to  derive  a  truly  fiend- 
like pleasure  from  alluring  and  seducing  from  the  paths 
of  virtue  the  comparatively  innocent,  and  to  exult  over 
tlie  moral  desolations  which  they  have  thus  accomplished. 
**  They  will  compass  sea  and  land  to  make  one  proselyte, 
and  when  he  is  made,  they  make  him  twofold  more  the 
child  of  hell  than  themselves."  It  is  scarcely  neces- 
sary to  add,  that  language  has  no  terms  of  moral  indig- 
nation that  are  capable  of  branding  with  adequate 
infamy  conduct  so  intensely  vicious.  It  is  wickedness, 
without  excuse,  and  without  palliation.  Or,  secondly, 
take  the  more  favorable  case.  One  man  wishes  to 
accomplish  some  purpose  of  self-gratification,  to  indulge 
his  passions,  to  increase  his  power,  or  to  feed  his  vanity ; 
and  he  proceeds  to  accomplish  that  purpose  by  means 
of  rendering  another  immortal  and  accountable  moral 
creature  degraded  forever,  —  a  moral  pest  henceforth 
i)n  earth,  and  both  condemned,  and  the  cause  of  con- 
demnation to  others,  throughout  eternity.  Who  has 
given  this  wretch  a  right  to  work  so  awful  a  ruin  among 
God's  creatures  for  the  gratification  of  a  momentary 
and  an  unholy  desire?  And  will  not  the  Judge  of  all, 
when  he  maketh  inquisition  for  blood,  press  to  the  lips 
of  such  a  sinner  the  bitterest  dregs  of  the  cup  of  trem- 
bling? 

With  this  all  the  teaching  of  the  sacred  Scriptures 
is  consonant.  The  most  solemn  maledictions  in  the 
holy  Scriptures  are  uttered  against  those  who  have 
been  the  instruments  of  corrupting  others.  In  the  Old 
Testament,  Jeroboam  is  signalized  as  a  sinner  of  un- 
paralleled atrocity,  because  he  made  Israel  to  sin.  In 
the  New  Testament,  the  judgment  of  the  Pharisees,has 
been  already  alluded  to.  And  again,  *'  Whosoever  shall 
break  the  least  of  these  commandments,  and  shall  ^eacA 
men  so,  shall  be  called  least  in  the  kingdom  of  heaven." 
By  comparison  with  the  preceding  verse,  the  meaning 


JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS   CHARACTEJL  271 

of  this  passage  is  seen  to  be,  that  as  the  doing  and 
teaching  the  commandments  of  God  is  the  great  proof 
of  virtue,  so  the  breaking  them,  and  the  teaching  others 
to  break  them,  is  the  great  proof  of  vice.  And  in  the 
RevelOition,  where  God  is  represented  as  taking  signal 
vengeance  upon  Babylon,  it  is  because  **  she  did  corrupt 
the  earth  with  her  wickedness." 

The  moral  precept  on  this  subject,  then,  is  briefly 
this.  We  are  forbidden,  for  any  cause,  or  under  any 
pretence,  or  in  any  manner,  willingly  to  vitiate  the 
character  of  another. 

This  prohibition  may  be  violated  in  two  ways : 

1 .  By  weakening  the  moral  restraints  of  men. 

2.  By  exciting  their  evil  passions. 

I.  By  weakening  the  moral  restraints  op  men. 

It  has  been  already  shown  that  the  passions  of  men 
were  intended  to  be  restrained  by  conscience,  and  that 
the  restraining  power  of  conscience  is  increased  by  the 
doctrines  and  motives  derived  from  natural  and  revealed 
religion.  Whoever,  therefore,  in  any  manner  renders 
obtuse  the  moral  sensibilities  of  others,  or  diminishes 
the  power  of  that  moral  truth  by  which  these  sensibil- 
ities are  rendered  operative,  inflicts  permanent  injury 
upon  the  character  of  his  fellow-men.  This  also  is  done 
by  all  wicked  example  ;  for,  as  we  have  seen  before,  the 
sight  of  wickedness  weakens  the  power  of  conscience 
over  us.  It  is  done  when,  either  by  conversation  or 
by  writing,  the  distinctions  between  right  and  wrong 
are  treated  with  open  scorn  or  covert  contempt ;  by  all 
conduct  calculated  to  render  inoperative  the  sanctions 
of  religion,  as  profanity,  or  Sabbath-breaking  ;  by  ridi- 
cule of  the  obligations  of  morality  and  religion,  under 
the  names  of  superstition,  priestcraft,  prejudices  of 
education  ;  or  by  presenting  to  men  such  views  of  the 
character  of  God  as  would  lead  them  to  believe  that  ho 
cares  very  little  about  the  moral  actions  of  his  creatures, 
but  is  willing  that  every  one  shall  live  as  he  chooses ; 
and  that,  therefore,  the  self-denials  of  virtue  are  only  a 
form  of  gratuitous,  self-inflicted  torture. 

It  is  against  this  form  of  moral  injury  that  the  young 


272  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

need  to  be  specially  upon  their  guard.  The  moral  se- 
ducer, if  ke  be  a  practised  villain,  corrupts  the  princi- 
ples of  his  victim  before  he  attempts  to  influence  his  or 
her  practice.  It  is  not  until  the  moral  restraints  are 
silently  removed,  and  the  heart  left  defenceless,  ^lat  he 
presents  the  allurements  of  vice,  and  goads  the  passions 
to  madness.  His  task  is  then  easy.  If  he  have  suc- 
ceeded in  the  first  effort,  he  will  rarely  fail  in  the  sec- 
ond. Let  every  young  man,  especially  every  young 
woman,  beware  of  listening  for  a  moment  to  any  con- 
versation of  which  the  object  is  to  show  that  the  re- 
straints of  virtue  are  unnecessary,  or  to  diminish  in 
aught  the  reverence  and  obedience  which  are  due  from 
the  creature  to  the  law  of  the  Creator. 

II.  We  injure  the  characters  of  men  BY  exciting  to 

ACTION  THEIR  EVIL   DISPOSITIONS. 

1 .  By  viciously  stimulating  their  imaginations,  No 
one  is  corrupt  in  action  until  he  has  become  corrupt 
in  imagination.  And,  on  the  other  hand,  he  who  has 
filled  his  imagination  with  conceptions  of  vice,  and  w^io 
loves  to  feast  his  depraved  moral  appetite  with  imagin- 
ary scenes  of  impurity,  needs  but  the  opportunity  to 
become  openly  abandoned.  Hence  one  of  the  most 
nefarious  means  of  corrupting  men  is  to  spread  before 
them  those  images  of  pollution  by  which  thoy  will  in 
secret  become  familiar  with  sin.  Such  is  the  guilt  of 
those  who  write,  or  publish,  or  sell  or  lend  vicious 
books,  under  whatever  name  or  character;  and  of  those 
whoengi^ave,  or  publish,  or  sell,  or  lend,  or  exhibit 
obsceue  or  lascivious  pictures.  Few  instances  of  human 
depravity  are  marked  by  deeper  atrocity  than  that  of 
an  author  or  a  publisher  w^ho,  from  literary  vanity  or 
sordid  love  of  gain,  pours  forth  over  society  a  stream  of 
moral  pollution,  either  in  prose  or  in  poetry. 

And  yet  there  are  not  only  men  who  will  do  this,  but, 
what  is  worse,  there  are  women  also,  who,  if  the  culprit 
have  possessed  talent,  will  commend  it,  and  even  weep 
tears  of  sympathy  over  the  infatuated  genius  ^vho  was 
60  sorely  persecuted  by  that  unfeeling  portion  of  the 
world  who  would  not  consider  talent  synonymous  with 


JrSTICB   AS   IT   RESPECTS   CHARACTER.  273 

virtue,  and  who  could  not  applaud  the  effort  of  that 
ability  which  was  exerted  only  to  multiply  the  victims 
of  vice. 

2.  By  ministerinrj  to  the  appetites  of  others.  Such 
is  the  relation  of  the  power  of  appetite  to  that  of  con- 
science, that,  where  no  positive  allurements  to  vice  are 
set  before  men,  conscience  will  frequently  retain  its 
ascendency.  While,  on  the  other  hand,  if  allurement 
be  added  to  the  power  of  appetite,  reason  and  conscience 
prove  a  barrier  too  feeble  to  resist  their  combined  and 
vicious  tendency.  Hence  he  who  presents  the  allure 
ments  of  vice  before  others,  who  procures  and  sets  be- 
fore them  the  means  of  vicious  gratification,  is  in  a 
great  degree  responsible  for  the  mischief  which  he 
produces.  Violations  of  this  law  occur  in  most  cases 
of  immoral  traffic,  as  in  the  sale  and  manufacture  of 
intoxicating  liquors,  the  sale  of  opium  to  the  Chinese, 
etc.  Under  the  same  class  is  also  comprehended  the 
case  of  female  prostitution. 

3.  By  using  others  to  minister  to  our  vicious  appetites. 
We  cannot  use  others  as  ministers  to  our  vices  without 
rendering  them  corrupt,  and  frequently  inflicting  an 
incurable  wound  upon  their  moral  nature.  For  the 
sake  of  a  base  and  wicked  momentary  gratification,  the 
vicious  man  willingly  ruins  forever  an  immortal  being, 
who  was,  but  for  him,  innocent;  and,  yet  more,  not 
unfrequently  considers  this  ruin  a  matter  of  triumph. 
Such  is  the  case  in  seduction  and  adultery,  and,  in  a 
modified  degree,  in  all  manner  of  lewdness  and  profli- 
gacy. 

4.  By  cherishing  the  evil  passions  of  men.  By  pas- 
sion, in  distinction  from  appetite,  I  mean  the  spiritual 
in  opposition  to  the  corporeal  desires.  It  frequently 
happens  that  Ave  wish  to  influence  men  who  cannot  bo 
moved  by  an  appeal  to  their  reason  or  conscience,  but 
who  can  be  easily  moved  by  an  appeal  to  their  ambition, 
their  avarice,  their  party  zeal,  their  pride,  or  their  van- 
ity. An  acquaintance  with  these  peculiarities  of  indi- 
viduals is  frequently  called  understanding  human  nature^ 
knowing  the  weak  sides  of  men,  and   is  by  many   per- 


274  PRACTICAL    ETHICS. 

sons  considered  the  grand  means  for  great  and  masterly 
effect.  But  he  can  have  but  little  practical  acquaint- 
ance with  a  conscience  void  of  offence  who  does  not 
instinctively  feel  that  such  conduct  is  unjust,  mean,  and 
despicable.  It  is  accomplishing  our  purposes  by  means 
of  the  moral  degradation  of  him  of  whom  we  profess  to 
be  the  friends.  It  is  manifestly  doing  a  man  a  greater 
injury  than  simply  to  rob  him.  If  we  stole  his  money, 
he  would  be  injured  only  by  being  made  poorer.  If  we 
procure  his  services  or  his  money  in  this  manner,  we 
also  make  him  poorer ;  and  we,  besides,  cultivate  those 
evil  dispositions  which  already  expose  him  to  sharpers, 
and  also  render  him  more  odious  to  the  God  before 
whom  he  must  shortly  stand. 

Nor  do  the  ordinary  excuses  on  this  subject  avail.  It 
may  be  said,  men  would  not  give  to  benevolent  objects 
but  from  these  motives.  Suppose  it  true.  What  if 
they  did  not  ?  They  would  be  as  well  off  morally  as 
they  are  now.  A  man  is  no  better,  after  having  refused 
from  avarice,  who  at  length  gives  from  vanity.  His 
avarice  is  no  better,  and  his  vanity  is  even  worse.  It 
may  be  said  the  cause  of  benevolence  could  not  be 
sustained  without  it.  Then,  I  say,  let  the  cause  of 
benevolence  perish.  God  never  meant  one  part  of  his 
creatures  to  be  relieved  by  our  inflicting  moral  injury 
upon  another,  if  there  be  no  other  way  of  sustaining 
benevolence,  God  did  not  mean  that  benevolence  should 
be  sustained.  But  it  is  not  so.  The  appeal  to  men's 
better  feelings  is  the  proper  appeal  to  be  made  to  men. 
It  will,  when  properly  made,  generally  succeed ;  and  if 
it  do  not,  our  responsibility  is  at  an  end. 

I  cannot  leave  this  subject  without  urging  it  upon 
those  who  are  engaged  in  promoting  the  objects  of 
benevolent  associations.  It  seems  to  me  that  no  man 
has  a  right  to  present  any  other  than  an  innocent  motive 
to  urge  his  fellovv-mcn  to  action.  Motives  derived  from 
party  zeal,  from  personal  vanity,  from  love  of  applause, 
however  covertly  insinuated,  are  not  of  this  character. 
If  a  man,  by  exciting  such  feelings,  sell  me  a  horse  at 
twice  its  value,  he  would  be  a  sharper.     If  he  excito 


JUSTICE   AS   IT   RESPECTS   CHARACTER.  275 

me  to  give  from  the  same  motives,  the  action  partakes 
of  the  same  character.  The  cause  of  benevolence  is 
holy :  it  is  the  cause  of  God.  It  needs  not  human 
chicanery  to  approve  it  to  the  human  heart.  Let  him 
who  advocates  it,  therefore,  go  forth  strong  in  the 
strength  of  Him  whose  cause  he  advocates.  Let  him 
rest  his  cause  upon  its  own  merits,  and  leave  every 
man's  conscience  to  decide  whether  or  not  he  will  enlist 
in  its  support.  And,  besides,  were  men  conscientiously 
to  confine  themselves  to  the  merits  of  their  cause,  they 
would  much  more  carefully  weigh  their  undertakings 
before  they  attempted  to  engage  others  in  support  of 
them.  Much  of  that  fanaticism  which  withers  the 
moral  sympathies  of  man  would  thus  be  checked  at  the 
outset. 


CHAPTER    IV. 

OF  JUSTICE  AS  IT  RESPECTS  REPUTATION. 

It  has  been  already  remarked  that  every  man  is,  by 
the  laws  of  his  Creator,  entitled  to  the  physical  results 
of  his  labor;  that  is,  to  those  results  which  arise  from 
the  operation  of  those  laws  of  cause  antl  effect  which 
govern  the  material  on  which  he  operates.  Thus,  if  a 
man  form  several  trees  into  a  house,  the  result  of  thi% 
labor,  supposing  the  materials  and  time  to  be  his  own, 
is  his  own  also.  Thus,  again,  if  a  man  study  diligently, 
the  amount  of  knowledge  which  he  gains  is  at  his  own 
disposal,  and  he  is  at  liberty  innocently  to  use  it  as 
he  will.  And,  in  general,  the  immediate  results  of  a 
man's  industry  are  his  own,  and  no  one  has  any  right 
to  interfere  with  them. 

But  these  are  not  the  only  results.  There  are  others, 
springing  from  those  laws  of  cause  and  effect  which 
govern  the  opinions  and  actions  of  men  towards  each 
other,  which  are  frequently  of  as  great  importance  to  the 
individual  as  the  physical  results.  Thus,  if  a  man  have 
built  a  house,  the  house  is  his.  But  if  he  have  done  it 
well,  there  arises  in  the  minds  of  men  a  certain  opinion 
of  his  skill,  and  a  regard  towards  hira  on  account  of  it, 
which  may  be  of  more  value  to  him  than  even  the 
house  itself;  for  it  may  be  the  foundation  of  groat  sub- 
sequent good  fortune.  The  industrious  student  is 
entitled  not  merely  to  the  use  of  that  knowledge  which 
he  has  acquired,  but  also  to  the  estimation  which  the  pos- 
session of  that  knowledge  gives  him  among  men.  Now, 
these  secondary  and  indirect  results  are  as  truly  effects 
of  the  character  and  actions  of  the  man  himself,  and 
they  as  truly  belong  to  him,  as  the  primary  and  direct 


JUSTICE   AS   IT   RESPECTS   REPUTATION.  277 

> 

results  of  which  we  have  before  spoken.  And  hence, 
to  diminish  the  esteem  in  which  a  man  is  held  by  his 
fellows,  to  detract  from  the  reputation  which  he  has 
thus  acquired,  is  as  great  a  violation  of  justice,  nay,  it 
may  be  a  far  greater  violation  of  justice,  than  robbing 
him  of  money.  It  has,  moreover,  the  additional  aggra- 
vation of  conferring  no  benefit  upon  the  aggressor  be- 
yond that  of  the  gratification  of  a  base  and  malignant 
envy. 

But,  it  maybe  said,  the  man  has  a  reputation  greater 
than  he  deserves,  or  a  reputation  for  that  which  he  does 
not  deserve.  Have  I  not  a  right  to  diminish  it  to  its 
true  level? 

We  answer V  The  objection  proceeds  upon  the  conces- 
sion that  the  man  has  a  reputation;  that  is,  men  have 
such  or  such  an  opinion  concerning  him.  Now,  the 
rule  of  property,  formerly  mentioned,  applies  here. 
If  a  man  be  in  possession  of  property,  though  his  title 
be  faulty,  this  gives  to  no  one  a  right  to  seize  upon  that 
property  for  himself,  or  to  seize  it  and  destroy  it,  unless 
he  can  himself  show  a  better  title.  The  very  fact  of 
possession  bars  every  other  claimant,  except  that  claim- 
ant whom  the  present  possessor  has  excluded.  So,  in 
this  case,  if  this  reputation  injures  the  reputation  of 
another,  the  other  has  a  right  to  set  forth  his  ow^n 
claims ;  and  any  one  else  has  a  right,  when  prompted 
by  a  desire  of  doing  justice  to  the  injured,  to  state  the 
facts  as  they  are  ;  but  where  this  element  of  desire  to 
do  justice  does  not  enter,  no  man  has  a  right  to  dimin- 
ish the  esteem  in  which  another  is  held,  simply  because 
he  may  believe  the  other  to  have  more  than  he  deserves. 

The  moral  rule  on  this  subject  I  suppose  to  be  this : 
We  are  forbidden  to  utter  anything  which  will  be  inju- 
rious to  the  reputation  of  another,  except  for  adequate 
cause.  I  say,  for  adequate  cause,  because  occasions 
may  occur  in  which  it  is  as  much  our  duty  to  speak, 
as  it  is  at  other  times  our  duty  to  be  silent.  The  con- 
sideration of  these  cases  will  be  a  subsequent  concern. 
The  precept,  thus  understood,  applies  to  the  cases  in 
which  we  tjpeij;!^  either/row  no  sujf;lcient  motive,  or  from 


278  PRACTICAL    ETHICS. 

a  had  motive.  It  is  merely  an  extension  of  the  great 
principle  of  the  law  of  reciprocity,  which  commands  us 
to  have  the  same  simple  desire  that  every  other  man 
should  enjoy  unmolested  the  esteem  in  which  he  is  held 
by  men,  that  we  have  to  enjoy  unmolested  the  same 
possession  ourselves. 

I  do  not  here  consider  the  cases  in  which  we  utter, 
either  wilfully  or  thoughtlessly,  m^wviou.^  falsehood  re- 
specting another.  In  these  cases,  the  guilt  of  lying  is 
superadded  to  that  of  slander.  I  merely  here  consider 
slander  by  itself;  it  being  understood  that,  when  what 
is  asserted  is  false,  it  involves  the  sin  of  lying,  besides 
the  violation  of  the  law  of  reciprocity,  which  we  are 
here  endeavoring  to  enforce. 

The  precept  includes  several  specifications.  Some  of 
Ahem  it  may  be  important  to  enumerate. 

I.  It  prohibits  us  from  giving  publicity  to  the  bad 
actions  of  men  without  cause.  The  guilt  here  consists 
in  causelessly  giving  publicity.  Of  course  it  does  not 
include  those  cases  in  which  the  man  himself  gives  pub- 
licity to  his  own  bad  actions.  He  has  himself  dimin- 
ished his  reputation,  and  his  act  becomes  a  part  of 
public  indiscriminate  information.  We  are  at  liberty 
to  mention  this,  like  any  other  fact,  when  the  mention 
of  it  is  demanded,  but  not  to  do  it  for  the  sake  of 
injuring  him.  So,  whenever  his  bad  actions  are  made 
known  by  the  providence  of  God,  it  comes  under  the 
same  rule.  Thus,  I  may  know  that  a  man  has  acted 
dishonestly.  This  alone  does  not  give  me  liberty  to 
speak  of  it.  But  if  his  dishonesty  have  been  proved 
before  a  court  of  justice,  it  then  becomes  really  a  part 
of  his  reputation,  and  I  am  at  liberty  to  speak  of  it  in 
the  same  manner  as  of  any  other  fact.  Yet  even  here, 
if  I  speak  of  it  with  pleasure,  or  with  a  desire  of  injury, 
I  do  wrong. 

Some  of  the  reasons  for  this  rule  are  the  following : 

1.  The  very  act  itself  is  injurious  to  the  slanderer's 
own  moral  character,  and  to  that  of  him  who  lends 
himself  to  be  his  auditor.  Familiarity  with  wrong 
diminishes  our  abhorrence  of  it.     The  contemplation 


I 


JUSTICE   AS   IT   RESPECTS   REPUTATION,  2)9 

of  it  in  others  fosters  the  spirit  of  envy  and  uncharita- 
bleness,  and  leads  us  in  the  end  to  exult  in  rather 
than  sorrow  over  the  faults  of  others. 

2.  In  the  present  imperfect  state,  where  every  indi- 
vidual, being  fallible,  must  fail  somewhere,  if  every  one 
were  at  liberty  to  speak  of  all  the  wrong  and  all  the 
imperfection  of  every  one  whom  he  knew,  society  would 
soon  become  intolerable  from  the  festering  of  universal 
ill-will.  What  would  become  of  families,  of  friend- 
ships, of  communities,  if  parents  and  children,  hus- 
bands and  wives,  acquaintances,  neighbors, and  citizens, 
should  proclaim  every  failing  which  they  knew  or  heard 
of  respecting  each  other?  Now,  there  can  no  medium 
be  established  between  telling  everything  and  forbid- 
ding everything  to  be  told  which  is  told  without  ade- 
quate cause. 

3.  We  may  judge  of  the  justice  of  the  rule  by 
applying  it  to  ourselves.  We  despise  the  man  who, 
either  thoughtlessly  or  maliciously,  proclaims  what  he 
considers,  either  justly  or  unjustly,  our  failings.  Now, 
what  can  be  more  unjust  or  more  despicable  than  to 
do  that  which  our  own  conscience  testifies  to  be  unjust 
and  despicable  in  others  ? 

II.  The  same  law  forbids  us  to  utter  general  conclu- 
sions respecting  the  characters  of  men,  drawn  from  a 
particular  bad  action  which  they  may  have  committed. 
This  is  manifest  injustice,  and  it  includes,  frequently, 
lying  as  well  as  slander.  A  single  action  is  rarely  de- 
cisive of  character,  even  in  respect  to  that  department 
ot  character  to  which  it  belonu^s.  A  sin«:le  illiberal 
action  does  not  prove  a  man  to  be  covetous,  any  more 
than  a  single  act  of  charity  proves  him  to  be  benevolent. 
How  unjust,  then,  muyt  it  be  to  proclaim  a  man  desti- 
tute of  a  whole  class  of  virtues  because  of  one  failure 
in  virtue  !  How  much  more  unjust,  on  account  of 
one  ftiult,  to  deny  him  all  claim  to  any  virtue  whatso- 
ever !  Yet  such  is  frequently  the  very  object  of  calum- 
ny I  And,  in  general,  this  form  of  vice  is  added  to  that 
just  noticed.  Men  first,  in  violation  of  the  law  of  reci- 
procity, make  public  the  evil  actions  of  others ;  and 


280  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

then,  with  a  malignant  power  of  generalization,  proceed 
to  deny  their  claims,  not  only  to  a  whole  class  of  vir- 
tues, but  not  un frequently  to  all  virtue  whatsoever. 
The  reasons  in  this  case  are  similar  to  those  just 
mentioned. 

III.  We  are  forbidden  to  judge;  that  is,  to  assign 
unnecessarily  bad  motives  to  the  actions  of  men.  I 
say  unnecessarily,  for  some  actions  are  in  their  nature 
such,  that  to  presume  a  good  motive  is  impossible. 

This  ruie  would  teach  us,  first,  to  presume  no  un- 
worthy motive  when  the  action  is  susceptible  of  an 
innocent  one. 

And,  secondly,  never  to  ascribe  to  an  action  which 
we  confess  to  be  good  any  other  motive  than  that  from 
which  it  professes  to  proceed. 

This  is  the  rule  by  which  we  are  bound  to  be  gov- 
erned in  our  own  private  opinions  of  men.  And  if, 
from  any  circumstances,  we  are  led  to  entertain  any 
doubts  of  the  motives  of  men,  we  are  bound  to  retain 
these  doubts  within  our  own  bosoms,  unless  we  are 
obliged,  for  some  sufficient  reason,  to  disclose  them. 
But  if  we  are  obliged  to  adopt  this  rule  respecting  our 
oion  opinions  of  others,  by  how  much  more  are  we 
obliged  to  adopt  it  in  the  publication  of  our  opinions  I 
If  we  are  not  allowed,  unnecessarily,  to  suppose  an 
unworthy  motive,  by  how  much  less  are  we  allowed  to 
circulate  it,  and  thus  render  it  universally  supposed ! 
<*  Charity  thinketh  no  evil,  rejoiceth  not  in  iniquity." 

The  reasons  for  this  rule  are  obvious  : 

1.  The  motives  of  men,  unless  rendered  evident  by 
their  actions,  can  be  known  to  God  alone.  They  are, 
evidently,  out  of  the  reach  of  man.  In  assigning  mo- 
tives unnecessarily,  we  therefore  undertake  to  assert  as 
fact  what  we  at  the  outset  confess  that  we  have  not  the 
means  of  knowing  to  be  such  ;  which  is,  in  itself,  false- 
hood :  and  we  do  all  this  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  a 
contemptible  vanity  or  a  wicked  envy,  or,  what  is 
scarcely  less  reprehensible,  from  a  thoughtless  love  of 
talking. 

2.  There  is  no  offence  by  which  we  are  excited  to  a 


JUSTICE   AS   IT    RE' PECTS   REPUTAl:iON.  281 

livelier  or  more  just  indignatioD ,  than  by  the  misinter- 
pretation of  our  own  motives.  This  quicli  sensitiveness 
in  ourselves  should  admonish  us  of  the  guilt  which  we 
incur  when  we  traduce  the  motives  of  others. 

IV.  By  the  same  rule  we  are  forbidden  to  lessen  the 
estimation  in  which  others  are  held,  by  ridicule,  mim- 
icry, or  by  any  means  by  which  they  are  brought  into 
contempt.  No  man  can  be  greatly  respected  by  those 
to  whom  he  is  the  frequent  subject  of  laughter.  It  is 
but  a  very  imperfect  excuse  for  conduct  of  this  sort,  to 
plead  that  we  do  not  mean  any  harm.  What  do  we 
mean?  Surely,  reasonable  beings  should  be  prepared 
to  answ^er  this  question.  Were  the  witty  calumniator 
to  stand  concealed,  and  hear  himself  made  the  subject 
of  remarks  precisely  similar  to  those  in  which  he  in- 
dulges respecting  others,  he  would  have  a  very  definite  , 
conception  of  what  others  mean.  Let  him,  then,  carry 
the  lesson  home  to  his  own  bosom. 

Nor  is  this  evil  the  less  for  the  veil  under  which  it  is 
frequently  and  hypocritically  hidden.  Men  and  women 
propagate  slander  under  the  cover  of  secrecy,  supposing 
that  by  uttering  it  under  this  injunction  the  guilt  is  of 
course  removed.  But  it  is  not  so.  The  simple  ques- 
tion is  this :  Does  my  duty  either  to  God  or  to  man 
require  me  to  publish  this  which  will  injure  another? 
If  it  do,  publish  it  wherever  that  duty  requires,  and  do 
it  fearlessly.  If  it  do  not,  it  is  just  as  great  guilt  to 
publish  it  to  one  as  to  another.  We  are  bound,  in  all 
such  cases,  to  ask  ourselves  the  question,  Am  I  under 
obligation  to  tell  this  fact  to  this  person  ?  If  not,  I  am 
under  the  contrary  obligation  to  be  silent.  And  still 
more.  This  injunction  of  secrecy  is  generally  nothing 
better  than  the  mere  dictate  of  cowardice.  We  wish 
to  gratify  our  love  of  detraction,  but  are  afraid  of  the 
consequences  to  ourselves.  We  therefore  converse  un- 
der this  injunction,  that  the  injury  to  another  may  be 
done  with  impunity.  And  hence  it  is  that  in  this 
manner  the  vilest  and  most  injurious  calumnies  are 
generally  circulated. 

And,  lastly,  if  all  this  be  so,  it  will  be  readily  seen 


282  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

that  a  very  large  portion  of  the  ordinary  conversation 
of  persons,  even  in  many  respects  estimable,  is  far  from 
being  innocent.  How  very  commonly  is  personal  char- 
acter, in  all  its  length  and  bi'cadth,  the  matter  of  ordi- 
nary conversation  !  And  in  this  discussion  men  seem 
to  forget  that  they  are  under  any  other  law  than  that 
which  is  administered  by  a  judge  and  jury.  How  com- 
monly are  characters  dissected  with  apparently  the  only 
object  of  displaying  the  power  of  malignant  acumen 
possessed  by  the  operator,  as  though  another's  reputa- 
tion were  made  for  no  other  purpose  than  the  gratifi- 
cation of  the  meanest  and  most  unlovely  attributes  of 
the  human  heart !  Well  may  we  say,  with  the  Apostle 
James,  **  If  any  man  offend  not  in  word,  the  same  is  a 
perfect  man,  able  to  bridle  the  whole  body."  Well  may 
we  tremble  before  the  declaration  of  the  blessed  Sa- 
viour: *' For  every  idle  word  that  men  speak,  they 
shall  give  an  account  in  the  day  of  judgment." 

The  following  extract  from  Bishop  Wilson,  on  this 
subject,  breathes  the  spirit  of  true  Christian  philan- 
thropy :  *'  It  is  too  true,  that  some  evil  passion  or  other, 
and  to  gratify  our  corruption,  is  the  aim  of  most  con- 
versations. We  love  to  speak  of  past  troubles  ;  hatred 
and  ill-will  make  us  take  pleasure  in  relating  the  evil 
actions  of  our  enemies.  We  compare,  with  some  de- 
gree of  pride,  the  advantages  which  we  have  over 
others.  We  recount,  with  too  sensible  a  pleasure,  the 
worldly  happiness  which  we  enjoy.  This  strengthens 
our  passions,  and  increases  our  corruption.  God  grant 
that  I  may  watch  against  a  weakness  that  has  such  evil 
consequences  I  May  I  never  hear,  and  never  repeat 
with  pleasure,  such  things  as  may  dishonor  God,  hurt 
my  own  character,  or  injure  my  neighbor  1 " —  Bishop 
Wilson'' s  Sacra  Privata, 

The  precepts  of  the  Scriptures  on  this  subject  are 
numerous  and  explicit.  It  will  be  necessary  here  to 
refer  only  to  a  few,  for  the  sake  of  illustrating  their 
general  tendency  :  ' '  Judge  not,  that  ye  be  not  judged  : 
for  with  what  judgment  ye  judge,  ye  shall  be  judged  ; 
and  with  what  measure  ye  mete,  it  shall  be  measured 


JUSTICE   AS   IT   RESPECTS   REPUTATION.  283 

to  you  again.  And  why  beholdest  thou  the  mote  that 
is  in  thy  brother's  eye,  but  considerest  not  the  beam 
that  is  in  thine  own  eye?"  (Matthew  vii.  1-5).  **  Let 
all  bitternesi,  and  wrath,  and  clamor,  and  evil-speaking 
be  put  away  from  you"  (Ephesians  iv.  31).  *'  Speak 
evil  of  no  man  "  (Titus  iii.  2).  *<  He  that  will  love  life, 
and  see  good  days,  let  him  refrain  his  tongue  from 
evil"  (1  Peter  iii.  10). 

See  also  James,  third  chapter,  for  a  graphic  delinea 
tion  of  the  miseries  produced  by  the  unlicensed  use  of 
the  tongue. 

Secondly,  I  have  thus  far  considered  the  cases  in 
which  silence  respecting  the  evil  actions  of  others  is 
our  duty.  It  is  our  duty  when  we  have  no  just  cause 
either  for  speaking  at  all  or  for  speaking  to  the  partic- 
ular person  whom  we  address.  But  where  there  is  a 
sufficient  cause,  we  are  under  an  equally  imperative 
obligation  to  speak,  wherever  and  whenever  that  cause 
shall  demand  it.  The  common  fault  of  men  is,  that 
they  speak  when  they  should  be  silent,  and  are  silent 
only  when  they  should  speak. 

The  plain  distinction  in  this  case  is  the  following : 
We  are  forbidden  causelessly  to  injure  another,  even  if 
he  have  done  wrong.  Yet,  whenever  justice  can  be 
done,  or  innocence  protected,  in  no  other  manner  than 
by  a  course  which  must  injure  him,  we  are  under  no 
such  prohibition.  No  man  has  a  right  to  expect  to  do 
wrong  with  impunity;  much  less  has  he  a  right  to 
expect  that,  in  order  to  shield  him  from  the  just  con- 
sequences of  his  actions,  injustice  should  be  done  to 
others,  or  that  other  men  shall  by  silence  deliver  up  the 
innocent  and  unwary  into  his  power. 

The  principleby  which  we  are  to  test  our  own  motives, 
in  speaking  of  that  which  may  harm  others,  is  this : 
When  we  utter  anything  which  will  harm  another,  and 
we  do  it  either  without  cause,  or  with  pleasure,  or 
thoughtlessly,  we  are  guilty  of  calumny.  When  we  do 
it  W\ih.  pain  and  sorrow  for  the  offender,  and  from  the 
sincere  motive  oi protecting  the  innocent,  of  promoting 
the  ends  of  public  justice,  or  for  the  good  of  the  offender 


284  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

himself,  and  speak  of  it  only  to  such  persons  and  in 
such  manner  as  is  consistent  with  these  ends,  we  may 
speak  of  the  evil  actions  of  others,  and  yet  be  wholly 
innocent  of  calumny. 

We  are  therefore  bound  to  speak  of  the  faults  of 
others  — 

1.  To  promote  the  ends  of  public  justice.  He  who 
conceals  a  crime  against  society,  renders  himself  a  party 
to  the  offence.  We  are  bound  here  not  merely  to  speak 
of  it,  but  also  to  speak  of  it  to  the  proper  civil  officer, 
in  order  that  it  may  be  brought  to  trial  and  punish- 
ment. The  ordinary  prejudice  against  informing  is 
unwise  and  immoral.  IIq  Yfho ,  from  proper  motives, 
informs  against  crime,  performs  an  act  as  honorable  as 
that  of  the  judge  who  tries  the  cause,  or  of  the  juror 
who  returns  the  verdict.  That  this  may  be  done  from 
improper  motives,  alters  not  the  case.  A  judge  may 
hold  his  office  for  the  love  of  money,  but  this  does  not 
make  the  office  despicable. 

2.  To  protect  the  innocent.  When  we  are  possessed 
of  a  knowledge  of  certain  facts  in  a  man's  history, 
which,  if  known  to  a  third  person,  would  protect  him 
from  important  injury,  it  may  frequently  be  our  duty 
to  put  that  person  on  his  guard.  If  A  knows  that  B, 
under  the  pretence  of  religion,  is  insinuating  himself 
into  the  good  opinion  of  C  for  the  purpose  of  gaining 
control  over  his  property,  A  is  bound  to  put  C  upon  his 
guard.  If  I  know  that  a  man  who  is  already  married 
is  paying  his  addresses  to  a  lady  in  another  country,  I 
am  bound  to  give  her  the  information.  So  if  I  know 
of  a  plan  laid  for  the  purpose  of  seduction,  I  am  bound 
to  make  use  of  that  knowledge  to  defeat  it.  All  that  is 
required  here  is  that  I  know  what  I  assert  to  be  fact, 
and  that  I  use  it  simply  for  the  purposes  specified. 

3.  For  the  good  of  the  offender  himself.  When  we 
know  of  the  crimes  of  another,  and  there  is  some  person 
—  for  instance,  a  parent,  a  guardian,  or  instructor  — 
who  might,  by  control  or  advice,  be  the  means  of  the 
offender's  reformation,  it  is  our  duty  to  give  the  neces- 
sary information.  It  is  frequently  the  greatest  kinduesa 


JUSTICE   AS  IT   RESPECTS   REPUTATION.  285 

that  we  can  manifest  to  both  parties.  Were  it  more 
commonly  practised,  the  allurements  to  sin  would  be 
much  less  attractive,  and  the  hope  of  success  in  correct- 
ing the  evil  habits  of  the  young  much  more  encourag- 
ing. No  wicked  person  has  a  right  to  expect  that  the 
community  will  keep  his  conduct  a  secret  from  those 
who  have  a  right  specially  to  be  informed  of  it.  He 
who  does  so  is  partaker  in  the  guilt. 

4.  Though  we  may  not  be  at  liberty  to  make  public 
the  evil  actions  of  another,  yet  no  obligation  exists  to 
conceal  his  fault  by  maintaining  towards  him  our  former 
habits  of  intimacy.  If  we  know  him  to  be  unworthy 
of  our  confidence  or  acquaintance,  we  have  no  right  to 
act  a  lie,  by  conducting  towards  him  in  public  or  in 
private  as  though  he  were  worthy  of  it.  By  associating 
with  a  man,  we  give  to  the  public  an  assurance  that  we 
know  of  nothing  to  render  him  unworthy  of  our  associ- 
ation. If  we  falsify  this  assurance,  we  are  guilty  of 
deception,  and  of  a  deception  by  which  we  benefit  the 
wicked  at  the  expense  of  the  innocent,  and,  so  far  as 
our  example  can  do  it,  place  the  latter  in  the  power  of 
the  former.  And  still  more,  if  we  associate,  on  terms 
of  voluntary  intimacy,  with  persons  of  known  bad  char- 
acter, we  virtually  declare  that  such  ofiences  constitute 
no  reason  why  the  persons  in  question  are  not  good 
enough  associates  for  us.  We  thus  virtually  become 
the  patrons  of  their  crime. 

5.  From  what  has  been  remarked,  we  see  what  is  the 
nature  of  an  historian's  duty.  He  has  to  do  with  facts 
which  the  individuals  themselves  have  made  public,  or 
which  have  been  made  public  by  the  providence  of  God, 
He  records  what  has  already  been  made  known.  What 
has  not  been  made  known,  therefore,  comes  not  within 
his  province ;  but  whatever  has  been  made  known, 
comes  properly  within  it.  Th\s  latter  he  is  bound  to 
use,  without  either  fear,  favor,  or  affection.  If,  from 
party  zeal  or  sectarian  bigotry  or  individual  partiality, 
he  exaggerate  or  conceal  or  misrepresent,  if  he  '*  aught 
extenuate,  or  set  down  aught  in  malice,"  he  is  guilty 
of  calumny  of  the  most  inexcusable  character.     It  ia 


286  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

calumny  perpetrated  deliberately,  under  the  guise  of 
impartiality,  and  perpetrated  in  a  form  intended  to  give 
it  the  widest  publicity  and  the  most  permanent  dura- 
tion. 

These  remarks  have  had  respect,  principally,  to  the 
pi^blication  of  injurious  truth  or  falsehood  by  conver- 
sation. But  it  will  be  immediately  seen  that  they  apply 
with  additional  force  to  the  publication  of  whatever  is 
injurious  by  the  press.  If  it  be  wrong  to  injure  my 
neighbor's  reputation  within  the  limited  circle  of  my 
acquaintance,  how  much  more  wrong  must  it  be  to 
injure  it  throughout  a  nation  !  If  it  be  by  universal 
acknowledgment  mean  to  underrate  the  talents  or 
vilify  the  character  of  a  personal  rival,  how  much  more 
so  that  of  a  political  opponent  I  If  it  would  be  de- 
grading in  me  to  do  it  myself,  by  how  much  is  it  less 
degrading  to  cause  it  to  be  done  by  others,  and  to  honor 
or  dishonor  with  my  confidence,  and  reward  with  polit- 
ical distinction,  those  who  do  it?  Because  a  man  is  a 
political  opponent,  does  he  cease  to  be  a  creature  of 
God  ;  and  do  we  cease  to  be  under  obligations  to  cbey 
the  law  of  God  in  respect  to  him?  Or,  rather,  I  might 
ask.  Do  men  think  that  political  collisions  banish  the 
Deity  from  the  throne  of  the  universe  ?  Nor  do  these 
remarks  apply  to  political  dissensions  alone.  The  con- 
ductor of  a  public  press  possesses  no  greater  privileges 
than  any  other  man,  nor  has  he  any  more  right  than 
any  other  man  to  use,  orsuflfer  to  be  used,  his  press  for 
the  sake  of  gratifying  personal  pique,  or  avenging  indi- 
vidual wrong,  or  holding  up  individuals  without  trial 
to  public  scorn.  Crime  against  society  is  to  be  punished 
by  society,  and  by  society  alone  ;  and  he  who  conducts 
a  public  press  has  no  more  right,  because  he  has  the 
physical  power,  to  inflict  pain  than  any  other  individual. 
If  one  man  may  do  it  because  he  has  a  press,  another 
may  do  it  because  he  has  muscular  strength ;  and  thus 
the  government  of  society  is  brought  to  an  end.  Nor 
has  he  even  a  right  to  publish  cases  of  individual  vice, 
unless  the  providence  of  God  has  made  them  public 
before.     While  they  are  out  of  sight  of  the  public, 


JUSTICE   AS   IT   RESPECTS   REPUTATON.  287 

they  are  out  of  his  sight,  unless  he  cfui  show  that  he 
has  been  specially  appointed  to  perform  this  service. 
Alexander  Hamilton,  in  the  trial  of  Henry  Croswell, 
unfolds  the  true  doctrine  of  the  liberty  of  the  press  in 
these  remarkable  words :  '*  The  liberty  of  the  press 
consists  in  the  right  to  publish,  with  impunity,  the 
ti^th^  with  good  motives^  and  for  justifiable  endsy 
whether  it  respects  governments,  magistrates,  or  indi- 
viduals." 


CLASS  I.  (continued). 

DUTIES  TO  MEN  AS  MEN. 
VEKACITY. 

Every  individual,  by  necessity,  stands  in  most  impor- 
tant relations  both  to  the  past  and  to  the  future. 
Without  a  knowledge  of  what  has  been,  and  of  what, 
so  far  as  his  fellow-men  are  concerned,  will  be,  he  can 
form  no  decision  in  regard  to  the  present.  But  this 
knowledsce  could  never  be  attained  unless  his  constitu- 
tion  were  made  to  correspond  with  his  circumstances. 
It  has,  therefore,  been  made  to  correspond.  There  is, 
on  the  one  hand,  in  men  a  strong  instinctive  disposition 
to  tell  the  truth,  and  it  controls  them  unless  some 
other  motive  interpose  ;  and  there  is,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  corresponding  disposition  to  believe  what  is  told  un- 
less some  counteracting  motive  is  supposed  to  operate. 

Veracity  has  respect  to  the  past  and  present,  or  to 
the  FUTURE.     We  shall  consider  them  separately. 


CHAPTER   I. 

VERACITY  A&    IT  RESPECTS   THE  PAST  AND  PRESENT. 

Veracity,  in  this  sense,  always  has  respect  to  afact; 
that  is,  to  something  done,  or  to  something  which  wo 
believe  to  be  doing. 

Moral  truth  consists  in  our  intention  to  convey  to 
another,  to  the  best  of  our  ability,  the  conception  of  a 
fact  exactly  as  it  exists  in  our  own  minds. 

Physical  truth  consists  in  conveying  to  another  the 
conception  of  a  fact  precisely  as  it  actually  exists  or 
has  existed. 

These  two,  it  is  evident,  do  not  always  coincide. 

I  may  innocently  have  obtained  an  incorrect  concep- 
tion of  a  fact  myself,  and  yet  may  intend  to  convey  it 
to  another  precisely  as  it  exists  in  my  own  mind.  Here, 
then,  is  a  moral  truth,  but  a  physical  untruth. 

Or,  again,  I  may  have  a  correct  conception  of  a  fact, 
supposing  it  to  be  an  incorrect  one,  but  may  convey  it 
to  another  with  the  intention  to  deceive.  Here,  then, 
is  a  moral  falsehood,  and  a  physical  truth.  Pure  truth 
is  communicated  only  when  I  have  a  correct  conception 
of  a  fact,  and  communicate  it,  intentionally,  to  another 
precisely  as  it  exists  in  my  own  mind. 

The  law  on  this  subject  demands  that  when  we  pro- 
fess to  convey  a  fact  to  another,  we,  to  the  best  of  our 
ability,  convey  to  him  the  impression  which  exists  in 
our  own  minds.  This  implies,  first,  that  we  convey  the 
impression  which  exists,  and  not  another  ;  and,  secondly, 
that  we  convey  that  impression  without  diminution  or 
exaggeration.  In  other  words,  we  are  obliged,  in  the 
language  of  jurisprudence,  to  tell  the  truth,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth. 


290  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

This  law,  therefore,  forbids  — 

1 .  The  utterance  as  truth  of  what  we  know  to  he  false, 
I  say  the  utterance  as  truth,  for  we  sometimes  imagine 
cases  for  the  sake  of  iUustration,  as  in  parables  or  ficti- 
tious writing,  where  it  is  known  beforehand  that  we 
merely  address  the  imagination.  Since  we  utter  it  as 
fiction,  and  do  not  wish  it  to  be  believed,  there  is  no 
falsehood  if  it  be  not  true. 

2.  Uttering  as  truth  what  we  do  not  Jcnow  to  be  true. 
Many  things  which  men  assert,  they  cannot  know  to  be 
true  ;  such,  for  instance,  are,  in  many  cases,  our  views 
of  the  motives  of  others.  There  are  many  other  things 
which  may  be  probable,  and  we  may  be  convinced  that 
they  are  so,  but  of  which  we  cannot  arrive  at  the  cer- 
tainty. There  are  other  things  which  are  merely  mat- 
ters of  opinion,  concerning  which  every  several  man  may 
hold  a  difierent  opinion.  Now,  in  any  such  case ,  to  utter 
as  truth  what  we  cannot  know  or  have  not  known  to  be 
truth,  is  falsehood.  If  a  man  utter  anything  as  truth, 
he  assumes  the  responsibility  of  ascertaining  it  to  be  so. 
If  he  who  makes  th^  assertion  be  not  responsible,  where 
shall  the  responsibility  rest?  And  if  any  man  may 
utter  what  he  chooses,  under  no  responsibility,  there 
is  the  end  of  all  credibility. 

But,  it  will  be  said.  Are  we  never  to  utter  anything 
which  we  do  not  know  to  be  true  ?  I  answer :  We  are 
never  to  utter  as  truth  what  we  do  not  know  to  be  true. 
Whatever  is  a  matter  of  probability,  we  may  utter  as  a 
matter  of  probability ;  whatever  is  a  matter  of  opinion, 
we  may  state  as  a  matter  of  opinion.  If  we  convey  to 
another  a  conception  as  true,  of  which  we  have  only 
the  impression  of  probability,  we  convey  a  different 
conception  from  that  which  exists  in  our  own  minds, 
and  of  course  we  do,  in  fact,  speak  falsely. 

3.  Uttering  what  may  be  true  in  fact,  but  uttering  it 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  convey  a  false  impression  to  the 
hearers, 

Ab,  a.  By  exaggerating  some  or  all  of  the  circum- 
stances  attendant  upon  the  facts. 

b.  By  extenuating  some  or  all  of  the  circumstances 
attendant  upon  the  facts. 


VERACITY  AS  IT  RESPECTS  THE  PAST  AND  PRESENT.  291 

c.  By  exaggerating  some,  and  extenuating  others. 

d.  By  stating  the  facts  just  as  they  existed,  but  so 
arranging  them  as  to  leave  a  false  impression  upon  the 
hearer.  As,  for  instance,  I  might  say,  A  entered  B's 
room,  and  left  it  at  ten  o'clock ;  within  five  minutes 
after  he  left  it,  B  discovered  that  his  watch  had  been 
stolen.  Now,  although  I  do  not  say  that  A  stole  B's 
watch,  yet,  if  I  intentionally  so  arrange  and  connect 
these  facts  as  to  leave  a  false  impression  upon  the  mind 
of  the  hearer,  I  am  guilty  of  falsehood.  This  is  a 
crime  to  which  pleaders  and  partial  historians  and  all 
prejudiced  narrators  are  specially  liable. 

4.  As  the  crime  here  considered  consists  in  mak- 
ing a  false  impression  with  intention  to  deceive,  the 
same  eflect  may  be  produced  by  the  tones  of  the  voice, 
a  look  of  the  eye,  a  motion  of  the  head,  or  anything  by 
which  the  mind  of  another  may  be  influenced.  The 
same  rule,  therefore,  applies  to  impressions  made  in  this 
manner  as  to  those  made  by  words. 

5.  As  this  rule  applies  to  our  intercourse  with  men 
as  intelligent  agents,  it  applies  to  our  intercourse  with 
men  under  all  the  possible  relations  of  life.  Thus,  it 
forbids  parents  to  lie  to  children,  and  children  to  lie  to 
parents ;  instructors  to  pupils,  and  pupils  to  instruc- 
tors ;  the  old  to  the  young,  and  the  young  to  the  old ; 
attorneys  to  jurors,  and  jurors  to  attorneys  ;  buyers  to 
sellers,  and  sellers  to  buyers.  That  is,  the  obligation 
is  universal,  and  cannot  be  annulled  by  any  of  the 
complicated  relations  in  which  men  stand  to  each  other. 

Nor  can  it  be  varied  by  the  considerations,  often 
introduced,  that  the  person  with  whom  we  are  convers- 
ing has  no  right  to  know  the  truth.  This  is  asufiicieiit 
reason  why  we  should  not  speak,  but  it  is  no  reason 
why  we  should  speak  a  falsehood.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances we  are  at  liberty  to  refuse  to  reveal  any  • 
thing,  but  we  are  not  at  liberty  to  utter  what  is  false. 

The  reason  for  this  is  the  following :  The  obligation 
to  veracity  does  not  depend  upon  the  right  of  the 
inquirer  to  know  the  truth.  Did  our-obligation  de- 
pend upon  this,  it  would  vary  with  every  person  with 


292  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

whom  we  conversed  ;  and  in  every  case,  before  speak- 
ing, we  should  be  at  liberty  to  measure  the  extent  of 
our  neighbor's  right,  and  tell  him  truth  or  falsehood 
accordingly.  And,  inasmuch  as  the  person  whom  we 
address  would  never  know  at  what  rate  we  estimated 
his  right,  no  one  would  know  how  much  to  believe, 
any  more  than  we  should  know  how  much  truth  we 
were  under  obligation  to  tell.  This  would  at  once  de- 
stroy every  obligation  to  veracity.  On  the  contrary, 
inasmuch  as  we  are  under  obligation  to  utter  nothing 
but  the  truth  in  consequence  of  our  relations  to  God, 
this  obligation  is  never  affected  by  any  of  the  circum- 
stances under  which  we  are  called  upon  to  testify.  Let 
no  one,  therefore,  excuse  himself  on  the  ground  that 
he  tells  only  innocent  lies.  It  cannot  be  innocent  to 
do  that  which  God  has  forbidden.  *'Lie  not  one  to 
another,  brethren,  seeing  ye  have  put  off  the  old  man 
with  his  deeds." 

*  That  obedience  to  this  law  is  demanded  by  the  will 
of  God  is  manifest  from  several  considerations  : 

1.  We  are  created  with  a  disposition  to  speak  what  is 
true,  and  also  to  believe  what  is  spoken.  The  fact  that 
we  are  thus  constituted  conveys  to  us  an  intimation 
that  the  Creator  wills  us  to  obey  this  constitution.  The 
intention  is  as  evident  as  that  which  is  manifested  in 
creating  the  eye  for  light,  and  light  for  the  eye. 

2.  We  are  created  with  a  moral  constitution,  by 
which  (unless  our  moral  susceptibility  shall  have  been 
destroyed)  we  suffer  pain  whenever  we  violate  this  law, 
and  by  which  also  we  receive  pleasure  whenever,  under 
circumstances  which  urge  to  the  contrary,  we  stead- 
fastly obey  it. 

3.  We  are  so  constituted  that  obedience  to  the  law 
of  veracity  is  absolutely  necessary  to  our  happiness. 
Were  we  to  lose  cither  our  feeling  of  obligation  to  tell 
the  truth,  or  our  disposition  to  receive  as  truth  what- 
ever is  told  to  us,  there  would  at  once  be  an  end  to  all 
science  and  all  knowledge  beyond  that  which  every 
man  had  obtained  by  his  own  personal  observation  and 
experience.     No  man  could  profit  by  the  discoveries  of 


VERACITY  AS  IT  RESPECTS  TEE  PAST  AND  1>RESENT.  293 

his  contemporaries,  much  less  by  the  discoveries  of 
those  men  who  have  gone  before  him.  Language  would 
be  useless,  and  we  should  be  but  little  removed  from  the 
brutes.  Every  one  must  be  aware,  upon  the  slightest 
reflection,  that  a  community  of  entire  liars  could  not 
exist  in  a  state  of  society.  The  effects  of  such  a  course 
of  conduct  upon  the  whole,  show  us  what  is  the  will  of 
God  in  the  individual  case. 

4.  The  will  of  God  is  abundantly  made  known  to  us 
in  the  holy  Scriptures.     I  subjoin  a  few  examples  : 

<*  Thou  shalt  not  bear  false  witness  against  thy  neigh- 
bor "  (  Ex.  XX.  16) .  **  Lying  lips  are  an  abomination 
to  the  Lord"  (Prov.  vi.  16).  **  Keep  thy  tongue  from 
evil,  and  thy  lips  that  they  speak  no  guile  "  (Psalm 
xxxiv.  13).  Those  that  speak  lies  are  called  children 
of  the  devil ;  that  is,  followers,  imitators  of  the  actions 
of  the  devil.  (John  viii.  44.)  See  also  the  cases  of 
Ananias  and  Sapphira,  and  of  Gehazi.  (Acts  v.  and  2 
Kings  V.  20-27.)  *«  All  liars  shall  have  their  portion 
in  the  lake  that  burneth  with  fire  and  brimstone  "  (Rev. 
xxi.  8) .  "  There  shall  in  no  wise  enter  therein  [  into 
Leaven  ]  anything  that  makcth  a  lie  "  {Ihid. ,  verse  27) . 

From  what  has  been  said,  the  importance  of  strict 
adherence  to  veracity  is  too  evident  to  need  further  re- 
mark. I  will,  however,  add,  that  the  evil  of  falsehood 
in  small  matters  —  in  lies  told  to  amuse,  in  petty  exag- 
gerations, and  in  complimentary  discourse  —  is  not  by 
any  means  duly  estimated.  Let  it  be  always  borne  in 
mind  that  he  who  knowingly  utters  what  is  false,  tells 
a  lie  ;  and  a  lie,  whether  white,  or  of  any  other  color, 
is  a  violation  of  the  command  of  that  God  by  whom  we 
must  be  judged.  And  let  us  also  remember  that  there 
is  no  vice  which  more  easily  than  this  stupefies  a  man's 
conscience.  He  who  tells  lies  frequently  will  soon  be- 
come an  habitual  liar ;  and  an  habitual  liar  will  soon 
lose  the  power  of  readily  distinguishing  between  the 
conceptions  of  his  imagination  and  the  recollections  of 
his  memory.  I  have  known  persons  who  seemed  to 
have  arrived  at  tliis  most  deplorable  moral  condition. 
Let  every  one,  therefore,  beware  of  even  the  most  dis- 


S04  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

tant  approaches  to  this  detestable  vice.  A  volume  might 
easily  be  written  on  the  misery  and  loss  of  character 
which  have  grown  out  of  a  single  lie ;  and  another 
volume  of  illustrations  of  the  moral  power  which  men 
have  gained  by  means  of  no  other  prominent  attribute 
than  that  of  bold,  unshrinking  veracity. 

If  lying  be  thus  pernicious  to  ourselves,  how  wicked 
must  it  be  to  teach  it,  or  specially  to  require  it  of  others  I 
What  shall  we  say,  then,  of  parents  who,  to  accomplish 
a  momentary  purpose,  will  not  hesitate  to  utter  to  a 
child  the  most  flagitious  falsehoods  ?  Or  what  shall  we 
say  of  those  heads  of  families  who  direct  their  children 
or  servants  deliberately  to  declare  that  they  are  not  at 
home,  while  they  are  quietly  sitting  in  their  parlor  or 
their  study  ?  What  right  has  any  one,  for  the  purpose 
of  securing  a  momentary  convenience,  or  avoiding  a 
petty  annoyance,  to  injure  forever  the  moral  sentiments 
of  another  ?  How  can  such  a  man  or  woman  expect 
to  hear  the  truth  from  those  whom  they  have  deliber- 
ately taught  to  lie  ?  The  expectation  is  absurd ;  and 
the  result  will  show  that  such  persons,  in  the  end,  drink 
abundantly  of  the  cup  which  they  themselves  have 
mingled.  Before  any  man  is  tempted  to  lie,  let  him 
remember  that  God  governs  this  universe  on  the  prin- 
ciples of  veracity,  and  that  the  whole  constitution  of 
things  is  so  arranged  as  to  vindicate  truth,  and  to  expose 
falsehood.  Hence  the  j^rs^  lie  always  requires  a  multi- 
tude of  lies  to  conceal  it,  each  one  of  which  plunges 
the  criminal  into  more  inextricable  embarrassment; 
and,  at  last,  all  of  them  will  combine  to  cover  him  with 
shame.  The  inconveniencea  of  truth,  aside  from  the 
question  of  guilt  and  innocence,  are  infinitely  less  than 
the  inconveniences  of  falsehood. 


CHAPTBK  II. 

VBRACITY   m  RESPECT    TO  THE   FUTUEB. 

The  future  is,  within  some  conditions,  subject  to  our 
power.  We  may,  therefore ,  place  ourselves  under  moral 
obligations  to  act,  within  those  conditions,  in  a  partic- 
ular manner.  When  we  make  a  promise,  we  voluntarily 
place  ourselves  under  such  a  moral  obligation.  The 
law  of  veracity  obliges  us  to  fulfil  it. 

This  part  of  the  subject  includes  promises  and  con- 
tracts. 

I.    Of  PBOMISES. 

In  every  promise  two  things  are  to  be  considered : 
the  intention  and  the  obligation. 

1.  The  intention.  The  law  of  veracity,  in  this  respect, 
demands  that  we  convey  to  the  promisee  the  intention 
as  it  exists  in  our  own  minds .  When  we  inform  another 
that  we  intend  to  do  a  service  for  him  to-morrow,  we 
have  no  more  right  to  lie  about  this  intention  than 
about  any  other  matter. 

2 .  The  obligation .  The  law  of  veracity  obliges  us  to 
fulfil  the  intention  just  as  we  made  it  known.  In  other 
words,  we  are  under  obligation  to  satisfy,  precisely,  the 
expectation  which  we  voluntarily  excited.  The  rule  of 
Dr.  Paley  is  as  follows  :  '*  A  promise  is  binding  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  promise.;  supposed  the  promisee  to 
receive  it." 

The  modes  in  which  promises  may  be  violated,  and 
the  reasons  for  believing  the  obligation  to  fulfil  promises 
to  be  enforced  by  the  law  of  God,  are  so  similar  to  those 
mentioned  in  the  preceding  chapter,  that  I  will  not 
repeat  them. 

1  therefore  proceed  to  consider  in  what  cases  promises 


296  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

are  not  binding.    The  following  are ,  I  think,  among  the 
most  important : 

Promises  are  not  binding  — 

1.  JVlien  the  performance  is  impossible.  We  cannot 
be  under  obligation  to  do  what  is  plainly  out  of  our 
power.  The  moral  character  of  such  a  promise  will, 
however,  vary  with  the  circumstances  under  which  the 
promise  was  made.  If  I  knew  nothing  of  the  impossi- 
bility, and  honestly  expressed  an  intention  which  I 
designed  to  fulfil,  I  am,  at  the  bar  of  conscience,  ac- 
quitted. The  providence  of  God  has  interfered  with 
my  intention,  and  I  am  not  to  blame.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  I  knew  of  the  impossibility,  I  have  violated  the 
law  of  veracity.  I  expressed  an  intention  which  I  did 
not  mean  to  fulfil.  I  am  bound  to  make  good  to  the 
other  party  all  the  loss  which  he  may  have  sustained 
by  my  crime. 

2.  W/ien  the  promise  is  unlawful.  No  man  can  be 
tinder  obligation  to  violate  obligation;  for  this  would 
be  to  suppose  a  man  to  be  guilty  for  not  being  guilty. 
Much  less  can  he  be  under  obligation  to  violate  his 
obligations  to  God.  Hence  promises  to  lie,  to  steal,  or 
in  any  manner  to  violate  the  laws  of  society,  are  not 
binding.  And  the  duty  of  every  man  who  has  placed 
himself  under  any  such  obligation  is,  at  once  to  confess 
his  fault,  to  declare  himself  free  from  his  engagement, 
and  to  endeavor  to  persuade  others  to  do  the  same. 
Here,  as  in  the  former  instance,  there  are  two  cases. 
Where  the  unlawfulness  was  not  known,  the  promiser 
is  under  no  other  obligation  than  that  of  informing  the 
promisee  of  the  facts  as  soon  as  possible.  Where  the 
unlawfulness  wa^  known  to  the  promiser,  and  not  to 
the  promisee,  I  think  that  the  former  is  bound  to  make 
good  the  loss  to  the  latter,  if  any  occur.  When  it  is 
known  to  both  parties,  either  is  at  liberty  to  disengage 
hiiuself,  and  neither  is  under  any  obligation  to  make 
any  restitution  ;  for  the  fault  is  common  to  both,  and 
each  should  bear  his  own  share  of  the  inconvenience. 

3.  Promises  are  not  binding  where  no  expectation  is 
voluntarily  excited  by  the  promiser.     Ho  is  bound  only 


VERACITY   IN    RESPECT   TO   THE   FUTURE.  297 

to  fulfil  the  expectation  which  he  voluntarily  excites; 
and  if  he  have  excited  none,  he  has  made  no  promise. 
If  A  tell  Bthat  he  shall  give  a  horse  to  C,  and  B,  with- 
out A's  knowledge  or  consent,  inform  C  of  it,  A  is  not 
bound.  But,  if  he  directed  B  to  give  the  information, 
he  is  as  much  bound  as  though  he  informed  C  himself. 

4.  Promises  are  not  binding  when  they  are  known  by 
both  parties  to  proceed  upon  a  condition,  which  condition 
is  subsequently,  by  the  promiser,  found  not  to  exist.  As , 
if  A  promise  to  give  a  beggar  money  on  the  faith  of  his 
story,  and  the  story  be  subsequently  found  to  be  a  fab- 
rication, A,  in  such  a  case,  is  manifestly  not  bound. 

5.  As  the  very  conception  of  a  promise  implies  an 
obligation  entered  into  between  two  intelligent  moral 
agents,  I  think  there  can  be  no  such  obligation  entered 
into  where  one  of  the  parties  is  not  a  moral  agent.  I  do 
not  think  we  can  properly  be  said  to  make  a  promise  to 
a  brute,  nor  to  violate  it.  I  think  the  same  is  true  of 
a  madman.  Nevertheless,  expediency  has,  even  in  such 
cases,  always  taught  the  importance  of  fulfilling  expec- 
tation which  we  voluntarily  excite.  I  think,  however, 
that  it  stands  on  the  ground  of  expediency,  and  not  of 
obligation.  I  do  not  suppose  that  any  one  would  feel 
guilty  for  deceiving  a  madman  in  order  to  lead  him  to 
a  madhouse. 

These  seem  to  me  to  be  the  most  common  cases  in 
which  promises  are  not  binding.  The  mere  inconven- 
ience to  which  we  may  be  exposed  by  fulfilling  a  promise 
is  not  a  release.  We  are  at  liberty,  beforehand,  to  enter 
into  the  obligation,  or  not.  No  man  need  promise  un- 
less he  please  ;  but,  haviug  once  promised,  he  is  holden 
until  he  be  morally  liberated.  Hence,  as  after  the 
obligation  is  formed  it  cannot  be  recalled,  prudence 
would  teach  us  to  be  extremely  cautious  in  making 
promises.  Except  in  cases  where  we  are  from  long 
experience  fully  acquainted  with  all  the  ordinary  con- 
tingencies of  an  event,  we  ought  never  to  make  a  prom- 
ise without  sufficient  opportunity  for  reflection.  It  is  a 
good  rule  to  enter  into  no  important  engagement  on 
the  same  day  in  which  it  is  first  presented  to  our  notico. 


208  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

And  I  believe  that  it  will  be  generally  found  that  those 
who  are  most  careful  iu  promising,  are  the  most  con- 
scientious in  performing ;  and  that,  on  the  contrary, 
those  who  are  willing  on  all  occasions  to  pledge  them- 
selves on  the  instant,  have  very  little  difficulty  in 
violating  their  engagements  with  correspondent  thought- 
lessness. 

Of  CONTKACTS. 

The  peculiarity  of  a  contract  is,  that  it  is  a  mutual 
promise ;  that  is,  we  promise  to  do  one  thing  on  the 
condition  that  another  person  does  another. 

The  rule  of  interpretation,  the  reasons  for  its  obliga- 
toriness, and  the  cases  of  exception  to  the  obligatori- 
ness, are  the  same  as  in  preceding  cases,  except 
that  it  has  a  specific  condition  annexed,  by  which  the 
obligation  is  limited. 

Hence,  after  a  contract  is  made,  while  the  other  party 
performs  his  part,  we  are  imder  obligation  to  perform 
our  part ;  but,  if  either  party  fail,  the  other  is,  by  the 
failure  of  the  condition  essential  to  the  contract,  liber- 
ated. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Not  only  is  the  one  party  liber- 
ated by  the  failure  of  the  other  party  to  perform  his 
part  of  the  contract ;  the  first  has,  moreover,  upon  the 
second,  a  claim  for  damages  to  the  amount  of  what  he 
may  have  sufiered  by  such  failure. 

Here,  however,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  a  distinction 
is  to  be  made  between  a  simple  contract — that  is,  a  con- 
tract to  do  a  particular  act  —  and  a  contract  by  which 
we  enter  upon  a  relation  established  by  our  Creator. 
Of  the  first  kind  are  ordinary  mercantile  contracts  to 
sell  or  deliver  merchandise  at  a  particular  place,  for  a 
specified  sum,  to  be  paid  at  a  particular  time.  Here,  if 
the  price  be  not  paid,  we  are  under  no  obligation  to 
deliver  the  goods ;  and  if  the  price  is  to  be  paid  on 
condition  of  the  delivery  of  the  goods  at  a  specified 
time,  and  they  are  not  so  delivered,  we  are  under  no 
obligation  to  pay  the  price.  Of  the  second  kind  are  the 
contract  of  civil  society,  and  the  marriage  contract. 
These,  being  appointed  by  the  constitution  under  which 


VERACITY   IN    RESPECT   TO   THE   FUTURE.  299 

God  has  placed  us,  may  be  dissolved  only  for  such  rea- 
sons as  he  1ms  appomted.  Thus,  society  and  the  indi- 
vidual enter  mutually  into  certain  obligations  with  re- 
spect to  each  other  ;  but  it  does  not  follow  that  either 
party  is  liberated  by  every  failure  of  the  other.  The 
case  is  the  same  with  the  marriage  contract.  In  these 
instances,  each  party  is  bound  to  fulfil  its  part  of  the 
contract,  notwithstanding  the  failure  of  the  other. 

It  is  here  proper  to  remark,  that  the  obligation  to 
veracity  is  precisely  the  same,  under  what  relations  so- 
ever it  may  be  formed.  It  is  as  binding  between  indi- 
viduals and  society  on  both  parts,  and  between  societies 
and  societies,  as  it  is  between  individuals.  There  is  no 
more  excuse  for  a  society,  when  it  violates  its  obligation 
to  an  individual,  or  for  an  individual  when  he  violates 
bis  obligations  to  a  society,  than  for  any  other  case  of 
deliberate  falsehood.  By  how  much  more  are  societies 
or  communities  bound  to  fidelity  in  their  engagements 
with  each  other,  since  the  faith  of  treaties  is  the  only 
barrier  which  interposes  to  shield  nations  from  the 
appeal  to  bloodshed  in  every  case  of  collision  of  inter- 
ests !  And  the  obligation  is  the  same,  under  what  cir- 
cumstances soever  nations  may  treat  with  each  other. 
A  civilized  people  has  no  right  to  violate  its  solemn 
obligations  because  the  other  party  is  uncivilized.  A 
strono:  nation  has  no  rio:ht  to  lie  to  a  weak  nation.  The 
simple  fact  that  two  communities  of  moral  agents  have 
entered  into  engagements,  binds  both  of  them  equally 
in  the  sight  of  their  common  Creator.  And  He  who 
is  the  Judge  of  all,  in  his  holy  habitation,  will  assin*- 
edly  avenge,  with  most  solemn  retributions,  that  viola- 
tion of  faith  in  which  the  peculiar  blessings  bestowed 
upon  one  party  are  made  a  reason  for  inflicting  misery 
upon  the  other  party,  with  whom  he  has  dealt  less 
bountifully.  Shortly  before  the  death  of  the  Duke  of 
Burgundy,  the  pupil  of  Fenelon,  a  cabinet  council  was 
held,  at  which  he  was  present,  to  take  into  consideration 
the  expediency  of  violating  jv treaty  ;  which  it  was  sup- 
posed could  be  done  with  manifest  advantage  to  France. 
The  treaty  was  read;  and  the  ministers  explained  in 


300  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

what  respects  it  operated  unfavorably,  and  how  great 
an  accession  of  territory  might  be  made  to  France  by 
actnig  in  defiance  of  its  solemn  obligations.  JRecusons 
of  state  were,  of  course,  ofiered  in  abundance,  to  justify 
the  deed  of  perfidy.  The  Duke  of  Burgundy  heard 
them  all  in  silence.  When  they  had  finished,  he  closed 
the  conference  by  laying  his  hand  upon  the  instrument, 
and  saying  with  emphasis,  **  Gentlemen^  there  is  a 
treat]/"  This  single  sentiment  is  a  more  glorious  mon- 
ument to  his  fame  than  a  column  inscribed  with  the 
record  of  a  huixlred  victories. 

It  is  frequently  said,  partly  by  way  of  explanation, 
and  partly  by  way  of  excuse  for  the  violation  of  con- 
tracts by  communities,  that  corporate  bodies  have  no 
conscience.  In  what  sense  this  is  true  it  is  not  neces- 
sary here  to  inquire.  It  is  sufficient  to  know  that  every 
one  of  the  corporators  has  a  conscience,  and  is  respon- 
sible to  God  for  obedience  to  its  dictates.  Men  may 
mystify  before  each  other,  and  they  may  stupefy  the 
monitor  in  their  own  bosoms,  by  throwing  the  blame  of 
perfidy  upon  each  other ;  but  it  is  yet  worthy  to  be  re- 
membered that  they  act  in  the  presence  of  a  Being 
with  whom  the  night  shineth  as  the  day,  and  that  they 
must  appear  before  a  tribunal  where  there  will  be  "no 
shufi[ling."  For  beings  acting  under  these  conditions 
there  surely  can  be  no  wiser  or  better  course  than  that 
of  simple,  unsophisticated  verity,  under  what  relations 
soever  they  may  be  called  upon  to  act. 


\ 


CHAPTER    III. 

OF  OATHS. 

I.   The  theory  of  oaths. 

It  is  frequently  of  the  highest  importance  to  society 
that  the  facts  relating  to  a  particular  transaction  should 
be  distinctly  and  accurately  ascertained.  Unless  this 
could  be  done,  neither  the  innocent  could  be  protected 
nor  the  guilty  punished ;  that  is,  justice  could  not  be 
administered,  and  society  could  not  exist. 

To  almost  every  fact,  or  to  the  circumstances  which 
determine  it  to  be  fact,  there  must,  from  the  laws  of 
cause  and  effect,  and  from  the  social  nature  of  man,  be 
many  witnesses.  The  fact  can,  therefore,  be  generally 
known,  if  the  witnesses  can  be  induced  to  testify,  and 
to  testify  the  truth. 

To  place  men  under  such  circumstances  that,  upon 
the  ordinary  principles  of  the  human  mind,  they  shall 
be  most  likely  to  testify  truly,  is  the  design  of  adminis- 
tering an  oath. 

In  taking  an  oath,  besides  incurring  the  ordinary  civil 
penalties  incident  to  perjury,  he  who  swears  calls  upon 
God  to  witness  the  truth  of  his  assertions  ;  and  also, 
either  expressly  or  by  implication,  invokes  upon  him- 
self the  judgments  of  God  if  he  speak  falsely.  The 
ordinary  form  of  swearing  in  this  country  and  in  Great 
Britain  is  to  close  the  promise  of  veracity  with  the 
words,  **  So-  help  me  God  ;"  that  is,  may  God  only  help 
me  so  as  I  tell  the  truth.  Inasmuch  as,  without  the 
help  of  God,  we  must  be  miserable  for  time  and  for 
eternity,  to  relinquish  his  help  if  we  violate  the  truth, 
is,  on  this  condition,  to  imprecate  upon  ourselves  the 
absence  of  the  favor  of  God,  and,  of  course,  all  possible 
misery  forever. 


802  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

The  theory  of  oaths,  then,  I  suppose  to  be  as  follows  : 

1.  Men  naturally  speak  the  truth  when  there  is  no 
counteracting  motive  to  prevent  it ;  and,  unless  some 
such  motive  be  supposed  to  supervene,  they  expect  the 
truth  to  be  spoken. 

2.  When,  however,  by  speaking  falsely,  some  imme- 
diate advantage  can  be  gained,  or  some  immediate  evil 
avoided,  they  will  frequently  speak  falsely. 

3.  But  when  a  greater  good  can  be  gained,  or  a 
greater  evil  avoided,  by  speaking  the  truth  than  could 
possibly  be  either  gained  or  avoided  by  speaking  falsely, 
they  will,  on  the  ordinary  principles  of  the  human 
mind,  speak  the  truth.  To  place  them  under  such  cir- 
cumstances is  the  design  of  an  oath. 

4.  Now,  as  the  favor  of  God  is  the  source  of  every 
blessing  which  man  can  possibly  enjoy,  and  as  his  dis- 
pleasure must  involve  misery  utterly  beyond  the  grasp 
of  our  limited  conceptions,  if  we  can  place  men  under 
such  circumstances  that,  by  speaking  falsely,  they  re- 
linquish all  claim  to  the  one  and  incur  all  that  is  awful 
in  the  other,  we  manifestly  place  a  stronger  motive 
before  them  for  speaking  the  truth  than  can  possibly 
be  conceived  for  speaking  falsehood.  Hence  it  is  sup- 
posed, on  the  ordinary  principles  of  the  human  mind, 
that  men  under  such  circumstances  will  speak  the 
truth. 

Such  I  suppose  to  be  the  theory  of  6aths.  There 
can  be  no  doubt  that,  if  men  acted  upon  this  convic- 
tion, the  truth  would  be,  by  means  of  oaths,  universally 
elicited. 

But,  inasmuch  as  men  may  be  required  to  testify 
whose  practical  conviction  of  these  great  moral  truths 
is  at  best  but  weak,  and  who  are  liable  to  be  more 
strongly  influenced  by  immediate  than  by  ulterior  mo- 
tives, human  punishments  have  always  been  affixed  to 
the  crime  of  perjury.  These,  of  course,  vary  in  dif- 
ferent ages,  and  in  different  periods  of  society.  The 
most  equitable  provision  seems  to  be  that  of  the  Jewish 
law,  by  which  the  perjurer  was  made  to  suffer  precisely 
the  same  injury  which  he  had  designed  to  inflict  upou 


OF    OATHS.  ^  303 

the  innocent  party.-  The  Mosaic  enactment  seems  in- 
tended to  have  been,  in  regard  to  this  crime,  unusually 
rigorous.  The  judges  are  specially  commanded  not  to 
spare,  but  to  exact  an  eye  for  an  eye,  a  tooth  for  a 
tooth.  It  certainly  deserves  serious  consideration, 
whether  modern  legislators  might  not  derive  important 
instruction  from  this  feature  of  Jewish  jurisprudence. 
II.  The  laicfulness  of  oaths.  On  this  subject  a 
diversity  of  opinion  has  been  entertained.  It  has  been 
urged  by  those  who  deny  the  lawfulness  of  oaths  — 

1.  That  oaths  are  frequently  forbidden  in  the  New 
Testament,  and  that  we  are  commanded  to  use  Yes 
for  our  affirmative,  and  N'o  for  our  negative ;  for  the 
reason  that  *'  whatsoever  is  more  than  these  cometh  of 
evil,"  or  of  the  evil  one. 

2.  That  no  man  has  a  right  to  peril  his  eternal  sal- 
vation upon  a  condition  which,  from  intellectual  or 
moral  imbecility,  he  would  be  so  liable  to  violate. 

3.  That  no  one  has  a  right  to  oblige  another  to  place 
himself  under  such  conditions. 

4.  That  the  frequent  use  of  oaths  tends,  by  abating 
our  reverence  for  the  Deity,  to  lessen  the  practical  feel- 
ing of  the  obligation  to  veracity. 

5.  That  no  reason  can  be  assigned  why  this  crime 
should  be  treated  so  differently  from  every  other.  Other 
crimes,  so  far  as  man  is  concerned,  are  left  to  human 
punishments ;  and  there  can  be  no  reason  why  this 
crime  should  involve  the  additional  punishment  in- 
tended by  the  imprecation  of  the  loss  of  the  soul. 

6.  It  is  said  that  those  sects  who  never  take  an  oath 
are  as  fully  believed,  upon  their  simple  affirmation,  as 
any  others ;  nay,  that  false  witness  among  them  is 
more  rare  than  among  other  men  taken  at  random. 
This  is,  I  believe,  acknowledged  to  be  the  fact. 

Those  who  defend  the  lawfulness  of  oaths  urge,  on 
the  contrary  — 

1.  That  those  passages  in  the  New  Testament  which 
have  been  referred  to,  forbid  not  judicial  oaths,  but 
merely  profanity. 

2 .  That  our  Saviour  responded,  when  examined  upon 


804  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

oath.     This,  however,  is  denied  by  the  other  jjarty  to 
be  a  fair  iaterpretation. 

3.  That  the  apostles,  on  several  occasions,  call  God 
to  witness,  when  they  are  attesting  to  particular  facts. 
The  instances  adduced  are  such  phrases  as  these : 
*'  God  is  my  witness;"  *' Behold,  before  God  I  lie 
not."  The  example  in  this  case  is  considered  sufficient 
to  assure  us  of  the  lawfulness  of  this  sort  of  appeal. 

4.  That  the  importance  of  truth  to  the  purposes  of 
justice  warrants  us  in  taking  other  measures  for  the 
prevention  of  perjury  than  are  taken  for  the  prevention 
of  other  crimes  ;  and  especially  as  this  is  a  crime  to  the 
commission  of  which  there  may  always  exist  peculiarly 
strong  temptations. 

These  are,  I  believe,  the  principal  considerations 
which  have  been  urged  on  both  sides  of  the  question. 
It  seems  to  me  to  need  a  more  thorough  discussion  than 
can  be  allowed  to  it  in  this  place.  One  thing,  however, 
seems  evident,  —  that  the  multiplication  of  oaths  de- 
manded by  the  present  practice  of  most  Christian 
nations  is  not  only  very  wicked,  but  that  its  direct 
tendency  is  to  diminish  our  reverence  for  the  Deity, 
and  thus,  in  the  end,  to  lead  to  the  very  evil  which  it  is 
intended  to  prevent. 

III.  Inter p relation  of  oaths. 

As  oaths  are  imposed  for  the  safety  of  the  party 
administering  them,  they  are  to  be  interpreted  as  he 
understands  them.  The  person  under  oath  has  no  right 
to  make  any  mental  reservation,  but  to  declare  the 
truth  precisely  in  the  manner  that  the  truth,  the  whole 
truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth  is  expected  of  him. 
On  no  other  principle  would  we  ever  know  what  to  be- 
lieve or  to  expect  from  a  witness.  If,  for  the  sake  of 
personal  friendship  or  personal  advantage,  or  from  fear 
of  personal  inconvenience,  or  from  the  excitement  of 
party  partiality,  he  shrink  from  declaring  the  whole 
truth,  he  is  as  truly  guilty  of  perjury  as  though  ho 
Bwore  falsely  for  money. 

IV.  Different  lands  of  oaths. 

Oaths  respect  either  the  past  or  the  future ;  that  is, 
are  cither  assertory  or  promissory. 


OF   OATHS.  ^       '  '605 

1.  The  oath  respecting  the  past  is  definite.  A  trans- 
action either  took  place,  or  it  did  not  take  place,  and  wo 
either  have  or  have  not  some  knowledge  respecting  it. 
It  is  therefore  in  our  power  either  to  tell  what  we  know, 
or  to  tell  what  and  in  how  much  we  do  not  know. 
This  is  the  proper  occasion  for  an  oath. 

2.  The  oath  respecting  the  future  is  of  necessity  in- 
definite f  as  when  we  promise  upon  oath  to  discharge,  to 
the  best  of  our  ohility,  a  particular  office.  Thus,  the 
parties  may  have  very  different  views  of  what  is  meant 
by  discharging  an  office  according  to  the  best  of  our 
ability;  or  this  obligation  may  conflict  with  others,  such 
as  domestic  or  personal  obligations  ;  and  the  incumbent 
may  not  know,  even  with  the  best  intentions,  which 
obligation  ought  to  take  the  precedence  ;  that  is,  what 
is  the  best  of  his  ability.  Such  being  the  case,  who 
that  is  aware  of  the  frailty  of  human  nature  will  dare 
to  peril  his  eternal  salvation  upon  the  performance,  to 
the  best  of  his  ability,  of  any  official  duty?  And  if 
these  allowances  be  understood  by  both  parties,  how 
are  they  to  ha  limited?  And  if  they  be  not  limited, 
what  is  the  value  of  an  oath?  Such  being  the  case,  it 
is,  at  best,  doubtful  whether  promissory  oaths  of  office 
ought  ever  to  be  required.  Much  less  ought  they  to  be 
required,  as  is  frequently  the  case,  in  the  most  petty 
details  of  official  life.  They  must  be  a  snare  to  the 
conscience  of  a  thoughtful  man,  and  must  tend  to 
obliterate  moral  distinctions  from  the  mind  of  him  who 
is,  as  is  too  frequently  the  case,  unfortunately  thought- 
less. Why  should  one  man,  who  is  called  upon  to  dis- 
charge the  duties  of  a  constable,  or  of  an  overseer  of 
common  schools,  or  even  of  a  counsellor  or  a  judge, 
be  placed  under  peril  of  his  eternal  salvation,  any  more 
than  his  neighbor  who  discharges  the  duty  of  a  mer- 
chant, of  an  instructor  of  youth,  a  physician,  or  a  cler- 
gyman ?  It  seems  to  me  that  no  man  can  take  such  an 
oath  of  office,  upon  reflection,  without  such  mental 
reservation  as  must  immediately  convince  him  that  the 
requirement  is  nugatory ;  and,  if  so,  that  it  must  be 
injurious. 


CLASS    II. 

DUITES  WHICH  ABISE   FROM  THE  CONSTITUTION  OP  THH 

SEXES. 

Under  this  division  of  the  subject  we  shall  consider— 

1.  The  general  duty  of  chastity. 

2.  The   nature  and  obligations  of  the  relation  of 
inaiTiage. 

3.  The  duties  of  parents. 

4.  The  duties  of  children* 


CHAPTER  I. 


THE   DUTY  OP  CHASTITT. 


The  moral  law  limits  the  indulgence  of  the  sexual 
desire  to  individuals  who  are  exclusively  united  to  each 
other  for  life. 

Hence  it  forbids  adultery, polygamy, concubinage,  or, 
in  general,  intercourse  with  one  of  the  other  sex,  under 
any  other  condition  than  that  of  the  marriage  covenant. 

Inasmuch  as  unchaste  desire  is  strongly  excited  by 
the  imagination,  the  law  of  chastit}^  forbids  all  impure 
thoughts  and  actions,  all  unchaste  conversation,  looks 
and  gestures,thercadingof  obscene  or  lascivious  books, 
and  everything  which  would  naturally  produce  in  us  a 
tendency  to  violate  this  precept. 

The  law  which  we  are  to  consider  contains  two  re- 
strictions. It  requires  that  the  individuals  be  exclu- 
sively united  to  each  other,  and  that  this  union  be 
during  life. 

Let  us  briefly  examine  the  teachings  of  natural  re- 
ligion upon  both  of  these  points. 

That  it  is  the  will  of  our  Creator  that  the  gratification 
of  the  sexual  desire  should  be  limited  to  those  who 
are  exclusively  united  to  each  other,  may  be  shown  as 
follows : 

1.  The  number  of  births  of  each  sex  is  substantially 
equal .  As  at  the  beginning  God  created  a  male  and  a 
female,  so  has  it  ever  been.  This  universal  fact  suffi- 
ciently indicates  bis  will. 

2.  Under  this  restriction  the  race  is  most  rapidly 
multiplied,  and  the  health  of  the  young  most  certainly 
secured. 


308  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

3.  The  human  infant  is  proverbially  helpless,  and  on 
its  entrance  into  this  world  needs  all  the  comforts  of  an 
affectionate  home,  where  everything  will  be  done  lov- 
ingly for  its  comfort  and  sustenance.  And  after  its 
infancy  is  passed,  it  needs  the  watchful  care  of  parents, 
who  w^ill  unite  in  rendering  to  it  every  needful  office,  to 
guide  it  by  their  experience,  restrain  it  by  parental  au- 
thority, and  prepare  it  for  its  future  situation  in  society. 
It  is  obvious  that  such  a  home  can  never  be  prepared 
for  the  offspring  of  disgraceful  lust  or  promiscuous 
concubinage. 

4.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  we  were  created  to 
find  a  large  part  of  our  earthly  happiness  in  domestic 
society,  where  all  the  relations  of  husband  and  wife, 
parents  and  children,  brothers  and  sisters,  combine  to 
augment  the  happiness  of  every  individual.  But  how 
can  such  happiness  be  enjoyed  when  the  domestic  soci- 
ety is  constituted  on  any  other  principles  than  those 
which  we  have  indicated? 

5.  No  reason  can  be  assigned  why  an  individual  of 
one  sex  is  not  as  valuable  in  the  sight  of  the  Creator  as 
an  individual  of  the  other,  much  less  why  the  one  sex 
should  be  the  abused  slave,  or  the  object  of  sensual 
gratification  for  the  other.  But  just  as  we  depart  from 
obedience  to  the  law  of  chastity,  is  woman  degraded  to 
this  condition.  No  one  can  suppose  that  the  Creator 
intended  one  human  being  to  stand  in  such  a  relation 
to  another,  while  both  are  equally  tending  to  the  same 
solemn  eternity. 

II.  The  second  requirement  of  the  law  of  chastity  is 
that  the  union  be  for  life.  Among  the  natural  reasons 
for  this  requirement  may  be  the  following : 

1.  Nothing  tends  so  strongly  to  cultivate  that  self- 
government  and  mutual  forbearance,  which  are  essen- 
tial to  any  connection  of  imperfect  beings,  as  the  con- 
viction that  the  union  is  for  life. 

2.  If  the  union  be  not  for  life,  it  must  be  liable  to  be 
dissolved  at  the  will  of  either  party.  This  would  lead 
to  all  the  evils  of  promiscuous  concubinage,  of  which 
we  have  spoken. 


THE   DUTT   OP   CHASTITY.       ^  309 

3.  Children  require  the  care  of  parents  until  they 
have  arrived  at  an  age  at  which  they  are  competent  to 
assume  the  care  of  themselves.  But  if  the  domestic 
society  be  dissolved,  they  belong  to  no  one  ;  they  have 
no  protector,  and  are  cast  helpless  upon  the  world. 

4.  Or,  if  otherwise,  they  become  the  charge  of  one  of 
the  parents,  and  this  will  commonly  be  the  mother, 
whose  parental  instincts  are  stronger,  and  who  would 
frequently  rather  die  than  desert  her  offspring.  The 
tendency  of  every  licentious  system  is  to  take  advan- 
tage of  the  maternal  instincts  of  the  mother  for  the 
purpose  of  devolving  upon  her  a  labor  which  she  is  least 
able  to  sustain. 

5.  Parents  themselves,  in  advanced  age,  frequently 
need  the  care  of  their  children,  and  arc  greatly  depend- 
ent for  their  happiness  upon  them.  But  all  this  source 
of  happiness  is  dried  up  by  any  system  which  allows  of 
the  disruption  of  the  domestic  society,  and  the  deser- 
tion of  offspring  at  the  will  of  both  or  either  of  the 
parents. 

If  it  be  suggested  that  though  this  may  be  the  gen- 
eral rule,  yet  that  occasional  aberrations  may  be  ex- 
empted from  the  general  rule,  it  may  be  answered  — 

1.  That  the  severity  of  the  punishment  which  God 
has  affixed  to  the  crime  displays  his  displeasure  against 
it.  in  woman  this  crime  is  fatal  to  reputation,  and  a 
return  to  virtue  seems  almost  hopeless  ;  and  in  man  it 
leads  directly  to  those  states  of  mind  which  are  the  sure 
precursors  to  destruction. 

2.  The  Creator,  who  made  us,  and  to  whom  we  must 
give  account,  is  no  respecter  of  persons,  and  he  will 
bring  every  secret  thing  into  judgment.  The  seducer 
and  his  victim  will  shortly  stand  at  the  bar  of  that 
tTudge  who  will  render  to  every  man  according  to  his 
deeds. 

3.  Let  it  be  remembered  that  a  female  is,  like  us,  a 
moral  and  accountal)le  being,  hastening  to  the  bar  of 
God.  Let  us  consider  the  worth  of  that  soul  which, 
unless  a  miracle  interposes,  must,  by  the  loss  of  virtue, 
be  driven  into  that  path  which  leads  to  endless  despair ; 


810  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

and  we  ask  whether  there  be  a  crime  whose  atrocity 
more  justly  merits  the  deepest  condemnation  than  that 
which,  for  the  sake  of  a  momentary  gratification,  will 
violate  all  these  obligations,  outrage  all  these  sympa- 
thies, and  work  out  so  wide-spreading  and  interminable 
a  ruin  ? 

III.  The  precepts  of  revealed  religion  on  this  subject 
may  be  briefly  stated. 

1.  The  seventh  commandment  of  the  decalogue  is, 
**  Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery."  The  term  aduU 
tery  here  is  intended  to  designate  impurity  of  action  of 
every  kind. 

2.  Our  Saviour,  in  reference  to  the  law  of  chastity,  in 
his  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  teaches  us  fully  the  extent  of 
this  precept.  **  Ye  have  heard  that  it  hath  been  said 
by  them  of  old  time.  Thou  shalt  not  commit  adultery. 
But  I  say  unto  you,  that  whosoever  shall  look  upon  a 
woman  to  lust  after  her  [to  cherish  impure  desire]  hath 
committed  adultery  with  her  already  in  his  heart.  And 
if  thy  right  eye  ofiend  thee  [cause  thee  to  offend] ,  pluck 
it  out  and  cast  it  from  thee  ;  for  it  is  profitable  for  thee 
that  one  of  thy  members  should  perish,  and  not  that 
thy  whole  body  should  be  cast  into  hell "  (Matt.  v. 
27-33).  That  is,  as  I  suppose,  eradicate  from  your 
bosom  every  impure  thought,  no  matter  at  what  sac- 
rifice ;  for  no  one  who  cherishes  impurity  even  in 
thought  can  inherit  the  kingdom  of  heaven. 

I  need  not  multiply  quotations  from  both  the  Old  and 
New  Testaments,  which  show  that  God  has  classed  un- 
cleanness  among  those  crimes  which  especially  bring 
down  his  judgments  upon  men.  Let  every  one,  then, 
remember  that  whoever  violates  this  command,  violates 
it  in  defiance  of  the  most  clearly  revealed  command  of 
God,  and  at  the  price  of  his  own  soul. 

I  remarked  above  that  the  law  of  chastity  forbade  the 
indulgence  of  lascivious  or  impure  imaginations,  the 
harboring  of  such  thoughts  in  the  mind,  or  the  doing 
of  anything  by  which  such  thoughts  could  be  excited. 
Licentiousness  in  outward  conduct  never  appears  until 
the  mind  has  become  defiled  by  impure  imaginations. 


I 


THE   DUTY   OP   CHASTITY.      ^  311 

Hence  the  necessity  of  the  utmost  vigilance  in  the 
government  of  our  thoughts,  and  in  the  avoiding  of 
all  books,  all  pictures,  all  society,  and  all  conduct  or 
actions,  of  which  the  tendency  is  to  imbue  our  imagin- 
ations with  anything  at  variance  with  the  purest  virtue. 
No  man  can  take  fire  in  his  bosom  and  his  clothes  be 
not  burned.  Hence  it  is  that  immodest  dancing,  and 
all  amusements  and  actions  which  tend  to  inflame  the 
passions,  are  sadly  pernicious  to  morals.  It  is  not 
enough  for  a  virtuous  woman  to  say  Ihat  she  suffers  no 
harm  from  such  associations ;  if  she  knows  that  they 
are  the  occasions  of  ruin  to  others,  she  must  charge 
herself  with  the  crime  of  being  accessory  to  the  undoing 
of  others.  It  was  Cain  who  asked,  "  Am  I  my  brother's 
keeper  ?  " 


CHAPTEE    II. 

THE  LAW  OF  MARRIAGE. 

It  has  already  been  remarked,  in  the  preceding  sec- 
tion, that  the  law  of  chastity  forbids  all  sexual  inter- 
course between  persons  who  have  not  been  exclusively 
united  for  life.  In  the  act  of  marriage,  two  persons, 
under  the  most  solemn  circumstauces,  are  thus  united ; 
and  they  enter  a  mutual  contract  thus  to  live  in 
respect  to  each  other.  This  relation  having  been  es- 
tablished by  God,  the  contract  thus  entered  into  has  all 
the  solemnity  of  an  oath.  Hence  he  who  violates  it  is 
guilty  of  a  twofold  crime  :  first,  the  violation  of  the 
law  of  chastity  ;  and,  secondly,  of  the  law  of  veracity, 
—  a  veracity  pledged  under  the  most  solemn  circum- 
stances. 

But  vastly  more  than  this  is  intended  by  the  institu- 
tion of  marriage.  By  the  contract  thus  entered  into 
a  society  is  formed,  of  a  most  interesting  and  important 
character,  which  is  the  origin  of  all  civil  society,  and 
in  which  children  are  prepared  to  become  members  of 
that  great  community.  As  our  principal  knowledge  of 
the  nature  and  oblio^ations  of  this  institution  is  derived 
from  the  sacred  Scriptures,  I  shall  endeavor  briefly  to 
explain  the  manner  in  which  they  treat  of  it,  without 
adding  anything  to  what  I  have  already  said  in  regard 
to  the  teaching  of  natural  religion. 

I  shall  consider,  first,  the  nature  of  this  contract ; 
and,  secondly,  the  duties  which  it  enjoins  and  the 
crimes  which  it  forbids. 

First.  The  nature  of  the  contract. 

1.  The  contract  is  for  life,  and  is  dissoluble  for  one 
cause  only,  —  the  cause  of  whoredom : 


THE   LAW   OF   MARRIAGE.       ^       '  813 

Matthew  xix.  3-6,  9:  <«Then  came  some  of  the 
Pharisees  to  him,  and,  tempting  him,  asked.  Can  a  man 
upon  every  pretence  divorce  his  wife?  He  answered, 
Have  ye  not  read,  that  at  the  beginning,  when  the  Cre- 
ator made  man,  he  formed  a  male  and  female ;  and 
said,  for  this  cause  shall  a  man  leave  father  and  mother, 
and  adhere  to  his  wife  ;  and  they  two  shall  be  one  flesh  ? 
Wherefore  they  are  no  longer  two,  but  one  flesh.  What 
then  God  hath  conjoined,  let  no  man  separate.  Where- 
fore, I  say  unto  you,  whosoever  divorceth  his  wife,  ex- 
cept for  whoredom,  and  marrieth  another,  committeth 
adultery."  I  use  here  the  translation  of  Dr.  Campbell, 
which,  I  think,  conveys  more  exactly  than  the  common 
version  the  meaning  of  the  original. 

2.  We  are  here  taught  that  marriage,  being  an  insti- 
tution of  God,  is  subject  to  his  lawsaXonQ^  and  not  to  the 
laws  of  man.  Hence  the  civil  law  is  binding  upon  the 
conscience  only  in  so  far  as  it  corresponds  to  the  law 
of  God. 

3.  This  contract  is  essentially  mutual.  By  entering 
into  it,  the  members  form  a  society  ;  that  is,  they  have 
something  in  common.  Whatever  is  thus  in  common 
belongs  equally  to  both.  What  is  not  thus  surrendered 
remains,  as  before,  in  the  power  of  the  individual. 

4.  The  basis  of  this  union  is  affection.  Individuals 
thus  contract  themselves  to  each  other  on  the  ground 
not  merely  of  mutual  regard,  but  also  of  a  regard 
stronger  than  that  which  they  entertain  for  any  other 
persons.  Such  is  the  nature  of  the  human  afiections, 
that  we  derive  a  higher  and  a  purer  pleasure  from  ren- 
dering happy  those  whom  we  love  than  from  self-grati- 
fication. This  is  the  essential  element  on  which  depends 
the  happiness  of  the  married  state. 

5.  1  have  mentioned  above  that  this  being  a  volun- 
tary compact,  and  forming  a  peculiar  society,  there  are 
some  things  which,  by  this  compact,  each  surrenders  to 
the  other,  and  also  other  things  which  are  not  surren- 
dered. It  is  important  that  these  be  distinguished  from 
each  other. 

I  remark,  then  — 


314  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

a.  Neither  party  surrenders  to  the  other  any  control 
over  anything  appertaining  to  the  conscience.  For 
either  party  to  interfere  with  the  discharge  of  those 
duties  which  the  other  party  really  believes  that  it  owes 
to  God,  is  therefore  wicked  and  oppressive. 

b.  Neither  party  surrenders  to  the  other  anything 
which  would  violate  prior  and  lawful  obligations .  Thus , 
a  husband  does  not  promise  to  subject  his  professional 
pursuits  to  the  will  of  his  wife.  So,  also,  his  duties  as 
a  citizen  are  of  prior  obligation ;  and,  if  they  really 
interfere  with  any  others,  those  subsequently  formed 
must  be  construed  in  subjection  to  them.  Thus,  also, 
the  filial  duties  of  both  parties  remain  in  some  respects 
unchanged  after  marriage,  and  the  marriage  contract 
should  not  be  so  interpreted  as  to  violate  them. 

c.  On  the  other  hand,  I  suppose  that  the  marriage 
contract  binds  each  party,  whenever  individual  gratifi- 
cation is  concerned,  to  prefer  the  happiness  of  the  other 
party  to  its  own.  If  pleasure  can  be  enjoyed  by  both, 
the  happiness  of  both  is  increased  by  enjoying  it  in 
common.  If  it  can  be  enjoyed  but  by  one,  each  should 
prefer  that  it  be  enjoyed  by  the  other.  And  if  there  be 
sorrow  to  be  endured,  or  inconvenience  to  be  suffered, 
each  should  desire,  if  possible,  to  bear  the  infliction  for 
the  sake  of  shielding  the  other  from  pain. 

d.  And,  as  I  have  remarked  before,  the  disposition 
to  do  this  arises  from  the  very  nature  of  the  principles 
on  which  the  compact  is  formed,  from  unreserved  affec- 
tion. This  is  the  very  manner  in  which  affection  always 
displays  itself.  And  this  is  the  only  course  of  conduct 
by  which  affection  can  be  retained. 

6.  As,  however,  in  all  societies  there  may  be  differ- 
ences of  opinion,  even  where  the  harmony  of  feeling 
remains  unimpaired,  so  there  may  be  differences  here. 
Where  such  differences  of  opinion  exist,  there  must  bo 
some  ultimate  appeal.  As  the  husband  is  responsible 
to  civil  society,  the  voice  of  nature  and  of  revelation 
unite  in  conferring  the  right  of  ultimate  authority  upon 
him.  By  this  arrangement  the  happiness  of  the  wife 
is  increased  no  less  than  that  of  the  husband.     Iler 


I 


THB  LAW   OF  MARRIAGE.  815 

power  is  always  greatest  in  concession.  She  is  graceful 
and  attractive  while  meek  and  gentle  ;  but  when  angered 
and  turbulent,  she  loses  the  fascination  of  her  own  sex, 
without  attaining  to  the  dignity  of  the  other. 

Secondly.  I  come  now  to  speak  of  the  duties  imposed 
by  the  marriage  relation. 

I.  The  marriage  relation  imposes  upon  both  parties 
equally  the  duty  of  chastity. 

1.  Hence  it  forbids  adultery,  or  intercourse  with  any 
other  person  than  that  one  to  whom  the  individual  is 
united  in  marriage. 

2.  And,  hence,  it  forbids  all  conduct  in  married  per- 
sons, or  with  married  persons,  of  which  the  tendency 
would  be  to  diminish  their  affection  for  those  to  whom 
they  are  united  in  marriage,  or  of  which  the  tendency 
would  be  to  give  pain  to  the  other  party. 

The  crime  of  adultery  is  of  an  exceedingly  aggra- 
vated nature.  The  misery  which  it  inflicts  upon  par- 
ents and  children,  relatives,  and  friends,  the  total  anni- 
hilation of  domestic  happiness,  and  the  total  disruption 
of  parental  and  filial  ties  which  it  necessarily  produces, 
mark  it  as  one  of  the  basest  forms  of  human  atrocity. 
And  if  any  one  will  remember  that  the  happiness  and 
prosperity  of  a  country  must  depend  on  the  virtue  of 
the  domestic  society  more  than  on  anything  else,  he  can- 
not fail  to  perceive  that  a  crime  which  by  a  single  act 
sunders  the  conjugal  tie,  and  leaves  children  worse  than 
pareutless,  must  be  attended  with  more  abundant  aiul 
remediless  evils  than  almost  any  other  that  can  be 
jiamed.  The  taking  of  human  life  can  be  attended 
with  no  consequences  more  dreadful.  In  the  one  case, 
the  parental  tie  is  broken,  but  the  victim  is  innocent ; 
in  the  other,  the  tie  is  broken,  with  the  additional  aggra- 
vation of  an  irretrievable  moral  stain,  and  a  wide- 
spreading  dishonor  that  cannot  be  washed  away. 
.  II.  The  law  of  marriage  enforces  the  duty  of  mutual 
affection. 

Affection  towards  another  is  the  result  of  his  or  her 
actions  and  temper  towards  us.  Admiration  and  respect 
may  be  the  result  of  other  manifestations  of  character, 


316  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

but  nothing  is  so  likely  as  evidence  of  affection  towards 
ourselves  to  produce  in  us  affection  towards  others. 

III.  The  law  of  marriage  imposes  the  duty  of  mu- 
tual assistance. 

In  the  domestic  society,  as  in  every  other,  there  are 
special  duties  devolving  upon  each  member.  So  here, 
there  are  duties  devolving  of  right  upon  the  husband, 
and  other  duties  devolving  of  riglit  upon  the  wife. 
Thus  it  is  the  duty,  in  the  first  instance,  of  the  husband 
to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the  family  ;  and  of  the  wife, 
to  assume  the  charge  of  the  affairs  of  the  household. 
His  sphere  of  duty  is  without,  her  sphere  of  duty  is 
within.  That  man  is  worthily  despised  who  does  not 
qualify  himself  to  support  that  family  of  which  he  has 
voluntarily  assumed  the  office  of  protector.  Nor  surely 
is  that  woman  less  deserving  of  contempt  who  enters 
upon  the  duties  of  a  wife  with  no  other  conceptions  of 
the  responsibilities  which  she  has  assumed  than  such  as 
have  been  acquired  from  a  life  of  childish  caprice,  lux- 
urious self-indulgence,  and  sensitive,  feminine,  yet 
thoroughly  finished  selfishness. 

I  have  remarked,  that  the  duties  of  the  husband  and 
wife  are  thus,  in  the  first  instance,  apportioned.  Yet, 
if  one  be  disabled,  all  that  portion  of  the  duty  of  the 
disabled  party  which  the  other  can  discharge  falls  upon 
that  other.  If  the  husband  cannot  alone  support  the 
family,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  wife  to  assist  him.  If  the 
wife  is,  through  sickness,  unable  to  direct  her  house- 
hold, the  husband  is  bound,  in  so  far  as  it  is  possible, 
to  assume  her  care.  In  case  of  the  death  of  cither, 
the  whole  care  of  the  children  devolves  upon  the  sur- 
vivor. 

I  shall  close  this  chapter  with  the  following  well- 
known  extract  from  a  poet  whose  purity  of  character 
and  exquisite  sensibility  have  done  more  than  any  other 
in  our  language  to  clothe  virtue  in  her  own  native  at- 
tractiveness : 

Domestic  happiness,  thou  only  blisa 
Of  Paradise  that  has  survived  the  fall  ! 
Though  few  uow  taste  thee  unimpaired  and  pare. 


THE   LAW   OF   MARRIAGE.      ^  817 

Or,  tasting,  long  enjoy  thee!  — too  infirm 
Or  too  incautious  to  preserve  thy  sweets 
Unmixed  with  drops  of  bitter,  which  neglect 
Or  temper  sheds  into  thy  crystal  cup: 
Thou  art  the  nurse  of  virtue;  in  thine  arms 
She  smiles,  appearing,  as  in  truth  she  is, 
Heaven-born,  and  destined  to  the  skies  again. 
Thou  art  not  known  where  pleasure  is  adored,  — 
That  reeling  goddess,  with  her  zoneloss  waist 
And  wandering  eyes,  still  leaning  on  the  arm 
Of  novelty,  her  fickle,  frail  support; 
For  thou  art  meek  and  constant,  hating  ohange. 
And  finding  in  the  calm  of  truth-tried  love 
Joys  which  her  stormy  rapture  never  yields. 
Forsaking  thee,  what  shipwreck  have  we  seea 
Of  honor,  dignity,  and  fair  renown! 
'Till  prostitution  elbows  us  aside 
In  all  oar  crowded  streets. 

2Uk 


CHAPTER   III. 

THE  LAW  OF  PARENTS. 

The  adaptation  of  the  physical  and  moral  laws  under 
which  man  is  placed,  to  the  promotion  of  human  hap- 
piness, is  beautifully  illustrated  in  the  relation  which 
exists  between  the  law  of  marriage  and  the  law  of 
parent  and  child.  Were  the  physical  or  moral  condi- 
tions of  marriage  different  in  any  respect  from  those 
which  exist,  the  evils  which  would  ensue  would  be  innu- 
merable. 

For  instance,  we  see  that  mankind  are  incapable  of 
sustaining  the  relation  of  parent  until  they  have  arrived 
at  the  age  of  maturity,  attained  to  considerable  knowl- 
edge and  experience,  and  become  capable  of  such  labor 
as  will  enable  them  to  support  and  protect  their  offspring. 
Were  this  otherwise,  the  progress  of  man  in  virtue  and 
knowledge  would  be  impossible,  even  if  the  whole  race 
did  not  perish  from  want  and  disease. 

Again,  the  parent  is  endowed  with  a  love  of  his  off- 
spring, which  renders  it  a  pleasure  to  him  to  contribute 
to  its  welfare,  and  to  give  it,  by  every  means  in  his 
power,  the  benefit  of  his  own  experience.  And,  on  the 
contrary,  there  is  in  the  child,  if  not  a  correspondent 
love  of  the  parent,  a  disposition  to  submit  to  tlie  parent's 
wishes,  and,  unless  its  instincts  have  been  mismanaged, 
to  yield  to  his  authority. 

Again,  it  is  evident  that  civil  society  is  constituted  by 
the  surrender  of  the  individual's  personal  desires  and 
propensities  to  the  good  of  the  whole.  Now,  in  this 
point  of  view,  the  domestic  society  is  designed  to  be, 
as  has  been  frequently  remarked,  the  nursery  for  the 
state. 


THE   LAW  OF   PARENTS.  '  819 

Thus,  the  parent  being  of  an  age  and  having  experi- 
ence sufficient  to  control  and  direct  the  child,  and  the 
child  being  instinctively  disposed  to  yield  to  his  author- 
ity, the  child  grows  up  under  a  system  in  which  he 
yields  to  the  will  of  another,  and  thus  he  learns  at  home 
to  submit  to  the  laws  of  that  society  of  which  he  is  soon 
to  become  a  member.  And  hence  it  is  that  the  relaxa- 
tion of  parental  authority  has  always  been  found  one 
of  the  surest  indications  of  the  decline  of  social  order, 
and  the  unfailing  precursor  of  public  turbulence  and 
anarchy. 

But  still  more,  it  is  a  common  remark  that  children 
are  influenced  by  example  more  readily  than  by  any 
other  means.  Now,  by  the  marriage  constitution  this 
principle  of  human  nature  is  employed  as  an  instrument 
of  the  greatest  possible  good.  We  stated  that  the  basis 
of  the  marriage  covenant  is  affection,  and  that  it  sup- 
poses each  party  to  prefer  the  happiness  of  the  other  to 
its  own.  While  the  domestic  society  is  governed  by 
this  principle,  it  presents  to  the  children  a  continual 
example  of  disinterestedness  and  self-denial,  and  of  the 
happiness  which  results  from  the  exercise  of  these  vir- 
tues. Audyet  more,  the  affection  of  the  parents  prompts 
them  to  the  exercise  of  the  same  virtues  in  behalf  of 
their  children,  and  hence  the  latter  have  before  their 
eyes  a  constantly  operating  motive  to  the  cultivation  of 
these  very  dispositions.  And,  lastly,  as  the  duty  of  the 
wife  is  submission,  children  are  thus  taught,  by  the  ex- 
ample of  one  whom  they  respect  and  love,  that  submis- 
sion is  both  graceful  and  dignified ;  and  that  it  in  no 
manner  involves  the  idea  of  baseness  or  servility. 

1 .  From  these  considerations  we  learn  the  relation 
which  exists  by  nature  between  parents  and  children. 
It  is  the  relation  of  a  superior  to  an  inferior.  The  right 
of  the  parent  \^  to  command;  the  dutyoi  the  child  is  to 
obey.  Authority  belongs  to  the  one,  submission  to  the 
other.  This  relation  is  apart  of  our  constitution,  and 
the  obligation  which  arises  from  it  is,  accordingly,  a  part 
of  our  duty.  It  is  not  a  mere  matter  of  convenience  or 
of  expediency,  but  it  arises  from  the  relations  under 


320  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

which  we  are  created ;  and  to  the  violation  of  it,  our 
Creator  has  affixed  peculiar  and  afflicting  penalties. 

2.  While  this  is  the  relation,  yet  the  motive  which 
should  govern  the  obligation,  on  both  sides,  is  affection. 
While  the  authority  to  command  rests  with  the  parent, 
and  the  duty  of  submission  is  imposed  upon  the  child, 
yet  the  parent  is  not  at  liberty  to  exercise  this  authority 
from  caprice,  or  for  his  own  advantage,  but  from  simple 
love  to  the  child,  and  for  the  child's  advantage.  The 
constitution  under  which  we  are  placed  renders  it  ne- 
cessary that  the  parent  should  exercise  this  power ;  but 
that  parent  abuses  it  if  he  exercise  it  from  any  other 
motive  than  duty  to  God  and  love  to  his  offspring. 

3.  This  relation  being  establislied  by  our  Creator, 
and  the  obligations  consequent  upon  it  being  binding 
upon  both  parties,  the  failure  in  one  party  does  not  an- 
nihilate the  obligations  of  the  other.  If  a  child  be  dis- 
obedient, the  parent  is  still  under  obligation  to  act 
towards  it  for  its  own  good,  and  not  to  exert  his  author- 
ity for  any  other  purpose.  If  a  parent  be  unreasonable, 
this  does  not  release  the  child ;  he  is  still  bound  to 
honor  and  obey  and  reverence  his  parent. 

The  duty  of  parents  is,  then,  generally,  to  educate, 
or  to  bring  up  their  children  in  such  a  manner  as  they 
believe  will  conduce  most  to  their  future  happiness,  both 
temporal  and  eternal. 

This  comprehends  several  particulars. 

I.  Support,  or  jvla-intenance. 

That  it  is  the  duty  of  the  parents  to  keep  alive  the 
helpless  being  whom  they  have  brought  into  existence 
need  not  be  proved.  As  to  the  expensiveness  of  this 
maintenance,  I  do  not  know  that  anything  very  definite 
can  be  asserted.  The  general  rule  would  seem  to  be, 
that  the  mode  of  life  adopted  by  the  parent  would  be 
that  which  he  is  required  to  provide  for  the  child. 
This,  however,  would  be  modified  by  some  circum- 
stances. If  a  parent  of  large  wealth  brought  up  his 
family  in  meanness  and  ignorance,  so  that  they  would 
be  specially  unfitted  for  the  opulence  which  they  were 
hereafter  to  enjoy,  he  would  act  unjustly.     So,  on  the 


THE   LAW    OF   PARENTS.       -  821 

other  hand,  if  a  parent,  destitute  of  means  to  render  his 
children  independent  of  hibor,  brings  them  up,  whether 
male  or  female,  in  idleness  and  expensiveness,  he  vio- 
lates his  duty  as  a  parent :  he  is  preparing  them  for  a 
life,  not  of  happiness,  but  of  discontent,  imbecility,  and 
misery. 
II.  Education. 

1 .  PJiy  steal  education,  A  parent  is  under  obligation 
to  use  all  the  means  in  his  power  to  secure  to  his  chil- 
dren a  good  physical  constitution.  It  is  his  duty  to 
regulate  their  food,  their  labor,  and  exercise,  so  as  fully 
to  develop  all  the  powers,  and  call  into  exercise  all  the 
functions  of  their  physical  system ;  to  accustom  them 
to  hardship,  and  render  them  patient  of  labor. 

By  the  same  rule  we  see  the  wickedness  of  those 
parents  who  employ  their  children  in  such  service,  or 
oblige  them  to  labor  in  such  manner,  as  will  expose 
them  to  sickness,  infirmity,  disease,  and  premature 
death.  In  many  manufacturing  countries  children  are 
forced  to  labor  before  they  are  able  to  endure  confine- 
ment and  ftitigue,  or  to  labor  vastly  beyond  their 
strength ;  so  that  the  vigor  of  their  constitution  is  de- 
stroyed even  in  infancy.  The  power  of  the  parent  over 
the  child  was  given  for  the  child's  good,  and  neither  to 
gratify  the  parent's  selfishness,  nor  to  minister  to  his 
love  of  gain.  It  is  not  improper  to  add,  that  the  guilt 
and  the  shame  of  this  abuse  of  the  rights  of  children 
are  equally  shared  between  the  parent  who  thus  sells 
his  child's  health  and  life  for  gold,  and  the  heartless 
agent  who  thus  profits  by  his  wickedness.  Nor  is  this 
form  of  violation  of  parental  obligation  confined  to  any 
one  class  of  society.  The  ambitious  mother  who,  for 
the  sake  of  her  own  elevation,  or  the  aggrandizement  of 
her  family,  and  without  any  respect  to  the  happiness 
of  her  child,  educates  her  daughter  in  all  the  trickery 
of  fashionable  fascination,  dwarfing  her  mind  and  sen- 
sualizing her  aspirations  for  the  chance  of  negotiating 
for  her  a  profitable  match,  falls  under  precisely  the  same 
condemnation. 

2.  Intellectual  education.     A  child  enters  into  the 


622  PRACTICAL   ETHii;b. 

world  utterly  ignorant,  and  possessed  of  nothing  else 
than  a  collection  of  impulses  and  capabilities.  To  some 
knowledge  and  discipline  the  parent  has,  from  the  ne- 
cessity of  the  case,  attained  ;  and,  at  least,  so  much  as 
this  he  is  bound  to  communicate  to  his  children.  In 
some  respects,  however,  this  duty  can  be  discharged 
more  effectively  by  others  than  by  the  parent ;  and  it 
•may,  therefore,  very  properly  be  thus  devolved  upon  a 
teacher.  The  parental  obligation  requires  that  it  be 
done  either  by  a  parent  himself,  or  that  he  procure  it 
to  be  done  by  another. 

I  have  said  that  it  can,  in  part,  be  discharged  by  the 
teacher.  But,  let  it  be  remembered,  it  can  be  done  onli/ 
in  part.  The  teacher  is  only  the  agent;  the  parent  is 
the  principal.  The  teacher  does  not  remove  from  the 
parent  any  of  the  responsibility  of  his  relation.  Several 
duties  devolve  upon  the  one  which  cannot  be  right- 
fully devolved  upon  the  other. 

For  instance  — 

1.  He  is  bound  to  inform  himself  of  the  peculiar 
habits  of  his  child,  and  consider  what  sort  of  education 
will  most  conduce  to  his  future  happiness  and  usefulness. 

2.  He  is  bound  to  select  such  instructors  as  will  best 
accomplish  the  results  which  he  believes  will  be  most 
beneficial. 

3.  He  is  bound  to  devote  such  time  and  attention  to 
the  subject  as  will  enable  him  to  ascertain  whether  the 
instructor  of  his  child  discharges  his  duty  with  faith- 
fulness. 

4.  To  encourage  his  child  by  manifesting  such  in- 
terest in  his  studies  as  shall  give  to  diligence  and 
assiduity  all  the  assistance  and  benefit  of  parental 
authority  and  friendship. 

5.  And  if  a  parunt  be  under  obligation  to  do  this,  he 
is,  of  course,  under  obligation  to  take  time  to  do  it,  and 
80  to  construct  the  arrangements  of  his  family  and 
business  that  it  ma]/  he  done.  He  has  no  right  to  say 
that  he  has  no  time  for  these  duties.  If  God  have  re- 
quired them  of  him,  as  is  the  fact,  he  has  time  exactly 
for  them,  and  he  has  not  time  for  those  other  occupa- 
tions which  interfere  with  them. 


THE   LAW   OF   PARENTS.  323 

Nor  let  it  be  supposed  that  this  will  ever  he  done 
without  bringing  with  it  its  own  reward.  A  parent 
who  assiduously  follows  his  children  throughout  the 
various  steps  of  their  education,  will  find  his  own 
knowledge  increased,  and  his  own  education  carried 
forward  vastly  beyond  what  he  would  at  first  have  con- 
ceived. And  yet  more.  It  is  only  thus  that  the  parent 
will  be  able  to  retain  that  intellectual  superiority 
which.it  is  so  much  for  the  interest  of  poth  parties  that 
he  should,  for  a  long  time  at  least,  possess.  It  is  au 
unfortunate  circumstance  for  a  child  to  suppose  that  he 
knows  more  than  his  parent ;  and  if  his  supposition  be 
true,  he  will  not  be  slow  to  entertain  it.  The  longer 
the  parent  maintains  his  superiority  in  knowledge  and 
wisdom,  the  better  will  it  be  for  both  parties.  But  this 
superiority  cannot  be  retained  if,  as  soon  as  the  parent 
enters  upon  active  business,  he  desist  from  all  effort 
after  intellectual  cultivation,  and  surrenders  himself  a 
slave  to  physical  labor,  while  he  devotes  his  child  to 
mere  intellectual  cultivation,  and  thus  renders  intel- 
lectual intercourse  between  himself  and  his  children 
almost  impossible. 

3.  Moral  education. 

The  eternal  destiny  of  the  child  is  placed,  in  a  most 
important  sense,  in  the  hands  of  its  parents.  The 
parent  is  under  obligation  to  instruct,  and  cause  his 
child  to  be  instructed,  in  those  religious  sentiments 
which  he  believes  to  be  according  to  the  will  of  God. 
With  his  duty  in  this  respect  no  one  has  a  right  to 
interfere.  If  the  parent  be  in  error,  the  fault  is  not  in 
teaching  the  child  what  he  believes,  but  in  believing 
what  is  false,  without  having  used  the  means  which 
God  has  given  him  to  arrive  at  the  truth.  But,  if  such 
be  the  responsibility,  and  so  exclusive  the  authority  of 
the  parent,  it  is  manifest  that  he  is  under  a  double  obli- 
gation to  ascertain  what  is  the  will  of  God,  and  in  what 
manner  the  future  happiness  of  an  immortal  soul  may 
be  secured.  As  soon  as  he  becomes  a  parent,  his  de- 
cisions on  this  subject  involve  the  future  happiness  or 
miser}',  not  only  of  his  own  soul,  but  also  of  that  of 


324  PRACTICAL   ETHICS. 

another.  Both  considerations,  therefore,  impose  upon 
him  the  obligation  of  coming  to  a  serious  and  solemn 
decision  upon  his  moral  condition  and  prospects. 

But,  besides  that  of  making  himself  acquainted  with 
the  doctrines  of  religion,  the  relation  in  which  he  stands 
imposes  upon  the  parent  several  other  duties. 

It  is  his  duty  — 

1.  To  teach  his  child  its  duties  to  God  and  to  man, 
and  produce  in  its  mind  a  permanent  conviction  of  its 
moral  responsibility.  And  specially  should  it  be  the 
constant  effort  of  the  parent  to  cultivate  in  his  child  a 
spirit  of  piety,  or  a  right  feeling  towards  God,  the  true 
source  of  every  other  virtue. 

2.  Inasmuch  as  the  present  state  of  man  is  morally 
imperfect,  and  every  individual  is  a  sharer  in  that  im- 
perfection, it  is  the  duty  of  the  parent  to  eradicate,  so 
far  as  is  in  his  power,  the  wrong  propensities  of  his 
children.  He  should  watch  with  ceaseless  vigilance 
for  the  first  appearances  of  pride,  obstinacy,  malice, 
envy,  vanity,  cruelty,  revenge,  anger,  lying,  and  their 
kindred  vices ;  and,  by  steadfast  and  unwearied  assi- 
duity, strive  to  extirpate  them  before  they  have  gained 
firmness  by  age,  or  vigor  by  indulgence.  There  cannot 
be  a  greater  un kindness  to  a  child  than  to  allow  it  to 
grow  up  with  any  of  its  evil  habits  uncorrected.  Every 
one  would  consider  a  parent  cruel  who  allowed  a  child 
to  grow  up  without  having  taken  means  to  cure  a  limb 
which  had  been  broken ;  but  how  much  worse  is  an 
evil  temp'er  than  a  broken  limb  I 

3.  Inasmuch  as  precept  will  be  of  no  avail  without  a 
correspondent  example,  a  parent  is  under  obligation  to 
set  such  an  example  as  will  be  most  likely  to  correct 
the  evil  disposition  of  his  children.  A  passionate, 
selfish,  envious  man  must  expect  that,  in  spite  of  all  his 
precepts,  his  children  will  be  passionate,  envious,  and 
selfish.  ^ 

4.  Inasmuch  as  all  our  efforts  will  be  fruitless  with- 
out the  blessing  of'Crod,  that  parent  must  be  convicted 
of  great  neglect  of  duty  who  does  not  habitually  pray 
for  that  direction  which  h&  needs  in  the  performance 


THE  LAW  OF  PARENTS.        ^      ,  825 

of  these  solemn  obligations,  as  well  as  for  that  blessing 
upon  his  efforts,  without  which,  though  ever  so  well 
directed,  they  will  be  utterly  in  vain. 

5.  Inasmuch  as  the  moral  character  of  the  child  is 
greatly  influenced  by  its  associations  and  companions, 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  parent  to  watch  over  these  with 
vigilance,  and  to  control  them  with  entire  independence. 
He  is  false  to  his  trust,  if,  for  the  sake  of  gratifying  the 
desires  of  his  child,  or  of  conciliating  the  favor  of  others, 
or  avoiding  the  reputation  of  singularity  or  preciseness, 
he  allow  his  child  to  form  associations  which  he  believes, 
or  even  fears,  will  be  injurious  to  him.  And,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  such  be  the  duty  of  the  parent,  he  ought 
to  be  considered  as  fully  at  liberty  to  perform  it,  with- 
out remark  and  without  offence.  In  such  matters  he 
is  the  ultimate  and  the  only  responsible  authority.  He 
who  reproaches  another  for  the  exercise  of  this  authority 
is  guilty  of  slander.  He  who,  from  the  fear  of  slander, 
shrinks  from  exercising  it,  is  justly  chargeable  with  a 
pusillanimity  wholly  unworthy  of  the  relation  which  he 
sustains. 

6.  As  the  parent  sustains  the  same  relation  to  all  his 
children,  it  is  manifest  that  his  obligations  to  them  all 
are  the  same.  Hence  he  is  bound  to  exercise  his  au- 
thority with  entire  impartiality.  The  want  of  this  must 
always  end  in  jealousy,  envy,  and  malice,  and  cannot 
fail  to  render  the  domestic  society  a  scene  of  perpetual 
bickering  and  contention.  A  striking  exemplification 
of  all  this  is  recorded  in  the  history  of  Joseph  and  his 
brethren.  ^ 

If  this  be  so,  it  is  evident  that  the  violation  of  pa- 
rental obligation  is  more  common,  among  even  indukent 
parents,  than  would  generally  be  supposed. 

1.  Parents  who  render  themselves  slaves  to, fashiona- 
ble society  and  amusement,  violate  this  obligation.  The 
mother  who,  from  the  pressure  of  engagements  to  which 
she  subjects  herself,  has  no  leisure  to  devote  to  tlie 
mental  and  moral  culture  of  her  children,  violates  her 
most  solemn  duties.  She  has  no  right  to  squander 
away  in  frivolous  self-gratification  the  time  which 
28 


326  PRACTICAL  ETHICS 

belungs  to  her  offspring.  She  will  reap  the  truits  of 
lier  folly  when,  in  a  few  years,  her  children,  having 
grown  up  estranged  from  her  affection,  shall  thwart  her 
wishes,  disappoint  her  hopes,  and  neglect,  if  they  do 
not  despise,  the  mother  who  bare  them. 

2.  The  father  who  plunges  into  business  so  deeply 
that  he  has  no  leisure  for  domestic  duties  and  pleasures, 
and  whose  only  intercourse  with  his  children  consists. 
in  a  brief  and  occasional  word  of  authority,  or  a  surly 
lamentation  over  their  intolerable  expensiveness,  is 
equally  to  be  pitied  and  to  be  blamed.  What  right  has 
he  to  devote  to  other  pursuits  the  time  which  God  has 
allotted  to  his  children  ?  Nor  is  it  any  excuse  to  say 
that  he  cannot  support  his  family  in  their  present  style 
of  living  without  this  effort.  I  ask.  By  what  right  can 
his  family  demand  to  live  in  a  manner  which  requires 
him  to  neglect  his  most  solemn  and  important  duties  ? 
Nor  is  it  an  excuse  to  say  that  he  wishes  to  leave  them 
a  competence.  Is  he  under  obligation  to  leave  them 
that  competence  which  he  desires  ?  Is  it  an  advantage 
to  them  to  be  relieved  from  the  necessity  of  labor  ? 
Surely,  well-cultivated  intellects,  hearts  sensible  to 
domestic  affection,  the  love  of  parents  and  brethren  and 
sisters,  a  taste  for  home  pleasures,  habits  of  order,  reg- 
ularity and  industry,  a  hatred  of  vice  and  of  vicious 
men,  and  a  lively  sensibility  to  the  excellence  of  virtue, 
are  as  valuable  a  legacy  as  an  inheritance  of  property, 
simple  property,  purchased  by  the  loss  of  every  habit 
which  could  render  that  property  a  blessing. 

3.  Nor  can  thoughtful  men  be  always  exculpated 
from  the  charge  of  this  violation.  The  duties  of  a 
parent  are  established  by  God,  and  God  requires  us  not 
to  violate  them.  While  the  social  worship  of  God  is  a 
duty,  it  ought  not  to  interfere  with  parental  duty. 
Parents  who  spend  that  time  which  belongs  to  their 
children  in  offices  of  public  social  worship,  have  mis- 
taken the  nature  of  their  special  obligation.  I  do  not 
pretend  to  say  what  time,  or  how  much  time,  any  in- 
dividual shall  spend  in  any  religious  service.  Tliis 
question  does  not  belong  to  the  present  discussion. 


THE  T.AW  OF  PARENTS.     ^      -  327 

Bat  I  say  tliat  this  time  must  be  taken  out  of  that 
which  belongs  to  ourselves;  and  it  might  easily  be 
abstracted  from  that  devoted  to  visiting,  company,  or 
idleness ;  it  should  not  be  taken  from  that  which  be- 
longs, by  the  ordinance  of  God,  to  our  children. 

It  will  be  easily  seen  that  the  fulfilment  of  these  obli- 
gations, in  the  manner  I  have  suggested,  would  work  a 
very  perceptible  change  in  the  whole  fabric  of  society. 
It  would  check  the  eager  desire  of  accumulation,  re- 
press the  ardor  of  ambition,  and  allay  the  feverish  thirst 
for  selfish  gratification.  But  it  would  render  a  family, 
in  truth,  a  society.  It  would  bring  back  parents  and 
children  to  the  relations  to  each  other  which  God  has 
established.  It  would  restore  to  home  a  meaning,  and 
to  the  pleasures  of  home  a  reality,  which  they  are  in 
danger  of  losing  altogether.  Forsaking  the  shadow  of 
happiness,  we  should  find  the  substance.  Instead  of  a 
continual  round  of  physical  excitation,  and  the  cease- 
less pursuit  of  pleasures  which,  as  every  one  confesses, 
end  in  ennui  and  disappointment,  we  should  secure 

A  sacred  and  home-felt  delight, 
A  sober  certainty  of  waldng  bliss, 

of  which  previously  we  could  have  had  no  conception. 

The  Rights  of  Parents. 

The  right  of  the  parent  over  the  child  is,  of  course, 
commensurate  with  his  duties.  If  he  be  under  obliga- 
tion to  educate  his  child  in  such  manner  as  he  sup- 
poses will  most  conduce  to  the  child's  happiness  and 
the  welfare  of  society,  he  has,  from  necessity,  the  right 
to  control  the  child  in  everything  necessary  to  the  ful- 
filment of  this  obligation.  The  only  limits  imposed 
are,  that  he  exert  this  control  no  further  than  is  ne- 
cessary to  the  fulfilment  of  his  obligation,  and  that  he 
exert  it  with  the  intention  for  which  it  was  conferred. 
While  he  discharges  his  parental  duties  within  these 
limits,  he  is,  by  the  law  of  God,  exempt  from  interfer- 
ence, both  from  the  individual  and  from  society. 

Of  the  duration  of  this  obligation  and  this  right. 

1.  In  infancy  the  control  of  the  parent  over  tho 


75^3  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

child  is  absolute ;  tliat  is,  it  is  exercised  without  any 
respect  whatever  to  the  wishes  of  the  child. 

2.  When  the  child  has  arrived  at  majority,  and  has 
assumed  the  responsibility  of  its  own  conduct,  both  the 
responsibility  and  the  right  of  the  parent  cease  al- 
together. 

The  time  of  majority  is  fixed  in  most  civilized  nations 
by  statute.  In  Great  Britain  and  in  the  United  States, 
an  individual  becomes  of  age  when  he  has  completed 
his  twenty-first  year.  The  law  therefore  settles  the 
rights  and  obligations  of  the  parties,  so  far  as  civil  so- 
ciety is  concerned,  but  does  not  pretend  to  decide  upon 
the  moral  relations  of  the  parties. 

3.  As  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  parent  at  one  pe- 
riod are  absolute,  and  at  another  cease  altogether,  it  is 
reasonable  to  infer  that  the  control  of  the  parent  should 
be  exercised  on  more  and  more  liberal  principles,  that 
a  wider  and  wider  discretion  should  be  allowed  to  the 
child,  and  that  his  feeling  and  predilections  should  be 
more  and  more  consulted  as  he  grows  older ;  so  that, 
when  he  comes  to  act  for  himself,  he  may  have  become 
prepared  for  the  responsibility  which  he  assumes  by  as 
extensive  an  experience  as  the  nature  of  the  case 
admits. 

4.  Hence  I  think  that  a  parent  is  bound  to  consult 
the  wishes  of  his  child,  in  proportion  to  his  age,  when- 
ever this  can  be  done  innocently ;  and  also  to  vary  his 
modes  of  enforcing  authority,  so  as  to  adapt  them  to 
the  motives  of  which  the  increasing  intellect  of  the 
child  is  susceptible.  While  it  is  true  that  the  treat- 
ment proper  for  a  young  man  woidd  ruin  a  child,  it 
is  equally  true  that  the  treatment  proper  for  a  child 
might  very  possibly  ruin  a  young  man.  The  right  of 
control,  however,  still  rests  with  the  parent,  and  the 
duty  of  obedience  ytill  is  imposed  upon  the  child.  The 
parent  is  merely  bound  to  exercise  it  in  a  manner  suited 
to  the  nature  of  the  being  over  whom  it  is  to  be  exerted. 

The  authority  of  instructors  is  a  delegated  authority, 
derived  immediately  from  the  parent.  He,  for  the  time 
being,  stands  to  the  pupil  in  loco  parentis.    Hence  tlia 


THE  LAW  OF  PARENTS.         ^       >  329 

relation  between  him  and  the  pupil  is  analogous  to  that 
between  parent  and  child  ;  that  is,  it  is  the  relation  of 
superiority  and  inferiority.  The  right  of  the  instructor 
is  to  command  ;  the  obligation  of  the  pupil  is  to  obey. 
The  right  of  the  instructor  is,  h  )wever,  to  be  exercised, 
as  I  before  stated  when  speaking  of  the  parent,  for  the 
pupil's  benefit.  For  the  exercise  of  it  he  is  responsi- 
ble to  the  parent,  whose  professional  agent  he  is.  He 
must  use  his  own  best  skill  and  judgment  in  governing 
and  teachmg  his  pupil.  If  he  and  the  parent  cannot 
agree,  the  connection  must  be  dissolved.  But,  as  he  is 
a  professional  agent,  he  must  use  his  own  intellect  and 
skill  in  the  exercise  of  his  own  profession,  and  in  the 
use  of  it  he  is  to  be  interfered  with  by  no  one. 

28* 


CHAPTER   IV. 

THE  LAW  OF  CHILDBEIT. 

I  SHALL  consider  in  this  chapter  the  duties  and  the 
rights  of  children,  and  their  duration. 

The  Duties  of  Children. 

I.  Obedience.  By  this  I  mean  that  the  relation  be- 
tween parent  and  child  obliges  the  latter  to  conform  to 
the  will  of  the  former  because  it  is  his  will,  aside  from 
the  consideration  that  what  is  required  seems  to  the 
child  best  or  wisest.  The  only  limitation  to  this  rule 
is  the  limitation  of  conscience.  A  parent  has  no  right 
to  require  a  child  to  do  what  it  believes  to  be  wrong ; 
and  a  child  is  under  no  obligation,  in  such  a  case,  to 
obey  the  commands  of  a  parent.  The  child  must  obey 
God,  and  meekly  suffer  the  consequences.  It  has  even, 
in  this  case,  no  right  to  resist. 

The  reasons  of  this  rule  are  manifest. 

1.  The  design  of  the  whole  domestic  constitution 
would  be  frustrated  without  it.  This  design,  from  what 
has  been  already  remarked,  is  to  enable  the  child  to 
avail  itself  of  the  wisdom,  knowledge,  and  experience 
of  the  parent,  and  also  of  that  affection  which  prompts 
the  parent  to  employ  all  these  for  the  well-being  of  the 
child.  But  of  these  advantages  the  child  can  never 
avail  himself,  unless  he  yield  obedience  to  the  parent's 
authority,  until  he  have  acquired  that  age  and  experi- 
ence which  are  necessary  to  enable  him  to  direct  and 
to  govern  himself. 

2.  That  this  is  the  duty  of  children  is  made  appar- 
ent by  the  precepts  of  the  holy  Scriptures. 

Exodus  XX.  12 :  "  Honor  thy  father  and  thy  mother, 


THE  LAW  OF  CHILDREN.  331 

tliat  Uiy  days  may  be  long  in  the  land  which  the  Lord 
thy  God  giveth  thee."  This,  as  St.  Paul  remarks 
(Eph.  vi.  2,  3),  is  the  only  commandment  in  the  dec- 
alogue to  which  a  special  promise  is  annexed. 

In  the  Book  of  Proverbs  no  duty  is  more  frequently 
inculcated  than  this ;  and  of  no  one  are  the  consequen- 
ces of  obedience  and  disobedience  more  fully  set  forth. 

A  few  examples  may  serve  as  a  specimen. 

Proverbs  i.  8,  9 :  "  My  son,  keep  the  instruction  of 
thy  father,  and  forsake  not  the  law  of  thy  mother. 
Tiicy  shall  be  an  ornament  of  grace  [that  is,  a  graceful 
ornament]  unto  thy  head,  and  chains  about  thy  neck." 

Proverbs  vi.  20  :  "  Keep  thy  father's  commandment, 
and  forsake  not  the  law  of  thy  mother." 

Proverbs  xiii.  1 :  "A  wise  son  heareth  his  father's 
instructions,  but  a  scorner  heareth  not  rebuke." 

The  same  duty  is  frequently  inculcated  in  the  Now 
Testament. 

Ephesians  vi.  1 :  "  Children,  obey  your  parents  in 
the  Lord,  for  this  is  right. ''^  The  meaning  of  the  phrase, 
"  in  the  Lord,"  I  suppose  to  be,  in  accordance  with  the 
will  of  the  Lord. 

From  such  passages  as  these — and  I  have  selected  only 
a  very  few  from  a  great  number  that  might  have  been 
quoted  —  we  learn,  1.  That  the  holy  Scriptures  plainly 
inculcate  obedience  to  parents  as  a  command  of  God. 
He  who  is  guilty  of  disobedience,  therefore,  violates  not 
merely  the  command  of  man,  but  that  also  of  God. 
And  it  is,  therefore,  our  duty  always  to  urge  it,  and  to 
exact  it,  mainly  on  this  ground. 

2.  That  they  consider  obedience  to  parents  as  no  in 
dication  of  meanness  and  servility,  but,  on  the  con 
trary,  as  the  most  honorable  and  delightful  exhibition 
of  character  that  can  be  manifested  by  the  young.  It 
is  a  graceful  ornament,  which  confers  additional  beauty 
upon  that  which  was  otherwise  lovely. 

3.  That  the  violation  of  this  commandment  exposes 
the  transgressor  to  special  and  peculiar  judgments. 
And,  even  without  the  light  of  revelation,  I  think  that 
the  observation  of  every  one  must  convince  him  that 


^32  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

the  curse  of  God  rests  heavily  upon  filial  disobedience, 
and  that  his  peculiar  blessing  follows  filial  obedience. 
And,  indeed,  what  can  be  a  surer  indication  of  future 
profligacy  and  ruin  than  that  turbulent  impatience  of 
restraint  which  leads  a  youth  to  follow  the  headlong 
impulses  of  passion  in  preference  to  the  counsels  of  age 
and  experience,  even  when  conveyed  in  the  language  of 
tender  and  disinterested  affection  ? 

II.  Another  duty  of  children  to  parents  is  reverence. 
Tills  is  implied  in  the  commandment,  ^' Honor  thy  father 
and  thy  mother."  By  reverence,  I  mean  that  conduct 
and  those  sentiments  which  are  due  from  an  inferior  to 
a  superior.  The  parent  is  the  superior,  and  the  child 
the  inferior,  by  virtue  of  the  relation  which  God  him- 
self has  established.  Whatever  may  be  the  rank  or  the 
attainments  of  the  child,  and  how  much  soever  they 
may  be  superior  to  those  of  the  parent,  these  can  never 
abrogate  the  previous  relation  which  God  has  established. 
The  child  is  bound  to  show  deference  to  the  parent 
whenever  it  is  possible,  to  evince  that  he  considers  him 
his  superior,  and  to  perform  for  him  services  which  he 
would  perform  for  no  other  person.  And  let  it  always 
be  remembered  that  in  this  there  is  nothing  degrading, 
but  everything  honorable.  No  more  ennobling  and  dig- 
nified trait  of  character  can  be  exhibited  than  that  of 
universal  and  profound  filial  respect.  The  same  prin- 
ciple, carried  out,  would  teach  us  universal  and  tender 
respect  for  old  age^  at  all  times  and  under  all  circum- 
stances. 

III.  Another  duty  of  children  {^filial  affection^  or  the 
peculiar  affection  due  from  a  child  to  a  parent  because 
he  is  a  parent.  A  parent  may  be  entitled  to  our  love 
because  he  is  a  man,  or  because  he  is  such  a  man,  —  that 
is,  possessing  such  excellencies  of  character, — but,  bo- 
sides  all  this,  and  aside  from  it  all,  he  is  entitled  to  our 
affection  on  account  of  the  relation  in  which  he  stands 
to  vs.  This  imposes  upon  us  the  duty  not  only  of  hiding 
his  foibles,  of  covering  his  defects,  of  shielding  him  from 
misfortune,  and  of  seeking  his  happiness  by  what  means 
iocvcr  Providence  has  placed  in  our  power,  ])ut  also  of 


THE  LAW  OF  CHILDREN.  '  3S5 

perfofiiiing  all  this,  and  all  the  other  duties  of  which 
we  have  spoken,  from  love  to  him  because  he  is  our 
parent^  —  a  love  which  shall  render  such  services  not 
a  burden,  but  a  pleasure,  under  what  circumstances 
soever  it  may  be  our  duty  to  render  them. 

IV.  It  is  the  duty  of  tlie  child,  whenever  it  is  by  the 
providence  of  God  rendered  necessary,  to  support  his 
parent  in  old  age.  That  man  would  deserve  the  repu- 
tation of  a  monster  who  would  not  cheerfully  deny 
himself  in  order  to  be  able  to  minister  to  the  comforts 
of  the  declining  years  of  his  parent. 

The  Rights  op  Children. 

1.  Children  have  a  right  to  maintenance,  and,  as  has 
been  remarked  before,  a  maintenance  corresponding  to 
the  circumstances  and  condition  of  the  parent. 

2.  They  have  a  right  to  expect  that  the  parent  will 
exert  his  authority,  not  for  his  own  advantage,  nor  from 
caprice,  but  for  the  good  of  the  child,  according  to  his 
best  judgment.  If  the  parent  act  otherwise,  he  violates 
his  duty  to  his  children  and  to  God.  This,  however,  in 
no  manner  liberates  the  child  from  his  obligations  to  his 
parent.  Tnese  remam  m  full  force,  the  same  as  before. 
The  wrong  of  one  party  is  no  excuse  for  wrong  in  the 
other.  It  is  the  child's  misfortune,  but  it  can  never  be 
alleviated  by  domestic  strife,  and  still  less  by  filial  diso- 
bedience and  ingratitude. 

Of  the  duration  of  these  rights  and  obligations. 

1.  Of  obedience.  The  child  is  bound  to  obey  the 
parent  so  long  as  he  remains  in  a  state  of  pupilage  ; 
that  is,  so  long  as  the  parent  is  responsible  for  his  con 
duct,  and  he  is  dependent  upon  his  parent.  This  period, 
so  far  as  society  is  concerned,  as  has  been  remarked,  i? 
fixed,  in  most  countries,  by  statute.  Sometimes,  by  i\\Q 
consent  of  both  parties,  it  ceases  before  that  period ;  at 
other  times,  it  continues  beyond  it.  With  the  termina- 
tion of  minority,  let  it  occur  when  it  will,  the  duty  of 
obedience  ceases.  After  this,  however,  the  advice  of  the 
parent  is  entitled  to  more  deference  and  respect  tlian 
that  of  any  other  person ;  but,  as  the  individual  now 
acts  upon  his  own  responsibility,  it  is  only  advice,  since 
it  has  ceased  to  be  authoritative. 


334  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

2.  The  conscience  of  a  child  becomes  capable  of  deliK 
erate  decision  long  before  its  period  of  pupilage  ceases. 
Whenever  this  decision  is  fairly  and  honestly  expressed, 
the  parent  ought  not  to  interfere  with  it.  It  is  his  duty 
to  strive  to  convince  his  child,  if  he  think  it  to  be  in 
error ;  but,  if  he  cannot  succeed  in  producing  convic 
tion,  he  must  leave  the  child,  like  any  other  human 
being,  to  obey  God  in  the  manner  it  thinks  will  be  most 
acceptable  to  him. 

3.  The  obligation  of  respect  and  affection  for  parents 
never  ceases,  but  rather  increases  with  advancing  age. 
As  the  child  grows  older,  he  becomes  capable  of  more 
disinterested  affection,  and  of  the  manifestation  of  more 
delicate  respect;  and  as  the  parent  grows  older,  he 
feels  more  sensibly  tlie  need  of  attention ;  and  his  hap- 
piness is  more  decidedly  dependent  upon  it.  As  we 
increase  in  years,  it  should,  therefore,  be  our  more 
assiduous  endeavor  to  make  a  suitable  return  to  our 
parents  for  their  kindness  bestowed  upon  us  in  infancy 
and  youth,  and  to  manifest,  by  unremitting  attention 
and  delicate  and  heartfelt  affection,  our  repentance  for 
those  act::,  of  thoughtlessness  and  waywardness  which 
formerly  may  have  grieved  them. 

That  a  peculiar  insensibility  exists  to  the  obligations 
of  tlie  parental  and  filial  relation,  is,  I  fear,  too  evident 
to  need  any  extended  illustration.  The  notion  that  a 
family  is  a  society,  and  that  a  society  must  be  governed, 
and  that  the  right  and  the  duty  of  governing  this  soci- 
ety rest  with  the  parent,  seems  to  be  vanishing  from  the 
minds  of  men.  In  the  place  of  it,  it  seems  to  be  the 
prevalent  opinion  that  children-  may  grow  up  as  they 
please,  and  that  the  exertion  of  parental  restraint  is  an 
infringement  upon  the  personal  liberty  of  the  child. 
But  all  this  will  not  abrogate  the  law  of  God,  nor  will 
it  avert  the  punishments  which  he  has  connected  indis- 
solubly  with  disobedience.  The  parent  who  neglects 
his  duty  to  his  children  is  sowing  thickly  for  himself 
and  for  them  the  seeds  of  his  future  misery.  He  who 
is  accustoming  his  children  to  habits  of  thoughtless  ca- 
price and  reckless  expenditure,  and  who  stupidly  smiles 


THE  LAW  OF  CHILDREN.  ^  335 

at  the  ebullitions  of  youthful  passion  and  the  indulgence 
in  fashionable  vice  as  indications  of  a  manly  spirit, 
needs  no  prophet  to  foretell  that,  unless  the  dissolute- 
ness of  his  family  leave  him  early  childless,  his  gray 
hairs  will  be  brought  down  with  sorrow  to  the  grave. 

I  remarked,  at  the  close  of  the  last  chapter,  that  the 
duty  of  instructors  was  analogous  to  that  of  parents, 
and  that  they  stood  to  pupils  in  a  relation  essentially 
pcurental.  It  is  proper  here  to  add,  that  a  pupil  stands 
to  his  instructor  in  a  relation  essentially  filial.  His 
duty  is  obedience :  first  to  his  parent ;  and,  secondly,  to 
the  professional  agent  to  whom  he  has  been  committed 
by  his  parent.  The  equals,  in  this  relation,  are  the 
parent  and  the  instructor :  to  both  of  them  is  the  pupil 
the  inferior ;  and  to  both  is  he  under  the  obligation  of 
obedience,  respect,  and  reverence. 

Now,  such  being  the  nature  of  the  relation,  it  is  the 
duty  of  the  instructor  to  enforce  obedience,  and  of  the 
pupil  to  render  it.  It  would  be  very  easy  to  show  that 
on  the  fulfilment  of  this  duty  on  the  part  of  the  instructor 
the  interests  of  education  and  the  welfare  of  the  young 
vitally  depend.  Without  discipline  there  can  be  formed 
no  valuable  habit.  Without  it,  when  young  persons 
are  congregated  together,  far  away  from  the  restraints 
of  domestic  society,  exposed  to  the  allurements  of  ever- 
present  temptation,  and  excited  by  the  stimulus  of 
youthful  passion,  every  vicious  habit  must  be  cultivated. 
The  young  man  may  applaud  the  negligent  and  pusil- 
lanimous instructor;  but  when  that  man,  no  longer 
young,  suffers  the  result  of  that  neglect  and  pusilla- 
nimity, it  is  well  if  a  better  spirit  have  taught  him  to 
mention  the  name  of  that  instructor  without  jittar 
execration. 

In  colleges  and  halls,  in  ancient  days. 

There  dwelt  a  sage  called  Discipline : 

His  eye  was  meek  and  gentle,  and  a  smile 

Played  on  his  lips ;  and  in  his  speech  was  heard 

Paternal  sweetness,  dignity,  and  love. 

The  occupation  dearest  to  his  heart 

Was  to  encourage  goodness.    Learning  grew 

Beneath  his  care,  a  thriving,  vigorous  plant. 


336  PKACTICAL  ETHICS. 

The  mind  was  well  informed,  the  passions  held 

Subordinate,  and  diligence  was  choice. 

If  e'er  it  chanced,  as  sometimes  chance  it  most. 

That  one,  among  so  many,  overleaped 

The  limits  of  control,  his  gentle  eye 

Grew  stern,  and  darted  a  severe  rebulie. 

His  frown  was  full  of  terror,  and  his  voice 

Shook  the  delinquent  with  such  fits  of  awe 

As  left  him  not  till  penitence  had  won 

Lost  favor  back  again,  and  closed  the  breach. 

•     But  Discipline  at  length, 
O'erlooked  and  unemployed,  grew  sick,  and  died. 
Then  study  languished,  emulation  slept. 
And  virtue  fled.    The  schools  became  a  scene 
Of  solemn  farce,  where  ignorance  in  e  tilts. 
Ills  cap  well  lined  with  logic  not  his  own, 
With  parrot  tongue  performed  the  scholar's  parti 
Proceeding  soon  a  graduated  dunce. 
What  was  learned, 
If  aught  was  learned  in  childhood,  is  forgot; 
And  such  expense  as  pinches  parents  blue. 
And  mortifies  the  liberal  hand  of  love, 
Ib  squandered  in  pursuit  of  idle  sports 
And  vicious  pleasures. 

Ttui. 


i 


CLASS  III. 

DUTIES  TO  MAN  AS  A  MEMBER  OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

To  this  class  belong  the  duties  of  magistrates  and  cit- 
izens. As  these,  however,  would  bo  but  imperfectly 
understood  without  a  knowledge  of  the  nature  of  civil 
society,  and  of  the  relations  subsisting  between  society 
and  the  individual,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider 
these  latter  before  entering  upon  the  former.  I  shall, 
therefore,  attempt  to  explain,  first,  Tlie  Nature  and 
Limitations  of  Civil  Society;  secondly,  Government^  or 
the  Manner  in  which  the  Obligations  of  Society  are  Dis- 
charged ;  fV^irdly,  The  Duties  of  Magistrates  ;  foui'thly, 
Tlie  Duties  of  Citizens, 

89 


CHAPTER  1 

OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

As  civil  society  is  a  somewhat  complicated  conception, 
it  may  be  useful,  in  the  first  place,  to  consider  the  na- 
ture of  a  society  in  its  simplest  form.  This  chapter  will 
therefore  be  divided  into  two  sections.  Tlie  first  treats 
of  the  constitution  of  a  simple  society ;  the  second,  of 
the  constitution  of  civil  society. 


SECTION  I. 

OF  A  SIMPLE  SOCIETr. 

I.   OJ  the  nature  of  a  simple  society, 

1.  A  society  of  any  sort  originates  in  a  peculiar  form 
of  contract,  entered  into  between  each  several  individual 
forming  the  society  on  the  one  part,  and  all  the  other 
members  of  the  society  on  the  other  part.  Eacli  party 
promises  to  do  certain  things  to  or  for  the  other,  and 
puts  itself  under  moral  obligation  to  do  so.  Hence  we 
see  that  conscience,  or  the  power  of  recognizing  moral 
obligation,  is,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  essential  to 
the  existence  of  a  society.  Without  it,  a  society  could 
not  be  formed. 

2.  This  contract,  like  any  other,  respects  those  things, 
and  those  things  only,  in  which  the  parties  have  thus 
bound  themselves  to  each  other.  As  the  individual  is 
under  no  obligation  to  belong  to  the  society,  but  the 
obligation  is  purely  voluntary,  he  is  bound  in  no  other 


OF  A  SIMPLE  SOCIETY.  .  33\S 

manner,  ana  for  no  other  purpose,  than  those  in  and 
for  which  he  has  bound  himself.  In  all  other  respects 
he  is  as  free  as  he  was  before. 

3.  Inasmuch  as  the  formation  of  a  society  involves 
the  idea  of  a  moral  obligation,  each  party  is  under 
moral  obligation  to  fulfil  its  part  of  the  contract.  The 
society  is  bound  to  do  what  it  has  promised  to  every 
individual,  and  every  individual  is  bound  to  do  what  he 
has  promised  to  the  society.  If  either  party  cease  to 
do  tliis,  the  compact,  like  any  other  mutual  contract,  is 
dissolved. 

4.  Inasmuch  as  every  individual  is  in  all  respects, 
excepting  those  in  which  he  has  bound  himself,  as  free 
as  he  was  before,  the  society  has  no  right  to  impose 
upon  the  individual  any  other  obligation  than  those 
under  which  he  has  placed  himself.  For,  as  he  has 
come  under  no  such  obligation  to  them,  they  have  no 
more  control  over  him  than  any  other  men.  And,  as 
their  whole  power  is  limited  to  that  which  has  been 
conferred  upon  them  by  individuals,  beyond  this  limit 
they  are  no  society ;  they  have  no  power  ;  their  act  is 
really  out  of  the  society,  and  is,  of  course,  binding 
upon  no  member  of  the  society  any  more  than  upon 
any  other  man. 

6.  As  every  member  of  the  society  enters  it  upon 
the  same  terms,  —  that  is,  as  every  one  comes  under  the 
same  obligations  to  the  society,  and  the  society  comes 
under  the  same  obligations  to  him,  —  they  are,  by  conse- 
quence, so  far  as  the  society  is  concerned,  all  equals  or 
fellows.  All  have  equal  rights,  and  all  are  subject  to 
the  same  obligations. 

6.  That  which  defines  the  obligations  under  which 
the  individual  and  the  society  have  come,  in  respect  to 
each  other,  is  called  the  constitution  of  the  society.  It 
is  intended  to  express  the  ol^ect  of  the  association,  and 
the  manner  in  which  that  object  is  to  be  accomplished  ; 
that  is  to  say,  it  declares  what  the  individual  promises 
to  do  for  "the  society,  what  the  society  promises  to  do 
for  the  individual,  and  the  object  for  which  this  associ 
atiou  between  tlio  parties  is  formed. 


340  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

7.  As  the  union  of  individuals  in  this  manner  is  vol- 
untary, every  member  naturally  has  a  right  to  dissolve 
the  connection  when  he  pleases  ;  and  the  society  have 
also  a  corresponding  right.  As,  however,  this  would 
frequently  expose  both  parties  to  inconvenience,  it  is 
common  in  the  articles  of  the  constitution,  or  the  form 
of  compact,  to  specify  on  what  terms  this  may  be  done. 
When  this  part  of  the  agreement  has  thus  been  entered 
into,  it  of  course  becomes  as  binding  as  any  other  part 
of  it. 

II.  Of  the  manner  in  which  ?vch  a  society  shall  be 
governed. 

r ,  The  object  of  any  such  association  is  to  do  some- 
^ling.  But  it  is  obvious  that  they  can  act  only  on  one 
of  three  suppositions  :  by  unanimity,  by  a  minority,  or 
by  a  majority.  To  expect  unammity  in  the  opniions  of 
a  being  so  diversified  in  character  as  man,  is  frivolous. 
To  suspend  the  operation  of  many  upon  the  decisions 
of  one,  is  manifestly  unjust,  would  be  subversive  of  tlie 
whole  object  of  the  association,  and  would  render  the 
whole  society  more  inefficient  than  the  separate  indi- 
viduals of  which  it  is  composed.  To  suppose  a  society 
to  be  governed  by  a  minority  would  be  to  suppose  a 
less  number  of  equals  always  superior  in  wisdom  and 
goodness  to  a  greater  number,  wliich  is  absurd.  It 
remains,  therefore,  that  every  society  must  of  necessity 
be  governed  by  a  majority. 

in.  Of  the  limits  within  which  the  power  of  the 
majority  is  restricted. 

The  majority,  as  we  have  just  seen,  is  vested,  from 
^necessity,  with  the  whole  power  of  the  society.     But  it 
y  derives  its  power  wholly  and  exclusively  from  the  so- 
^ciety,  and  of  course  it  can  have  no  power  beyond,  or 
diverse  from,  that  of  the  society  itself.  _  Now,  as  the  ) 
power  of  the  society  is  limited  by  the  concessions  made  , 
by  each  individual   respectively,  and  is  bound  by  its  ( 
obligations  to  each  individual,  the  power  of  the  majority  y 
id  manifestly  restricted  within  precisely  the  same  limits. 

Thus,  to  be  more  particular,  a  majority  has  no  right ; 
to  do  anything  whicli  the  individuals  forming  the  society 
have  not  authorized  the  society  to  do. 


DF  A  SIMPLE  SOCIETY.  ,  341 

1.  They  have  no  right  to  change  the  object  of  the 
"■ociety.  If  this  he  changed,  another  society  is  formed, 
'^nd  thn  individual  members  are,  as  at  first,  at  liberty 

o  unito  with  it  or  not. 

2.  I'liey  have  no  right  to  do  anything  beyond,  or 
different  from,  the  object  of  tlie  society.  The  reasons 
%VQ  the  same  as  in  the  former  instance. 

3.  Nor  have  they  a  right  to  do  anything  in  a  manner 
different  from  that  to  wliicli  the  members,  upon  enter- 
ing the  society,  agreed.  The  manner  set  forth  in  tlio 
constitution  was  that  by  which  the  individuals  bound 
themselves,  and  they  are  bound  by  nothing  else. 

4.  Nor  have  they  a  right  to  do  anything  which  vio- 
lates the  principle  of  the  entire  social  equality  of  the 
members.  As  all  subjected  themselves  equally  to  the 
same  rules,  any  act  which  supposes  a  difference  of  riglit 
is  at  variance  with  the  fundamental  principle  of  the 
compact. 

And  hence,  from  the  nature  of  the  compact,  it  is  ob- 

/  vious  that,  while  a  majority  act  witlun  the  limits  of 

/the  authority  thus  delegated  to  them,  the  individual  is 

under  a  moral  obligation  to  obey  their  decisions  ;  for 

he  has  voluntarily  placed  himself  under  such  obligatien, 

and  lie  is  bound  to  fulfil  it. 

And,  on  the  otlier  hand,  the  society  is  bound  to  fulfil 
to  the  individual  the  contract  which  they  have  formed 
with  him,  and  to  carry  forward  the  object  of  the  asso- 
ciation in  the  manner  and  in  the  spirit  of  the  contract 
entered  into.  Nor  is  this  a  mere  matter  of  form  or  of 
expediency :  it  is  a  matter  of  moral  obligation,  volun- 
tarily entered  into ;  and  it  is  as  binding  as  any  other 
contract  formed  under  any  other  circumstances. 

And  again,  if  the  society  or  the  majority  act  in  vio- 
lation of  these  engagements,  or  if  they  do  anything  not 
committed  to  them  by  the  individual,  such  act  is  not 
Innding  upon  any  member ;  and  he  is  under  no  moro 
obligation  to  be  governed  by  it  than  he  would  be  if  it 
were  done  by  any  other  persons,  or  if  not  done  at  all. 

If  these  prhiciples  be  correct,  they  will,  I  think, 
thr'.)w  some  Tght  upon  the  question  of  the  durabilitj^ 
2D* 


842  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

of  corporations.  A  corporation  is  a  soci(3ty  established 
for  certain  purposes,  wliicli  are  to  be  executed  in  a  cer- 
tain manner.  Ho  who  joins  it,  joins  it  under  these  con- 
ditions ;  and  the  whole  power  of  the  society  consists  in 
power  to  do  these  things  in  this  manner.  If  they  do 
anything  else,  they,  when  doing  it,  are  not  this  society, 
but  some  other.  And  of  course  those,  whether  the 
minority  or  the  majority,  who  act  according  to  the  ori- 
ginal compact,  are  the  society  ;  and  the  others,  whether 
more  or  less,  are  something  else.  The  act  of  incorpo- 
ration is  governed  by  the  same  principles.  It  renders 
the  persons  so  associated  a  body  politic,  and  recognized 
in  law,  but  it  does  not  interfere  with  the  original  prin- 
ciples of  such  an  association.  Tlie  corporation,  there- 
fore, are  the  persons,  whether  more  or  less,  who  adhere 
to  the  original  agreement ;  and  any  act  declaring  any- 
thing  else  to  be  the  society  is  unjust  and  void. 

But  suppose  them  all  to  have  altered  their  sentiments. 
The  society  is  then,  of  course,  dissolved.  They  may,  if 
they  choose,  form  another  society ;  but  they  are  not 
another  of  course,  nor  can  they  be  such  until  they  form 
another  organization. 

Again,  suppose  that  they  have  property  given  under 
the  original  association,  and  for  the  promotion  of  its 
oljjects,  and  the  whole  society,  or  a  majority  of  them, 
have  changed  its  objects.  I  answer,  If  a  part  still  re- 
main, and  prosecute  the  original  object,  they  are  the 
society  ;  and  the  others,  by  changing  the  object,  have 
ceased  to  be  the  society.  The  right  of  property  vests 
with  those  who  adhere  to  the  original  constitution.  If 
all  have  changed  the  object,  the  society  is  dissolved, 
and  all  ownership,  so  far  as  the  property  is  concerned, 
ceases.  It  therefore  either  belongs  to  the  public,  or 
reverts  to  the  heirs  at  law.  A  company  of  men  united 
for  another  object,  though  retaining  the  same  name, 
have  no  more  right  to  inherit  it  than  any  other  citizens. 
The  right  of  a  legislature  to  give  it  to  them  by  special 
act  is  even  very  questionable.  Legislatures  are  not 
empowered  to  bestow  property  upon  men  at  will ;  and 
such  grant,  being  beyond  the  power  conceded  to  tho 
legislator,  seems  to  me  to  be  null  and  void. 


OF  A  SIMPLE  SOCIETY.         '    ,  S43 

The  principles  of  this  section  seem  to  me  to  demand 
the  sjiecial  attention  of  those  who  are  at  present  en-^ 
gaged  in  conducting  the  business  of  voluntary  associa- 
tions. It  should  always  be  remembered  that  he  who^ 
joins  a  voluntary  association,  joins  it  for  a  specified  ob-^ 
joct,  and  for  no-  other.  The  association  itself  has  oneT' 
object,  and  no  other.  3^iis  object,  and  the  manner  in 
which  it  is  to  be  accomplished,  ought  to  be  plainly  set 
forth  in  the  constitution.  Now,  when  a  majority  at- 
tempt to  do  anything  not  comprehended  within  this 
object  tlius  set  forth,  or  in  a  manner  at  variance  with 
that  prescribed,  they  violate  the  fundamental  article  of 
the  compact,  and  the  society  is  virtually  dissolved. 
And  against  such  infraction  of  right  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  individual  to  protest ;  and  if  it  bo  persisted  in,  it  is 
his  duty  to  withdraw.  And  it  seems  to  me  that,  other- 
wise, the  whole  benefit  of  voluntary  associations  will  be 
lost ;  and  if  the  whole  society  do  it,  the  society  is 
changed,  and  it  is  changed  in  no  manner  the  less  be- 
cause its  original  name  is  retained.  If  the  objects  of 
such  associations  be  not  restricted,  their  increasing 
complication  will  render  them  unmanageable  by  any 
form  of  agency.  If  an  individual,  when  he  unites  with 
others  for  one  object,  knows  not  for  how  many  objects, 
nor  for  what  modes  of  accomplishing  them,  he  shall  be 
held  responsible,  who  will  ever  unite  in  a  benevolent 
enterprise  ?  And  if  masses  of  men  may  be  thus  asso- 
ciated in  every  part  of  a  country  for  one  professed 
object,  and  this  object  may  be  modified,  changed,  or 
exceeded,  according  to  the  will  of  an  accidental  ma- 
jority, voluntary  associations  will  very  soon  be  trans- 
formed into  the  tools  of  intriguing  and  ambitious  men, 
ftud  will  thus  become  a  curse  instead  of  a  blessing. 


8U.  PRACnCAL  ETHICS. 

SUCTION  II. 

OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY. 

<In  order  the  more  clearly  to  understand  this  subject, 
we  shall,  in  the  first  place,  treat  of  society  in  distinction 
from  government.  It  may  exist  without  government. 
Government  is  merely  the  instrument  by  which  it  ac- 
complishes its  purposes.  Government  is  the  agent, 
society  is  the  principal. 

In  presenting  this  subject,  we  shall  commence  with 
the  axiom,  which  we  have  already  frequently  considered, 
namely.  Every  man  has  a  right  to  himself.  That  is, 
every  man  has  a  right  to  his  own  body,  and  to  his  fac- 
ulties both  of  body  and  mind ;  he  is  at  liberty  to  use 
them  as  he  will,  subject  only  to  his  responsibility  to 
God.  Within  this  limitation,  he  may  use  them  as  he 
will,  and  for  using  them  in  any  particular  way  hq 
need  give  no  other  reason  than  that  such  is  his  choice. 
As  this  right  is  universal,  and  belongs  just  as  much  tq 
my  neighbor  as  to  myself,  my  right  over  my  own  mean? 
of  happiness,  therefore,  forbids  me  from  interfering  witU 
the  means  of  happiness  bestowed  upon  another.  Over 
my  own  faculties,  and  the  means  of  happiness  which 
they  present,  I  am  supreme ;  beyond  these  I  have  no 
right  whatever. 

The  use  of  our  faculties  within  the  above  limit  pro- 
duces results.  To  tliese  results  the  individual  also  hag 
a  right.  The  man  who,  on  unoccupied  land,  produces  a 
crop  of  corn,  has  a  right  to  that  corn.  It  is  the  joint 
product  of  his  labor  and  the  powers  of  the  soil.  His 
own  labor  enters  mto  every  particle  of  it.  It  is  his  as 
truly  as  his  faculties  themselves,  and  he  has  a  right  to 
dispose  of  it  as  he  will. 

2.  But  every  man  has  the  physical  power  in  some 
way  or  other  to  violate  the  rights  of  his  neighbor.  Ho 
may  deprive  him  of  life ;  he  may  reduce  him  to  subjec- 
tion to  J  lis  will;  he  may  seize  upon  his  property  by  force, 


OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY.  '    ,  S15 

or  procure  it  by  stealth,  and  in  a  thousand  ways  may 
violate  the  rights  which  have  been  conferred  on  him  by 
the  Creator.     And,  unfortunately,  it  is  found  to  be  the 
fact  that  men  have  the  disposition  in  various  degrees 
thus  to  injure  each  other ;  not  that  they  love  injury /o/ 
itself,  but  choose  injury  of  another  only  when  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  the  accomplishment  of  their  unrestrained^ 
desires.     When  they  have  no  personal  desire  to  gratify,  ; 
conscience  teaches  them  to  disapprove  of  injustice,  and  ^ 
condemn  the  evil-doer. 

3.  Under  these  circumstances,  the  individual  can  pro-  i 
tect  himself  from  injury,  or  redress  the  injuries  which  ) 
he  has  suffered,  by  nothing  but  his  own  physical  power^j 
But  this  is  manifestly  insufficient.     He  who  w^as  able 
at  first  to  violate  right,  has  commonly  the  power  to 
violate  it  again,  and  to  resist  with  effect  the  claims  of 
the  injured  party.  £  Should  every  one  attempt  by  his 

.  own  arm  to  redress  his  wrongs,  or  protect  his  rights, 
/  the  world  would  present  a  scene  of  nothing  but  intol- 
C,  erable  strife.  And  the  strife  w^ould  be  commonly  fruit- 
loss,  for  power  is  as  likely  to  be  united  with  wrong  as 
with  right.  The  contest  would,  therefore,  have  no 
tendency  to  the  establishment  of  justice.  But  this  is 
not  all.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  redress  our  own 
grievances  without  awakening  in  ourselves  the  spirit 
of  revenge.  Vindictiveness  only  increases  wrong,  and 
renders  the  injurious  person  the  injured.  Thus  is  laid 
the  foundation  of  contention,  growing  into  interminable 
wrong  and  unappeasable  malice.  Such  a  condition  of 
human  beings  would  be  nothing  else  than  universal 
war. 

4.  now  then  can  justice  be  administered  ?  How  can 
right  be  protected  and  injury  redressed  ?  I  answer, 
Provision  is  made  for  this  in  the  social  nature  of  man. 
Every  man  is  so  created  as  instinctively  to  commit  to 
the  community  of  his  felloiu-men  the  protection  of  his 
rights  and  the  redress  of  his  tvrong-s ;  and  his  fellow- 
men,  on  the  other  hand,  instinctively  assume  this  au» 
ihority.  They  feel  tliat  they  assume  it  innocently ;  nay 
more,  they  feel  guilty  if  they  do  not  exert  it.    Every 


) 


51G  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

man  feels  that  lie  stands  in  this  relation  to  society,  and 
society  feels  that  it  stands  in  the  corresponding  relation 
to  him.  In  this  manner  is  the  society  of  human  beings 
established. 

The  human  being  thus  surrenders  the  right  to  re- 
dress his  wrongs  and  to  protect  his  rights  by  the  prowess 
of  his  own  arm,  and  receives  in  return  the  poiver  of  the 
whole  community  to  do  this  for  him.  Instead  of  meas- 
iiring  redress  by  his  own  exasperated  feelings,  redress 
is  administered  by  those  who  have  no  personal  interest 
in  the  matter,  and  to  whose  decision  the  injurious  per- 
son feels  himself  instinctively  bound  to  submit.  More 
than  this,  the  Christian  religion  imposes  upon  us  sub- 
jection to  the  civil  power,  as  a  matter  of  moral  duty, 
on  the  ground  that  society  is  an  ordinance  of  God. 
"  Let  every  soul  be  subject  to  the  higher  powers ;  for 
there  is  no  power  but  of  God  ;  the  powers  that  be  are 
ordained  of  God.  Whosoever,  therefore,  resisteth  the 
power,  resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God.  Wherefore  we 
must  needs  be  subject,  not  only  for  wrath,  but  for  con- 
science' sake  "  (Rom.  xiii.  1,  2,  6). 

5.  The  formation  of  a  society  on  the  principles  stated 
above  depends  neither  upon  organization  nor  number ;  it 
exists  wherever  human  beings  exist.  ^  As  soon  as  they 
associate  together,  and  form  a  community  by  themselves, 
they  form  a  society  on  these  principles,  each  individual 
surrendering  himself  to  the  whole,  and  the  whole  as- 
suming the  care  of  each  individual.  ^  Thus,  we  have 
heard  of  a  case  in  which  a  company  was  crossing  the 
wilderness  of  the  West,  and  who,  when  far  beyond  the 
confines  of  civilization,  found  that  one  of  their  number 
had  been  murdered  by  a  fellow-traveller.  They  paused 
in  their  journey,  all  feeling  that  their  first  duty  was  to 
do  justice.  They  arrested  the  suspected  person,  ap- 
pointed a  jury  to  examine  the  evidence  and  render  a 
verdict  accordingly.  It  was  done  immediately.  The 
man  was  found  guilty  of  murder,  and  was  executed 
accordingly.     They  then  proceeded  on  their  journey. 

Or,  again.     During  one  of  the  British  expeditions  to 
tlie  polar  regions,  Dr.  Richardson,  the  surgeon  of  tlie 


OF  CIVIL  SOCIETr.  .  347 

company,  found  himself  in  the  depths  of  the  wilderness, 
accompanied  only  by  a  midshipman,  a  sailor,  and  an 
Indian  guide.  The  temper  of  the  Indian  had  for  some 
time  been  far  from  satisfactory;  when,  on  one  occasion, 
upon  the  return  of  Dr.  Richardson  and  the  sailor  to  the 
tent  after  an  absence  of  some  hours,  they  found  the 
midshipman  dead.  He  had  been  shot,  and  the  Indian 
declared  that  he  had  shot  himself. 

Dr.  Richardson  and  the  sailor  formed  the  only  society 
within,  perhaps,  a  circuit  of  a  thousand  miles.  They 
proceeded  to  perform  the  functions  of  society  in  the  case 
before  them.  They  examined  the  body.  It  had  been 
shot  in  the  back,  in  a  manner  that  showed  that  death 
by  suicide  was  impossible.  The  Indian  was  evidently 
the  murderer,  and  justly  condemned  to  die.  The  sailor 
offered  to  be  the  executioner ;  but  Dr.  Richardson,  as 
the  superior  officer,  considered  that  the  duty  devolved 
on  himself.  He,  therefore,  as  soon  as  the  Indian  en- 
tered the  tent,  shot  him,  himself. 

I  think  that  while  we  all  regret  the  necessity  for  these 
acts,  we  approve  of  the  acts  themselves.  We  believe 
that  the  executioners  did  not  transcend  their  rightful 
authority.  They  acted  innocently.  They  did  no  more 
than  perform  a  deed  of  justice,  and  they  acted  from 
a  stern  conviction  of  duty.  These  were  evidently 
the  sentiments  of  Dr.  Richardson,  for  he  has  related  the 
transaction,  with  all  its  particulars,  in  his  report  of  the 
expedition.  I  think  that  the  common  conscience  of 
humanity  acquits  him  of  all  blame  in  the  occurrence. 

6.  It  will  be  seen,  from  what  has  been  said,  that  soci- 
ety confers  no  right  upon  any  man ;  it  only  secures  to 
him  the  enjoyment  of  rights  already  bestowed  upon  him 
by  the  Creator.  The  Creator  who  bestowed  them  has 
secured  them  to  him  by  the  constitution  under  which 
man  was  created.  That  society  best  fulfils  its  ofhce 
which  most  perfectly  protects  the  rights  and  redresses 
the  wrongs  of  every  individual,  and  where  every  indi* 
fidual  confides  these  duties  wholly  to  society. 

Hence  v  e  see  the  error  of  the  notion,  sometimes  en- 
tertained, Uiat  property,  na5,  that  oven  right  and  wi'ong, 


818  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

are  merely  the  creatures  of  society.  I  know  that  men 
may  declare  that  they  will  punish  or  reward  particular 
actions,  but  this  makes  the  actions  neither  right  nor 
wrong.  They  may  protect  me  in  the  enjoyment  of  my 
property,  but  they  cannot  make  that  my  property 
which  was  not  mine  before  they  took  action  on  the 
subject. 

7.  Inasmuch  as  every  man  has  been  created  a  con- 
stituent member  of  society,  every  man  has  a  right  lo  it. 
He  may  ditfer  from  the  community  in  which  he  lives  in 
various  respects,  and  may  hold  opinions  quite  dissimilar 
from  theirs ;  but,  so  long  as  he  violates  no  right,  he  is 
entitled  to  all  the  privileges  of  the  social  state.  Hi? 
person  and  his  property  are  under  the  protection  of  the 
community.  He  may  be  a  foreigner,  alone  and  friend- 
less, yet  society  covers  all  his  rights  as  a  man  under  the 
shield  of  her  protection.  The  infant  of  a  day  old  is 
watched  over  and  protected  by  the  same  benevolent 
power,  and  no  man  may  lay  upon  it  an  unkind  hand 
williout  exposing  himself  to  the  penalty  of  the  laws 
which  society  has  enacted  for  the  protection  of  every 
individual. 

Hence  we  see  the  error  of  those  who  suppose  that  any 
company  of  men  who  choose  to  organize  a  society  for 
themselves,  and  who  even  may  settle  in  the  wilderness 
for  this  purpose,  liave  a  right  to  organize  it  upon  such 
principles  as  they  please.  They  have  no  right  to  form 
a  society  in  violation  of  the  social  laws  of  man.  God 
evidently  intended  that  man  should  live  in  societ}^,  and 
of  this  right  he  cannot  be  deprived  unless  he  violates 
some  social  law.  His  opinions  and  practices  may  differ 
from  ours;  but  if  he  commits  no  injury,  his  right  to  the 
privileges  of  his  social  nature  remains  intact.  It  is  not 
enough  for  us  to  say,  if  he  does  not  agree  with  us,  let 
him  form  some  other  society  for  himself.  He  has  a 
right  to  this  society,  and  so  long  as  he  interferes  with 
tlie  rights  of  no  one,  he  is  as  free  of  this  society  as  an^ 
other  man. 

It  was  in  this  respect,  I  suppose,  that  our  Puritan 
, forefathers  erred. _  They  came  to  this  land,  inhabited 


OF  CIVIL  SOCIETY.  .  S49 

only  by  wandering  savages,  desiring  freedom  to  worship 
God ;  and  in  establishing  the  foundations  of  their  or- 
ganization, assumed  the  authority  to  punish  by  banish- 
ment, or  even  by  death,  all  those  who  differed  from 
them  in  wliat  they  considered  important  religious  opin- 
ions. They  believed  in  their  oivn  right  to  worship  God 
accof  iing  to  me  dictates  of  their  own  consciences,  but 
they  did  not  allow  this  to  be  the  common  right  of  all 
men.  Hence  arose  the  banishment  of  Roger  Williams, 
the  severe  treatment  of  Baptists,  the  execution  of 
Quakers,  and  the  harsh  measures  dealt  out  to  dissentients 
from  their  own  religious  belief.  A  true  conception  of 
the  nature  of  religious  liberty  would  have  taught  tliem 
that  tlie  right  which  they  so  nobly  claimed  for  them- 
selves was  equally  the  right  of  every  human  being. 

8.  We  see,  from  what  has  been  stated,  that  a  vasl 
difference  exists  between  civil  society  and  the  voluntary 
societies  and  associations  existing  among  men.  Men 
belong  to  a  voluntary  society,  because  they  choose  to 
unite  with  it :  they  select  the  object  which  tliey  wish  to 
accomplish  ;  they  adopt  such  means  as  they  suppose  will 
advance  their  purposes  ;  they  continue  united  as  long 
as  they  see  fit ;  and  any  member  dissolves  his  connection 
with  the  society  as  he  will,  or  they  may  all  agree  to 
abolish  the  society  altogether. 

On  the  contrary,  it  is  not  a  matter  of  choice  whether 
a  man  Avill  or  will  not  be  a  member  of  /'ivil  society. 
He  becomes  a  member  of  it  as  sof  n  as  he  begins  to  live, 
and  society  at  once  bestows  i.pon  him  the  full  benefit 
of  its  protection.  That  protection  he  needs  every  mo- 
ment of  his  life.  This  protection,  which  others  afford 
to  him,  he  is  under  obligations  to  unite  in  affording  to 
others.  He  cannot  free  himself  from  his  obligation, 
nor  live  without  the  protection  of  society.  It  is  an 
inliuence  which,  like  the  atmosphere,  surrounds  him 
everywhere  and  always,  and  he  can  no  more  dissever 
himself  from  it  than  he  can  cease  to  breathe. 

But  it  may  be  said  that  societies  may  err,  as  well  as 
individuals,  and  may  impose  unjust  restrictions  upon 
its  memberSj  or  may  even  interfere  with  their  obliga- 
^0 


S50  PRACTICAI.  ETHICS. 

tions  to  God.  This  is  true  ;  and  the  question  arise.?, 
What  then  is  to  bo  done  ?  We  see  at  once  that  the 
attempt  is  hopeless  for  the  individual,  by  force,  to  over- 
come the  power  of  society.  ^He  has  the  right  to  exhibit 
what  he  believes  to  be  the  truth  before  men,  and  gain 
as  many  converts  to  his  opinions  as  he  can.  j  If  he  suc- 
ceed in  changing  the  opinions  of  his  fellow-citizens,  they 
will  agree  with  him,  and  the  variance  between  the  parties 
will  cease.  If  he,  however,  is  unable  to  do  this,  and 
cannot  contend  by  force,  what  then  shall  he  do  ?  jJ  see 
no  other  course  open  for  him  than  to  do  whatever  ha 
oelieves  to  be  right,  dispassionately  and  boldly,  and 
suffer  the  consequences,  i.  These  may  be  suffering  even 
to  martyrdom ;  but  if  he  sTifier  in  the  cause  of  right,  ho 
may  in  this  manner  do  more  to  change  the  minds  of 
men  than  by  the  most  convincing  argument.  Persecu-  • 
tion  is  apt  to  react  powerfully  upon  the  persecutor.  Thus  ( 
it  was  said  in  early  days,  "  The  blood  of  the  martyrs  was/ 
the  seed  of  the  church."  It  is  from  just  such  martyr- \ 
doms  that  the  greatest  and  most  important  improvements  J 
ill  society  have  originated. 

9.  This  relation  of  the  individual  to  society  is  the 
foundation  of  some  of  the  most  interesting  affections  in 
our  nature.  /  As  society  is  thus  the  source  of  innumer- 
able blessings,  we  look  up  to  it  with  gratitude,  vener- 
ation, and  love.  \  It  is  to  us  a  sort  of  parent,  to  whom 
we  owe  a  vast  debt  of  filial  obedience.  sWe  all  know 
the  special  regard  in  which  we  hold  a  neignbor,  a  towns- 
man, a  fellow-citizen  of  our  state,  or  of  the  United 
States.  (Thus  is  formed  the  affection  of  patriotism,  or 
love  of  country,  one  of  the  most  ennobling  virtues  that 
can  adorn  our  character.  Mt  is  thus  that  we  joyfully 
suffer  the  loss  of  all  things,  even  life  itself,  for  our 
native  land  ;  and  the  sentiment  has  for  twenty  centuries 
thrilled  the  hearts  of  thousands,  Dulce  et  decorum  est 
pro  patria  mori.  This  particular  form  of  love  of  society 
gives  us  victory  over  tlie  love  of  self,  and  raises  us  to 
the  dignity  not  only  of  intelligent,  but  of  social  and 
moral  beings. 

10.  From  tJiis  lust  and  proper  love  of  ^society,  it  not 


V 


OF  CITIL  SOCIETY.  >  S^l 

unnaturally  follows  that  we  are  disposed  to  conceutt 
to  it  other  forms  of  authority.  Some  of  these  tend  lu 
good,  others  to  evil.^^Thus,  universal  education  is  an 
undoubted  blessing,  and  it  can  best  be  secured  by  con- 
fiding it  to  the  public  charge.  The  control  of  society 
over  the  labor  of  the  individual,  over  his  religious  opin- 
ions, over  his  personal  expenses,  and  over  various  other 
innocent  acts,  can  work  nothing  but  evil.  Hence,  in 
respect  to  the  claims  of  society,  an  important  distinc- 
tion is  to  be  taken.  Society,  without  asMng  the  consent 
of  the  individual,  may  properly  tax  him  for  his  propor- 
tionate share  of  all  the  necessary  expenses  of  the  gov- 
ernment. All  that  the  citizen  can  rightfully  claim  is 
that  no  more  than  his  proportionate  part  be  demanded. 
A  government  can  demand  money  for  no  other  purpose, 
unless  the  authority  to  do  so  has  been  conferred  on  it 
by  society.  It  is  not  sufficient  for  tlie  majority  to  be- 
lieve the  object  to  be  wise  or  benevolent :  the  question, 
first  of  all,  is,  has  power  been  conferred  on  them  to  act 
in  the  premises  ?  Thus,  it  may  be  supposed  that  the 
good  order  of  society  requires  that  churches  be  built 
and  ministers  of  religion  supported  by  law.  All  this 
would  avail  nothing  until  it  first  be  shown  that  the 
power  to  support  religion  by  law  had  been  conferred  by 
the  people  tliemselves  on  their  legislators.  Until  the 
article  of  the  constitution  be  shown  by  which  *liis 
power  is  conferred,  all  such  acts  are  usurpatioA  and 
tyianny. 


CHAPTER   II. 

OF  THE  MODE  IN  WHICH  THE  OBJECTS  OF  SOCIETY  ARE 
ACCOMPLISHED. 

"We  have  thus  far  treated  merely  of  the  constitution 
and  obligations  of  society,  and  of  the  obligations  hence 
devolving  upon  each.  These  obligations  are  to  protect 
the  individual  from  infractions  of  the  law  of  reciprocity, 
and  to  redress  his  wrongs  if  he  have  been  injured. 

But  it  is  manifest  that  this  obligation  cannot  be  dis- 
charged by  the  whole  of  society  as  a  body.  If  a  man 
steal  from  his  neighbor,  the  whole  community  cannot 
leave  their  occupations  to  detect,  to  try,  and  to  punish 
the  thief.  Or,  if  a  law  is  to  be  enacted  respecting  the 
punishment  of  theft,  it  cannot  be  done  by  the  whole 
community,  but  must  of  necessity  be  intrusted  to  dele- 
gates. On  the  principle  of  division  of  labor,  it  is  man- 
ifest that  tliis  service  will  be  both  more  cheaply  and 
more  perfectly  done  by  those  who  devote  themselves  to 
it,  than  by  those  who  are  for  the  greater  part  of  the 
time  engaged  in  otlier  occupations. 

Now,  I  suppose  a  government  to  be  that  system  of 
delegated  agencies  by  which  tliese  obligations  of  society 
to  the  individual  are  fulfilled. 

And,  moreover,  as  every  society  may  have  various 
engagements  to  form  with  other  independent  societies^ 
it  is  convenient,  in  general,  that  this  business  should  be 
transacted  by  this  same  system  of  agencies.  These  two 
offices  of  government,  though  generally  united,  are  in 
their  nature  distinct.  Thus  we  see,  in  our  own  country, 
the  State  governments  are,  to  a  considerable  degree, 
intrusted  with  the  first,  while  a  part  of  the  former,  and 
all  the  latter  power,  vest  in  the  General  governji^ent. 


now  THE  ENDS  OF  SOCIETY  ARE  ACCOMPLISHED.    353 

A  government  thus  understood  is  naturally  dh  ided 
into  three  parts. 

1.  An  mdividual  may  from  ignorance  violate  the 
rights  of  his  neighbor,  and  thus  innocently  expose  him- 
self to  punishment.  Or,  if  he  violate  his  neighbor's 
rights  maliciously,  and  justly  merit  punishment,  a  pun- 
ishment may  be  inflicted  more  severe  than  the  nature 
of  the  case  demands.  To  avoid  this,  it  is  necessary 
that  the  various  forms  of  violation  be  as  clearly  as  pos- 
sible defined,  and  also  that  the  penalty  be  ])lainly  and 
explicitly  attached  to  each.  This  is  a  law.  This,  as  we 
have  shown,  must  be  done  by  delegates.  These  dele- 
gates are  called  a  legislature^  and  the  individual  mem- 
bers of  it  are  legislators. 

From  what  we  have  said,  their  power  is  manifestly 
limited.  They  have  no  power  except  to  execute  the 
obligations  which  society  has  undertaken  to  faliil  towards 
the  individual.  This  is  all  that  society  has  conferred, 
for  it  is  all  that  society  had  to  confer. 

If  legislators  assume  any  power  not  conferred  on  them 
by  society,  or  exercise  any  power  conferred,  for  any 
purpose  different  from  that  for  which  it  was  conferred, 
they  violate  right,  and  are  guilty  of  usurpation. 

2.  But  suppose  a  law  to  be  enacted  ;  that  is,  a  crime 
to  be  defined,  and  the  penalty  to  be  affixed.  It  has  ref- 
erence to  no  particular  case ;  for,  when  enacted,  no  case 
existed  to  be  affected  by  it.  Suppose,  now,  an  individual 
to  be  accused  of  violating  this  law.  Here  it  is  neces- 
sary to  apply  the  law  to  this  particular  case.  In  order 
to  do  this,  we  must  ascertain,  first,  whether  the  accused 
did  commit  the  act  laid  to  his  charge ;  secondly,  whether 
the  act,  if  it  be  proved  to  have  been  done,  is  a  violation 
of  the  law, —  that  is,  whether  it  come  within  the  descrip- 
tion of  actions  which  the  law  forbids, — and,  thirdly,  if 
this  be  proved,  it  is  necessary  to  declare  tlie  punishment 
which  the  law  assigns  to  this  particular  violation.  This 
is  the  judicial  branch  of  the  government. 

3.  After  the  law  has  been  thus  applied  to  this  partio 
iilar  case,  it  is  necessary  that  it  be  carried  into  eftect. 

30* 


854  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

This  devolves  upon  the  third,  or  the  executive  branch 
of  a  government. 

Respecting  all  of  these  three  branches  of  government, 
it  may  be  remarked  in  general,  that  they  are  essentially 
independent  of  each  other ;  that  each  one  has  its  spe- 
cific duties  marked  out  by  society,  within  the  sphere  of 
which  duties  it  is  responsible  to  society^  and  to  society 
alone.  Nor  is  this  independence  at  all  affected  by  the 
mode  of  its  appointment.  Society  may  choose  a  way 
of  appointing  an  agent,  but  that  is  by  no  means  a  sur- 
render of  the  claim  which  it  has  upon  the  agent.  Thus, 
society  may  impose  upon  a  legislature  or  an  executive 
the  duty  of  appointing  a  judiciary ;  but  the  judiciary  is 
just  as  much  independent  of  the  executive  or  of  the 
lef^islature  as  though  it  were  appointed  in  some  other 
way.  Society,  by  conferring  upon  one  branch  the  right 
of  appointment,  has  conferred  upon  it  no  other  right. 
The  judge,  although  appointed  by  the  legislator,  is  as 
independent  of  him  as  the  legislator  would  be  if  ap- 
pointed by  the  judge.  Each,  within  his  own  sphere,  is 
under  obligation  to  perform  precisely  those  duties 
assigned  by  society,  and  no  other.  And  hence  arises 
the  propriety  of  establishing  the  tenure  of  office,  in  each 
several  branch,  independently  of  the  other. 

The  two  first  of  these  departments  are  frequently 
Bub-divided. 

Thus,  the  legislative  department  is  commonly  divided 
into  two  branches,  chosen  under  dissimilar  conditions, 
for  the  purpose  of  exerting  a  check  upon  each  other, 
by  representing  society  under  different  aspects,  and  thus 
preventing  partial  and  hasty  legislation. 

The  judiciary  is  also  generally  divided.  The  judges 
explain  and  interpret  the  law  ;  while  it  is  the  province 
of  i\\QJury  to  ascertain  the  facts. 

The  executive  is  generally  sole,  and  executes  the  law 
by  means  of  subordinate  agents.  Sometimes,  however, 
a  council  is  added,  for  the  sake  of  advice,  without  whoso 
concurrence  the  executive  cannot  act. 

Sometimes  the  fundamental  principles  of  the  social 
compact  are  expressed,  and  the  respective  powers  of  tho 


HOW  THE  ENDS  OF  SOCIETY  ARE  ACCO^IPLISHED.    355 

different  branches  of  the  government  are  defined,  and 
the  mode  of  their  appointment  described  in  a  written 
document.  Such  is  the  case  in  the  United  States.  At 
other  times,  these  principles  and  customs  have  grown 
up  with  the  progress  of  society,  and  are  the  deductions 
drawn  from,  or  principles  established  by,  uncontested 
usage.  The  latter  is  the  case  in  Great  Britain.  In 
either  case,  such  principles  and  practices,  whether  ex- 
pressed or  understood,  are  called  the  constitution  of  a 
country. 

Nations  differ  widely  in  the  mode  of  selection  tc 
office,  and  in  the  tenure  by  which  office  is  held.  Thus, 
under  some  constitutions,  the  government  is  wholly 
hereditary.  In  others  it  is  partly  hereditary  and  partly 
elective.     In  others  it  is  wholly  elective. 

Thus,  in  Great  Britain,  the  executive  and  one  branch 
of  the  legislature  are  hereditary  ;  the  other  branch  of 
the  legislature  is  elective.  The  judiciary  is  appointed 
by  the  executive,  though  they  hold  office,  except  in  the 
case  of  the  lord  high  chancellor,  during  good  behavior. 

In  the  United  States,  the  executive  and  both  branches 
of  the  legislature  are  elective.  The  judiciary  is  ap- 
pointed by  the  executive,  by  and  with  the  advice  and 
consent  of  the  senate.  In  the  State  governments  the 
mode  of  appointment  is  various. 

If  it  be  asked,  Which  of  these  is  the  preferable  form 
of  government  ?  the  answer,  I  think,  must  be  condi- 
tional. The  best  form  of  government  for  any  people 
is  the  best  that  its  present  moral  and  social  condition 
renders  practicable.  A  people  may  be  so  entirely  sur- 
rendered to  the  injiuence  of  passion,  and  so  feebly  influ- 
enced by  moral  restraint,  that  a  government  which  re- 
lied upon  moral  power  could  not  exist  for  a  day.  In 
this  case,  a  subordinate  and  inferior  principle  yet  re- 
mains,—  the  principle  of  fear  ;  and  the  only  resort  is 
to  a  government  of  force,  or  a  military  despotism.  And 
such  do  we  see  to  be  the  fact.  An  anarchy  always  ends 
in  this  form  of  government.  After  this  has  been  es- 
tablished, and  habits  of  subordination  have  been  formed, 
while  the  moral  restrahits  are  yet  too  feeble  for  self- 


856  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

government,  a  hereditary  government,  which  addresses 
itself  to  the  imagination,  and  strengthens  itself  by  the 
influence  of  domestic  connections  and  established  usage, 
may  be  as  good  a  form  as  a  people  can  sustain.  As 
they  advance  in  intellectual  and  moral  cultivation,  it 
may  advantageously  become  more  and  more  elective  ; 
and  in  a  suitable  moral  condition,  it  may  be  wholly  so. 
For  beings  who  are  willing  to  govern  themselves  by 
moral  principle,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  a  govern- 
ment relying  upon  moral  principle  is  the  true  form  of 
government.  There  is  no  reason  why  a  man  should  be 
oppressed  by  taxation,  and  subjected  to  fear,  who  is 
willing  to  govern  himself  by  the  law  of  reciprocity.  It 
is  surely  better  for  an  intelligent  and  moral  being  to  do 
right  from  his  own  will,  than  to  pay  'another  to  force 
him  to  do  right.  And  yet,  as  it  is  better  that  he  should 
do  right  than  wrong,  even  though  he  be  forced  to  it,  it 
is  well  that  he  siiould  pay  others  to  force  him,  if  there 
be  no  other  way  of  insuring  his  good  conduct.  God 
has  rendered  the  blessing  of  freedom  inseparable  from 
moral  restraint  in  the  individual ;  and  hence  it  is  vain 
for  a  people  to  expect  to  be  free,  unless  they  are  first 
willing  to  be  virtuous. 

It  is  on  this  point  that  the  question  of  the  perma- 
nency of  the  present  form  of  government  of  the  United 
States  turns.  That  such  a  form  of  government  requires, 
of  necessity,  a  given  amount  of  virtue  in  the  people, 
cannot,  I  think,  be  doubted.  If  we  possess  that  required 
amount  of  virtue,  or  if  we  can  attain  to  it,  the  govern- 
uient  will  stand ;  if  not,  it  will  fall.  Or,  if  we  now 
possess  that  amount  of  virtue,  and  do  not  maintain  it, 
the  government  will  fall.  There  is  no  self-sustaining 
power  in  any  form  of  social  organization.  The  only 
Bclf-sustaining  power  is  in  individual  virtue.  And  the 
form  of  a  government  will  always  adjust  itself  to  the 
moral  condition  of  a  people.  A  virtuous  people  will, 
by  their  own  moral  power,  frown  away  oppression,  and, 
und(;r  any  form  of  constitution,  become  essentially  free. 
A  people  surrendered  up  to  their  ow^n  licentious  pas- 
bions  must  be  held  in  subjection  by  force  •  for  every 


HOW  THE  ENDS  OF  SOCIETY  ARE  ACCOIMPLISIIED.    357 

(»iio  will  find  that  force  alone  can  protect  him  from  his 
neighbors ;  and  he  will  submit  to  be  oppressed,  if  he 
may  only  be  protected.  Thus,  in  the  feudal  ages,  the 
small  independent  landholders  frequently  made  them- 
selves slaves  of  one  powerful  chief,  in  order  to  shield 
themselves  from  tha  incessant  oppression  of  twenty. 


CHAPTER    III. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  A  GOVERNMENT. 

From  what  has  been  said,  the  duties  of  the  officers  of 
a  government  may  be  stated  in  a  few  words. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  a  government  derives  its 
authority  from  society,  of  which  it  is  the  agent ;  that 
society,  and  the  relations  between  society  and  individ- 
uals, are  the  ordinance  of  God :  of  course  the  officer  of 
a  government,  as  the  organ  of  society,  is  bound  as  such 
by  the  law  of  God,  and  is  under  obligation  to  perform 
the  duties  of  his  office  in  obedience  to  this  law.  And 
hence  it  makes  no  difference  how  the  other  party  to  the 
contract  may  execute  their  engagements  ;  he,  as  tho 
servant  of  God,  set  apart  for  this  very  thing,  is  bound, 
nevertheless,  to  act  precisely  according  to  the  principles 
by  which  God  has  declared  that  this  relation  should  be 
governed. 

The  officers  of  a  government  are  Legislative,  Judi- 
cial, and  Executive. 

I.   Of  legislative  officers, 

1.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  legislator  to  understand  the 
social  principles  of  man,  the  nature  of  the  relation 
which  subsists  between  the  individual  and  society,  and 
the  mutual  obligations  of  each.  By  these  are  his 
power  and  his  obligations  limited  ;  and,  unless  he  thus 
inform  himself,  he  can  never  know  respecting  any  act, 
whether  it  be  just,  or  whether  it  be  oppressive.  With- 
out such  knowledge  he  can  never  act  with  a  clear 
conscience. 

2.  It  is  the  duty  of  a  legislator  to  understand  the 
precise  nature  of  the  compact  which  binds  together  the 
particular  society  for  which  ho  legislates.  This  involves 


THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  A  GOYEENMEFT.    359 

the  general  conditions  of  the  social  compact,  and  some- 
thing more.  It  generally  specifies  conditions  which 
the  former  dpes  not  contain,  and  besides,  establishes 
the  limit  of  the  powers  of  the  several  branches  of  the 
government.  He  who  enters  upon  the  duties  of  a  legis- 
lator without  such  knowledge,  is  not  only  wicked,  but 
contemptible.  The  injury  which  he  inflicts  is  not  on 
an  individual,  but  on  an  entire  community.  There 
is  probably  no  method  in  which  mischief  is  done  so 
recklessly,  and  on  so  large  a  scale,  as  by  ignorant  and 
thoughtless  and  wicked  legislation.  Were  these  plain 
considerations  duly  weighed,  there  would  be  somewhat 
fewer  candidates  for  legislative  office,  and  a  somewhat 
greater  deliberation  on  the  part  of  the  people  in  select- 
ing them. 

3.  Having  made  himself  acquainted  with  his  powers 
and  his  obligations,  he  is  bound  to  exert  his  power  pre- 
cisely within  the  limits  by  which  it  is  restricted,  and  for 
the  purposes  for  which  it  was  conferred,  to  the  best  of 
his  knowledge  and  ability,  and  for  the  best  good  of  the 
whole  society.  He  is  bound  impartially  to  carry  into 
effect  the  principles  of  the  general  and  the  particular 
compact,  just  in  those  respects  in  which  the  carrying 
them  into  effect  is  committed  to  him.  For  the  action  of 
others  he  is  not  responsible,  unless  he  has  been  made 
so  responsible.  He  is  not  the  organ  of  a  section,  or  of 
a  district,  much  less  of  a  parti/,  but  of  the  society  at 
large.  And  he  who  uses  his  power  for  the  benefit  of  a 
section,  or  of  a  party,  is  false  to  his  duty,  to  his  country, 
and  to  his  God.  He  is  engraving  his  name  on  the  ad- 
amantine pillar  of  his  country's  history,  to  be  gazed 
upon  forever  as  an  object  of  universal  detestation. 

4.  It  is  his  duty  to  leave  everything  else  undone. 
From  no  plea  of  present  necessity,  or  of  peculiar  cir- 
cumstances, may  he  overstep  the  limits  of  his  constitu- 
tional power,  either  in  the  act  itself  or  the  purpose  for 
which  the  act  is  done.  Precisely  the  power  committed 
to  him  exists,  and  no  other.  If  he  may  exercise  one 
power  not  delegated,  he  may  exercise  anotlier,  and  ho 
may  exercise  all  j  thus,  on  principle,  he  assumes  himself 


6dO  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

to  be  the  fountain  of  power :  restraint  upon  encroach- 
ment ceases,  and  all  liberty  is  henceforth  at  an  end.  If 
.the  powers  of  a  legislator  are  insufficient  to  accomplish 
the  purposes  of  society,  inconveniences  will  arise.  It 
is  better  that  these  should  be  endured  until  the  ne- 
cessity of  some  modification  be  made  apparent,  than  to 
remedy  them  on  principles  which  destroy  all  liberty, 
and  thus  remove  one  inconvenience  by  taking  away  the 
possibility  of  ever  removing  another. 

The  only  exception  to  this  is  when  an  emergency 
arises,  for  which  the  constitution  has  made  no  provision, 
and  which  must  be  met  immediately.  In  such  a  case, 
the  executive  may  be  obliged  to  act  on  his  own  au- 
thority, submitting  his  conduct  to  the  approval  of  his 
fellow-citizens  after  the  emergency  shall  have  passed. 

II.   Of  judicial  officers, 

1.  The  judicial  officer  forms  an  independent  branch 
of  the  government,  or  a  separate  and  distinct  agent,  for 
executing  a  particular  part  of  the  contract  which  society 
has  made  with  the  individual.  As  I  have  said  before, 
it  matters  hot  how  he  is  appointed:  as  soon  as  he  is 
appointed,  he  is  the  agent  of  society,  and  of  society 
alone. 

The  judge,  precisely  in  the  same  manner  as  the  legis- 
lator, is  bound  by  the  principles  of  the  social  contract, 
and  by  those  of  the  particular  civil  compact  of  the  so- 
ciety in  whose  behalf  he  acts.  This  is  the  limit  of  his 
authority  ;  and  it  is  on  his  own  responsibility  if  he 
transcend  it. 

2.  The  provisions  of  this  compact,  as  they  are  em- 
bodied in  laws,  he  is  bound  to  enforce. 

And  hence  we  see  the  relation  in  which  the  judge 
stands  to  the  legislator.  Both  are  equally  limited  by 
the  principles  of  the  original  compact.  The  acts  of 
both  are  valid,  in  so  far  as  they  are  authorized  by  that 
compact.  Hence,  if  the  legislator  violate  his  trust,  and 
enact  laws  at  variance  with  the  constitution,  the  judge 
is  bound  not  to  enforce  them.  The  fact  that  the  ono 
has  violated  the  constitution,  imposes  up@n  the  other 
uo  obligation  to  do  the  sanie.     Thus  the  judge,  iuus- 


THE  DUTIES  OF  THE  OFFICERS  OF  A  GOVERNMENT.    §61 

much  as  he  is  obliged  to  decide  upon  the  constitution- 
ality of  a  law  before  he  enforces  it,  becomes  accidentally, 
but  in  fact,  a  coordinate  power,  without  whose  concur- 
rence  the  law  cannot  go  into  effect. 

Hence  we  see  that  the  duty  of  a  judge  is  to  under- 
stand, 

1.  The  principles  of  that  contract  from  which  ho 
derives  his  power ; 

2.  The  laws  of  the  community,  whose  agent  he  is  ; 

3.  To  explain  these  laws  without  fear,  favor,  or  affec- 
tion ;  and  to  show  their  bearing  upon  each  individual 
case,  without  bias  either  towards  the  individual  or 
towards  society ;  and, 

4.  To  pronounce  the  decision  of  the  law,  according 
to  its  true  intent. 

6.  As  the  jury  are  a  part  of  the  judicial  agents  of  the 
government,  they  are  bound  in  the  same  manner  to 
decide  upon  the  facts,  according  to  their  best  knowledge 
and  ability,  with  scrupulous  and  impartial  integrity. 

III.   Of  executive  officers. 

The  executive  office  is  either  simple  or  complex. 

1.  Simple;  as  where  his  only  duty  is  to  perform 
what  either  the  legislative  or  judicial  branches  of  the 
government  have  ordered  to  be  done. 

Such  is  the  case  with  sheriffs,  military  officers,  etc. 

Here  the  officer  has  no  right  to  question  the  goodness 
or  wisdom  of  the  law,  since  for  these  he  is  not  respon- 
sible. His  only  duty  is  to  execute  it,  so  long  as  he 
retahis  his  office.  If  he  believe  the  action  required  of 
him  to  be  morally  wrong,  or  at  variance  with  the  con 
stitution,  he  should  resign.  He  has  no  right  to  hold 
the  office,  and  refuse  to  perform  the  duties  which  others 
have  been  empowered  to  require  of  him. 

2.  Complex;  where  legislative  and  executive  duties 
are  imposed  upon  the  same  person  ;  as  where  the  chief 
magistrate  is  allowed  a  veto  on  all  acts  of  the  other 
branches  of  the  legislature. 

As  far  as  his  duties  are  legislative,  he  is  bound  by 
the  same  principles  as  any  other  legislator. 
Sometimes  his  power  is  limited  to  a  veto  on  moro 


3(52  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

constitutional  questions  ;  and  at  others  it  extends  to  all 
questions  whatsoever.  Sometimes  his  assent  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  the  passage  of  all  bills  ;  ii?  other 
cases  it  is  only  conditionally  necessary :  that  is,  the  other 
branches  may,  under  certain  circumstances,  enact  laws 
without  it. 

When  tliis  legislative  power  of  the  executive  has  been 
exerted  within  its  constitutional  limits,  he  becomes 
merely  an  executive  officer.  He  has  no  other  delibera- 
tive power  than  that  conferred  upon  him  by  the  consti- 
tution. He  is  under  the  same  obligations  as  any  other 
executive  officer  to  execute  the  law,  unless  it  seem  to 
him  a  violation  of  moral  or  constitutional  obligation. 
In  that  case  it  is  his  duty  to  resign.  He  has  no  more 
right  than  any  other  man  to  hold  the  office  while  he 
is  from  any  reason  whatever  unable  to  discharge  the 
duties  which  the  office  imposes  upon  him.  That  exec- 
utive officer  is  guilty  of  gross  perversion  of  official  and 
moral  obligation,  who,  after  the  decision  of  the  legisla- 
tive or  judicial  branch  of  a  government  has  been  ob- 
tained, suffers  his  own  personal  views  to  influence  him 
in  the  discharge  of  his  duty.  It  shows  that  a  man  is 
either  destitute  of  the  ability  to  comprehend  the  nature 
of  his-  station,  or  fatally  wanting  in  that  self-government 
so  indispensably  necessary  to  him  who  is  called  to  pre- 
side over  important  business. 

And  not  only  is  an  executive  officer  bound  to  exert 
no  otlier  power  than  that  committed  to  liim  ;  he  is  also 
bound  to  exert  that  power  for  no  other  purposes  than 
tliose  for  which  it  was  committed.  A  power  may  bo 
conferred  for  the  public  good  ;  but  this  by  no  means 
ttuihorizes  a  man  to  use  it  for  the  gratification  of  indi- 
vidual love  or  hatred,  much  less  for  the  sake  of  build- 
ing up  one  political  party,  or  of  crushing  another. 
Political  corruption  is  in  no  respect  the  less  wicked 
because  it  is  so  common.  Dishonesty  is  no  better  pol- 
icy in  the  affairs  of  state  than  in  any  other  aflairs, 
though  men  may  persuade  themselves  and  others  to  tho 
contrary 


CHAPTER    IV. 

THE  DUTIES  OF  CITIZENS. 

From  wl  at  has  already  been  stated,  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  duties  of  a  citizen  are  of  two  kinds  :  first,  as 
an  individual ;  and,  second,  as  a  member  of  society. 
A  few  remarks  on  each  of  these  will  close  this  part  of 
the  subject. 

First.  As  an  individual. 

Every  individual  is  under  obligation  to  observe  in 
good  faith  the  contract  which  he  instinctively  makes  as 
soon  as  he  becomes  a  member  of  society.  This  obliges 
him  — 

1.  To  observe  the  law  of  reciprocity  in  all  his  in 
tercourse  with  others. 

The  nature  of  this  law  has  been  already  explained. 
Every  one  expects  that  his  neighbor  shall  refrain  from 
every  violation  of  his  rights.  This  expectation  imposes 
upon  him  the  equal  obligation  to  refrain  from  every 
violation  of  tlie  rights  of  his  neighbor.  It  may  also  bo' 
added,  that  the  nature  of  the  law  of  reciprocity  binds  us, 
not  merely  to  avoid  those  acts  which  are  destructive  to 
the  existence  of  society,  but  also  those  which  would  in- 
terfere with  its  happiness.  The  principle  is  in  all  cases 
the  same.  If  we  assume  the  right  to  interfere  with  the 
smallest  means  of  happiness  possessed  by  our  neighbor, 
the  admission  of  that  assumption  would  excuse  every 
form  of  interference. 

2.  To  surrender  the  right  of  redressing  his  wrongs 
wholly  to  society.  This  has  been  considered  already, 
hi  treating  of  the  social  compact.  Aggression  and 
injury  in  no  case  justify  retaliation.  If  a  man's  house 
bo  attacked,  he  may,  so  far  as  society  is  concerned,  ro- 


S64  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

pel  the  robber,  because  here  societj  is  unable  at  t\\(S 
instant  to  assist  him ;  but  he  is  at  hberly  to  put  forth 
no  other  effort  than  that  necessary  to  protect  iiimself, 
or  to  secure  the  aggressor  for  the  purpose  of  delivering 
him  over  to  the  judgment  of  society.  If,  after  having 
secured  him,  he  put  him  to  death,  this  is  murder. 

3.  To  obey  all  laws  made  in  accordance  with  the 
constituted  powers  of  society.  Hence  we  are  hi  no 
manner  released  from  this  obligation  by  the  conviction 
that  the  law  is  unwise  or  inexpedient.  We  have  con- 
fided the  decision  of  this  question  to  society,  and  wo 
must  abide  by  that  decision.  To  do  otherwise  would 
be  to  constitute  every  man  the  judge  in  his  own  case ; 
that  is,  to  allow  every  man  to  obey  or  disobey  as  he 
pleased,  while  he  expected  from  everi/  other  man  im- 
plicit obedience.  Thus,  though  a  man  were  convinced 
that  laws  regulating  the  rate  of  interest  were  inexpe- 
dient, this  would  give  him  no  right  to  violate  tliese  laws. 
He  must  obey  them  until  he  be  able  to  persuade  society 
to  think  as  he  does. 

Secondly.  The  citizen  is  under  obligations  as  a  con- 
stituent  member  of  society.  By  these  obligations,  on  the 
other  hand,  he  is  bound  to  fulfil  the  contract  which  ho 
has  made  with  every  individual. 

Hence  he  is  bound  — 

1.  To  use  all  the  necessary  exertion  to  secure  to 
every  individual,  from  the  highest  and  most  powerful 
to  the  lowest  and  most  defenceless,  the  full  benefit  of 
perfect  protection  in  the  enjoyment  of  liis  rights. 

2.  To  use  all  the  necessary  exertion  to  procure  for 
every  individual  just  and  adequate  redress  for  wrong. 

3.  To  use  all  the  necessary  exertion  to  carry  into 
effect  the  laws  of  civil  society,  and  to  detect  and  punish 
crime,  whether  committed  against  the  individual  or 
against  society.  Wherever  he  knows  these  laws  to  be 
violated,  he  is  bound  to  take  all  proper  steps  to  bring 
the  offenders  to  justice. 

And  here  it  is  to  be  remarked,  that  he  is  to  consider 
not  merely  his  property,  but  his  personal  service, 
pledged  to  the  fulfilment  of  this  obligation.     Ho  who 


THE  DUTIES  OF  CITIZENS.  '  365 

stands  by  and  sees  a  mob  tear  down  a  bouse,  is  a  par- 
taker in  the  guilt.  And  if  society  knowingly  neglect 
to  protect  the  individual  in  the  enjoyment  of  his  rights, 
every  member  of  that  society  is  in  equity  bound,  in 
his  proportion,  to  make  good  that  loss,  how  great  soever 
it  may  be. 

4.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  citizen  to  bear  cheerfully 
his  proportionate  burden  of  the  public  expense.  As 
society  cannot  be  carried  on  without  expense,  he,  by 
entering  into  society,  obliges  himself  to  bear  his  pro- 
portion of  it.  And,  besides  this,  there  are  but  few 
modes  in  which  we  receive  back  so  much  for  what  we 
expend,  as  when  we  pay  money  for  the  support  of  civil 
government.  The  gospel,  I  think,  teaches  us  to  go 
further,  and  be  ready  to  do  more  than  we  are  compelled 
to  do  by  law.  Tlie  precept,  "  If  a  man  compel  thee  to 
go  a  mile,  go  witli  him  twain,"  refers  to  labor  in  the 
public  service,  and  exhorts  us  to  do  more  than  can  bo 
in  equity  demanded  of  us. 

5.  Besides  this,  I  think  a  citizen  is  under  moral 
obligation  to  contribute  his  proportion  to  every  effort 
which  affords  a  reasonable  prospect  of  rendering  his 
fellow-citizens  wiser  and  better.  From  every  such  suc- 
cessful effort  he  receives  material  benefit,  both  in  his 
person  and  estate.  lie  ought  to  be  willing  to  assist 
others  in  doing  that  from  which  he  himself  derives 
important  advantage. 

6.  Inasmuch  as  society  enters  into  a  moral  obligation 
to  fulfil  certain  duties,  which  duties  are  performed  by 
agents  whom  the  society  appoints ;  for  their  faithful 
discharge  of  those  duties  society  is  morally  responsible. 
As  this  is  the  case,  it  is  manifestly  the  duty  of  every 
member  of  society  to  choose  such  agents  as,  in  his 
opinion,  will  truly  and  faithfully  discharge  those  duties 
to  which  they  are  appointed.  He  who,  for  the  sake  of 
party  prejudice  or  personal  feeling,  acts  otherwise,  and 
selects  individuals  for  office  without  regard  to  these 
solemn  obligations,  is  using  his  full  amount  of  influence 
to  sap  the  very  foundations  of  society,  and  to  perpetrate 
the  most  revolting  injustice. 


563  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

Thus  far  wc  have  gone  upon  the  supposition  that  so 
ciety  has  exerted  its  power  within  its  constituted  limits 
This,  however,  unfortunately,  is  not  always  the  case 
The  question  then  arises.  What  is  the  duty  of  an  indi 
vidual  when  such  a  contingency  shall  arise  ? 

Now,  there  are  but  three  courses  of  conduct,  in  such 
a  case,  for  the  individual  to  pursue  :  passive  obedience, 
resistance,  and  suffering  in  the  cause  of  right. 

1.  Passive  obedience,  in  many  cases,  would  be  mani- 
festly wrong.  We  have  no  right  to  obey  an  unright- 
eous law,  since  we  must  obey  God  at  all  hazards.  And 
aside  from  this,  the  yielding  to  injustice  forms  a  prece- 
dent for  wrong,  which  may  work  the  most  extensive 
mischief  to  those  who  shall  come  after  us.  It  is  mani- 
fest, tlierefore,  that  passive  obedience  cannot  be  the  rule 
of  civil  conduct. 

2.  Resistance  by  force. 

Resistance  to  civil  authority  by  a  single  individual 
would  be  absurd.  It  can  succeed  only  by  the  combina- 
tion of  all  the  aggrieved  against  the  aggressors,  termi- 
nating in  an  appeal  to  physical  force  ;  that  is,  by  civif 
war. 

The  objections  to  this  course  are  the  following: 

1.  It  is,  at  best,  uncertain.  It  depends  mainly  on 
the  question.  Which  party  is,  under  the  present  circum- 
stances, the  stronger  ?  Now,  the  oppressor  is  as  likely 
to  be  the  stronger  as  the  oppressed,  as  the  history  of 
the  world  has  abundantly  shown. 

2.  It  dissolves  the  social  fabric,  and  thus  destroys 
whatever  has  thus  far  been  gained  in  the  way  of  social 
organization.  But  it  should  be  remembered  that  few 
forms  of  society  have  existed  for  any  considerable  pe- 
riod, in  which  there  does  not  exist  much  that  is  worthy 
of  preservation. 

3.  The  cause  of  all  oppression  is  the  wickedness  of 
man.  But  civil  war  is  in  its  very  nature  a  most  de- 
moralizing process.  It  never  fails  to  render  men  mora 
wicked.  Can  it,  then,  be  hoped  that  a  form  of  govern- 
ment can  be  created  by  men  already  worse  than  before, 
better  than  that  which  their  previous  but  less  intense 
wickedness  rendered  intolerable  ? 


THE  DUTIES  OF  CITIZENS.  >     .  367 

4.  Civil  war  is,  of  all  evils  which  men  inflict  upon 
tliemsclves,  the  most  horrible.  It  dissolves  not  only 
social  but  domestic  ties,  overturns  all  the  security  of 
property,  throws  back  for  ages  all  social  improvement, 
and  accustoms  men  to  view  without  disgust,  and  even 
rith  pleasure,  all  that  is  atrocious  and  revoking. 
Napoleon,  accustomed  as  he  was  to  bloodshed,  turned 
away  with  horror  from  the  contemplation  of  civil  war. 
This,  then,  cannot  be  considered  the  way  designed  by 
our  Creator  for  rectifying  social  abuses. 

3.  Tlie  tliird  course  is  that  of  suffering  in  the  cause 
of  right.  Here  we  act  as  we  believe  to  be  right,  in 
defiance  of  oppression,  and  bear  patiently  whatever  an 
oppressor  may  inflict  upon  us. 

Tlie  advantages  of  this  course  are  — 

1.  It  preserves  entire  whatever  exists  that  is  valuable 
in  the  present  organization. 

2.  It  presents  the  best  prospect  of  ultimate  correc- 
tion of  abuse,  by  appealing  to  the  reason  and  the  con- 
science of  men.  This  is,  surely,  a  more  fit  tribunal  to 
wliich  to  refer  a  moral  question,  than  the  tribunal  of 
physical  force. 

3.  It  causes  no  more  suffering  than  is  actually  ne- 
cessary to  accomplish  its  object ;  for  whenever  men  arei 
convinced  of  the  wickedness  of  oppression,  the  sufiering, 
of  itself,  ceases. 

4.  Suffering  in  the  cause  of  right  has  a  manifest 
tendency  to  induce  the  injurious  to  review  their  con- 
duct, under  all  the  most  favorable  circumstances  for 
conviction.  It  disarms  pride  and  malevolence,  and 
enlists  sympathy  in  favor  of  the  sufferer.  Hence  ita 
tendency  is  to  make  men  better. 

6.  And  experience  has  shown  that  the  ca,use  of  civD 
liberty  has  always  gained  more  by  martyrdom  than  by 
war.  It  has  rarely  happened  that,  during  civil  war, 
the  spirit  of  true  liberty  has  not  declined.  Such  was 
the  case  in  the  time  of  Charles  I.  in  England.  How 
far  the  love  of  liberty  had  declined  in  consequence  of 
civil  war,  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  Cromwell  suc- 
ceeded immediately  to  unlimited  power,  and  Charles 


868  PKACTICAL  ETHICS. 

II.  returned  with  acclamation,  to  inflict  upon  the  na- 
tion the  most  odious  and  heartless  tyranny  by  which  it 
was  ever  disgraced.  During  the  suffering  for  corir* 
science  under  his  reign,  the  spirit  of  liberty  revived, 
hurled  liis  brother  from  the  throne,  and  established 
British  freedom  upon  a  firm,  and,  we  trust,  an  immov- 
able foundation. 

6.  Every  one  must  be  convinced,  upon  reflection, 
that  this  is  really  the  course  indicated  by  the  highest 
moral  excellence.  Passive  obedience  may  arise  from 
servile  fear ;  resistance,  from  vain-glory,  ambition,  or 
desire  of  revolution.  Suffering  for  the  sake  of  right 
can  arise  only  from  a  love  of  justice  and  a  hatred  of 
oppression.  The  real  spirit  of  liberty  can  never  exist 
in  any  remarkable  degree  in  any  nation  where  there  is 
not  this  willingness  to  suffer  in  the  cause  of  justice 
and  liberty.  Ever  so  little  of  the  spirit  of  martyrdom 
is  always  a  more  favorable  indication  for  civilization 
than  ever  so  much  dexterity  of  party  management,  or 
ever  so  turbulent  protestatioix  of  immaculate  patriotism. 


DIVISION    II. 

THE  LAW  OF  BENEVOLENCE. 

CHAPTER  I. 

GENERAL  OBLIGATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  THE  SUBJECT. 

We  have  thus  far  considered  merely  the  law  of  reci- 
procity ;  that  is,  the  law  which  prevents  our  interfer- 
ence with  those  means  of  happiness  which  belong  to 
our  neighbor,  from  the  fact  that  they  are  the  gift  of 
God  to  him.  But  it  is  manifest  that  this  is  not  the  only 
law  of  our  present  constitution.  Besides  being  obliged 
to  abstain  from  doing  wrong  to  our  neighbor,  we  are 
also  obliged  to  do  him  good ;  and  a  large  part  of  our 
moral  probation  actually  comes  under  this  law. 

The  law  of  benevolence,  or  the  law  which  places  us 
under  obligation  to  be  the  instruments  of  happiness  to 
those  who  have  no  claim  upon  us  on  the  ground  of  reci- 
procity, is  manifestly  indicated  by  the  circumstances  of 
our  constitution. 

1.  We  are  created  under  a  constitution  in  which  we 
are  of  necessity  dependent  upon  the  benevolence  of 
others.  Thus,  we  are  all  exposed  to  sickness,  in  which 
case  we  become  perfectly  helpless,  and  when,  were  it 
not  for  the  kindness  of  others,  we  must  perish.  We 
grow  old,  and  by  age  lose  the  power  of  supporting  our- 
selves. Were  benevolence  to  be  withdrawn,  many  of 
the  old  would  die  of  want.  The  various  injuries  aris- 
ing from  accident,  as  well  as  from  disease,  teach  us  the 
same  lesson.     And,  besides,  a  world  in  which  every 


870  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

individual  is  subject  to  death,  must  abound  with  wid- 
ows and  orphans,  who,  deprived  by  the  hand  of  God  of 
their  only  means  of  support,  must  frequently  either 
look  for  sustenance  and  protection  to  those  on  whom 
they  have  no  claim  by  the  law  of  reciprocity,  or  they 
must  die.  Now,  as  we  live  under  a  constitution  in 
which  these  things  are  of  daily  occurrence,  and  many 
of  them  by  necessity  belonging  to  it,  and  as  we  are  all 
equally  liable  to  be  in  need  of  assistance,  it  must  be 
the  design  of  our  Creator  that  we  should,  under  such 
circumstances,  help  each  other. 

2.  Nor  do  these  remarks  apply  merely  to  the  neces- 
sity of  physical  support.  Much  of  the  happiness  of 
man  depends  upon  intellectual  and  moral  cultivation. 
But  it  is  generally  the  fact,  that  those  who  are  deprived 
of  these  means  of  happiness  are  ignorant  of  their  value ; 
and  would,  therefore,  remain  forever  deprived  of  them, 
were  they  not  awakened  to  a  conviction  of  their  true 
interests  by  those  who  have  been  more  fortunate.  Now, 
as  we  ourselves  owe  our  intellectual  happiness  to  the 
benevolence,  either  near  or  more  remote,  of  others,  it 
would  seem  that  an  obligation  was  imposed  upon  us  to 
manifest  our  gratitude  by  extending  the  blessings  which 
we  enjoy  to  those  who  are  destitute  of  them.  We  fre- 
quently cannot  requite  our  actual  benefactors,  but  we 
always  may  benefit  others  less  happy  tlian  ourselves ; 
and  tlms  in  a  more  valuable  manner  promote  the  wel- 
fare of  the  whole  race  to  which  we  belong. 

3.  This  being  manifestly  an  obligation  imposed  upon 
us  by  God,  it  cannot  be  affected  by  any  of  the  actions 
of  men ;  that  is,  we  are  bound  by  the  law  of  benevo- 
lence, irrespective  of  the  character  of  the  recipient.  It 
matters  not  though  he  be  ungrateful,  or  wicked,  or  inju- 
rious ;  this  does  not  affect  the  obligation  under  which 
we  are  placed  by  God,  to  treat  our  neighbor  according 
to  the  law  of  benevolence.  Hence,  in  all  cases,  we  are 
bound  to  govern  ourselves,  not  by  the  treatment  which 
we  have  received  at  his  hands,  but  according  to  the  law 
by  which  God  has  directed  our  intercourse  with  him  to 
be  governed. 


GENERAL  OBLIGATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  THE  SUBJECT.    371 

And  yet  more.  It  is  evident  that  many  of  the  vir- 
tues most  appropriate  to  human  nature  are  called  into 
exercise  only  by  the  miseries  or  the  vices  of  others. 
How  could  there  be  sympathy  and  mercy,  were  there 
no  suffering  ?  How  could  there  be  patience,  meekness, 
and  forgiveness,  were  there  no  injury  ?  Thus  we  see 
tliat  a  constitution  which  involves,  by  necessity,  suffer- 
ing, and  the  obligation  to  relieve  it,  is  that  which  alone 
is  adapted  to  the  perfection  of  our  moral  character  in 
our  present  state. 

This  law  of  our  moral  constitution  is  abundantly  set 
forth  in  the  holy  Scriptures. 

It  is  needless  here  to  speak  of  the  various  passages 
in  the  Old  Testament  which  enforce  the  necessity  of 
mercy  and  charity.  A  single  text  from  our  Saviour's 
Sermon  on  the  Mount  will  be  sufficient  for  my  purpose. 

It  is  found  Luke  vi.  32-36,  and  Matthew  v.  43-48. 
I  quote  the  passage  from  Luke  : 

"If  ye  love  them  that  love  you,  what  thank  have  ye  ? 
for  sinners  also  love  those  that  love  them.  And  if  ye 
do  good  to  those  that  do  good  to  you,  what  thank  have 
ye  ?  for  sinners  also  do  even  the  same.  And  if  ye  lend 
to  them  of  whom  ye  hope  to  receive,  what  thank  have 
ye  ?  for  sinners  also  lend  to  sinners,  to  receive  as  much 
again.  But  love  ye  your  enemies,  and  do  good  and 
lend,  hoping  for  nothing  again  ;  and  your  reward  shall 
be  great,  and  ye  shall  be  the  children  of  the  Highest, 
for  he  is  kind  unto  the  unthankful  and  to  the  evil.  Be 
ye,  therefore,  merciful,  as  your  Father  in  heaven  is 
merciful."  In  Matthew  it  is  said,  "  Love  your  enemies; 
bless  them  that  curse  you,  do  good  to  them  that  hate 
you,  and  pray  for  them  that  despitefully  use  you  and 
persecute  you  ;  that  ye  may  be  the  children  of  [that  is, 
that  ye  may  imitate]  your  Father  which  is  in  heaven, 
for  he  makcth  his  sun  to  rise  upon  the  evil  and  upon 
the  good,  and  sendeth  rain  upon  the  just  and  upon  the 
unjust." 

The  meaning  of  this  procept  is  obvious  from  the  con- 
text. To  be  merciful,  is  to  promote  the  happiness  of 
those  who  have  no  claim  upon  us  by  t!ie  law  of  reci 


572  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

procity,  and  from  whom  we  can  hope  for  nothing  by 
way  of  remuneration.  We  are  to  be  merciful,  as  our 
Father  wlio  is  in  heaven  is  merciful. 

1.  God  is  the  independent  source  of  happiness  to 
everything  that  exists.  None  can  possibly  repay  him, 
and  yet  his  bounty  is  unceasing.  All  his  perfections  are 
continually  employed  in  promoting  the  happiness  of  his 
creation.  Now,  we  are  commanded  to  be  imitators  of 
him  ;  that  is,  to  employ  all  our  powers,  not  for  our  own 
gratification,  but  for  the  happiness  of  others.  We  are 
to  consider  this  not  as  an  onerous  duty,  but  as  a  privi- 
lege ;  as  an  opportunity  conferred  upon  us  of  attaining 
to  some  resemblance  to  the  Fountain  and  Author  of  all 
excellence. 

2.  This  precept  teaches  us  that  our  obligation  is  not 
altered  by  the  character  of  the  recipient.  God  sends 
rain  on  the  just  and  on  the  unjust,  and  causeth  his  sun 
to  shine  on  the  evil  and  on  the  good.  "  God  commend- 
eth  his  love  to  us,  in  that,  wliile  we  were  yet  sinners, 
Christ  died  for  us."  In  imitation  of  this  example,  we 
are  connnanded  to  do  good  to,  and  promote  the  happi- 
ness of,  the  evil  and  the  wicked.  We  are  to  comfort 
them  when  they  are  afflicted,  to  relieve  them  when  they 
are  sick ;  and  specially,  by  all  the  means  in  our  power, 
to  strive  to  reclaim  them  to  virtue.  We  are  not,  how- 
ever, to  give  a  man  the  means  of  breaking  the  laws  of 
God  ;  as  to  furnish  a  drunkard  with  the  means  of  in- 
temperance :  this  would  be  to  render  ourselves  parta- 
kers of  his  sin.  What  is  here  commanded  is  merely 
the  relieving  his  misery  as  a  suffering  human  creature, 

3.  Nor  is  our  obligation  altered  by  the  relation  in 
which  the  recipient  may  stand  to  us.  His  being  our 
enemy  in  no  manner  releases  us  from  obligation.  Every 
wicked  man  is  the  enemy  of  God,  yet  God  bestows 
even  upon  such  the  most  abundant  favors. 

"  God  so  loved  the  world,  that  he  sent  his  only-begot- 
ten Son,  that  whosoever  believeth  on  him  should  not 
perish,  but  have  everlasting  life."  Jesus  Christ  spent 
his  life  in  acts  of  mercy  to  his  bitterest  enemies.  Ho 
died  praying  for  his  murderers.    So  we  are  commanded 


GENERAL  OBLIGATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  THE  SUBJECT.    375 

to  love  our  enemies,  to  overcome  evil  with  good,  and  to 
follow  the  example  of  St.  Paul,  who  declares  to  the 
Corinthians,  "  I  desire  to  spend  and  be  spent  for  you  ; 
though  the  more  abundantly  I  love  you,  the  less  I  bo 
loved." 

Li  a  word,  God  teaches  us  in  the  holy  Scriptures 
that  all  our  fellow-men  are  his  creatures  as  well  as  our- 
selves ;  and  hence,  that  we  are  not  only  under  obliga- 
tion, under  all  circumstances,  to  act  just  as  he  shall 
command  us,  but  that  we  are  specially  under  obligation 
to  act  thus  to  our  fellow-men,  who  are  not  only  our 
brethren,  but  who  are  also  under  his  special  protection. 
He  declares  that  they  are  all  his  children;  that  by 
showing  mercy  to  them,  we  manifest  our  love  to  him ; 
and  that  this  manifestation  is  the  most  valuable  when 
it  is  the  most  evident  that  we  are  influenced  by  no 
other  motive  than  love  to  him. 

Shakspeare  has  treated  this  subject  very  beautifully 
in  the  foilowuig  passages ; 


'Tis  mightiest  in  the  mightiest;  it  becomes 

The  throned  monarch  better  than  his  crown : 

His  sceptre  shows  tlie  force  of  temporal  power. 

The  attribute  to  awe  and  majesty, 

Wherein  doth  sit  the  dread  and  fear  of  kings  ; 

But  mercy  is  above  this  sceptred  sway : 

It  is  enthroned  in  the  hearts  of  Icings, 

It  is  an  attribute  of  God  himself; 

And  earthly  power  doth  then  show  likest  God's 

When  mercy  seasons  justice. 

Merchant  of  Venice,  Act  iv..  Scene  1 


Alas!  alas! 
Why  all  the  souls  that  are,  were  forfeit  once; 
And  He  that  might  the  advantage  best  have  took, 
Found  out  the  remedy.    How  would  you  be. 
If  He,  who  is  the  top  of  judgment,  should 
But  judge  you  as  you  are  ? 

Measure  for  Measure,  Act  ii..  Scene  %, 


574  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

The  Scriptures  enforce  this  duty  upon  us  for  several 
reasons : 

1.  From  the  example  of  God.  He  manifests  himself 
to  us  as  boundless  in  benevolence.  He  has  placed  us 
under  a  constitution  in  which  we  may,  at  humble  dis- 
tance, imitate  him.  This  has  to  us  all  the  force  of  law, 
for  we  are  surely  under  obligation  to  be  as  good  as  we 
have  the  knowledge  and  the  ability  to  be.  And  as  the. 
goodness  of  God  is  specially  seen  in  mercy  to  the  wicked 
and  the  injurious,  by  the  same  principles  we  are  bound 
to  follow  the  same  example. 

2.  We  live,  essentially  and  absolutely,  by  the  bounty 
and  forbearance  of  God.  It  is  meet  that  we  should 
show  the  same  bgunty  and  forbearance  to  our  fellow- 
men. 

3.  Our  only  hope  of  salvation  is  in  the  forgiveness  of 
God  —  of  that  God  whom  we  have  offended  more  than 
we  can  adequately  conceive.  How  suitable  is  it,  then, 
that  we  forgive  the  little  offences  of  our  fellow-men 
against  us  !  Our  Saviour  illustrates  this  most  beauti- 
fully in  his  parable  of  the  two  servants,  Matthew  xviii. 
23-35. 

4.  By  the  example  of  Christ,  God  has  shown  us  what 
is  that  type  of  virtue  which  in  human  beings  is  most 
acceptable  in  his  sight.  This  was  an  example  of  perfect 
forbearance,  meekness,  benevolence,  and  forgiveness. 
Thus  we  are  not  only  furnished  with  the  rule,  but  also 
with  the  exemplification  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
rule  is  to  be  observed. 

5.  These  very  virtues,  which  are  called  forth  by  suf- 
fering from  the  wickedness  and  injury  of  our  fellow- 
men,  are  those  which  God  specially  approves,  and  which 
he  declares  essential  to  that  character  which  shall  fit  us 
for  heaven.  Blessed  are  the  merciful^  for  they  shall 
obtain  mercy.  Blessed  are  the  meek^  blessed  are  the 
peacemakers,  etc.  A  thousand  such  passages  might 
easily  be  quoted. 

6.  God  has  declared  that  our  forgiveness  with  him 
depends  upon  our  forgiveness  of  others.  "  If  ye  forgive 
not  men  their  trespasses,  neither  will  your  Father  who 


GEIsT:R.iL  OBLIGATION  AND  DIVISION  OF  THE  SUBJECT.  575 

is  in  heaven  forgiv^e  you  your  trespasses."  "  He  shall 
have  judgment  without  mercy,  that  showeth  no  mercy  ; 
but  mercy  rejoiceth  against  judgment  ; "  tliat  is,  a 
merciful  man  rejoices,  or  is  confident,  in  the  view  of  the 
judgment  day. 

If  it  be  asked.  What  is  the  Christian  limit  to  benevo- 
lence ?  I  answer,  that  no  definite  rule  is  laid  down  in 
the  Scriptures,  but  that  merely  the  principle  is  incul- 
cated. All  that  we  possess  is  God's,  and  we  are  under 
obligation  to  use  it  all  as  he  wills.  His  will  is  that  we 
consider,  every  talent  as  a  trust,  and  that  we  seek  our 
happiness  from  the  use  of  it,  not  in  self-gratification, 
but  in  ministering  to  the  happiness  of  others.  Our 
doing  thus  he  considers  as  the  evidence  of  our  love  to 
him ;  and  therefore  he  fixes  no  definite  amount  which 
shall  be  abstracted  from  our  own  immediate  sources  of 
happiness  for  this  purpose,  but  allows  us  to  show  our 
consecration  of  all  to  him,  just  as  fully  as  we  please. 
If  this  be  a  privilege,  and  one  of  the  greatest  privileges 
of  our  present  state,  it  would  seem  that  a  truly  grate- 
ful heart  would  not  ask  how  little^  but  rather  how  much 
may  I  do  to  testify  my  love  for  the  God  who  preserves 
me,  and  the  Saviour  who  has  redeemed  me. 

And,  inasmuch  as  our  love  to  God  is  more  evidently 
displayed  in  kindness  and  mercy  to  the  wicked  and  the 
injurious  than  to  any  others,  it  is  manifest  that  we  are 
bound  by  this  additional  consideration  to  practise  these 
virtues   toward  them  in  preference  to  any  others. 

And  hence  we  see  that  benevolence  is  a  religious  act, 
m  just  so  far  as  it  is  done  from  love  to  God.  It  is  lovely 
and  respectable  and  virtuous,  when  done  from  sym- 
pathy and  natural  goodness  of  disposition.  It  is  pious 
only  when  done  from  love  to  God. 


CHAPTER    II. 

OF  BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  UNHAPPY. 

A  MAN  may  be  simply  unhappy  from  either  his  physi' 
cal  or  his  intellectual  condition.  We  shall  consider 
these  separately. 

SECTION  I, 

UNHAPPINESS  FROM  PHYSICAL  CONDITION. 

The  occasions  of  unhappiness  from  this  cause  art 
simple  poverty,  or  the  mere  want  of  the  necessities  and 
conveniences  of  life ;  and  sickness  and  decrepitude^- 
either  alone,  or  when  combined  with  poverty. 

1.  Of  poverty.  Simple  poverty,  or  want,  so  long  as 
a  human  being  has  the  opportunity  of  labor  sufficiently 
productive  to  maintain  liim,  does  not  render  him  an 
object  of  charity.  "  If  a  man  will  not  work,  neither 
shall  he  eat,"  is  the  language  no  less  of  reason  than  of 
revelation.  If  a  man  be  indolent,  tlie  best  discipline  to 
which  he  can  be  subjected  is  to  suffer  the  evils  of  pen- 
ury. Hence,  all  that  we  are  required  to  do  in  such  a 
case  is  to  provide  such  a  person  with  labor,  and  to  pay 
him  accordingly.  This  is  the  greatest  kindness,  both 
to  him  and  to  society. 

2.  Sometimes,  however,  from  the  dispensations  of 
Providence,  a  human  being  is  left  so  destitute  that  his 
labor  is  insufficient  to  maintain  him.  Such  is  fre- 
quently the  case  with  widows  and  orphans.  This  forms 
a  manifest  occasion  for  charity.     The  individuals  have 


mrHAPPINESS  FROM  PHYSICAL  CONDITION.  877 

become,  by  the  dispensation  of  God,  unable  to  help 
themselves,  and  it  is  both  our  duty  and  our  privilege 
to  help  them. 

3.  Sickness.  Here  the  ability  to  provide  for  ourselves 
is  taken  away,  and  the  necessity  of  additional  provision 
is  created.  In  such  cases,  the  rich  stand  frequently  in 
need  of  our  aid,  our  sympathy,  and  our  services.  If 
this  be  the  case  with  them,  how  much  more  must  it  be 
with  the  poor,  from  whom  the  affliction  which  produces 
suffering  takes  away  the  power  of  providing  the  means 
necessary  for  alleviating  it !  It  is  here  that  the  benev- 
olence of  the  gospel  is  peculiarly  displayed.  Our  Sa- 
viour declares,  "  Inasmuch  as  ye  have  done  it  unto  one 
of  the  least  of  these,  ye  have  done  it  unto  me."  Bishop 
Wilson,  on  this  passage,  has  the  following  beautiful  re- 
mark :  "  '  Inasmuch '  (^as  often)  ;  who  then  would  miss 
any  occasion  ?  '  The  least ; '  who  then  would  despise 
any  object  ?  '  To  me  ; '  so  that  in  serving  the  poor  we 
serve  Jesus  Christ.''^ 

4.  Age  also  frequently  brings  with  it  decrepitude  of 
body,  if  not  imbecility  of  mind.  This  state  calls  for  our 
sympathy  and  assistance,  and  all  that  care  and  attention 
which  the  aged  so  much  need,  and  which  it  is  so  suit- 
able for  the  young  and  vigorous  to  bestow. 

The  above  are,  I  believe,  the  principal  occasions  for 
the  exercise  of  benevolence  towards  man's  physical 
sufferings.  We  proceed  to  consider  the  principles  by 
which  our  benevolence  should  be  regulated.  These 
have  respect  both  to  the  recipient  and  to  the  bene- 
factor. 

I.  Principles  which  relate  to  the  recipient 

It  is  a  law  of  our  constitution,  that  every  benefit 
which  God  confers  upon  us  is  the  result  of  labor,  and 
generally  of  labor  in  advance  ;  that  is,  a  man  pays  for 
what  he  receives,  not  after  he  has  received  it,  but  be- 
fore. This  rule  is  universal,  and  applies  to  physical, 
intellectual,  and  moral  benefits,  as  wiU  be  easily  seen 
upon  reflection. 

Now,  so  universal  a  rule  could  not  have  been  estab- 
lished without  both  a  good  and  a  universal  reason ;  and 
32* 


878  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

hence  we  find  by  experience  that  labor,  even  physical 
labor,  is  necessary  to  the  healthful  condition  of  man,  as 
a  physical,  an  intellectual,  and  a  moral  being.  And 
bonce  it  is  evident  that  the  rule  is  just  as  applicable  to 
the  poor  as  to  the  rich.  Or,  to  state  the  subject  in 
anollier  form :  Labor  is  either  a  benefit  or  a  curse.  If 
it  be  a  curse,  there  can  bo  no  reason  why  every  class  of 
men  should  not  bear  that  portion  of  the  infliction  which 
God  assigns  to  it.  If  it  be  a  benefit,  there  can  be  no 
reason  why  every  man  should  not  enjoy  his  portion  of 
the  blessing. 

And  hence  it  will  follow  that  our  benevolence  should 
cooperate  with  this  general  law  of  our  constitution. 

1.  Those  who  are  poor,  but  yet  able  to  snpport  them- 
selves, should  be  enabled  to  do  so  by  means  of  labor, 
and  on  no  other  condition.  If  they  are  too  indolent  to 
do  this,  they  should  suffer  the  consequences. 

2.  Those  who  are  unable  to  support  themselves  wholly 
should  bo  assisted  only  in  so  far  as  they  are  thus  un- 
able. Because  a  man  cannot  do  enoyg;h  to  support 
himself,  there  is  no  reason  why  he  should  do  nothing. 

3.  Those  who  are  unable  to  do  anything,  should 
have  everything  done  for  them  which  their  condition  re- 
quires. Such  are  infants,  the  sick,  the  disabled,  and 
the  aged. 

Benevolence  is  intended  to  have  a  mora^  effect  upon 
the  recipient,  by  cultivating  kindness,  gratitude,  and 
universal  benevolence  among  all  the  different  classes  of 
men.  That  mode  of  charity  is  therefore  most  beneficial 
to  its  object,  which  tends  in  the  highest  degree  to  cul- 
tivate the  kinder  and  better  feelings  of  his  nature. 
Hence  it  is  far  better  for  the  needy,  to  administer  to 
tlicm  alms,  ourselves,  than  to  employ  others  to  do  it  for 
us.  The  gratitude  of  the  recipient  is  but  feebly  exer 
cised  by  the  mere  fact  of  the  relief  of  his  necessities, 
unless  he  also  have  the  opportunity  of  witnessing  the 
temper  and  spirit  from  winch  the  charity  proceeds. 
II.  Principles  which  relate  to  the  benefactor. 
The  Christian  religion  considers  charity  as  a  means 
of  moral  cultivation,  specially  to  the  benefactor.    It  ia 


UNHAPPINESS  FROM  PmSICAL  CONDITION.  379 

ill  tliG  New  Testament  classed  with  prayer,  and  is  gov- 
erned essentially  by  the  same  rules.  This  may  be  seen 
from  our  Saviour's  Sermon  on  the  Mount. 

Hence,  1.  That  method  of  charity  is  always  the  best 
which  calls  into  most  active  exercise  the  virtues  of  self- 
denial  and  personal  sacrifice,  as  they  naturally  arise 
from  kindness,  sympathy,  and  charity,  or  universal  love 
to  God  and  man.  And  on  the  contrary,  all  those  modes 
of  benevolence  must  be  essentially  defective,  in  which 
the  distresses  of  others  are  relieved  without  the  neces- 
sary exercise  of  these  virtues. 

2.  As  charity  is  a  religious  service,  and  an  important 
means  of  cultivating  love  to  God,  and  as  it  does  this  in 
proportion  as  all  external  and  inferior  motives  are  with- 
drawn, it  is  desirable  also  that,  in  so  far  as  possible,  it 
be  done  secretly.  The  doing  of  it  in  this  manner  re- 
moves the  motives  derived  from  the  love  of  applause, 
and  leaves  us  simply  those  motives  which  are  derived 
from  love  to  God.  Those  modes  of  benevolence  wlvich 
are  in  their  nature  the  furthest  removed  from  lunaan 
observation,  are,  cceteris  paribus,  the  most  favorable  to 
the  cultivation  of  virtue,  and  are  therefore  always  to  be 
preferred. 

Hence,  in  general,  those  modes  of  charity  are  to  be 
preferred  which  most  successfully  teach  the  objec^  to 
relieve  himself,  and  which  tend  most  directly  to  the 
moral  benefit  of  both  parties.  And,  on  the  contrary, 
those  modes  of  charity  are  the  worst  which  are  tlie 
furthest  removed  from  such  tendencies. 

These  principles  may  easily  be  applied  to  some  of  the 
OT  dinary  forms  of  benevolence. 

I.  Public  provision  for  the  poor  bj/ poor  laws  Infill  be 
found  defective  in  every  respect. 

1.  It  makes  a  provision  for  the  poor  because  he 
is  poor.  This,  as  I  have  said,  gives  no  claim  wpoii 
charity. 

2.  It  in  no  manner  teaches  the  man  to  help  himself ; 
but,  on  the  contrary,  tends  to  take  from  him  the  natural 
Btimulus  for  doing  so. 

3.  Hence   its  tendency  is  to  multiply  paupers,  va- 


380  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

grants,  and  idlers.  Such  have  been  its  effects  to  an 
appalling  degree  in  Great  Britain,  and  such,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case,  must  they  be  everywhere.  It  is 
taking  from  the  industrious  a  portion  of  their  earn- 
mgs,  and  conferring  them,  without  equivalent,  upon  the 
idle. 

4.  It  produces  no  feeling  of  gratitude  towards  the 
benefactor,  but  the  contrary.  In  those  countries  where 
poor-rates  are  the  highest,  the  poor  will  be  found  the 
most  discontented  and  lawless,  and  the  most  inveterate 
against  the  rich. 

5.  It  produces  no  moral  intercourse  between  the 
parties  concerned,  but  leaves  the  distribution  of  bounty 
to  the  hand  of  an  official  agent.  Hence,  what  is  re- 
ceived is  claimed  by  the  poor  as  a  matter  of  rig-ht,  and 
the  only  feeling  elicited  is  that  of  displeasure  because 
it  is  so  little. 

6.  It  produces  no  feeling  of  sympathy  or  of  compas- 
sion in  the  rich  ;  but,  being  extorted  by  force  of  law,  is 
viewed  as  a  mere  matter  of  compulsion. 

Hence  every  principle  would  decide  against  poor- 
laws  as  a  means  of  charity.  If,  however,  the  society 
undertake  to  control  the  capital  of  the  individual,  and 
manage  it  as  they  will,  and  by  this  management  make 
paupers  by  thousands,  I  do  think  they  are  under  qJjU' 
gation  to  support  them.  But  if  they  insist  upon  pur- 
suing this  course,  it  would  be  better  that  every  poor- 
house  should  be  a  workhouse,  and  that  the  poor-rates 
should  always  be  given  as  the  wages  of  some  form  of 
labor. 

I  would  not,  however,  be  understood  to  decide  against 
all  public  provision  for  the  necessitous.  The  aged  and 
iniirm,  the  sick,  the  disabled,  and  the  orphan,  in  the 
failure  of  their  relatives,  should  be  relieved,  and  re- 
lieved cheerfully  and  bountifully,  by  the  public.  I  only 
speak  of  provision  for  the  poor^  because  they  are  poor^ 
and  do  not  refer  to  provision  made  for  other  reasons. 
Where  the  circumstances  of  the  recipient  render  'lim 
atn  object  of  charity,  let  him  be  relieved  freely  md 


UNHAPPINESS  FBOM  PHYSICAL  CONDITION.  381 

tenderly.  But,  if  he  be  not  an  object  of  charity^  to 
maKe  public  provision  for  him  is  injurious. 

II.    Voluntary  associations  for  purposes  of  charity. 

Some  of  the  inconveniences  arising  from  poor-laws 
are  liable  to  ensue  from  the  mode  of  conducting  these 
institutions. 

1.  They  do  not  make  the  strongest  appeal  to  the 
moral  feelings  of  the  recipient.  Gratitude  is  mud 
diminished  when  we  are  benefited  by  a  public  charity 
instead  of  a  private  benefactor. 

2.  This  is  specially  the  case  when  a  charity  is  funded, 
and  the  almoner  is  merely  the  official  organ  of  a  dis- 
tribution, in  which  he  can  have  but  a  comparatively 
trifling  personal  interest. 

3.  The  moral  effect. upon  the  giver  is  much  less  than 
it  would  be  if  he  and  the  recipient  were  brought  im- 
mediately into  contact.  Paying  an  annual  subscription 
to  a  charity  has  a  very  different  effjct  from  visiting 
and  relieving,  with  our  own  hands,  the  necessities  and 
distresses  of  the  sick  and  the  afflicted. 

1  by  no  means,  however,  say  that  such  associations 
are  not  exceedingly  valuable.  Many  kinds  of  charity 
cannot  well  be  carried  on  without  them.  The  compar- 
atively poor  are  thus  enabled  to  unite  in  extensive  and 
important  works  of  benevolence.  In  many  cases,  the 
expenditure  of  capital  necessary  for  conductijig  a  be- 
nevolent enterprise  requires  a  general  effort.  I  how- 
ever say,  that  tlie  rich,  who  are  able  to  labor  personally 
in  the  cause  of  charity,  should  never  leave  the  most 
desirable  part  of  the  work  to  be  done  by  others.  They 
should  be  their  own  almoners.  If  they  will  not  do 
this,  why  then  lot  them  furnish  funds  to  be  distributed 
by  others  ;  but  let  them  remember  that  they  are  losing 
by  far  the  most  valuable,  that  is,  they  are  losing  the 
moral  benefit  whicli  God  intended  them  to  enjoy.  God 
meant  every  man  to  be  charital)le,  as  much  as  to  be 
prayerful ;  and  he  never  intended  tliat  the  one  duty, 
any  more  than  the  other,  shouhl  be  done  by  a  deputy. 
Tlic  same  principles  would  lead  us  to  conclude,  what, 
I  believe,  experience  has  alwitys  shovvu  to  be  the  fact. 


882  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

that  a  fund  for  the  support  of  the  poor  of  a  town  has 
always  proved  a  nuisance  instead  of  a  benefit.  And, 
in  general,  as  charity  is  intended  to  be  a  means  of 
moral  improvement  to  both  parties,  and  specially  to  tho 
benefactor,  those  modes  of  charity  which  do  not  havo 
hi  view  the  cultivation  of  moral  excellence,  are  in  this 
-espect  essentially  defective. 


SECTION  II. 

OF  UNHAPPINESS  FROM  INTELLECTUAL  CONDITION. 

To  an  intellectual  being,  in  a  cultivated  state  of  so- 
ciety, a  certain  amount  of  knowledge  may  be  considered 
a  necessary  of  life.  If  he  do  not  possess  it,  he  is  shut 
out  from  a  vast  source  of  enjoyment ;  is  liable  to  be- 
come the  dupe  of  the  designing,  and  to  sink  down  into 
mere  animal  existence.  By  learning  how  to  read,  he  is 
enabled  to  acquire  the  whole  knowledge  which  is  con- 
tained within  a  language.  By  writing,  he  can  act 
where  he  cannot  be  personally  present,  and  can  also 
benefit  others  by  the  communication  of  his  own 
thoughts.  By  a  knowledge  of  accounts,  he  is  enabled 
to  be  just  in  his  dealings  with  others,  and  to  be  assured 
that  others  are  just  in  their  dealings  with  him. 

So  much  as  this  may  be  considered  necessary  ;  tho 
rest  is  not  so.  The  duty  of  thus  educating  a  child  be- 
longs, in  the  first  instance,  to  the  parent.  But  since, 
as  so  much  knowledge  as  this  is  indispensable  to  the 
cliild's  happiness,  if  the  parent  be  unable  to  furnish  it, 
the  child  becomes,  in  so  far,  an  object  of  charily.  And 
as  it  is  for  the  benefit  of  the  whole  society  that  every 
individual  should  bo  thus  far  instructed,  it  is  properly, 
also,  a  subject  of  social  regulation.  And  hence  pro- 
vision should  bo  made,  at  public  expense,  for  the  edu- 
cation of  those  who  arc  unable  to  procure  it. 


timAPPINESS  FROM  INTELLECTUAL  CONDITION.     383 

Nevertheless,  this  education  is  a  valuable  consideration 
to  the  receiver  ;  and  hence  our  former  principle  ought 
not  to  be  departed  from.  Although  the  provision  for 
this  degree  of  education  be  properly  made  a  matter  of 
public  enactment,  yet  every  one  should  contribute  to  it, 
in  so  far  as  he  is  able.  Unless  this  be  done,  he  will 
cease  to  value  it,  and  it  will  be  merely  a  premium  on 
idleness.  And  hence  I  think  it  will  be  found  that 
large  permanent  funds  for  the  purpose  of  general 
education  are  commonly  injurious  to  tlie  cause  of  edu- 
cation itself.  A  small  fund,  annually  appropriated, 
may  be  useful  to  stimulate  an  unlettered  people  to 
exertion  ;  but  it  is,  probably,  useful  for  no  other  pur- 
pose. A  better  plan,  perhaps,  would  be  to  oblige  each 
district  to  support  schools  at  its  own  expense.  This 
would  produce  the  greatest  possible  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject, and  the  most  thorough  supervision  of  the  schools. 
It  is  generally  believed  that  the  large  school  funds  of 
some  of  our  older  states  have  been  injurious  to  the 
cause  of  common  education. 

In  •  so  far,  then,  as  education  is  necessary  to  enable 
us  to  accomplish  the  purposes  of  our  existence,  and  to 
perform  our  duties  to  society,  the  obligation  to  make  a 
provision  for  the  universal  enjoyment  of  it  comes 
within  the  law  of  benevolence.  Beyond  this  it  may 
very  properly  be  left  to  the  arrangements  of  Diviiio 
Providence  ;  that  is,  every  one  may  be  left  to  acquire 
as  much  more  as  his  circumstances  will  allow.  There 
is  no  more  reason  why  all  men  should  be  educated 
alike,  than  why  they  should  all  dress  alike,  or  live  in 
equally  expensive  houses.  As  civilization  advances, 
and  capital  accumulates,  and  labor  becomes  more  pro- 
ductive, it  will  become  possible  for  every  man  to  acquire 
more  and  more  intellectual  cultivation.  In  this  man- 
ner the  condition  of  all  classes  is  to  be  improved, 
and  not  by  the  impracticable  attempt  to  render  the 
education  of  all  classes,  at  any  one  time,  alike. 

While  I  say  this,  however,  I  by  no  means  assert  that 
it  is  not  a  laudable  and  excellent  charity  to  assist  in 
the  acquisition   of  knowledge   any  person  who   givea 


884  PHACTICAL  ETHICS. 

promise  of  peculiar  usefulness.  Benevolence  is  fre- 
quently  exerted  under  such  circumstances  with  the 
greatest  possible  benefit,  and  produces  the  most  grati- 
fying and  the  most  abundant  results.  There  can  surely 
be  no  more  delightful  mode  of  charity  than  that  which 
raises  from  the  dust  modest  and  despairing  talent,  and 
enables  it  to  bless  and  adorn  society.  Yet,  on  such  a 
subject  as  this,  it  is  manifest  that  no  general  rule  can 
be  given.  The  duty  must  be  determined  by  the  re- 
spective condition  of  the  parties.  It  is,  however,  proper 
to  add,  that  aid  of  this  kind  should  be  given  with  dis- 
cretion, and  never  in  such  a  manner  as  to  remove 
from  genius  the  necessity  of  depending  on  itself.  The 
early  struggle  for  independence  is  a  natural  and  a 
salutary  discipline  for  talent.  Genius  was  given,  not  for 
the  benefit  of  its  possessor,  but  for  the  benefit  of  others ; 
and  the  sooner  its  possessor  is  taught  the  necessity  of 
exerting  it  to  a  practical  purpose,  the  better  is  it  for  him, 
and  the  better  for  society.  The  poets  tell  us  much  of 
the  amount  of  genius  which  has  been  nipped  in  the 
bud  by  the  frosts  of  adversity.  This,  doubtless,  is 
true  ;  but  let  it  not  be  forgotten  tl:at,  by  the  law  of 
our  nature,  early  promise  is  frequently  delusive.  The 
poets  do  not  tell  us  how  great  an  amount  of  genius  is 
also  withered  by  the  sun  of  prosperity.  It  is  probable 
that  a  greater  proportion  of  talent  is  destroyed,  or  ren- 
dered valueless,  by  riches  than  by  poverty;* and  the 
rapid  mutations  of  society,  I  thhik,  demonstrate  this 
to  be  the  fact. 

The  same  principles  will,  in  substance,  apply  to  the 
case  in  which,  for  a  particular  object,  as  for  the  pro- 
motion of  religion,  it  is  deemed  expedient  to  increase 
the  proportion  of  professionally  educated  men. 

In  this,  as  in  every  other  instance,  if  we  would  be 
truly  useful,  our  charities  must  be  governed  by  the 
principles  which  God  has  marked  out  in  the  con-stitu- 
tion  of  man. 

The  general  principle  of  God's  government  is,  that 
for  all  valuable  possessions  we  must  render  a  consider- 
ation ;  and  experience  has  taught  that  it  is  impossible 


UNHAPPINESS  FROM  INTELLECTUAL  CONDITION.     385 

to  vary  from  this  rule  without  the  liability  of  doing 
viijury  to  the  recipient.  The  reason  is  obvious  ;  for  wo 
5an  scarcely,  in  any  other  manner,  injure  another  so 
seriously,  as  by  leading  him  to  rely  on  any  one  else 
than  himself,  or  to  feel  that  the  public  are  under  obli- 
gations to  take  charge  of  him. 

Hence  charity  of  this  sort  should  be  governed  by 
the  following  principles : 

1.  The  recipient  should  receive  no  more  than  is  ne- 
cessary, with  his  own  industrious  exertions,  to  accom- 
plish the  object. 

2.  To  loan  money  is  better  than  to  give  it. 

3.  It  should  be  distributed  in  such  manner  as  most 
successfully  to  cultivate  the  good  dispositions  of  both 
parties. 

Hence  private  and  personal  assistance,  when  practi- 
cable, has  many  advantages  over  that  derived  from 
associations.  And  hence  such  supervision  is  always 
desirable  as  will  restrict  the  charity  to  that  class  of 
persons  for  whom  it  was  designed,  and  as  will  render  it 
of  such  a  nature  that  those  of  every  other  class  would 
be  under  the  least  possible  temptation  to  desire  it. 

And,  in  arranging  the  plan  of  such  an  association,  it 
should  always  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  sudden  change 
in  all  the  prospects  of  a  young  man's  life  which  is  made 
by  setting  before  him  the  prospect  of  a  professional 
education,  is  one  of  the  severest  trials  of  human  virtue. 

Public  provision  for  scientific  education  does  not 
come  under  the  head  of  benevolence.  Inasmuch,  how- 
ever, as  the  cultivation  of  science  is  advantageous  to  all 
classes  of  a  community,  it  is  for  the  interest  of  the 
whole  that  it  be  cultivated.  But  the  means  of  scien- 
tific education,  as  philosophical  instruments,  libraries, 
and  buildings,  could  never  be  furnished  by  instructors 
without  rendering  this  kind  of  education  so  expensive 
as  to  restrict  it  entirely  to  the  rich.  It  is,  therefore, 
wise  for  a  commimity  to  make  these  provisions  out  of 
the  common  stock,  so  that  a  fair  opportunity  of  improve- 
ment may  be  open  to  all.  When,  however,  the  public 
fails  to  discharge  this  duty,  it  is  frequently,  with  great 
33 


886  PBACTICAL  ETHICS. 

patriotism  and  benevolence,  assumed  by  individuals.  I 
know  of  no  more  interesting  instances  of  expansive 
benevolence  than  those  in  which  wealth  is  appropriated 
to  the  noble  purpose  of  diffusing  over  all  coming  time 
"  the  light  of  science  and  the   blessings  of  religion." 


CHAPTER  III. 

BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  WICKED. 

Y^f^:>w  come  to  treat  of  a  form  of  benevolence  in 
which  f«tiier  elements  are  combined.  What  is  our  duty 
to  our  fellow-men  who  are  wicked  f 

A  wicked  man  is,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  un- 
happy. He  is  depriving  himself  of  all  the  pleasures  of 
virtue ;  he  is  giving  strength  to  those  passions  which, 
by  their  ungovernable  power,  are  already  tormenting 
him  with  insatiable  and  ungratified  desire  ;  he  is  incur- 
ring the  pains  of  a  guilty  conscience  here  ;  and  he  is,  in 
the  expressive  language  of  the  Scriptures,  "  treasuring 
up  wrath  against  the  day  of  wrath  and  of  righteous 
indignation."  It  is  manifest,  tlien,  that  no  one  has 
stronger  claims  upon  our  pity  than  such  a  fellow-crea- 
ture as  this. 

So  far,  then,  as  a  wicked  man  is  miserable  or  unhappy, 
he  is  entitled  to  our  pity,  and,  of  course,  to  our  love 
and  benevolence.  But  this  is  not  all.  He  is  also  wicked ; 
and  the  proper  feeling  with  which  we  should  contem- 
plate wickedness  is  that  of  disgust,  or  moral  indigna^ 
tion.  Hence  a  complex  feeling  in  such  a  case  naturally 
arises  —  that  of  benevolence  because  he  is  unhappy, 
and  that  of  moral  indignation  because  he  is  sinful. 
These  two  sentiments,  however,  in  no  manner  conflict 
with,  but,  on  the  contrary,  if  properly  understood^ 
strengthen  each  other. 

Tlie  fact  of  a  fellow-creature's  wickedness  affects  not 
our  obligation  to  treat  him  with  the  same  benevolence 
as  would  be  demanded  in  any  other  case.  If  he  is 
necessitous,  or  sick,  or  afflicted,  or  ignorant,  our  duty 


888  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

to  relieve  and  sympathize  with,  and  assist,  ani  tcAcfi 
him,  is  the  same  as  though  he  were  virtuous.  God 
Bends  his  rain  on  the  evil  and  on  the  good. 

But  especially,  as  the  most  alarming  source  of  his 
misery  is  his  moral  character,  the  more  we  detest  his 
wickedness,  the  more  strongly  would  benevolence  urge 
us  to  make  every  effort  in  our  power  to  reclaim  him. 
This,  surely,  is  the  highest  exercise  of  charity  ;  for  vir- 
tue is  the  true  solace  against  all  the  evils  incident  to 
the  present  life,  and  it  is  only  by  being  virtuous  that  wo 
can  hope  for  eternal  felicity. 

We  are  bound,  then,  by  the  law  of  benevolence  to 
labor  to  reclaim  the  wicked  — 

1.  By  example,  by  personal  kindness,  by  conversation, 
and  by  instructing  them  in  the  path  of  duty,  and  per- 
suading them  to  follow  it. 

2.  As  the  most  efficacious  mode  of  promoting  moral 
reformation  yet  discovered  is  found  to  be  the  inculca- 
tion of  the  truths  of  the  holy  Scriptures,  it  is  our  im- 
perative duty  to  bring  these  truths  into  contact  with  tha 
consciences  of  men.  This  duty  is  by  our  Saviour 
imposed  upon  all  his  disciples :  "Go  ye  into  all  the 
world,  and  preach  the  gospel  to  every  creature?'* 

3.  As  all  men  are  our  brethren,  and  as  all  men 
equally  need  moral  light,  and  as  experience  has  abun- 
dantly shown  that  all  men  will  be  both  wicked  and  un- 
happy without  it,  this  duty  is  binding  upon  every  man 
towards  the  whole  human  race.  The  sentiments  of  Dr. 
Johnson  on  this  subject,  in  his  letter  on  the  translation 
of  the  Scriptures  into  the  Gaelic  language,  are  so  appo- 
site to  my  purpose,  that  I  beg  leave  to  introduce  them 
here,  though  they  have  been  so  frequently  published. 
"  If  obedience  to  the  will  of  God  be  necessary  to  hap- 
piness, and  knowledge  of  his  will  necessary  to  obedi- 
ence, I  know  not  how  he  that  withholds  this  knowledge, 
or  delays  it,  can  be  said  to  love  his  neighbor  as  himself. 
He  that  voluntarily  continues  in  ignorance,  is  guilty  of 
all  the  crimes  which  that  ignorance  produces ;  as  to 
him  that  should  extinguish  the  tapers  of  a  lighthouse 
might  be  justly  imputed  the  calamities  of  shipwrecks. 


BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  WICKED.  389 

Christianity  is  the  highest  perfection  of  humanity ;  and 
as  no  man  is  good  but  as  he  wishes  the  good  of  others, 
no  man  can  be  good  in  the  highest  degree  who  wishes 
not  to  others  the  largest  measures  of  the  greatest  good." 
—  Life,  Anno  1766. 

We  see,  then,  that  in  so  far  as  wicked  men  are  by 
their  wickedness  miserable,  benevolence  renders  it  our 
duty  to  reclaim  them.  And  to  such  benevolence  the 
highest  rewards  are  promised.  "  They  that  turn  many 
to  righteousness,  shall  shine  as  the  stars  for  ever  and 
ever."  But  this  is  not  all.  If  we  love  our  Father  in 
heaven,  it  must  pam  us  to  see  his  children  violating  his 
just  and  holy  laws,  abusing  his  goodness,  rendering  not 
only  themselves  but  also  his  other  children  miserable, 
and  exposing  themselves  and  others  to  his  eternal 
displeasure.  The  love  of  God  would  prompt  us  to 
check  these  evils,  and  to  teach  our  brethren  to  serve 
and  love  and  reverence  our  common  Father,  and  to 
become  his  obedient  children,  both  now  and  forever. 
.  Nor  is  either  of  these  sentiments  inconsistent  with 
the  greatest  moral  aversion  to  the  crime.  The  more 
hateful  to  us  is  the  conduct  of  those  whom  we  love,  the 
more  zealous  will  be  our  endeavors  to  bring  them  back 
to  virtue.  And  surely  the  more  we  are  sensible  of  the 
evil  of  sin  against  God,  the  more  desirous  must  we  be 
to  teach  his  creatures  to  love  and  obey  him. 

The  perfect  exemplification  of  both  of  these  senti- 
ments is  found  in  the  character  of  our  Lord  and  Saviour 
Jesus  Christ.  While  in  all  his  conduct  and  teachings 
we  observe  the  most  intense  abhorrence  of  every  form 
of  moral  evil,  yet  we  always  find  it  combined  with  a 
love  for  the  happiness,  both  temporal  and  spiritual,  of 
man,  which  in  all  its  bearings  transcends  the  limits  of 
finite  comprehension.  This  is  the  example  which  God 
has  held  forth  for  our  imitation.  It  would  be  easy  to 
show  that  the  improvement  of  the  moral  character  of 
our  fellow  men  is  also  the  surest  method  of  promoting 
tlieir  physical,  intellectual,  and  social  happhiess. 
33* 


CHAPTER  IV. 

BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  INJURIOUS. 

The  teaching  of  the  gospel  in  this  case  is  explicit, 
Our  Saviour  has  taught  us  that  it  is  our  duty  to  return 
good  for  evil.  "  If  thine  enemy  hunger,  feed  him ;  and 
if  he  thirst,  give  him  drink."  We  are  to  love  our  en- 
emies, to  bless  those  that  curse  us,  and  pray  for  those 
that  despitefuUy  use  us  and  persecute  us.  The  gospel 
commands  us  to  love  all  men.  If  they  violate  this  com- 
mand, it  furnishes  us  with  no  reason  for  following  their 
example.  And  stiU  more,  their  ill  conduct  furnishes 
us  with  an  opportunity  for  the  exercise  of  special  and 
peculiar  virtue.  It  is  made  our  duty  to  overcome  the 
wrong  disposition  of  the  evil-doer  by  manifesting  towards 
him  particular  kindness  and  good-will.  It  is  our  duty 
to  overcome  evil  with  good ;  that  is,  by  the  exhibition 
of  sincere  good-will  to  reclaim  the  injurious  person  to 
virtue.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  is  the  teach- 
ing of  the  New  Testament.  It  is,  moreover,  evident  that 
such  a  course  is  indicated  by  the  conditions  of  our 
being.  This  is  evident  from  the  slighteet  considera- 
tion. 

The  conscience  of  every  man  bears  witness,  that  to 
overcome  evil  with  unchanged  kindness  is  an  act  of  the 
most  exalted  virtue  ;  while  retaliation  is  ever  an  unfail- 
ing indication  of  meanness  of  spirit.  We  cannot  hope 
for  the  forgiveness  of  God,  unless  from  the  heart  we 
forgive  all  wlio  have  injured  us. 

Again :  this  method  of  treating  an  injurious  person 
has  a  manifest  tendency  to  put  an  end  to  every  form  of 

m-wiiL 


BENEVOLENCE  TC    THE  INJURIOUS.  891 

For,  1.  No  man  can  long  continue  in  a  cour&o  of  in- 
jurious conduct,  when  he  receives  in  return  nothing 
but  kindness. 

2.  By  such  conduct  the  heart  of  the  offender  is  im- 
proved, and  there  is  less  probability  that  he  will  repeat 
the  injury. 

3.  It  also  improves  the  heart  of  the  offended  person, 
and  thus  renders  it  less  likely  that  he  will  ever  commit 
an  injury  himself. 

On  the  contrary,  the  tendency  of  retaliation  is  exactly 
the  reverse.  It  tends  to  increase  and  foster  and  mul- 
tiply wrongs  absolutely  without  end.  It  renders  neither 
party  better,  but  always  renders  both  parties  worse. 
The  offending  party  is  aroused  to  revenge,  and  the 
offended  party  who  retaliates  is  so  much  the  worse,  as 
he  has  done  a  mean  action  when  he  might  have  done  a 
noble  one. 

We  thus  learn  the  temper  which  we  should  cultivate 
towards  those  who  injure  us,  and  the  conduct  which 
should  flow  from  sucli  a  temper. 

It,  however,  frequently  happens  that  the  injury  may 
be  of  such  a  nature  that  the  peace  of  society  demands 
its  suppression.  Society  was  established  for  the  very 
purpose  of  protecting  rights  and  redressing  wrongs. 
We  may  therefore,  without  any  feeling  of  vindictiveness, 
deliver  such  an  offender  to  the  judgment  of  society. 
It  is  our  duty  to  do  this  without  the  least  feeling 
of  vindictiveness  or  malice.  Thus  the  Apostle  Paul 
appealed  to  his  rights  as  a  Roman  citizen  for  protec- 
tion. 

But  when  the  case  of  injustice  or  violation  of  right 
is  in  the  hands  of  society,  the  same  principles  should 
govern  its  action  as  in  the  case  of  the  individual.  The 
crime  should  be  prevented,  and  the  criminal  should,  if 
possible,  be  reclaimed.  Those  means  should  be  adopted 
which  will  most  directly  tend  to  eradicate  wrong  habits, 
to  cultivate  and  strengthen  moral  principles,  to  form 
habits  of  industry,  and  eventually  restore  the  criminal 
to  society  a  wiser,  a  better,  and  a  useful  man.  The 
whole  experience  of  John  Howard  is  summed  up  by 


392  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

him  in  the  simple  sentence,  "  It  is  in  vain  to  punish  ttio 
wicked,  unless  you  seek  to  reclaim  them." 

Secondhj.  If  injury  be  done  by  one  society  to  another, 
what  is  to  be  done  ? 

Here  there  is  no  party  to  which  we  naturally  appeal. 
Both  parties  are  supreme.  The  common  resort  of  na- 
tions, in  case  of  injury,  is  war ;  that  is,  they  declare  their 
purpose  to  do  each  other  the  greatest  injury,  by  every 
means  in  their  power.  Hundreds  of  thousands  of  men 
are  brought  face  to  face  for  the  express  purpose  of 
slaughtering  each  other,  and  of  destroying  the  property 
of  each  other,  which  has  been  the  accumulation  of  the 
labor  of  ages,  and  wherever  this  property  is  found, 
whether  on  land  or  at  sea.  This  work  of  mutual  de- 
struction proceeds,  giving  unlimited  indulgence  to  every 
evil  passion,  until  one  of  the  parties  can  endure  it  no 
longer ;  and  then  peace  is  restored  by  the  weaker  yield- 
ing to  the  stronger  the  matter  in  dispute.  In  such 
contests  the  loss  of  life  in  battle  and  by  disease  is  fright- 
ful ;  the  murder  of  innocent  and  unoffending  men,  wo- 
men, and  children  is  shocking  to  contemplate.  And  the 
demoralization  of  those  engaged  in  actual  warfare  is 
such  as  we  might  expect  from  men  associated  for  the 
very  purpose  of  destruction,  and  from  whom  all  ordi- 
nary restraints  have  been  removed,  and  by  whom  all 
evil  passions  of  the  human  heart  may  be  exerted  with- 
out control. 

Strange  as  it  may  seem,  yet  even  Christian  nations 
seem  to  resort  to  this  as  the  only  method  of  dealing 
with  a  nation  which  they  believe  to  have  offered  to  them 
an  injury.  Yet  I  think  no  one  can  for  a  moment  sup- 
pose that  this  work  of  universal  destruction  is  in  har- 
mony with  the  precepts  of  the  Prince  of  Peace.  Can 
any  other  method  be  devised  ? 

On  this  subject  we  beg  leave  to  offer  a  few  sugges- 
tions. 

First,  It  is  the  duty  of  every  society  to  present  an 
example  of  strict  justice  in  all  its  dealings  with  every 
other  society ;  to  refrain  in  all  cases  from  injury ;  and 
when,  from  any  cause,  it  has  committed  an  injury,  to 
make  at  once  all  needful  reparation. 


BENEVOLENCE  TO  THE  INJURIOUS.  S93 

Secondly.  It  is  the  duty  of  every  nation  to  manifest 
kindness  and  charity  to  every  other  nation ;  to  relieve 
them  when  suffering  from  famine,  or  by  any  otlier 
afflictive  dispensation  of  Divine  Providence ;  to  abstain 
from  every  form  of  aggression  ;  and  to  desire  the  happi- 
ness of  the  whole  human  race,  as  we  desire  our  own. 

Thirdly.  A  nation  acting  upon  these  principles 
would  rarely  suffer  injury  from  its  neighbors.  But 
suppose  injury  to  be  offered.  Suppose  any  nation  to  act 
at  variance  with  the  principles  of  national  law,  and 
injure  or  rob  any  of  our  citizens.  Are  we  not  bound  to 
use  the  whole  power  of  the  nation  for  the  protection 
and  redress  of  every  member  of  the  body  politic  ? 

I  think  we  are.  But  this  does  not  involve  the  neces- 
sity of  war.  'It  would  be  far  better  for  us  at  once  to  as- 
sume the  charge  of  remuneration  for  the  injury  inflicted, 
and  present  our  claim  to  the  offending  nation.  When 
the  violence  of  passion  has  subsided,  a  calm  appeal  to  tho 
principles  of  right,  in  the  view  of  all  the  nations  of  the 
earth,  will  commonly  have  a  greater  and  better  effect 
than  can  be  obtained  by  war. 

But  suppose  these  means  to  fail :  what  then  is  to  bo 
done  ?  Suppose  a  nation  to  hold  itself  amenable  nei- 
ther to  the  principles  of  national  law  or  individual  right. 
What  course  should  we  pursue  when  a  case  of  the  same 
kind  occurs  between  individuals  ?  When  a  man  by  his 
conduct  renders  it  evident  that  he  is  governed  by  no 
principle  of  right,  though  we  should  cheerfully  relievo 
him  in  distress,  yet  we  should  withdraw  from  all  ordinary 
intercourse  with  him ;  we  should,  as  far  as  possible,  put  it 
out  of  his  power  to  do  us  an  injury  again.  It  seems  to 
me  that  the  same  course  might  with  advantage  be  pur- 
sued by  a  nation.  If  another  nation,  in  its  treatment 
of  our  citizens,  held  itself  at  liberty  to  act  in  defiance 
of  all  the  rules  of  right,  we  might  well  refuse  to  have 
with  it  any  intercourse.  If  this  mode  of  treatment  were 
universally  adopted,  the  offending  nation  would  suffer 
all  the  evils  of  entire  isolation,  and  would  soon  see  the 
importance  of  retracing  its  steps,  and  yielding  obedi* 
ence  to  the  principles  of  universal  law. 


394  PRACTICAL  ETHICS. 

But  suppose  an  extreme  case.  If  a  nation,  in  defiance 
of  right,  from  love  of  conquest,  or  desire  of  territory, 
or  any  other  wicked  motive,  should  resolve  on  the  sub- 
jugation of  its  unoffending  neighbor,  with  the  intention 
of  overthrowing  a  just  government,  and  establishing  in 
its  place  the  power  of  brute  force  :  what  then  is  to  be 
done  ?  The  offending  nation,  abjuring  all  moral  princi- 
ples, lays  aside  its  character  as  men,  and,  like  inferior 
animals,  appeals  solely  to  physical  force.  As  such,  I 
think,  they  must  be  treated ;  and  force  must  be  repelled 
by  force,  just  so  far  as  it  is  necessary  to  resist  their  evil 
design.  In  this  the  whole  people  may  unite,  and  strive 
to  the  utmost  to  transmit  unharmed  to  their  children 
the  legacy  of  liberty  which  they  have  received  from 
their  fathers.  Their  object  is  simply  to  repel  injury ; 
and  when  this  is  accomplished,  the  sword  should  be 
returned  to  its  scabbard,  and  the  offending  nation  be 
treated  as  brethren  as  soon  as  they  have  by  their  con- 
duct Kl>own  themselves  worthy  of  tliis  relation. 


NOTE. 

OUR  DUTY  TO  BRUTES. 

I  snouLD  be  guilty  of  injustice  to  one  class  of  my 
fellow-creatures,  if  I  should  close  this  treatise  upon 
human  duty  without  a  single  remark  upon  our  obli' 
gations  to  brutes. 

Brutes  are  sensitive  beings,  capable  of,  probably,  as 
great  degrees  of  physical  pleasure  and  paui  as  our- 
selves. Tliey  are  endowed  with  instinct,  which  is,  prob- 
ably, a  form  of  intellect  inferior  to  our  own,  but 
which,  being  generically  unlike  to  ours,  we  are  unable 
to  understand.  They  differ  from  us  chiefly  in  behig 
destitute  of  any  moral  faculty. 

We  do  not  stand  to  them  in  the  relation  of  equalit}'. 
"  Our  right  is  paramount,  and  must  extinguish  theirs.'* 
We  have,  tlierefore,  a  right  to  use  them  to  promote  our 
comfort,  and  may  innocently  take  their  life  if  our  ne- 
cessities demand  it.  This  right  over  them  is  given  to 
us  by  the  revealed  will  of  God.  But,  inasmuch  a^ 
they,  like  ourselves,  are  the  creatures  of  God,  we  have 
no  right  to  use  them  in  any  other  manner  than  that 
which  God  has  permitted.  They,  as  much  as  ourselves, 
are  under  his  protectioij. 

We  may,  therefore,  use  them,  1.  For  our  necessities. 
We  are  designed  to  subsist  upon  animal  food,  and  we 
may  innocently  slay  them  for  this  purpose. 

2.  We  may  use  them  for  labor,  or  for  innocent  phys- 
ical recreation,  as  when  we  employ  the  horse  for 
draught  or  for  the  saddle. 

3.  But,  while  we  so  use  them,  we  are  bound  to  treat 
them  kindly,  to  furnish  them  with  sufficient  food,  and 
with  convenient  shelter.     Ue  who  cannot  feed  a  brute 


306  PRACTICAL  ETinCS. 

well,  ought  not  to  own  one.    And  when  we  put  them 
to  death,  it  should  be  with  the  least  possible  pain. 

4.  We  are  forbidden  to  treat  them  unkindly  on  any 
pretence,  or  for  any  reason.  There  can  be  no  clearer 
indication  of  a  degraded  and  ferocious  temper,  than 
cruelty  to  animals.  Hunting,  in  many  cases,  and  horse- 
racing,  seem  to  me  liable  to  censure  in  this  respect. 
Why  should  a  man,  for  the  sake  of  showing  his  skill 
as  a  marksman,  shoot  down  a  poor  animal  which  he 
does  not  need  for  food  ?  Why  should  not  the  brute, 
that  is  harming  no  living  thing,  be  permitted  to  enjoy 
the  happiness  of  its  physical  nature  unmolested  ? 
*'  There  they  are  privileged  ;  and  he  that  hurts  or 
harms  them  there,  is  guilty  of  a  wrong." 

5.  nonce  all  amusements  which  consist  in  inflicting 
pain  upon  animals  —  such  as  bull-baiting,  cock-fighting, 
cct.  —  are  purely  wicked.  God  never  gave  us  power 
over  animals  for  such  purposes.  I  can  scarely  conceive 
of  a  more  revolting  exhibition  of  human  nature  than 
that  which  is  seen  when  men  assemble  to  witness  the 
misery  whivJi  brutes  inflict  upon  eacli  other.  Surely 
nothing  can  tend  more  directly  to  harden  men  in  worse 
than  brutal  ferocity. 


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